THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGICAL MATERIAL ON JIHADIST’S CHOICE OF TARGETS – p18

JUST A FACE IN THE CROWD? THE PROBLEMS WITH SPOTTING UNFAMILIAR FACES – p26

HOW RADICAL IDEAS SPREAD AND TAKE HOLD – p24
From the Editor

Understanding how extremist ideas are transmitted is a key priority of many governments and law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies.

In this issue we focus on ‘transmission’ – the transmission of ideas, beliefs and values. This can vary from a single message to an entire doctrinal system. In mechanics, medicine or horticulture, the thing transmitted may be power, a virus or genetic material. These wider uses provide plentiful metaphors even when talking about ideas – from epidemiology and contagion, to sowing and spreading. But the communication of ideologies differs considerably from the transmission of energy or germs, in terms of the mediating pathways and the boundaries to be traversed. New ideas and values can certainly be resisted in ways that viruses cannot.

CSR focuses on research that informs our understanding of security threats, and how to counter and mitigate them. In this context, studying transmission focuses attention on how, where and by whom extremist ideologies are acquired and spread. Transmission is a process requiring a person or persons who transmit things, and others who receive them. Transmission takes place somewhere – in social, geographical and virtual spaces. It involves a medium of communication, in the form of a conversation, lecture, poster, text, video or even ritual, and a mode of transmission such as listening, reading, repetition, imitation or embodied practice.

In covering these areas, we haven’t just focused on the transmission of extremist ideas. Most ideas and values are not extreme, but we can still draw useful lessons from how they are transmitted. Jonathan Scourfield (page 6) and Jasjit Singh (page 8) draw on research into transmission of religious identity in Muslim and Sikh families. We learn valuable lessons from their work about religious nurture and how the internet has affected transmission.

We have case studies on transmission in the suffragette movement and Northern Ireland on page 16, provided by Elizabeth Morrow and Benjamin Lee. Aristotle Kallis walks us through how waves of radical ideas can spread through whole societies, drawing on the ‘virus’ of fascism in 1930s Europe (page 24). Lynn Davies gives us one example of how schools can become sites for blocking transmission of extremist ideas (page 22), while on page 20 we have an interview with Ray Hill – a grassroots activist challenging extremism one conversation at a time.

In articles outside of our focus on transmission, we draw on work by Lorraine Hope and other researchers in memory to find out when we should and shouldn’t be worried about inconsistencies in interviews (page 28).

Understanding ideological transmission is an important area, with many significant insights being drawn from ongoing research. As always, I’d love to hear your thoughts about this issue and please let me know about other research on transmission – this is a topic we’re sure to revisit.

Matthew Francis
Editor, CSR
WHY TRANSMISSION?

Studying transmission focuses attention on how, where and by whom extremist ideologies are acquired and spread. Transmission can include ideas and skills, like bomb-making, as much as the beliefs and values about how such skills should be applied. Political scientists and scholars of religion have used the concept since the 1960s to signal the process by which ideas, beliefs and values are passed from parents to children, peer-to-peer, and from political and religious leaders to the party faithful, congregations and newcomers. Researchers link transmission to other processes: socialisation, development, education, and religious nurture. Studying extremist ideological transmission and how counter-messaging works needs to be seen within the broader context of child and adult learning, cultural acquisition, and political and religious communication. Similar processes are at work, whether the material to be transmitted is socially acceptable or not.

WHY IS ‘TRANSMISSION’ USEFUL?

Researching transmission draws attention to how ideologies are mediated, and how propaganda works. How do social groups, including radical ones, replicate the traditions and culture they have worked so hard to build? Why are some charismatic individuals and ideologies successful transmitters? What makes for an effective transmission process, and does the same process work for counter messaging?

Not everyone who acts violently and supports or carries out a terrorist attack is necessarily motivated by deep-seated beliefs and values, but many are. For these people, it is important for us to understand how emotion, rhetoric, and the power of stories or images work to enable ideas to stick and behaviours to be learned.

Transmission is more successful in particular places and at particular times of our lives, hence the focus on home and school, when children are developing. But other locations are important too. Prisons are closed spaces where vulnerable people may adopt new ideas, practices and social relationships, for self-protection, personal gain or self-improvement. Converting to a religion or joining a gang is not uncommon, but research shows this should not be equated with radicalisation, congregations and gang members may go on to act violently after leaving prison.

The medium of communication also affects successful transmission. Does the message favour speech or image, tweets or monologues, direct appeals or interaction?

Is it closed and secure, or is it broadcast publicly? The internet offers easy and private engagement with extremist ideologies. Social media can act as an ‘echo chamber’ that narrows users’ exposure to diverse views and critical perspectives. Understanding the nature and power of the medium is vital for the interception of messages and gathering of extremist material, as well as the insertion of counter messages, whether by security practitioners or grassroots activists.

THE LIMITATIONS AND BENEFITS FOR SECURITY RESEARCHERS AND PRACTITIONERS

Security threats are diverse, and the tools for researching them must be too. Studying ideological transmission adds to our understanding of these threats. But it is not a substitute for research on identity, behaviour, social movements, mental health, risk, and technological innovation.

What understanding transmission does not do is presuppose any direct route to violent action. Neither does it support a causal link between extremist views and acts of terrorism. Research on religious and political groups, prisons and student societies stresses that extreme ideas, beliefs and values can be shared and newcomers brought into the circle of transmission without violence being the necessary result. Nevertheless, some extremist groups do endorse and preach violence, with a number going on to commission or inspire terrorist attacks. As yet there are no short-cuts to pinpointing those that do.

What this approach does is focus thinking on how, where, when and by whom ideologies are passed on. Understanding more about transmission in general can help practitioners to distinguish what counts as routine from what is irregular or unusual. It can help in the identification of nascent ideologies, venues and leaders, as well as vulnerable groups and new channels of communication. They can then be assessed as potential nodes in a chain of extremist or counter-extremist messaging.

Finally, knowing what makes for effective transmission more broadly must also be of value within security organisations for the sharing of good ideas and employment practices.

Kim Knott guest edited this issue. She is professor of religious and secular studies at Lancaster University and the lead for the Ideas, Beliefs And Values In Social Context programme of CREST.

Transmit verb

1. To cause (a thing) to pass, go, or be conveyed to another person, place or thing; to send across an intervening space; to convey, transfer.
2. To convey or communicate (usually something intangible) to another or others; to pass on… to hand down.

The Oxford English Dictionary
Belief in the literal truth of the Qur’an is mainstream, rather than being a fringe ideology. This truth is seen to be timeless and not to be reinterpreted for the 21st century. Parents do emphasise some aspects of Islam more than others, and adapt religious practice to modern life, but they would be reluctant to admit any reinterpretation of the enduring Quranic truth. There is some variation across schools of thought, but most Sunni parents we interviewed either did not know their specific Islamic tradition or were unwilling to see themselves as anything other than Sunni. There was little evidence of any mixing between Sunni and Shi’a families.

