Countering violent extremism

This study underscores that understanding and predicting extremist mobilisation requires focusing on specific behavioural indicators such as talk of violence and logistics.

Taken from the paper:

Abstract:

Psychological theories of mobilisation tend to focus on explaining people’s motivations for action, rather than mobilization (“activation”) processes. To investigate the online behaviours associated with mobilisation, we compared the online communications data of 26 people who subsequently mobilised to right-wing extremist action and 48 people who held similar extremist views but did not mobilize (N = 119,473 social media posts).

In a three-part analysis, involving content analysis (Part 1), topic modeling (Part 2), and machine learning (Part 3), we showed that communicating ideological or hateful content was not related to mobilisation, but rather mobilisation was positively related to talking about violent action, operational planning, and logistics.

Our findings imply that to explain mobilisation to extremist action, rather than the motivations for action, theories of collective action should extend beyond how individuals express grievances and anger, to how they equip themselves with the “know-how” and capability to act.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, we suggest that understanding extremist mobilisation and the initiation of action requires different theorising than radicalisation (or support for extremist collective action)—as they involve different processes (or at least different phases of a process). Our findings suggest that people who are intent on mobilising to extremist action are likely to post content about violent actions, operational planning, and logistics, as well as “leaking” emotional intensity through paralinguistic cues. In contrast, both people who support extremist action but are not intent on mobilising, and people who are, post-ideological and hateful content, so this content cannot help elucidate the mobilisation process. To enable accurate explanation and prediction of mobilisation, theories of collective action and mobilisation need to describe the behaviours and conditions that lead to a radicalised individual passing a psychological tipping point that enables action. In turn, these insights and methods may help law enforcement personnel to identify the “needles” of terrorism in an ever-growing “haystack” of extremist content.

Psychological theories of mobilization tend to focus on explaining people’s motivations for action, rather than mobilization (“activation”) processes. To investigate the online behaviors associated with mobilization, we compared the online communications data of 26 people who subsequently mobilized to right-wing extremist action and 48 people who held similar extremist views but did not mobilize (N = 119,473 social media posts). In a three-part analysis, involving content analysis (Part 1), topic modeling (Part 2), and machine learning (Part 3), we showed that communicating ideological or hateful content was not related to mobilization, but rather mobilization was positively related to talking about violent action, operational planning, and logistics. Our findings imply that to explain mobilization to extremist action, rather than the motivations for action, theories of collective action should extend beyond how individuals express grievances and anger, to how they equip themselves with the “know-how” and capability to act.

(From the journal abstract)

Brown, O., Smith, L. G. E., Davidson, B. I., Racek, D., & Joinson, A. (2024). Online Signals of Extremist Mobilization. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672241266866

From the journal abstract:

This paper explores the challenges and complexities navigated and negotiated in public facing counter-terrorism strategic communication campaigns. Informed by frame analysis of campaign assets, practitioner interviews and public focus groups, the discussion pivots around three high-profile UK public messaging campaigns. Building from Goffman’s theory of “normal appearances” and the established concept of a “frame trap”, the analysis identifies two further shaping tensions. A “fear trap” occurs when counter-terrorism messages seek to “outbid” other risks in order to capture public attention, thereby unintentionally creating the negative emotional reactions sought through acts of terrorism, or overly-reassuring messages that induce public disengagement. In contrast, a “fame trap” results from creating “too much” public awareness of terrorism, by using commercial marketing logics. In practice, frame, fame and fear traps overlap and interact across different contexts, and the analysis uses the concept of a dialectic of anomaly and normality to highlight implications for future scholarship and practice.

