



The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation

The Animal Liberation Movement in the UK, 1972-2008

ANNEX C

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1. INTRODUCTION

For the purpose of this case study, we consider the Animal Liberation Movement to comprise a sub-section of the wider animal rights movement, characterised by their willingness to use illegal forms of direct action in order to advance campaigns for animal rights, including, but not necessarily limited to, trespass and property damage.

Scholars and activists alike often trace the origins of the animal liberation movement to the formation of the Band of Mercy in 1972 by Ronnie Lee, Cliff Goodman and four others. Lee and Goodman, both previously activists with the Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA), are said to have formed the Band of Mercy out of frustration both at the slow pace of change and at how the HSA's commitment to non-violence sometimes made hunt saboteurs a soft target for violence from hunt supporters (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 49). A short campaign of criminal damage ensued: focused initially on targets associated with fox hunting and seal hunting, it soon also targeted factory farming and animal experimentation (Molland, 2002). The first use of arson took place in 1973 at an animal experimentation laboratory under construction in Milton Keynes (Henshaw, 1989, p. 14). Lee and Goodman were arrested in 1974 for their part in a raid on Oxford Laboratory Animal Colonies, Bicester. On release from prison in 1976, Goodman renounced animal rights activism, but Lee, along with 30 other activists, formed the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). Causing in the region of £250,000 worth of damage to property in their first year of existence (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 74), the ALF soon made news headlines and has remained one of the most prominent animal liberation groups in the UK and beyond up to the present day.

Throughout most of its history the animal liberation movement has operated through a loosely structured network of prominent individuals, groups and campaigns. The ALF itself has always operated on a cell-based structure, said to have been inspired by the IRA and a desire to maximise resilience to police disruption (Henshaw, 1989; Liddick, 2013). As such, while there has at times been a centralised public

communications team, local groups of activists operate largely under their own steam, providing that they operate within the group's 'Credo'. Indeed, according to that Credo 'Any group of people who are vegetarians or vegans and who carry out actions according to ALF guidelines have the right to regard themselves as part of the ALF.'¹

There have also been multiple groups alongside the ALF that could be considered part of the animal liberation movement, including the Animal Rights Militia (ARM), Hunt Retribution Squad (HRS), Justice Department (JD) and the various regional Animal Liberation Leagues that briefly gained prominence in the 1980s. The extent to which these ever comprised distinct groups has been subject to debate. As a minimum, there has been significant overlap between them in terms of personnel, and some observers have considered these labels little more than banners of convenience or 'ad hoc acronyms dreamt up for the occasion' (Henshaw, 1989, p. 12). Where new labels have been used to claim more violent actions, such 'groups' have enabled hitherto radical groups, such as the ALF, to position themselves as relative moderates and sustain their claims to eschew the use of physical violence.

Since the latter half of the 1990s, the organisational picture has been further complicated by the emergence of several multi-faceted campaigns against specific entities involved in breeding or storing animals for experimentation, such as the Save the Hill Grove Cats campaign, a campaign to close down Consort Kennels, and the Save the Newchurch Guinea Pigs campaign against Darley Oaks Farm. These campaigns involved a broad spectrum of pro-animal activists, with different tactical appetites, who deployed a variety of more or less legal and more or less violent strategies of action, ranging from information and fundraising stalls, to marches, pickets, lock-ons and liberation raids, through to serious property-damage, harassment and intimidatory home visits. The successes achieved through these campaigns – several of which achieved their primary objective of closing down the entity that they were mobilising against – inspired some of the most high-profile animal rights campaigns of the early 21st century, such as Stop Primate Experiments at Cambridge (SPEAC), SPEAK (a similar campaign

¹ Accessed via http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFFront/alf_credos.htm.

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focused on Oxford University), and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC).

Throughout this time, the animal liberation movement has had a complex relationship with wider animal rights and animal welfare movements. On the one hand, relations between the more radical and moderate strands of pro-animal activism have been ‘based on a considerable amount of mutual distrust, which sometimes even turns into hostility’ (Posłuszna, 2015, p. 68). Activists in both camps frequently accuse one another of undermining the cause and, often, of placing their own personal interests before those of the animals on whose behalf they claim to be campaigning. Whole sections of some of the ALF Supporters Group (ALF SG) Bulletins were given over to identifying ‘fifth columnists’ (e.g., *ALF SG Bulletin* 13, Oct 1984) while critics of ALF, and of the ALF SG in particular, blamed the rise of what they described as a ‘cult of militancy’ for undermining efforts to build a mass movement to promote animal rights (Roberts, 1986).

Yet there are also examples of collaboration and mutual recognition across moderate and radical strands of pro-animal activism. During the 1980s, for example, while the established and highly respected British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV) criticised some of the property damage carried out under the ALF banner, particularly when it involved targeting individuals, they also made use of video and documentary evidence captured during raids by the Animal Liberation Leagues during their attempts to bring legal action against a number of organisations involved in animal experimentation (Mann, 2007),² and even provided office space for ALF and the ALF SG until 1984 (Stallwood, 2004).

There have also been frequent overlaps in personnel between ostensibly more radical and moderate animal rights organisations. There have, for example, been cases of individuals who were on the committee of

organisations that officially opposed the use of illegal actions, such as BUAV, the League Against Cruel Sports (LACS), National Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS) and Animal Aid, while being actively involved in groups deploying more radical strategies of action. For example, Mike Huskisson was for a while a LACS press officer, until his position became publicly untenable when he was caught during a South East Animal Liberation League (SEALL) raid on the Royal College of Surgeons laboratory (Henshaw, 1989, p. 167). It is likely that such overlaps in personnel were partly the product of attempts by some animal liberation activists to gain a voice in, even control of, some of the larger, more established and resource-rich pro-animal organisations, such as BUAV, LACS, NAVS and even the RSPCA (Henshaw, 1989, pp. 156-165).³ They were also likely a product of more general recognition across the animal liberation movement and among some of the more tactically moderate pro-animal activists that pro-animal activism was more likely to be effective when they adopted a pluralistic approach to their tactical repertoire (Best & Nocella, 2004).