Some of the youngest children in the study confused their religious identity with ethnic background. This is understandable, since a great deal of children’s time is spent with other families from the same ethnic background as their parents. There is some ideology of ‘apartism’ but for most it is more likely that the company of other Muslims, and especially those from the same ethnic and linguistic background, is just more comfortable and more familiar. It also provides a guarantee (in theory) of a suitable moral framework for children. Time spent with people from the same ethnic background is not straightforwardly a choice for Muslims. Employment patterns are certainly racialised, and this may also be true for the housing market. In practice, attendance at most mosques is dominated by a single ethnic group. This can reinforce the identification of religion with ethnicity. However, as they get older, there will be an expectation that children identify first and foremost as Muslim, before any national or ethnic identification.

Jonathan Scourfield is Professor of Social Work at Cardiff University. The full research this article is based on is available in Jonathan Scourfield, Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Auma Khan and Sameh Otri. (2013) Muslim Childhood: Religious Nurture in a European Context, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Learning to be a Muslim

When attempting to identify violent extremism, it is important to understand the religious mainstream, to have something against which to compare the potentially high risk cases. My research, with colleagues at Cardiff University, concentrates on exactly that – mainstream practice in the transmission of Islam. We undertook research with 60 Muslim families in Cardiff – a diverse sample in terms of ethnicity, social class and religious tradition. We focused on how children learned to be Muslims in early and middle childhood – the oldest children in the study were aged 12 and the youngest aged 4. We refer to the process of learning as ‘religious nurture’ as there are relationships involved – with family members, Muslim peers, and religious teachers.

A child will usually be marked as a Muslim from the first moments of life, by having the adhan (call to prayer) spoken into her ear. She will also be given a name which marks her as Muslim. When she is growing up, the faith will very likely be made material in the fabric of the home. This often starts at the front door with Arabic text on the lintel. Inside, framed verses from the Qur’an may be displayed, as well as pictures of famous mosques, usually in preference to family photographs. Other religious items could include prayer mats, copies of the Qur’an and an adhan clock to prompt five daily prayers.

In many family homes, there will be frequent repetition of ritual and religious teachings. The age at which children learn ritual prayer (salat) varies, but even if the ritual is not strictly observed five times a day, it is a core aspect of the embodied learning of Islam. Salat is a physical enactment of submission to Allah (the meaning of the term ‘Islam’). There is a subtle and embodied pedagogical process wherein children are gradually socialised into ways of thinking and doing. Behaviour is of central importance. Our youngest interviewees tended to describe what being a Muslim meant to them in terms of following a behavioural code.

Formal learning is an important part of Muslim childhood. Almost all children learn to read the Qur’an in Arabic and most do this in classes at mosques, in teachers’ homes, or in their own homes. It is very common for these classes to be attended several times a week and a popular pattern is to attend each day Monday to Friday from 5 to 7pm. A minority also attend Islamic Studies classes for children. At home, there can be additional input from Islamic media such as TV channels and websites. The regimes of religious teaching in most UK Christian churches are relatively ‘light touch’ compared to those organised by mosques and Muslim families.
Historical spaces of transmission, such as families and religious institutions, play a key role in the transmission of beliefs and practices for many young Sikhs. In my own study, very few Sikhs found their own faith reflected in school worship or in religious education. This led many to look for other areas in which to engage with the Sikh tradition, including camps, faith societies and the online environment. Religious institutions (gurdwaras) play a role in the transmission of beliefs and practices for many young Sikhs.

However, the traditional methods of communication, delivered in Punjabi and targeted to the older generation, did not appeal to all. This has led some entrepreneurial young people to establish and organise events for their peers, delivered in English and held outside gurdwaras, in activity centres, supplementary schools, and student societies. In addition to gurdwaras, learning now often takes place in small networks, and targeted events, and increasingly online.

THE SIKH TRADITION ONLINE
I found young British Sikhs using the internet to engage with their tradition in a number of ways including to discuss taboo subjects, to obtain answers to questions about the tradition, to explore differing practices, to access resources, to examine English translations, to find out about events, and to understand the legal position of articles of faith. For those young people who are not already affiliated to a group or place of worship and who use the internet to begin to engage with their tradition, the internet affords them a relatively safe space in which they can start to explore it on their own terms. For those who do adhere to a religious perspective or ideology, the internet can supply well-rehearsed arguments for and against these views, acting as a way of entrenching viewpoints.

Although the online environment is increasingly important for autonomous religious learning, offline religious mentors and guides continue to provide authority and endorsement for information accessed online.

RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
Few religious institutions provide targeted services for the younger generation, and the demographic of minority religious communities is changing with increasing numbers being born in Britain. For this reason, young people are beginning to search online for religious understanding from services developed by young people, for young people. While the family and traditional sources of transmission will continue to play a key role alongside the internet, it is increasingly important that quality resources are developed for schools and online to ensure that all young people are able to engage with a variety of histories, cultures, beliefs and traditions in all their diversity.

Jasjit Singh is a Research Fellow in Religious and Cultural Transmission based at the University of Leeds and a recognised expert on Sikhs in Britain. Keeping the Faith: Reflections on religious nurture among young British Sikhs, Journal of Beliefs and Values, Volume 33 (3), pp. 369-383.
Transmitting terrorism: a family affair?

Nearly 20 years after his father was convicted of helping plan the 1993 World Trade Centre bombings, an FBI agent who had worked on the case told Zak Ebrahim: ‘I was afraid that you’d followed in his path.’ Whilst Ebrahim has heard similar comments, the statement nevertheless reveals preconceptions about the ability and means by which families pass on extremist beliefs. How then does Ebrahim’s decision to become an outspoken critic of all forms of terrorism, including the actions of his father, challenge these preconvictions?

Despite examples like Ebrahim’s, our belief in the ideological influence of family persists. In every culture, past and present, families have played a critical role in the socialisation of children. For most individuals, family provides the initial frame to help make sense of a complicated world. Examining the role of family therefore begins to address key questions of ideological transmission: ‘when’ and ‘between whom’ does transmission take place? There has been little empirical study of the role of the family in passing on extremist beliefs. Most accounts draw on research about the transmission of other religious and political ideologies. They assume that beliefs are passed on from parent-to-child or from older-generation-to-younger. Outside of academic research, such thinking is reflected in the public rhetoric of many religious and political organisations who emphasise the duty of parents to educate children and ensure that they hold the same beliefs.