Rice, C., Innes, M., & Ratcliffe, J. (2024). “Frame, Fame and Fear Traps: The Dialectic of Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communication.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2360669

The first people to suspect someone is planning an act of terrorism or violent extremism are often those closest to them. Encouraging friends or family to report an “intimate” preparing to perpetrate violence is a strategy for preventing violent extremist or targeted mass violence. We conducted qualitative-quantitative interviews with 123 diverse U.S. community members to understand what influences their decisions to report potential violent extremist or targeted mass violence. We used hypothetical scenarios adapted from studies in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Factors influencing reporting decisions include fears of causing harm to the potential violent actor, self, family, or relationships; not knowing when and how to report; mistrust of law enforcement; access to mental health services; and perceptions that law enforcement lacks prevention capabilities. White and non-White participants were concerned about law enforcement causing harm. Participants would contact professionals such as mental health before involving law enforcement and Black-identified participants significantly preferred reporting to non-law enforcement persons, most of whom are not trained in responding to targeted violence. However, participants would eventually involve law enforcement if the situation required. They preferred reporting in-person or by telephone versus on-line. We found no difference by the type of violent extremism or between ideologically motivated and non-ideologically motivated violence. This study informs intimate bystander reporting programmes in the U.S. To improve reporting, U.S. policymakers should attend to how factors like police violence shape intimate bystander reporting. Our socio-ecological model also situates intimate bystander reporting beside other population-based approaches to violence prevention.

(from the journal abstract)

Eisenman, D. P., Weine, S., Thomas, P., Grossman, M., Porter, N., Shah, N. D., Polutnik Smith, C., Brahmbhatt, Z. & Fernandes, M. (2023) Obstacles and facilitators to intimate bystanders reporting violent extremism or targeted violence, Critical Studies on Terrorism 10.1080/17539153.2023.2269011

The purpose of this pre-registered study was to investigate how different ideological groups justified and mobilised collective action online. We collected 6878 posts from the social media accounts of pro-Black Lives Matter (n = 13) and anti-Black Lives Matter (n = 9) groups who promoted collective action in the month after George Floyd's murder and the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests and counter-protests. We used content analysis and natural language processing (NLP) to analyse the content and psychological function of the posts. We found that both groups perceived their action as ‘system-challenging’, with pro-BLM accounts focused more on outgroup actions to mobilise collective action, and anti-BLM accounts focused more on ingroup identity. The reverse pattern occurred when the accounts were attempting to justify action. The implications are that groups’ ideology and socio-structural position should be accounted for when understanding differences in how and why groups mobilise through online interactions.

(From the journal abstract)

Brown, O., Lowery, C. & Smith, L. G. E. (2022) How opposing ideological groups use online interactions to justify and mobilise collective action, The European Journal of Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2886

This paper explores the role of internal communication in one under-researched form of organizational crisis, insider threat – threat to an organization, its people or resources, from those who have legitimate access. In this case study, we examine a high security organization, drawing from in-depth interviews with management and employees concerning the organizational context and a real-life incident of insider threat. We identify the importance of three communication flows (top-down, bottom-up, and lateral) in explaining, and in this case, enabling, insider threat. Derived from this analysis, we draw implications for communication and security scholars, as well as practitioners, concerning: the impact of unintentional communication, the consequences of selective silence and the divergence in levels of shared understanding of security among different groups within an organization.

(From the journal abstract)

  Rice, C., & Searle, R. H. (2022). ‘The Enabling Role of Internal Organizational Communication in Insider Threat Activity – Evidence From a High Security Organization.’ Management Communication Quarterly. 

In recent months recurrent calls have been made by conservative right-wing politicians to designate Antifa a “domestic terrorist organization” in the United States. Fixated on the spectacle of its Black Bloc tactics they have equated Antifa, what is essentially an ad-hoc, non-hierarchical, geographically dispersed social movement comprised of local autonomous activist groups, with organized violent extremists. And yet, the evidence for such an equation has been mostly limited to a handful of instances that usually bare the hallmarks of political exaggeration or are alternatively attributable to individuals loosely associated with the Antifa movement. Why is this so? How do militant anti-fascists in the US understand violence and exercise restraint in their use of it? This article seeks an answer to these questions based on interviews with activists from Portland’s Rose City Antifa, one of the United States’ most well-known Antifa groups, and an analysis of a collection of the group’s Tweets. It reveals that Antifa exercises considerable restraint, internally and externally, with regards to both the literal and rhetorical use of violence within its street and digital activism. In turn it calls upon others to exercise reciprocal levels of restraint by ceasing their labelling of Antifa as a “domestic terrorist” organization.

