How Influencers Indirectly Mobilise Action and Legitimate Violence

The August 2024 riots across the UK followed a knife attack at a Taylor Swift-themed dance class in Southport on 29th July, which killed three young girls and injured several others. Misinformation rapidly spread online falsely claiming the attacker was an asylum seeker or Muslim immigrant. Gatherings, initially framed as vigils, turned violent, with attacks on mosques, immigrants, and police officers.

Social media played a central role in the protests, both through organisational group chats and political influencers shaping narratives around the riots. Influencers are effective mobilisers of (violent) action due to their established follower bases, which readily consume and disseminate content. One-to-many communication forms, such as Telegram channels, enable rapid spread of messages. Beyond direct calls to action, influencers can indirectly mobilise followers by defining group boundaries and norms, influencing who acts in what way while remaining legally protected from incitement charges.

Beyond direct calls to action, influencers can indirectly mobilise followers by defining group boundaries and norms...

Case Study: Tommy Robinson

Tommy Robinson, whose real name is Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, is a popular far-right influencer and former leader of the English Defence League. Two days before the Southport attack, he was detained under the Terrorism Act at the ‘Unite the Kingdom’ rally and left the UK upon his release. During the riots, Robinson used his substantial digital presence on X and Telegram to comment on events and criticise government responses. 

We explored how Tommy Robinson indirectly mobilised followers to participate in protests and legitimised actions on his Telegram channel, qualitatively analysing 230 messages and videos from 29th July – 7th August 2024.

Group identity and opinion leadership

Protesters are consistently framed as “the people”, emphasising the perceived opinion majority status of the ingroup. As protests progress and counter-protesters arrive, ingroup boundaries are narrowed to emphasise existing conflicts: protesters become “the working class” while counter protesters are “communists”, or “Muslim mobs” attack “white people”.  This accentuates long-standing group conflicts as well as existential threats to the ingroup. 

Child safety and national pride are frequently mentioned values, tying the attack to existing concerns about child safety (a common right-wing dog whistle), as well as existential fears around the survival of the group. Additionally, as riots escalate beyond England, posts celebrate “Catholics and Protestants united in Belfast for the future of their children”, highlighting how traditional divides are transcended to protect children from the ultimate enemy. 

Some posts feature positive sentiments of the Unite the Kingdom rally, emphasising the success of the movement through frequent references to the size of the event. The ingroup is positioned as the “resistance that clearly terrifies the establishment” and “there is no political solution. You, the people, are the solution”, framing protest participation as a moral imperative to the movement’s success. 

Throughout, Tommy Robinson establishes himself as a prototypical group member and opinion leader through displays of authenticity and shared identity markers like parenthood. Equally, his arrest at the Unite the Kingdom rally becomes evidence of prototypicality: Tommy Robinson is targeted precisely because he is so representative of the ingroup. Claiming “First they come for Tommy” his arrest becomes an omen of the group’s fate. 

How the “Great Replacement” conspiracy connects outgroups

As protests progress to riots, sophisticated conspiracy narratives emerge to explain the multitude of perceived threats. Multiple outgroups – Muslims, immigrants, the government, mainstream media, and police – are connected through strategic juxtaposition of posts and explicit conspiracies. Muslims and immigrants represent the dangerous other, combining grievances of immediate violence with cultural replacement fears. Government, mainstream media, and the police represent elite authorities, with police reframed as enforcers of the government’s will, abandoning their role of people’s protectors. 

Indirectly mobilising content is “lawful but awful” - any one post does not directly violate content guidelines but taken together they convey harmful or hateful ideas.

These groups are connected through conspiracy narratives, linking demographic change, cultural transformation, and perceived betrayal by the government. Specifically, Robinson claims the government is manipulating the media, police, and Muslims to encourage violence against protesters, using the Great Replacement conspiracy theory to accuse Labour of replacing white people with immigrants so they can stay in power, creating urgency to act in the face of existential threat. 

Indirect mobilisation and violence legitimation

Mobilisation efforts are largely indirect, relying on emotional appeals and providing targets against which outrage can be directed. The deaths of three girls are frequently referenced, highlighting existential threat and anger. Violence is portrayed as a last resort, reluctantly adopted by the ingroup, justified by outgroups having successfully achieved their aims through rioting. As violence escalates, posts emphasise the violence experienced by the ingroup from police and counter-protesters.

Throughout, Tommy Robinson employs strategic ambiguity by explicitly condemning violence whilst simultaneously inflaming the emotions that fuel it. Appeals to refrain from violence are accompanied by reminders about long-term goals of the movement, prompting followers to “prepare for what is to come”.  

Practical implications

• Indirectly mobilising content is  “lawful but awful” - any one post does not directly violate content guidelines but taken together they convey harmful or hateful ideas. Content moderation may therefore be ineffective at taking down indirectly mobilising content and users.
• Through setting group norms rather than explicit calls for action influencers maintain plausible deniability. Current legal frameworks require explicit mobilisation and thus  indirect mobilisation strategies allow influencers to avoid prosecution under laws related to incitement.
• Broadcast-style channels (like Telegram) and algorithmic amplification allow influencers to dominate discourse with minimal follower input, creating perceptions of consensus. Platform design choices directly shape how effectively influencers can set norms and mobilise followers.