The ability of parents to effectively pass on their beliefs to children has received mixed empirical support. Accounts of current and former terrorists similarly describe few instances of individuals inheriting extremist ideologies from their parents. Even where this does appear to take place, these values often form only partial motivations for violence. It sits alongside other factors such as traumatic life events or personal experiences of victimisation.

The focus on parent-child transmission often mitigates the importance of other familial relations. It was the sister of Mohamed Merah, who committed a series of terror attacks in France in 2011, that played the defining role in his ideological development. That this sister also radicalised their mother similarly challenges the assumption that ideology is only passed down through generations. It also flows upwards.

Families are often sites of ideological contestation. Omar Shafik Hammami, an American who travelled to Somalia in search of jihad, recalls the competing religious beliefs of his Christian mother and Muslim father during his childhood. The discovery that his wife had been secretly taking their children to church led Hammami’s father to reassess and ultimately readopt his own faith with renewed vigour. Ironically, Hammami admits that his later adoption of a radical interpretation of Islam was a means to defy his more moderate father. In choosing to reject his mother’s faith and to reinterpret his father’s, Hammami demonstrates that all family members, even children, are active participants in their own ideological development.

In acknowledging the agency of all members, a question then arises as to exactly ‘what’ it is that families transmit? Whilst families can pass on formalised ideologies, including explicit support for terrorism or terrorist organisations, they are also responsible for transmitting other more abstract values, beliefs and traditions. Some of these may have a fairly obvious link to terrorism such as narratives of victimisation, persecution, grievance or hatred. However, terrorist autobiographies reveal that other family inherited beliefs, which would in other circumstances be considered positive, may inform these individuals’ motivations in unintended ways. The idea that many terrorists hold twisted, but ultimately altruistic motivations for their actions has been well explored. In a similar vein, the upbringing of a number of loyalist paramilitary members in Northern Ireland also reveal domestic environments in which significant value was placed upon family traditions of military service. For these individuals, terrorism provided a means to live up to and continue these family ideals.

Further research is needed to properly address questions regarding family and the transmission of extremist ideologies including ‘what’ these systems transmit, ‘when’ transmission occurs and between whom it does. In addition, one particular question remains unexplored, that of ‘how’ transmission occurs. What are the tangible micro-processes by which radical beliefs are passed on from one family member to another? Without a better understanding of the answers, the prospect of developing means to effectively disrupt the transmission of extremist ideologies, whether inside or outside of family settings, will remain elusive.

Simon Copeland is a doctoral student funded by CREST and based at Lancaster University in the UK. His thesis investigates the transmission of extremist ideology within family and peer networks.
How beliefs may come and go: a brief overview of a ‘cult career’

For nearly two decades I have researched how and why people join minority religions, the impact on them of conversion, and what makes some of them leave. How do former members of high-demand groups – those that are socially closed and doctrinally authoritarian – understand and narrate their ‘cult careers’?

JOINING

There is an affinity between what a religious group offers and those who join it. Vegetarians are likely to be drawn to groups that teach the sanctity of animal life or the importance of avoiding meat (e.g., new Hindu or Jain groups), whilst young black people might well feel an affinity for those that strongly affirm black identity (e.g., Rastafarianism or the Nation of Islam). But even within an appropriate demographic, not everybody will join, and how they do so will differ depending on the group as well as the individual.

Research has shown that, rather than being defined merely by a vulnerability, those who join high-demand groups often claim to be ideologically motivated. They are attracted by messages that make a move towards the group seem like a rational choice. The image of the group is also important. A strong leader surrounded by interesting and remarkable people is more likely to be considered charismatic and impressive. Furthermore, personal contact with one or more others when joining (either one buddy, face-time with various members, or even intense virtual contact with someone) makes for a welcoming environment. The joiner feels special and basks in the attention – this is often referred to as ‘love-bombing’. A religious experience around the time of joining will likely convince the newcomer of the ‘Truth’ of this path.

THE ‘CULT CAREER’

The excitement and fervour that come with new ideas, beliefs, and friends can make for a real and significant ‘honeymoon’ phase for those converts for whom the new group and lifestyle appear a perfect fit. This phase and its duration may vary, but gradually it wanes. Converts find that they were not privy to all there was to know, and eventually a more realistic view of the group and the requirements of the lifestyle begin to emerge. Whether a convert stays or leaves depends on a number of factors, and each person has their own tipping point. Eventually things might not add up and doubts emerge, yet cognitive dissonance and wilful blindness can cover the cracks that have begun to appear. Furthermore, over time investments in the group (a spouse, children, a home life) and sacrifices (burnt bridges with old friends and family) may have been made, and these make it harder to walk away. Crucially, there may still be the belief that this group is the right one.

LEAVING

Most groups actually have a high turn-over of members, with many joining and leaving. Some may stay for longer, or even for life. Although the term ‘brainwashing’ has been widely discredited and is not always helpful, it can occasionally work as a figure of speech for those who make a career out of their membership, and become part of the core group. In these cases the term is metaphorically understood as a social process leading to increasing levels of ideological commitment and obedience, with the beliefs of the group providing the frame through which reality is viewed. This will influence how someone weighs up and chooses between those positives that keep them engaged in the group and those adverse views about the outside world that may stop them leaving. But beliefs and frames are adjusted over time as new information comes in, and when they are no longer compelling, leaving might be the better option. Exit costs – the combination of investments and sacrifices – accumulate over a ‘cult career’, but even these can be overcome.

EXPLAINING WHAT HAPPENED

Post-hoc interpretations of ‘what happened’ depend on why and how people leave. The leaving process again changes the frame through which everything is viewed. Someone who leaves on bad terms is more likely to have a negative view, and vice versa. If the leaver’s external milieu is judgemental of the group, the negative aspects of the narrative will be emphasised. Hindsight builds a new frame, where stories of victimhood or undue influence may be drawn on to explain what happened. Cases of coercive control are relatively rare compared to narratives of mind control.
Transmitting legitimacy and victimhood: violent dissident Irish republicanism

When analysing the transmission of violent dissident Irish republican (VDR) ideas, beliefs and values, the central question is how do they transmit an air of legitimacy for the continuation of their armed campaign? Their former comrades in the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) have now completely politicised. The peace process has seen almost two decades of relative peace and prosperity in the region. The vast majority of the Northern Irish population, irrespective of political beliefs, condemn any return to violence. Yet, there remain those who wish to maintain paramilitary activity in order to, ostensibly, achieve a united Ireland. The challenge to develop and transmit legitimacy is internally fostered strategies.

The challenge to develop and transmit legitimacy is internally acknowledged as the most significant obstacle they must overcome. For years the VDR community has been an assortment of groups, each carrying its own unique acronym and claims of legitimacy. Their potential support base constantly changes due to the maintenance of paramilitary vigilantism. They question whether the tactic may actually be driving support away, rather than strengthening it. It is only with this internal debate led by trusted members, that an organisation can move away from long-fostered strategies.