1.1 VIOLENT ESCALATION AND NON-ESCALATION WITHIN ANIMAL LIBERATION ACTIVISM

As with most social movements, the tactical repertoire of animal liberation activism has encompassed a wide range of more and less radical activities, evolving over time at least partly in response to changes in their operating environment. In the case of animal liberation activism, such changes have included the significant upgrading of the security at animal breeding centres and research laboratories, largely as a result of the threat of raids from animal liberation activists, and, more importantly still, significant developments in the legal environment, with several new pieces of legislation being used to criminalise the radical flank of animal rights activism and reduce the range of legal

² Henshaw (1989, p. 165) also argues that groups such as the National Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS), accepted footage from groups such as the Animal Liberation Leagues and ALF because ‘when it came to what the ALF had to offer, even though it had been obtained illegally, the temptations were too great for nice considerations about the ethics of receiving stolen property’

³ ‘Flashback: 5 November 1994 – Police called as rival factions clash at anti-vivisection group’s meeting’, *Red Black Green*, 5 November 2017, accessed via <https://network23.org/redblackgreen/2017/11/05/flashback-5-november-1994-police-called-as-rival-factions-clash-at-anti-vivisection-groups-meeting/>

protest methods available.^{4,5}

What makes the animal liberation movement an interesting case study with which to explore the internal brakes on violent escalation is that it is open to contrasting interpretations of the effectiveness of these brakes. On the one hand, it could be read as an example of repeated brake failure. The ALF, the foremost animal liberation group, established itself ostensibly as a ‘non-violent campaign’ and has continued to insist on its non-violent credentials. In their Credo they make clear that anybody operating under the ALF banner should take ‘all precautions not to harm any animal (human or otherwise)’.⁶ Yet there have been multiple and repeated instances of violent escalation during the history of the ALF and the wider movement. From the outset, there was a rapid escalation from minor property damage and animal rescue to arson, and then in the early 1980s ‘an observable shift’ took place as ALF activists began ‘personalizing’ threats as part of their campaigns of intimidation (Monaghan, 2013, p. 935) – a shift that arguably converted itself into a lasting norm.⁷

In 1982 the ARM sent letter bombs to the leaders of the main political parties. By the mid-1980s ALF activists were using pocket-sized incendiary devices to carry out arson attacks on department stores selling fur, and during the winter of 1985–86 a series of ‘six minor bomb attacks’ on scientists’ homes and four car bombs were carried out under the ARM banner (Monaghan, 2013, p. 936). Violence escalated further in April 1986 when ARM adopted a ‘no more warnings’ policy for such attacks, thereby increasing the likelihood of serious injury, or worse (Monaghan, 2013, p. 936).

No fatal attacks were forthcoming. However, in 1989–90 a further escalation occurred when three devices using high explosives were set off: one at the Senate House, Bristol University, one under the car of a veterinary surgeon working at the Porton Down laboratories of the UK Government, and another under the car of a Bristol University scientist (Vines, 1990). The first device was claimed by the previously unheard of Animal Abused Society, and was dismissed by some activists as a ‘false flag’ operation. The second two devices remain unclaimed. Nobody was seriously injured by any of these devices, although a baby in a passing push chair was reported to have received some shrapnel injuries during the last attack. The attacks attracted strong condemnation from within the animal rights movement, including from some within the ALF (Graham, 1990). Even Lee, often an advocate for the more militant tendencies within the movement, intimated that such attacks went beyond the bounds of legitimate action (Lee, 1989).

In spite of the condemnation of such tactics, there was another wave of violent escalation at the radical flank of the movement three years later, this time under the banners both of the ARM and the JD. In October 1993 a package addressed to an individual connected with field sports exploded in a postal sorting office and was subsequently claimed by the JD. They claimed a further 31 attacks in 1993, ‘predominately poster tube and video cassette bombs’ and claimed in the region of 100 attacks during the course of 1994 (Monaghan, 1999, p. 163). This included a series of letter-bombs in June of that year, targeting the live exports industry, one of which exploded in the hands of a secretary at the offices of Stena Sealink, a shipping company,

4 This has included the Public Order Act 1986 (especially Section 5, enabling detention of people causing harassment, alarm or distress); the Malicious Communications Act 1988; the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (especially the offense of aggravated trespass in section 68); the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (used to establish exclusion zones where activists are unable to protest; to seek civil injunctions against animal rights activists to prevent harassment of employees; and prohibit forms of harassment including abusive communications and defamatory public notices); the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (which extended police powers established under previous legislation); the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (which enabled, on conviction, the imposition of ASBOs banning individual activists from approaching the premises of or making contact with companies involved in animal experimentation); and the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (especially sections 145–149, which prohibit acts or threats intended to cause someone to terminate or not enter into a contract with animal testing facilities). See Monaghan (2013) and Ellefsen (2016) for detailed descriptions of the application of these legal instruments and analysis of how they affected the trajectory of animal rights activism and specific campaigns.

5 Mann (2007, p. 597) argues, ‘campaign adaptations have been necessary to deal with increasingly unreasonable policing. With the police steadily softening the effect of lawful protest by designating ‘protest zones’ and dictating what language and images can be used, tactics have had to change. Step over the protest line to get near enough to be heard and risk arrest. Say something that might be deemed offensive to an animal poisoner within the hearing of a police officer and risk arrest.’