(From the journal abstract)

Copsey, N., & Merrill, S. (2020). Violence and Restraint within Antifa: A View from the United States. Perspectives on Terrorism, 14(6), 122–138.

Despite their centrality in academic and policy debates about radicalization and political violence, ideologies have been conceived narrowly, as cognitive, top-down, coherent and systematic.

In general, those who have used the concept of ideology have failed to draw on ideological theory or on recent insights about its practice and embodiment, or location in space and time.

Our interest is less in the content of ideology than in how it is shared by those for whom it matters. We offer an interpretive framework, based on six key questions about ideological transmission: What ideas, beliefs, and values are shared, how and why, by whom, and in which spatial and temporary contexts?

Following a discussion about the methodological pros and cons of the framework, it is tested on a series of interviews with members of Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese religious group responsible for the Tokyo subway attack in 1995. We assess the strengths and limitations of the framework for analysing the various dimensions of ideological transmission before considering what it adds to our understanding of the relationship between extreme beliefs and violent behaviour.

(From the journal abstract)

Benjamin Lee, Kim Knott. (2022) Fascist aspirants: Fascist Forge and ideological learning in the extreme-right online milieu. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 14:3, pages 216-240.

The online space is a haven for extremists of all kinds. Although efforts to remove violent and extremist content are increasing, there is a widely accepted need to also contest extremist messages with counter messages designed to undermine and disrupt extremist narratives.

While the majority of academic focus has been on large and well‐funded efforts linked to governments, this article considers the experiences of informal actors who are active in contesting extremist messaging but who lack the support of large institutions.

Informal actors come without some of the baggage that accompanies formal counter message campaigns, which have been attacked as lacking in credibility and constituting “just more government propaganda.” This has been noted by some of the wider countering violent extremism industry and the appetite for incorporating “real‐world” content in their campaigns seems to be rising.

This article fills a gap in our knowledge of the experiences of informal counter messaging actors. Through a series of in‐depth qualitative interviews it demonstrates that, despite the potentially serious risks of incorporating greater levels of informal content, there is an appetite among informal actors to engage with formal campaigns where they can be selective over who they work with and maintain a degree of control.

(From the journal abstract)

Benjamin Lee, 2019. Countering Violent Extremism Online: The Experiences of Informal Counter Messaging Actors. Policy & Internet. https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.210

Online countermessaging—communication that seeks to disrupt the online content disseminated by extremist groups and individuals—is a core component of contemporary counterterrorism strategies. Countermessaging has been heavily criticized, not least on the grounds of effectiveness. Whereas current debates are focused on the role of government and large organizations in developing and disseminating countermessages, this article argues that such approaches overlook the informal production of countermessages. Recognizing the appetite for “natural world” content among those engaged in countermessaging, this article highlights some of the potential benefits of informal approaches to countermessaging. At the same time, the article also acknowledges the risks that may result from closer working between countermessaging organizations and informal actors.

(From the journal abstract)

Benjamin Lee. 2018. ‘Informal Countermessaging: The Potential and Perils of Informal Online Countermessaging’. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1513697.

Since the 1990s, scholars of religion on both sides of the Atlantic have been drawn into engagement with law enforcement agencies and security policymakers and practitioners, particularly for their expertise on new religious movements and Islam. Whilst enabling researchers to contribute to real-world challenges, this relationship has had its frustrations and difficulties, as well as its benefits and opportunities. Drawing on examples from the UK, Canada, and the US, I set out the relationship between religion and the contemporary security landscape before discussing some of the key issues arising in security research partnerships. I then turn to the question of knowledge exchange and translation in the study of religions, developing the distinction between ‘know what’ (knowledge about religions and being religiously literate), ‘know why’ (explaining religions and making the link to security threats), and ‘know how’ (researcher expertise and skills in engagement with practitioners).

(From the journal abstract)

Kim Knott. 2018. ‘Applying the Study of Religions in the Security Domain: Knowledge, Skills, and Collaboration’. Journal of Religious and Political Practice, 4 (3): 354–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/20566093.2018.1525901.