Central to the VDR quest for legitimacy has been the emphasis of the plight of their prisoner community. Invoking the memory of Bobby Sands and others, they depict the VDR prisoners as the victims of an oppressive judicial system and prison regime. This has manifested in the proliferation of prisoner statements reinforcing the notion of apparent victimisation. This has seen the more persistent targeting of prison officers in order to further emphasise the centrality of the prisoners’ struggle to their legitimising campaign. The 2012 murder of David Black and 2000 murder of Adrian Ismay are stark illustrations of this.

For supporters of the peace process, it is imperative that no opportunity is given to the VDR groups to legitimise their narrative of victimisation, in the prisons or across the criminal justice system. The publication of a damning report in 2015 of the conditions and operations within Maghaberry prison was seized upon by prisoners and their external representatives as evidence of their targeted victimisation by a corrupt and inhumane prison regime. It is only if VDR groups succeed in depicting republicans and nationalists as victims that they will achieve any significant level of support.

Ultimately, efforts to counter the legitimacy of these groups and their violence will only be successful when it comes from those influential within dissident republicanism. It is for this reason that the prisoners’ challenge to the continuation of vigilantism and punishment attacks must be welcomed and supported. It has yet to bear fruit, and may provide false hope. Yet it demonstrates the potential for a discussion about the gradual move from violence.

Dr John Morrison is Director of the Terrorism and Extremism Research Centre at the University of East London. You can read the research this article is based on here: John F. Morrison (2016). “Fighting Talk: The Statements of ‘The IRA/New IRA.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 28(3), 598-619. www.radicalisationresearch.org/research/morrison-fighting-talk-new-ira/
The transmission of ideas, beliefs and practices takes many forms, from time-honoured familial socialisation to innovative adoptions in radical social networks. Benjamin Lee and Elizabeth Morrow present case-studies of the Ulster Defence Association and the suffragettes.

**THE ULSTER DEFENCE ASSOCIATION, LOYALIST SOLIDARITY AND THE FAMILY** (BENJAMIN LEE)

As Simon Copeland discusses on page 10, there are a variety of roles that the family can play in transmitting ideology. But family involvement, together with the impact of peers and critical events, can be a potent combination in shaping how one thinks and acts. The case of Ken – from a study by Colin Crawford – illustrates this.

Ken was born in 1962, and lived in Brown Square at the bottom of the Shankhill Road in Belfast. He had a good relationship with his parents growing up, although a difficult time at school. From 1969 onwards, the British Army attacked repeatedly by Catholics, but then, after the INLA [Irish National Liberation Army] murdered one of them, were joining paramilitary organisations, either the UDA, or the UVF. He stressed close kinship connections, remarking that ‘it was already a personal thing, between me and Catholics, but then, after the INLA [Irish National Liberation Army] murdered --- [an uncle] it became really personal, they’d started to kill my family.’

Ken believed key events had a hand in leading to his hostility to Catholics, and highlighted the murder of three soldiers from the Royal Highland Fusiliers in 1971 by the IRA. Their deaths had a ‘profound impact’ on him, exacerbated by his good relationships with the local British soldiers.

Ken’s involvement in the UDA was not framed in ideological terms. Instead, he stressed how family and community solidarity, the perceived threat of Republican violence, and the impact of critical local events shaped his beliefs, feelings and actions.

**INNOVATION ADOPTION AMONG THE SUFFRAGETTES (ELIZABETH MORGOW)**

Our social environment informs the way we make sense of the world and communicate with others. In her work on the adoption of new and innovative ideas and practices, the sociologist Gemma Edwards showed how some activists were influenced by debates within their own networks, and others by the decisions made by those of a similar social status.

Helen Watts and Mary Blathwayt were both suffragettes. Watts embraced the innovation of militancy – the strategy of intentional arrest and imprisonment – whereas Blathwayt rejected it.

Watts was part of an activist network whose members shared an understanding that militant tactics were a socially acceptable and recognised method of articulating a grievance. By contrast, Blathwayt’s network included non-militant members. Importantly, her mother – also a suffragette – rejected militancy.

Innovations are risky and uncertain. Of particular relevance are the experiences of others who are like us in adopting an innovation. People who occupy the same position in a social structure are referred to as being structurally equivalent. When an activist is considering adopting an innovation, she will be more likely to do so if those who are her structural equivalents have made the decision to adopt. Structurally equivalent people are likely to use each other as a frame of reference, and may also feel a sense of competition. One activist is more likely to follow another to avoid the embarrassment of being the last of her social group to adopt the innovation. By contrast, if no structural equivalents have made the decision to adopt, she will be more likely to hold back from proceeding.

We can use this theory of structural equivalence to shed light on the decisions made by the suffragettes. Blathwayt – a member of a prominent, upper-middle class family – failed to utilise militant tactics despite being part of a network that contained a number of successful militants. Very few of the militancy adopters within her own network could be considered structurally equivalent to her. Two militants from a prominent family had already been labelled ‘mad’ by their local community. Their marginal status prior to adoption meant they had less to lose than Blathwayt. A third adopter, the wife of a local surgeon, was criticised by Blathwayt’s mother for having acted improperly, with ‘dreadful’ consequences for her husband. These examples suggest that innovation adoption among Blathwayt’s equivalents was seen as particularly risky and costly because it led to social sanctioning. In turn, this may have deterred Blathwayt.

The discussion, debate and consensus that occur within social networks can influence an activist’s feelings and views about the appropriateness and effectiveness of adopting a controversial innovation. Watts’ pro-militancy network legitimised her adoption of this innovation, whereas the lack of consensus within Blathwayt’s network may have led her to reject it.
From ideological material to targeting choice in leaderless jihad

Part of the reason leaderless jihadist attacks do not resemble those of militant groups is likely because it’s difficult to produce viable bombs or access firearms. But it’s not hard to think of attacks that produce significant fear and casualties through low-tech means: a mass knitting in a train station, or arson attacks against schools. Also, given the number of leaderless jihadist operations directed at comparatively challenging targets such as military personnel, it does not seem that operational contingencies are the primary factor that shapes targeting choices. If logistical reasons are unable, on their own, to explain leaderless jihadist targeting, what might?

The primary factor uniting leaderless jihadists is their consumption of jihadist material, so in my research with Gilbert Ramsay, we sought to find out whether the answer to understanding targeting choices might lie there. Our starting point was that research trying to understand the relationship between ideological content and behaviour typically overlooks the differences that exist within jihadist output. Most straightforwardly, some content is more effective at engaging listeners to develop commitments to the ideological material constructs a rich, storied world and functions such material serves in creating a sense of legitimacy targets: those targets that seem more likely to be directed at high value in some types of action, and some types of actor. Pursuing these insights suggested an alternative way of thinking about how targeting preferences might emerge.