6 Accessed via http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credos.htm

7 Mann (2007, p. 61) appears to acknowledge this in his observation about the initial use of home visits: ‘At that time, unlike thirty years later, there was little appetite for actions which specifically targeted people’s homes as opposed to the centres of abuse. In stark contrast to today’s environment, vivisectors were left largely unmolested at home.’

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causing minor injuries.^{8,9} Unusually within the animal liberation movement, these attacks were accompanied by public statements about ‘their desire to inflict injury on their targets’ (Mann, 2007, p. 503). Meanwhile, in the summer of 1994 the ARM set off a number of incendiary devices, one of which caused a major fire in Cambridge, and a series of attacks that caused an estimated £3m worth of damage across the Isle of Wight. The ARM attacks were later attributed to Barry Horne.

Outside of these campaigns of violence aimed at damaging the commercial interests of companies identified as responsible for animal abuse, there have been numerous isolated assaults, as well as prolonged campaigns of intimidation. These have included the attacks on Brian Cass, managing director of Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) and Andrew Gay, HLS marketing director, outside their homes in February 2001; campaigns depicting specific individuals involved with animal experimentation industry as paedophiles;¹⁰ instances of grave desecration and even, perhaps most notoriously, the removal of the body of Gladys Hammond, mother-in-law of one of the partners at Darley Oaks Farm, from her grave in 2004. While it is clear that support for such activities within the animal liberation movement, and even the ALF itself, has always been far from unanimous (Stallwood, 2004), it has led some observers to argue that the ALF has an ‘almost schizophrenic attitude to violence against humans’ in which they ‘publicly argued against violence against humans while condoning it in many cases as a legitimate tactic’ (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 63).

On the other hand, the animal liberation movement could be read as an example of remarkably effective internal brakes being applied over a period of more than 40 years. During this time there have been significant upward spirals of political opportunities as the main political parties in the UK and elsewhere have made clear their support for the animal experimentation and meat industries;¹¹ a substantial escalation of state

repression in the form of significantly expanded legal and police powers to disrupt animal rights activism (see above); and several serious provocations by their opponents (including the deaths of one anti-live-exports campaigner, two hunt saboteurs and another seriously injured in confrontations with hunt supporters). All of these developments could potentially, and at times arguably did, lend themselves to emergent radicalisation dynamics.

Nonetheless, animal liberation activists have never used lethal force, albeit this in some cases appears to have been more a result of good fortune than careful planning.¹² Where violence has escalated, such as with the adoption of arson attacks, care has usually been taken to avoid serious physical injury, for example by using timers so that devices go off outside of business hours when there are unlikely to be people around; checking around and inside of buildings and vehicles for human and non-human animals prior to undertaking arson attacks, and even on occasion aborting actions where they are considered to pose too great a risk of harm (Stallwood, 2004). Certainly, instances of animal liberation activists setting out to cause serious physical harm are outliers, and much of the most bellicose rhetoric – Lee’s advocating for ‘the lightening of violence’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 100) or his comment that ‘Someday, someone will get a screwdriver in the face’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 11) – has rarely if ever been matched by their deeds.

Instead, close attention to the history of the animal liberation movement reveals fairly consistent and widespread intra-movement push-back against escalation of violence beyond established repertoires of action. There have only ever been a small number of activists willing to carry out acts of arson (Mann, 2007, p. 508), with many within the movement expressing concern not only that such attacks undermine public support but that they also carry too great a risk of harming humans or other animals (e.g., Webb, 1990). Direct opposition to violent escalation can often be

8 ‘Animal protesters send five bombs’, Mary Braid, *The Independent*, 4 June 1994. Accessed via <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/animal-protesters-send-five-bombs-1420284.html>

9 Gurjeet Aujla was subsequently arrested for the Stena Sealink letter bombs, but was not adjudged to have been responsible for other JD campaigns. ‘Justice Department’, accessed via <http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/AbuseLinked/justiced.htm>;

10 For example, ‘Activists blamed for child sex slur’, *BBC News*, 7 October 2003, accessed via http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/staffordshire/3172766.stm

11 As Mann (2007, p. 596) argues, ‘The campaign against HLS galvanised the movement and changed the rules of the game against vivisection. It opened up the fact that the battle against HLS is a war against vivisection between the people and the entire petrochemical/ pharmaceutical/ governmental machine, whose activities are sanctioned, protected, and funded by the State and its various branches, who in turn profits from the power and wealth of those industries.’

12 In Asal & Rethemeyer’s (2008, p. 260) study on the use of lethal force, they also note that ‘Though two environmental/animal rights organizations committed enough attacks to make our list of the fifty most active terrorist organizations in our database, not one of these attacks was lethal’.

found within the pages of movement-wide publications such as *Arkangel* magazine, and has also taken the form of tactical innovations away from violence. One of the clearest examples of the latter was the formation in the 1980s of the various Animal Liberation Leagues and their adoption of daylight information gathering raids in which activists explicitly eschewed clandestinity and sought to minimise damage to property (Monaghan, 1999, p. 71) – a shift away from violence that was however curtailed when such actions resulted in the mass arrests of those involved (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 71). Similarly, opposition to the adoption of personalised targeting was reportedly what led the BUAV to expel the ALF SG from their London offices in May 1984, and the Peace News Collective to expel the ALF SG from their PO Box later in the same year (Stallwood, 2004).