Our analysis of a range of jihadist output revealed two types of justification for jihad. One rooted in a geo-strategic logic designed to extract concessions from enemy states, and a second which sees violent jihad as a religious duty that will continue until judgement day; in effect, a true global war against unbelief. These differing rationales portray jihad either as an exceptional form of violence necessary to achieve specific, instrumental outcomes, such as control of territory. Or they assume jihad is a persistent, universal, and thereby normalised spiritual duty to attack the enemies of Islam wherever they may be found.

Faced with an overwhelming array of potential targets, it seems leaderless jihadists are more likely to attack targets, such as military personnel, which are more clearly legitimate...

These two types of global jihad have different implications for targeting. Efforts to achieve strategic goals seem likely to produce exceptional forms of violence directed at states through attacks on their civilians and economic infrastructure, the archetypal example of which is 9/11. By contrast, less spectacular violence in the service of an enduring, spiritual obligation seems more likely to be directed at high legitimacy targets: those targets that reflect what jihadists perceive to be Islam’s most obvious enemies, such as the police, military personnel or people felt to have blasphemed against Islam. This second targeting profile is reflected in many of the international jihadist attacks orchestrated by formal militant networks.

To understand why a universalist rather than a strategic jihad might be more compelling to leaderless jihadists, we looked in depth at the material of two prominent ideologues: Adam Gadahn and Anwar al-Awlaki. Their outputs differ in both rhetorical flare and the ways they position the listener. Al-Awlaki’s material constructs a rich, storied world with complex characters involved in unfolding plots into which the listener is invited. Gadahn describes simplistic tales concerned with obligations and duties enacted by one dimensional characters in an effort to tell the listener how they should behave. Al-Awlaki’s capacity to draw listeners into tales of courage, daring, and heroism marked him out as a more persuasive orator. Rather than simply trying to tell listeners what they should do, al-Awlaki seemed better equipped to encourage listeners to develop commitments to the characteristics embodied by the heroes of Islam’s golden age.

Given the different targeting logics reflected in jihadist discourse and the multiple layers of meaning it encompasses, it is perhaps not surprising that, when leaderless jihadists engage in violence, their attacks generally do not adhere to the strategic logic reflected in those carried out by militant networks. Faced with an overwhelming array of potential targets, it seems leaderless jihadists are more likely to attack targets, such as military personnel, which are more clearly legitimate, and that offer the opportunity to enter the canon of heroic mujahideen portrayed in the most powerful ideological material. These insights illustrate the importance of differentiating between jihadist texts, both to appreciate what makes some ideological content more effective than others, and to understand the complex functions such material serves in informing targeting preferences.
A different perspective on CVE

My research looks at grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism: who is doing it, how, and what motivates them. As part of this research I sat down with Ray Hill to talk about the work he does with young people.

Ray isn’t part of any government or civil society programme. He’s 77, retired and works independently. In the 1960s Ray was an active member of the far-right British Movement, but towards the end of the decade he moved to South Africa. His politics changed after seeing apartheid first hand and, on his return to the UK, he worked as a mole inside the UK far-right for the anti-fascist organisation, Starshight. He broke cover spectacularly in 1984, telling all in a Channel 4 documentary.

Ray works with young people (16-25) in his local area, directly approaching and engaging them to try and limit far-right extremism. It’s nascent terrorism. ’When you talk about terrorism, which is the extreme wing of what we’re talking about, where does it start?’ I asked. Ray describes a local scene of young men (and less frequently women), unemployed or in ‘dead-end’ jobs, ‘universally poorly educated’ and involved in low-level criminality.

When I ask Ray about the opinions he encounters, he gives a typical example:

‘My Dad and my Granddad, and sometimes even my great Granddad, fought for this country and these bastards are giving it away… to people from all over the fucking world. Just giving it away. Nicked it, it’s mine.’

I ask Ray about the likelihood of the young people he works with joining formal political organisations. ‘What’s happened, UKIP has syphoned off… the respectable right, leaving this indisciplined, often violent and often youthful section, and they, the one time they had their home [was] in the BNP. And don’t misunderstand me, I don’t go out my way to praise the BNP, but they did keep them in some sort of check. Not anymore. They join little groups now, little local groups with a loose affiliation with a similar group in a nearby town. But that’s it. No organised structural, sort of political activity.

Ray gives the impression that his work is a good illustration of how extremism is being countered outside formal political organisations. It’s difficult to imagine a narrative as oppositional as Ray’s finding much traction in official circles.

Ray gives the impression that his work would be a good deal harder if he was tied to an official programme or organisation. ‘I'm not in any organisation, I don't have any rules, I just do it off the top of my head, the way it strikes me. I see an in and I jump in.’

‘I have grave doubts about CVE [counter violent extremism], because he’s face it, extremism depends on where you’re standing, some of the terminology is fucking mad. Radicalisation, what you mean like the peasant’s revolt?’ Ray doesn’t think that his kind of background is often represented in official programmes. Although he sees them as ‘well-intentioned and may do some good’, he doubts that those involved could connect with the types of people and places he engages with. So, what drives him on?

‘I’m 77 years old now. I do this purely out of conviction. There’s no financial inducement, I’m as poor as a fucking church mouse, I’m driving a 12 year old car… I just go out and do it because it’s become my raison d’etre, you know, it’s why I’m here.’

This is not de-radicalisation or counter messaging as we generally think of it. Ray makes no bones about his lack of government or NGO support. Equally, it is difficult to imagine a narrative as oppositional as Ray’s finding much traction in official circles. Nevertheless, his work is a good illustration of how extremism is being countered outside government and formal CVE programmes.

I conclude by asking Ray how his background as an active member of the far-right relates to his motivation to dissuade young people from following the same path. I ask him directly if he is trying to atone. In response he says, ‘I think I’ve done fascism more harm than I ever did it good.’
Disrupting transmission of extremist messages through education

Educational institutions ought to be the prime site for building resilience to the lure of violent extremism. However, many extremists are highly educated, and educational and religious institutions are not necessarily protective of people joining extremist movements - whether Islamist or far right.

Efforts at peace education and education for cohesion are paralleled elsewhere by authoritarian methods, biased curricula and the normalisation of violence. Research on the impact of segregated schooling on conflict is mixed and depends on the political context and how far schools are linked to religious and ethnic identities. But studies of divided societies across the world reveal how segregated schooling can reinforce mistrust among communities.