As such, the animal liberation case enables us to explore both how brakes have been applied over four decades, and how some activists at the radical flank of the movement have at various points undermined the effectiveness of these brakes. It also enables us to look at how different brakes combine. Of particular interest here is the way that different brakes at times operate apparently in isolation, almost as trade-offs of one another – for example in Lee’s observation that ‘the only reason the ALF so far has not killed any of the enemy is not a principle position, but rather a matter of tactics’ Nagtzaam (2017, p. 82),¹³ or in Best & Nocella’s (2004, p. 57) reflection that the challenge for the ALF concerns ‘how to be as militant and effective as possible without losing the moral high ground, without alienating public support, and without diluting the values of freedom and compassion’. At other times however the moral and strategic logics appear to align with one another, such as for example when moral proscriptions of violence coincide with arguments about how campaigns based on a mass movement are more effective than isolated acts of militancy (e.g., Roberts, 1986).

¹³ It is possible that such statements contain a certain element of bravado and posturing, implying in effect that the only reason they haven’t done more violence is because they have chosen not to, but that that might change, so their opponents ought to be wary.

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Throughout its history, there has been limited ostensible organisational control of violent escalation within the movement. The ALF has tended to exert scant direct control over individual cells (Monaghan, 1999, p. 165), and some of the most violent actions have been carried out by people acting largely on their own e.g., Barry Horne's and Gurjeet Aujla's respective 'ARM' and 'JD' bombing campaigns. Yet academic accounts, activist memoirs and documentary evidence indicate a range of internal brakes on violent escalation being applied through activist networks at the levels of campaign planning, action planning and during actions, applied both by some of the more tactically moderate actors and by some situated very much within the radical flank.

2.1 BRAKE 1

Identification of non- or less violent strategies of action as being as or more effective than more violent alternatives.

Brakes operating on strategic logics are prominent across contexts of campaign planning, action planning and during actions. As noted above, their relationship to moral brakes in particular is somewhat ambivalent. While at times the strategic logics for limiting violence are presented as coinciding with moral logics, at other times moral and strategic logics are presented as being in competition. Lee, for example, argued on occasion that he had no moral qualms about using greater levels of violence, in particular violence against persons, but that he did have concerns that such violence would undermine public support and therefore urged activists to respect norms regarding the limited use of violence.

Each of the five sub-brakes under brake 1 are evident within this case study.

Brake 1a

Expressions of scepticism about their ability to beat their opponents in a violent struggle, including concerns that greater militancy will increase backlash or repression from opponents or the state towards them and their supporters.

Scepticism about their ability to beat their opponents in a violent struggle was rarely foregrounded by activists, presumably as it was largely taken as a given. After all, in the final analysis their campaign was conceived of in terms of challenging the state-industrial complex. It is nonetheless present and appears to have played an important role in shaping tactical decisions within animal liberation activism. While some radical fringe actors conceived of direct action, including some limited forms of violence (primarily against property) as being a fundamental part of the struggle, there is little indication that even the more radical actors within the radical fringe of the movement conceived of their struggle as one that could be won primarily, let alone solely, through violence. Rather, direct action was almost always conceived of ultimately as part of a wider movement strategy (e.g., Stallwood, 2004). This did not preclude the use of some violence. Some radical flank actors framed their actions as those of a guerrilla campaign, for example. However, such framing in itself generates opportunities to apply brakes on violent escalation due to the emphasis that it places both on notions of maintaining discipline and self-control¹⁴ and on building support within the wider population (see brake 1b).

Concerns about the personal costs of conflict escalation were frequently expressed, with the spectre and prior experience both of state repression and of backlash from opponents used repeatedly to urge caution about loss of discipline and control. During campaign planning, action planning and during actions activists frequently reminded one another about the risks of arrest. This was often expressed through comments about how it wasn't 'worth it' (Respondents C1, C2 and C3), a phrase that simultaneously worked on moral logics – with notions of not needing or wanting to 'stoop' to the level of their

¹⁴ A letter in *Arkangel* magazine from Pippin Took, a contributor, citing Inti Peredo, A Bolivian guerrilla of the 1960s, writes, 'Those who participate in the preparatory stage of a guerrilla movement must have an extra-ordinary capacity for self-control and sacrifice' before going on to talk about the relevance of this (Mann 2007, 352).

opponents – and on strategic logics through the idea that they were more likely to be able to help animals if they weren't in prison or under a restraining order. As might be expected, concerns about state repression intensified as activists found themselves and their colleagues facing increasingly severe sentences (Mann, 2007, p. 597).

Concern about backlash from opponents is most apparent in contexts relating to hunt sabbing, where activists experienced the most intense and frequent interpersonal violence through their clashes with hunt supporters, albeit personal accounts of hunt sabotaging indicate considerable regional and local variation in the levels of violence, often a function of the relationships formed between local hunt supporters and local hunt saboteurs (Respondent C1 and C2; Mann, 2007). Such concerns clearly impacted on activists' actions. Respondent C2 recalled that even where they felt aggrieved about violence that had taken place during previous meets, they and their fellow hunt saboteurs would in general seek to avoid confrontation at subsequent meets rather than pursuing revenge due, at least partly, to a desire not to escalate the violence. Mann also describes how awareness of the consequences of escalation in effect set up a conundrum for some hunt saboteurs, keen to get together with other hunt saboteurs to 'hit' hunt supporters with mass disruption as 'payback' for previous actions, but at the same time aware that this would likely lead to retribution.

National hits were big payback for something serious, a show of strength with 200 sabs to say: you hit us we hit you. It didn't always help, of course, to support these big hits on the local hunt and then leave, because local sabs would later bear the brunt of subsequent retribution. But equally, these raids would have a controlling effect on some hunts. (Mann, 2007, p. 234).

The way that concerns about backlash from opponents translated into internal brakes is perhaps illustrated most starkly by Mann's account of the deaths of two young hunt saboteurs, Mike Hill (1991) and Tom Worby (1993). Mike Hill's death prompted a vigil by activists outside the house of the man who had been driving the vehicle from which Hill fell and died. The vigil turned into a house-raid that resulted in multiple arrests. Mann claims that Hill's death 'instilled a new resolve in the

hearts of many to fight that bit harder' (2007, p. 260). He also argues however that it encouraged activists to fight a bit more 'cautiously' in future, something reflected in a change to the words of a popular mantra:

'Once upon a time, the popular mantra on marches was:

What do we want?

Animal liberation!

When do we want it?

Now!

Are we going to fight for it?

Yes!

Are we going to die for it?

Yes!

We no longer invite each other to die for it; this has quietly drifted from the chanting since tragic deaths started to happen for real'. (Mann, 2007, p. 260).

Two years later, when Tom Worby was killed,

There was, not surprisingly, a mood for revenge, but local sabs asked for calm. They didn't want a repeat of Dodleston [where Mike Hill had been killed] and to have to take the flak when the dust settled [...] There was no response from anyone to the killing of Tom Worby. (Mann, 2007, p. 265).

Nonetheless, while the request of local sabs was respected by the wider hunt saboteur community, some activists, including Mann, wondered whether 'turning the other cheek' might 'make us more vulnerable' (Mann, 2007, p. 265) – indicating that one way in which such brakes might be undermined is through in effect raising questions about the possible unintended consequences of less confrontational approaches.

There are also indications that while concerns about backlash and repression might deter some activists from engaging in violent escalation, that once people had become involved in such practices these concerns became an acknowledged but largely accepted risk:

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‘there aren’t really that many people who have been prepared to build and plant incendiaries in shops, not even within Animal Liberation Front circles. During the fruitful fur campaign between 1984 and 1987, around 40 in-store devices were placed by only a small number of activists, mostly known to each other... Less technical devices were and have been used much more often, but still not by any great number of people. Put simply, it isn’t something a lot of people do and those that do so once then lose the fear, and go on to do most of the work, prepared to continue until the inevitable happens. (Mann, 2007, p. 508).

Indeed, it is possible that, as Jasper & Nelkin (1992, p. 46) discuss in their account of animal rights activism in the USA, for some activists their willingness to suffer for their cause becomes a source of pride and a sign of their commitment and righteousness. There is little doubt that being arrested acted as a source of prestige for activists in the UK, and through his hunger strikes and the impact that these had on the wider movement, Barry Horne demonstrated that one could still contribute to the cause when imprisoned. In the early 2000s, imprisoned SHAC activists also enjoyed celebrity status within the movement.

What may also have undermined the effects of brake 1a within the animal liberation movement was the support provided to activists who were facing convictions. As Henshaw notes, ‘the knowledge that the Front would pay your way if you got caught was encouraging to cell members who were by and large young, otherwise law abiding and not well off’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 139) – although it is unclear whether this continued to be the case once sentences became much more significant.

2.2 Brake 1b

Expressions of concern that violent escalation will undermine support for the group.

One of the most frequently deployed brakes within the animal liberation movement were expressed concerns

about how violent escalation might undermine public support for their cause.¹⁵ As is often the case in radical social movements, animal liberation activists in some respects distanced themselves from the general public, marking themselves out in ways that emphasised their particular moral worth. Einwohner (2002, p. 257), for example, describes how animal rights activists in the USA, drew distinctions between themselves as members of an ‘aware’ community and the general ‘unaware’ public that could be described with terms such as ‘the lunkheads’, ‘those dead heads’, ‘the meat eaters’ or ‘slime’. Similarly, Henshaw describes ALF activists that he met showing open ‘contempt’ for the public (1989, p. 83) and argues that Lee’s vision of the ALF contained a ‘subtext of exclusivity’ (1989, p. 56). Nonetheless, most activists conceived of public support as being fundamental to the success of the movement and the need to build such support was frequently invoked as a reason not to escalate violence (e.g., Roberts, 1986).

Recognition of the need for public support resulted in most activists making distinctions between the types of direct action that they thought were likely to win public sympathy and those that were not (Henshaw, 1989, p. 160). The use of tactics thought likely to undermine public support e.g., bombs and incendiary devices, was usually met with expressions of frustration and anger, particularly from some of the more tactically moderate actors, multiple examples of which can be found in the pages of *Arkangel*.

It seems likely that part of the reason why even militant activists placed value on the importance of public support was that there was an acknowledgement that public support was financially important for the movement. SHAC for example is reported to have raised more than £1m through street collections and street stalls (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 99).

This brake sometimes failed however, particularly within radical flank groups who became increasingly detached from public opinion. Respondent C3 observed for example that this brake had little purchase among the SHAC leadership as they became increasingly insular. Similarly, Henshaw notes that in 1987 after ALF activists had burned down Debenham’s department

¹⁵ Jasper & Nelkin (1992, p. 50) note that within animal rights groups in the USA, concerns about alienating public opinion are a significant factor in their reluctance to condone violence.

store in Luton,¹⁶ the ALF's central press office 'issued a statement saying that [...] he was more interested in stopping the slaughter of animals than in winning over public opinion; he didn't think the activists cared too much about what the public would think' (Henshaw, 1989, p. 111). Yet such arguments appear to have gained little traction outside of the most radical fringes of the movement and, as already noted above, even individuals such as Lee who tended to be supportive of actions that pushed at the boundaries of their tactical repertoire, spoke about the risks associated with alienating the public.

Brake 1c

Attempts to build or maintain ties with strategically useful allies who are not supportive of violent escalation.