...attractions to violent extremism whether radical Islamist or racist white extremism, are likely to be stronger in isolated and monocultural communities where ethnic segregation and singular identities are the norm (Paul Thomas, 2009, 'Between Two Stools? The Government’s Preventing Violent Extremism agenda')

While in many countries there are programmes to counter extremism and extremist messaging, measuring the long term impact of these is difficult. One field of research that looks at the ways to challenge polarised thinking suggests that this cannot be achieved through the simple promotion of a counter-narrative or 'correct' ideology. Instead, what works is increasing the complexity of thinking in students. Programmes promoting 'integrative complexity' in countries as far apart as Scotland, Kenya and Pakistan broaden ways of seeing the world and others. This work suggests that resilience comes through ‘value pluralism’, being able to understand apparently opposing views, and even integrate them. Getting children to debate and mount arguments on controversial government policy, or international issues like climate change, builds habits of seeing more than one side, fostering comfort with ambiguity and healthy doubt about received knowledge.

Linked to this exploration of contested values is the need to provide safe spaces for debate. Ideally, discussion and dialogue should not be limited just to one bounded context. The encounter with others who think differently is crucial to complex thinking. In the UK, current proposals to increase selective grammar and faith schools, in essence to erect more boundaries between schools and between communities, can be argued to pose threats to integration and to community contact. Faith schools in particular run the risk of a singular transmission of values, however much they may claim to value all faiths equally or mount periodic exchanges with ‘others’.

Another important task for schools is to raise awareness around how extremists communicate. There are numerous programmes and websites promoting internet safety. This isn’t just a question of blocking access, but also requires promoting skills in decoding messages and imagery, habits of searching for evidence, and awareness of the sophisticated strategies that radicalisers use to promote the appeal of violence, adventure and belonging.

Surrounding all this is the imperative of learning about rights. Value pluralism is not the same as moral relativism, that anything goes. Understanding human rights enables decisions on what to tolerate and, importantly, what not to tolerate. An evaluation of UNICEF’s Rights Respecting Schools programme revealed that children who participated showed increasingly greater respect for diversity as well as becoming actively involved in campaigns upholding or defending the rights of others. Knowledge of rights can help enable confidence to challenge injustice or corruption, or conversely not to claim rights when none exist.

Disruption of the extremist message space therefore entails the building of a complex, rights-based, confident worldview which has enduring resistance to manipulation.

Lynn Davies is Emeritus Professor of International Education at the University of Birmingham and Co-Director, ConnectFutures, and is author of Unsafe Gods: Security, Secularism and Schooling.
‘Reverse waves’: how radical ideas spread and take hold

‘WAVES’ OF PROGRESS?
In his classic account of democracy, Samuel Huntington described the modern process of democratic diffusion in terms of a ‘wave’. Others have used similarly evocative metaphors—domino effect, snowballing, cascade, avalanche, demonstration effect, contagion—to explain how an unexpected, shock event in one place may affect other neighbouring communities and create a momentum for similar change. A classic contemporary example of such dynamic diffusion is the collapse of the Soviet satellite regimes in countries of central and Eastern Europe in rapid succession during the second half of 1989. A more recent example is the 2010-11 popular uprisings against authoritarian rulers in countries of the Middle East and North Africa, which became collectively known as the ‘Arab Spring’.

Huntington was perceptive enough to talk not just of ‘waves’ of positive change but also of ‘reverse waves’ that slowed down, reversed or even cancelled out entirely the effects of the prior ‘wave’. He was willing to concede that progress is not irreversible and that too much change happening too fast may produce a powerful backlash. This foresight has been echoed in explanations given for why political shocks, such as ‘Brexit’, have rejected the apparent progress of globalisation. Indeed, ‘Time’ magazine’s shortlist for 2016 Person of the Year included the Brexit campaigner, Nigel Farage. The magazine’s rationale for this decision was that Mr Farage was a face of the successful campaign, positioning the referendum as the start of a global populist wave.

Time magazine’s shortlist for 2016 Person of the Year included the Brexit campaigner, Nigel Farage. The magazine’s rationale for this decision was that Mr Farage was a face of the successful campaign, positioning the referendum as the start of a global populist wave.

RADICAL IDEAS AND ‘REVERSE WAVES’

Do ‘waves’ and ‘reverse waves’ unfold in similar ways? Generally, any idea that divests, excludes, and persecutes. The mechanisms for diffusion are essentially the same: breaking a previous taboo; gaining traction by receiving new adherents and mobilising human resources; and, finally, if successful, spreading further through multiple channels of interaction, getting translated in the process to respond to the requirements of different contexts.

Still, reverse waves and populist ideas have a distinct advantage when it comes to the momentum of their diffusion. They gain traction amidst prevalent perceptions of crisis and emergency within a group, seemingly caused by an impression (whether based on reality or not) that change has moved too deep too fast. Psychologists tell us that, once switching to fear mode, humans tend to narrow down their focus and fall back on prior stereotypes to deal with the perceived competitors.

This is where ‘reverse waves’ differ fundamentally from ‘waves’. They do not so much involve a departure from conventional wisdom as entail the reactivation and legitimisation of a suppressed desire. This process is better known as cognitive liberation, whereby the status quo ceases to be regarded as the only legitimate way of thinking and acting. As a result, previously taboo—taboo—alternatives become legitimised as plausible ways of thinking and acting. But it does take a radical innovator to take the first leap against the establishment and achieve a level of success that can inspire others to follow suit or go beyond.

Huntington considered the period starting with the rise of Mussolini in power (1922) and the end of World War 2 as the most seismic of ‘reverse waves’. During this short quarter-century, liberal democracy was obliterated in most southern, central, and Eastern European countries, and individual freedoms were derogated or sacrificed altogether to defend the collective community. But, there is no more chilling example of diffusion than the spread of violent anti-Semitic sentiments across Europe in the 1930s. While anti-Semitism was pervasive in interwar Europe, decades of Jewish emancipation and the ‘wave’ of liberal constitutions introduced in the early 1920s cultivated the - illusion, as it turned out - belief that the world had turned anti-Semitism into an unacceptable taboo.

The taboo was shattered in 1933-1935 by the National Socialist regime in Germany. The introduction of the racial ‘Nuremberg laws’ at the Nazi Party rally of September 1935 transformed the country’s Jews into second-class citizens and justified their designation as a racially inferior species. In the following six years, this particularly aggressive anti-Semitic paradigm was adopted by fascist and radical nationalist movements across the continent. It was adapted for political use by a number of regimes, from Hungary to the puppet states of wartime Croatia and Slovakia. In hindisght, this was the beginning of a seismic change that would swiftly normalise anti-Semitism and violent anti-Jewish policies in large parts of Europe. These were the first decisive steps along the previously unthinkable path to a campaign of genocide, unprecedented in scale, brutality and transnational participation.