As described above, there was considerable overlap in 'membership' across the various groups comprising the animal liberation movement and the wider animal rights movement. It is not clear however that attempting to build or maintain ties with strategically useful allies who are not supportive of violent escalation constituted a significant brake within this movement. It does appear to have been relevant within some of the more moderate groups. Henshaw for example argues that the 'politicos' within the movement

believed in the ideology of animal rights, the principle that they were parallel and equivalent to human rights; but when it came to the balaclava'd hit squads of the direct action tendency, there was some embarrassment. (Henshaw, 1989, p. 160)

Such brakes are less evident within the radical flank of the movement.

Where more militant or radical flank activists sought either to influence the direction of the wider movement or access the resources available through some of the larger and more moderate groups, in some cases they in fact sought to take control of those groups,¹⁷ rather than trying to forge alliances, which may have partially short-circuited this brake.

Brake 1d

Identification of political opportunities that favour (re)adoption of non- or less violent strategies of action.

Outside of the calls for hard political lobbying made by people from the more moderate flank of the animal rights movement, such as Kim Stallwood, former director of BUAV and PETA (e.g., Henshaw, 1989, p. 160; Stallwood, 2004), there are limited examples of this brake. This is likely a reflection of the fact that there have been relatively few occasions on which there has been a significant opening up of political opportunities for animal rights activism (Henshaw, 1989, p. 161). Rather, the state and other elite actors have by and large shown repeated commitment to support major industries such as farming and pharmaceuticals, or at least political opportunities for pro-animal activism have tended to be heavily circumscribed and more suited to those with welfarist agendas.

There are however two noteworthy examples in which activists within the animal liberation movement appear to have identified political opportunities and where this has led some within the movement to innovate away from violent escalation. The first of these takes place in early 1980s when the animal liberation leagues sought, through their daytime raids, to capitalise on what they perceived to be a rising tide of public sympathy for pro-animal agendas, and the fact that 'few news editors (or the viewers and the readers they serviced) could resist touching stories featuring the rescue of animals,' particularly if they were provided with 'dramatic picture material' (Henshaw, 1989, pp. 79-80).

The other example takes place in the late 1990s when, Robin Webb, former spokesperson of the ALF, claims, animal liberation-related violence abated amidst hope that the Labour Party would deliver on a number of promises relating to addressing animal abuse and exploitation (Nagtzaam, 2017, pp. 107-8).

Brake 1e

Identification of non- or less violent strategies of actions that are perceived to be effective, including identification of 'sufficient' levels of violence.

¹⁶ The sprinkler system happened to be undergoing repairs on the day that the incendiary device was set off.

¹⁷ E.g., 'Flashback: 5 November 1994 – Police called as rival factions clash at anti-vivisection group's meeting', Red Black Green, 5 November 2017, accessed via <https://network23.org/redblackgreen/2017/11/05/flashback-5-november-1994-police-called-as-rival-factions-clash-at-anti-vivisection-groups-meeting/>

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Within the animal liberation case study, the idea of ‘sufficient’ levels of violence is more often associated with moral rather than strategic logics. The identification of non- or less violent strategies of action as being effective is however evident. Again, perhaps the clearest example of this relates to the adoption of daytime raids by the animal liberation leagues in the early 1980s – raids in which activists entered in daylight, doing minimum damage to property with the aim only of collecting evidence that could be used to support legal action against the companies that were targeted (Monaghan, 1999, p. 71). A series of successes in the early 1980s – including at University Park Farm (by the Central Animal Liberation League, 1984) and the Royal College of Surgeons (RCS) establishment in Downe, Kent (South East Animal Liberation League, 1984, which resulted in a successful summons against the RCS for inadequate ventilation of cages) – encouraged similar invasions across the country until such raids began to lead to significant numbers of arrests.

2.3 BRAKE 2

Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional impulses towards violence (e.g., revenge).

While resistance to violent escalation from within the movement is often expressed with reference to perceived strategic shortcomings, ‘efficacy is certainly not the only criterion in choosing particular methods. Equally important for a vast majority of animal rights activists is the moral aspect of the methods used’ (Pośluszna, 2015, p. 74).

The application of these brakes is most apparent at the level of campaign planning, with multiple and repeated expression of moral concerns within movement-wide publications and in the communiqués of the more moderate actors within the movement. However, these brakes are also evident at the level of action planning and in the context of actions themselves, with activists reporting that on more than one occasion actions were ‘aborted’ due to concern either about possible confrontations or to the possibility that the actions would result in physical harm. Mann (2007, p. 58) for example claims that ‘[w]hile fire is seen as the best

option for inflicting maximum damage, many attacks have been aborted where a potential risk of it spreading was identified.’ A similar claim is made by Stallwood (2004).

Where moral brakes seemingly failed, this made some alliances within the wider movement untenable. For example, the Peace News Collective explained the withdrawal of a PO box for the ALF in 1984 on the ground that the ALF’s ‘increasingly and publicly showing a willingness to support acts of intimidation and physical violence to animal abusers’...‘raises difficult questions for pacifists’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 95).

Brake 2a

Articulation and performance of general moral norms and principles that problematise certain forms of violence, require violence to be justified or enable activists to forestall on entering the ‘tunnel of violence’ (e.g., the conception of violence as a tactic of last resort; positioning non-retaliation as a virtue; emphasising values such as mercy and compassion).

The ALF was initially established as a non-violent organisation, and the concept of non-violence, in particular non-violence towards human and non-human animals, has continued to be invoked to inhibit the adoption of more violent strategies of action. These concepts are discussed at considerable length in movement publications, with particular attention given to the contradictions that arise if a movement supposedly committed to reducing the suffering of all animals, both human and non-human,¹⁸ prosecutes a campaign of violence that itself causes harm and suffering. In 1974, Lee argues that direct action should be ‘limited only by a reverence for life and a hatred of violence’ (Stallwood, 2004, p. 83), and Lee and Gary Treadwell are also reported as writing in *Freedom* magazine, ‘The ALF is not violent in that much care is taken to prevent injury to people and many raids have been called off because of possible confrontation. In any case our aims are for human as well as (other) animal liberation’ (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 80).