RADICAL IDEAS AND ‘REVERSE WAVES’

Do ‘waves’ and ‘reverse waves’ unfold in similar ways? Generally, any idea that challenges convention or undermines social consensus teases the boundary of what it considered as acceptable. This is as true of ideas involving emancipatory, inclusive change as of ideas calculated to divide, exclude, and persecute. The mechanisms for diffusion are essentially the same: breaking a previous taboo; gaining traction by receiving new adherents and mobilising human resources; and, finally, if successful, spreading further through multiple channels of interaction, getting translated in the process to respond to the requirements of different contexts.

Still, reverse waves and populist ideas have a distinct advantage when it comes to the momentum of their diffusion. They gain traction amidst prevalent perceptions of crisis and emergency within a group, seemingly caused by an impression (whether based on reality or not) that change has moved too deep too fast. Psychologists tell us that, once switching to fear mode, humans tend to narrow down their focus and fall back on prior stereotypes to deal with the perceived competitors.

This is where ‘reverse waves’ differ fundamentally from ‘waves’. They do not so much involve a departure from conventional wisdom as entail the reactivation and legitimisation of a suppressed desire. This process is better known as cognitive liberation, whereby the status quo ceases to be regarded as the only legitimate way of thinking and acting. As a result, previously taboo—taboo—alternatives become legitimised as plausible ways of thinking and acting. But it does take a radical innovator to take the first leap against the establishment and achieve a level of success that can inspire others to follow suit or go beyond.

Huntington considered the period starting with the rise of Mussolini in power (1922) and the end of World War 2 as the most seismic of ‘reverse waves’. During this short quarter-century, liberal democracy was obliterated in most southern, central, and Eastern European countries, and individual freedoms were derogated or sacrificed altogether to defend the collective community. But, there is no more chilling example of diffusion than the spread of violent anti-Semitic sentiments across Europe in the 1930s. While anti-Semitism was pervasive in interwar Europe, decades of Jewish emancipation and the ‘wave’ of liberal constitutions introduced in the early 1920s cultivated the - illusion, as it turned out - belief that the world had turned anti-Semitism into an unacceptable taboo.

The taboo was shattered in 1933-1935 by the National Socialist regime in Germany. The introduction of the racial ‘Nuremberg laws’ at the Nazi Party rally of September 1935 transformed the country’s Jews into second-class citizens and justified their designation as a racially inferior species. In the following six years, this particularly aggressive anti-Semitic paradigm was adopted by fascist and radical nationalist movements across the continent. It was adapted for political use by a number of regimes, from Hungary to the puppet states of wartime Croatia and Slovakia. In hindisght, this was the beginning of a seismic change that would swiftly normalise anti-Semitism and violent anti-Jewish policies in large parts of Europe. These were the first decisive steps along the previously unthinkable path to a campaign of genocide, unprecedented in scale, brutality and transnational participation.

Writing shortly after the end of World War 2, the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce described the ‘wave’ of fascism and the violence it unleashed as an alien virus that infected Europe—contagious, devastating but eventually only temporary. Is ‘contagion’ a suitable metaphor to describe this domino effect of aggressive anti-Semitism in the 1930s?

Certainly the radical, taboo-shattering actions of Nazi Germany offered the most powerful legitimising precedent for others to follow. A ‘successful’ bold model for shaping similar ‘solutions’ to the so-called ‘Jewish problem’ outside Germany. But, far from alien, the radical action of the Nazi regime encountered a reservoir of support—suppressed, and until then, inactive and invisible—in Germany and beyond, not only among fascists but also within mainstream society. It was in this lethal conjunction of empowering radical precedent and widespread suppressed desire that the most devastating dynamics of a ‘wave’ seem to lie.

If we were to fully account for the diffusion dynamics of radicalism, then and now, we could heed instead the words of Albert Camus. In The Plague (1947), the creator of the ideas that followed the containment of the epidemic came with an all-too-important caveat:

He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could have learned from books: that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; that it can lie dormant for years and years (…); and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and enlightenment of men, it would rouse its ugly head again and send them forth to die in a happy city.

Aristotle Kallis is a Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at Keele University (2003) Far-Right “Contagion” or a Failing “Mainstream”? How Dangerous Ideas Cross Borders and Blur Boundaries. Democracy and Security 9:3, 221-246

Editorial credit: Lenscap Photography / Shutterstock, Inc.
Just another face in the crowd – what makes spotting unfamiliar faces difficult?

The ability to recognize faces is second nature to most of us, and we rely on it daily. We’re also good at spotting people we know well in crowds, in the arrivals lounge in an airport or across the room of the local pub. But searching for faces is also a fundamental task in various security-critical domains such as surveillance of suspects, and searching for unfamiliar faces is very difficult. Our research looks at the challenges and the individual characteristics that can have an influence on our ability to spot faces. We also address what the limitations are in training to improve that skill.

Whilst we might assume that people are generally good at searching for more than one unfamiliar face at a time, the reality is quite different. When someone is asked to spot two unfamiliar faces at the same time, one is prioritised and the likelihood of spotting the second face is much reduced and could be no greater than chance.

THE LIMITATIONS OF WORKING MEMORY

The difficulty in searching for more than one unfamiliar face is due to limitations in working memory. Working memory is the mental process that stores information whilst we work on a task – it’s similar to RAM in a computer. Think about how your computer slows down when running a virus scan and playing a computer game, or why it is difficult to talk on the phone and drive at the same time. In the case of spotting unfamiliar faces, we can only fit one face into our working memory at a time.

FACES THAT DON’T FIT

There are other restrictions to searching for faces. People find it more difficult to discriminate between faces of people from different racial backgrounds to them. This is known as the own-race bias, or the other-race effect. There is evidence that this is due to how people process faces differently. For other-race faces people process them analytically (by parts) whereas people process own-race faces holistically (all together).

There is a similar effect with people from different age groups. Evidence suggests that people also have own-age biases, where they find it more difficult to discriminate between faces of people in different age groups to themselves.

FROM FACE-BLINDNESS TO SUPER-RECOGNISERS

Not all people are equal when it comes to recognizing faces. Performance ranges from clinical impairment (face blindness – a condition called prosopagnosia) to exceptionally good ability – a group of people called ‘super-recognisers’. Super-recognisers aren’t just good at remembering faces, they also have superior performance at searching for unfamiliar faces.

It isn’t clear from the evidence whether the skills of super-recognisers are innate or learnt. But there is some evidence that training can help performance.

At the most limited level, showing multiple examples of an unfamiliar face to someone can increase their chances of spotting it. Another technique is that used by forensic face examiners, who use a more detailed examination strategy than most people. This controlled strategy can be taught to non-professionals to improve their performance too.

HOW TO TRAIN PEOPLE TO SPOT FACES

People can improve their ability to search for faces, with training and practice. But there are inherent limits to how good people can get, and once they have reached that level further training and experience has little effect. Some people are better at it than others, and training will not help an average face spotter become an excellent face spotter.