The articulation of general moral principles also operated as a braking mechanism by infusing decisions to avoid confrontation, and in particular to avoid

¹⁸ Respondent C2 emphasised that while as a young person involved in animal rights activism part of the attraction was the excitement of direct action, what gave this meaning was the idea that ‘you were saving lives’.

retaliation, with feelings of moral righteousness, rather than, for example, feelings of shame or humiliation: they enabled non-violence and non-retaliation to be constructed as the brave and noble thing to do. This can be seen, for example, in the decision not to retaliate after the death of Tom Worby, where activists could explain their actions not only in terms of avoiding subsequent state repression, but as a means in effect of elevating themselves morally both above their opponents and above other organisations elsewhere involved in campaigns of violence. Mann, for example, muses about whether the decision not to seek revenge makes them ‘more mature’ than the IRA, although as discussed above, he also wonders whether it makes them ‘more vulnerable’ (Mann, 2007, p. 265).

The effectiveness of general moral norms as a brake on violent escalation has been circumscribed in a number of ways, however (Liddick, 2013). One of these has been through some activists’ adoption of a narrow definition of ‘violence’ as referring only to direct physical violence against human or non-human animals. This has generated considerable ambiguity around the parameters of legitimate force, with property damage and even in some cases campaigns of intimidation, effectively being deemed morally acceptable, enabling some activists to continue to claim the moral high ground despite the use of actions that many people would consider violent. This is epitomised by much of the discussion of violence within Mann’s memoir:

[L]et me make clear I object so greatly to the use of violence that I joined the ALF. I separate violence against the individual from damage done to inanimate objects. The latter moves me not a jot, the other always will. (Mann, 2007, p. 21).

It has also meant that, within the radical flank of the movement, this moral brake appears to be more effective with regards to higher levels of violence i.e., physical violence against persons, and indiscriminate violence. As an activist writes in *Snarl! Handbook of the Leeds Animal Liberation Front*,

Personally speaking, as an activist for some time, I wouldn’t plant a ‘bomb’...on or near any human or animal; no matter how cruel

they may be. However, I would be prepared to use a device against empty property. This may sound contradictory, but it’s not. To kill or seriously main [sic] someone seems very contradictory, to me at least. (Cited in Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 81).

This brake was also undermined through appeals to arguments of necessity: that certain forms of violence are acceptable because they are the only means of achieving their objectives. Throughout the history of the animal liberation movement, actors on its radical flank have tended to equate militancy with effectiveness. During one of its bombing campaigns, for example, the ARM stated in a communiqué – published without comment in the *ALF SG Bulletin* – “Our power is in the two petrol bombings...and the car bombings” (Henshaw, 1989, p. 118). Similarly, the violence deployed by hunt supporters against hunt saboteurs caused some saboteurs to express scepticism about the viability of non-violence. Henshaw (1989, p. 96) for example reports a hunt saboteur who argues, ‘Right now...I’d say that effective hunt sabotage and non-violence look about a million miles apart’.

Claims that the ends justify the means have also been made with reference to historical examples of struggles for liberation that used limited forms of violence to pursue social justice, such as the anti-Apartheid struggle, the suffragists or the anti-slavery struggle (Postuszna, 2015, p. 95). In 1984 Lee, in a contribution to the *ALF SG Bulletin* went so far as to rail against what he described as a ‘half-baked pacifist ideology’¹⁹ on the grounds that it was hindering their ability to bring about the desired change. In their most extreme form, appeals to the underlying utilitarian logic of such arguments have even been used to propose that killing vivisectors could be morally justified,

‘I don’t think you’d have to kill – assassinate – too many vivisectors before you would see a marked decrease in the amount of vivisection going on. And I think for 5 lives, 10 lives, 15 human lives, we could save a million, 2 million, 10 million nonhuman animals’. (Jerry Vlasak, ALF press officer in the USA, quoted in Postuszna, 2015, p. 95).

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Since no lethal attacks have followed such statements, the intention of making such arguments is unclear. It is possible that they are made, and interpreted by fellow activists, as an indirect means of threatening and intimidating those involved in animal experimentation.

Some activists have also justified the use of limited forms of violence by arguing that their violence pales in comparison to that of their opponents. They point both to the violence meted out against animal liberation activists – e.g., reminders that in the UK context while pro-animal activists have never deployed lethal force two hunt saboteurs and one anti-live-exports campaigner have been killed and one hunt saboteur left with life-long disabilities – and, above all, the massive scale of violence carried out against animals by the meat, dairy, cosmetic and animal experimentation industries. Sometimes the rhetoric of being ‘at war’ is used to make this point. Henshaw (1989, p. 91) for example cites Tim Daley as saying he can ‘support petrol bombing, bombs under cars, and probably shootings at a later stage’ on the grounds that ‘It’s a war.’ As one ARM communiqué argued

Animal liberation must be part of a wide spectrum of revolutionary change in the structure of society, for British democracy is based on more blood, terror and exploitation than any other country in history. It has a brutal police force whose crimes against people and animals the media will not report, and whose government blatantly supports repressive systems of governments [sic] around the world. (Quoted in Henshaw, 1989, p. 118).