As with other training, the skills to spot faces can also fade over time if not used, in which case re-training is necessary.

Good training includes a variety of easy, moderate and hard examples all mixed up. The better the range, the easier it is for people to apply what they learn to new examples. The examples should also be adapted to the skill of the trainee – increasing the difficulty as the level of skill improves. The training should also involve practicing all parts of the task, as coordination of different search strategies is a skill in itself, alongside the skill of mastering each individual strategy.

Nick Donnelly, Anne Hillstrom and Natalie Mestry are based at the University of Southampton. Several CREST guides have been written based on their research, which can be downloaded from the CREST website at http://www.crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/
When does inconsistency matter?

Does it matter when someone seems to change their story from one interview to another – if they’ve added some new information or contradict themselves? Lorraine Hope and Matthew Francis draw on research on memory and consistency to look at when interviewers should, and shouldn’t, worry about inconsistencies.

**Types of inconsistencies**

There are at least three types of inconsistency: forgotten or omitted information, additional information and contradictory information.

Forgotten or omitted information is contained in the first account, but not subsequently. It could be simply forgotten; memory decays over time. It could also be omitted because of a change in interviewer or interview style. Other information may be reported in response to different questions or interviewing style.

Additional information is new information that wasn’t mentioned in the first account, but is in subsequent accounts. Although memory fades over time, style of interview, or a different interview type can change the ‘retrieval cues’ which trigger reminiscence. This can be common across multiple interviews, especially if the interview format changes. Both of these inconsistencies do not reflect on the accuracy of the original or new information. Research shows both can be highly accurate, although reminiscent information is sometimes less accurate than subsequently forgotten information, so caution may be necessary.

Contradictory information is information provided in later interviews that contradicts the details given in the first account. For example, an item of clothing might change colour. This can be quite problematic and research suggests that the accuracy rates for contradictory items are low. However, exploring the contradiction with the interviewee might well identify a plausible reason why the change occurred.

Research also shows that inconsistencies in parts of an account do not necessarily mean that the whole account is false, nor that the interviewee is generally unreliable. It’s important to understand why these inconsistencies might have arisen in assessing the overall accuracy of the account.

Informed by Professor Hope’s research on memory and interviewing and other work in this field, the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats has produced a guide to help interviewers distinguish between different types of inconsistency. This guide can help inform good judgements about where threats to accuracy lie and contains pointers on how interviewers should respond to inconsistencies. It is available from the CREST website at www.restresearch.ac.uk/category/resources.
IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION

Although there is no universally accepted model that explains ideological transmission, socialisation is a process whereby society’s norms, values and traditions are transmitted. Primary socialisation takes place during childhood, when children develop their core identity. Secondary socialisation extends into adolescence and adulthood and is when the young adult learns how to behave in society – putting what they learned as a child into practice.

PRIMARY SOCIALISATION

Family and home
Provides the primary context for ideological transmission, where children are first exposed to political or religious influence. Parents more successfully transmit concrete ideas, about party affiliation or religious adherence, than they do abstract values. This is particularly so where views are shared by both parents, strongly held and frequently discussed.

Children
Young people don’t just passively absorb ideology from their parents. There is strong evidence that children are active in their own ideological development, initiating discussions that can cause parents to seek out new information and perspectives, or challenging their views.

Collective memory
Research with incarcerated terrorists and in post-conflict zones suggests that shared experiences, such as being refugees, living through a war, or being exposed to accounts of earlier family trauma, can significantly influence ideological development.

GENETICS

Inherited factors, such as how much tissue connects neurons in the brain at birth, can predict cognitive and language development in young children and potentially cognitive problems later on.

SECONDARY SOCIALISATION

Schools
Although charged with the responsibility for developing good citizens who are literate in religion, politics and moral values, there has been much debate on how best to do this and what makes a good citizen. Research has focused on how classrooms, pupil councils and volunteering, and the playground can influence student learning about democracy, leadership and authority, and intercultural dialogue.

Friends
People tend to be friends with others like themselves (homophily) but it isn’t clear whether we just seek out those already like us, or if being friends makes people more alike. Clubs, youth groups, urban spaces, and social media all offer sites for informal peer-to-peer interaction.

Religious education
Research suggests that doctrinal transmission is effective, given that such schools and religious classes and that informal religious nurture may be equally effective. Informal nurture can involve watching or participating in rituals, listening to religious music, and picking up the emotional register of a religious gathering or event.

Social environment
Social class, gender, ethnicity and religion, as well as where we grow up and what events we live through all influence how and what we learn. But, when it comes to ideological outlook, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of social environment from family influences.

OTHER EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

Whether directly through propaganda and persuasion, or indirectly through the opinions and actions of others, there are many external sources and places of transmission, including public events and crises; government action; mainstream and social media; political parties and religious movements.

EXTREMIST SOCIALISATION

Some sites of socialisation are seen as particularly significant for extremist transmission. Although young people may be more exposed to extremist messaging in these contexts, relatively few adopt radical positions or act violently as a result.

Student societies
Universities are important sites of socialisation and often seen as vulnerable to extremist transmission, especially their student societies which may provide platforms for radical speakers.

Extremist networks
Violent and non-violent groups can facilitate ideological indoctrination for new recruits and existing members.

Prisons
May act as a bridge between criminality and extremist involvement, providing an environment in which extreme ideas, skills and networks can be transmitted.

Online
Socialisation never takes place online alone, but online places and tools like social networks, messaging applications and chat rooms can provide space for rapid ideological transmission or forums for attracting and persuading potentially vulnerable people.
CREST Security Review provides a gateway to the very best knowledge and expertise. Its articles translate academic jargon to ‘so what’ answers and illustrate how behavioural and social science can be used effectively in everyday scenarios.

THE CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS

CSR is produced by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). CREST is funded by the UK’s security and intelligence agencies to identify and produce social science that enhances their understanding of security threats and capacity to counter them. CREST also receives funding from its six founding partners (the universities of Bath, Birmingham, Cranfield, Lancaster, Portsmouth and West of England). Its funding is administered by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC Award ES/N009614/1), one of seven UK Research Councils, which direct taxpayers’ money towards academic research and training. The ESRC ensures the academic independence and rigour of CREST’s work.

CREST has established a growing international network of over 100 researchers, commissioned research in priority areas, and begun to tackle some of the field’s most pressing questions.

“There really is some impressive work going on. Yet, all that effort is irrelevant if practitioners, policy-makers, and other stakeholders do not get to hear about it. CREST Security Review is one way we will keep stakeholders informed not only on what CREST is doing, but also on the best research from around the world.”

Professor Paul Taylor, CREST Director

For more information on CREST and its work visit http://www.crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/ and follow us on twitter @crest_research