This enables some forms of violence, especially property damage and animal rescue, to be positioned as a form of ‘extensional self-defense’ (Best, 2008), or even as a moral obligation, on the basis that it might be the only way to prevent or at least reduce the threat of imminent harm (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992, p. 49). Again, references to supposed historic parallels, such as hypothetical conundrums about whether or not to destroy Nazi gas chambers or torture chambers are often used to make these points, particularly in relation to property damage,

‘There was a bit of tension between the ideology of the daylight big break-ins and the night-time small break-ins in the sense that some people would say, well, if you’re going to all the trouble of getting in there you should at least smash the torture equipment up, and you can imagine the kind of thing you break into a set of dungeons and there’s all the shackles there, do you leave them or do you take them sort of thing, and so you can see where that tension was coming from’ (‘Phil’, quoted in Plows, Wall & Doherty, 2004, p. 212).

References to the violence of their opponents are also used to explain, if not necessarily to justify, violence emerging out of revenge dynamics. Campaigns are described as becoming deeply personal – activists might themselves have been attacked, or seen friends attacked. When describing how the owner of Hill Grove Farm’s Range Rover was ‘burnt out in front of their house and windows were broken...’ Mann for example observes that ‘too much momentum had gathered to stop what was happening to the business now. It had become personal for too many people’ (Mann, 2007, p. 535). Similarly, major property damage carried out at Regal Rabbits is explained as an act of revenge for an alleged intimidation of female activists by Regal Rabbits security staff (Mann, 2007, pp. 579-86).

Such arguments nonetheless continued to position non-violence as an ideal (albeit, for some, unrealistic) position and violence as a tactic of last resort, placing pressure on activists who did use violence to justify their actions. Furthermore, the arguments undermining non-violence norms tend also to only address limited or specific forms of violence. For example, drawing parallels with the Underground Railroad is used primarily to justify property damage undertaken in the process of liberating animals; while comparisons with those who sought to destroy Nazi concentration camps are used to justify damage to laboratory or farming equipment rather than direct physical violence towards vivisectioners or farmers. No moral arguments were put forward in support of indiscriminate violence, and those that advocated physical harm to their opponents were outliers.

Brake 2b

Identification of some groups of actors as illegitimate targets for violence.

Brake 2b is most often evident in the extensive debates about the rights and wrongs of arson attacks, where there are widespread expressions of concern about the risks of harming or endangering the life of human and non-human animals. As Robin Webb, an ALF press officer, states,

In my opinion, arson does not fall under the classification of ‘damage to property’ but rather, actions that endanger life. The ALF is proud of its claim never to have harmed human life but arson has, almost undisputedly, taken life, whether it be a mouse, rat, or spider. One cannot check every nook and cranny of a department store or broiler shed; the presence of a small creature is not as obvious as that of a human and they do not understand fire alarms and emergency exists. (Webb, 1990).

Even Lee, who at various points extolled the virtues of (limited forms of) violence, later reflected on the problematic nature of claims that arson could be used, providing that buildings were first cleared of animals:

‘This is clearly untrue. Since every building is home to countless very small animals, e.g., insects, who could not be evacuated to safety and who would therefore be murdered...I think we were naïve to think that animals would not be harmed.’ (Lee, in conversation with Carolyn Bailey, 2010).²⁰

Concerns about harming those who do not deserve to be harmed also informs intra-movement criticism of letter bombing campaigns, with concern frequently expressed that such letters might go off in the hands of postal workers or other innocent parties (Lee, 1989). The concept of ‘innocents’ is also prominent in the intra-movement condemnation of an incendiary attack on a pub in 1995. The pub was attacked with an incendiary device on the grounds that it was being frequented by two individuals playing a significant role in the live

export of animals, but the attack was undertaken at night when the landlord and the landlord’s family were in their flat above the pub.

‘Tactically and morally in this case, however, the problem was considered by many to be the indiscriminate nature of the action; it wasn’t so much the fact the pub had been frequented by the two exporters, but more that there had been innocent people upstairs at the time of the attack. The targeting of a business over its use by a Hunt or even because of a customer’s attendance has been a legitimate tactic, but not the targeting of innocent tenants. (Mann, 2007, p. 454).

No similar attacks have taken place in the name of animal rights in the UK subsequently.

This brake appears to have had purchase even within the most radical fringes of the movement. For example, activists operating under the ARM banner emphasised in a communiqué after an attack that their attacks were targeted at “‘the real animal abusers, the vivisectors, huntsmen and slaughterhouse owners’” i.e., they were not indiscriminate and did not target those who might be considered innocent (Henshaw, 1989, p. 68).

2.4 BRAKE 3

Self-identification as a group that is either non-violent or uses only limited forms of violence.

As described under brake 2, concepts of and identification as a non-violent movement have shaped the trajectory of the animal liberation movement. It is not therefore surprising that maintenance of these identities was often used as a brake on violent escalation, with the upholding of principles of non- or minimal violence placed at the very core of activists’ sense of who they collectively are – a theme that runs throughout Mann’s memoir,

the rules are unwritten but the central edict is: don’t use violence or incite others to do so.... We break the rules to end the bloodshed, not to pursue it. (Mann, 2007, p. 22).

²⁰ Lee’s comments here touch on an extensive debate within animal rights movements about the relative weight that should be put on the lives of different animals (see also Jasper & Nelkin, 1992)

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Even when actions clearly exceed the established parameters of legitimate action, Mann maintains that movement norms make it unlikely that such strategies of action will proliferate. For example, reflecting on the assault on Brian Cass, Mann states,

Premeditated violence is a new phenomenon. It is not widespread. It doesn't seem like it ever would be given the track record thus far and the lack of motivation for bloodshed from animal activists. (Mann, 2007, p. 606).

Observation of brake 3 highlights the difficulty at times of trying to disaggregate moral and strategic logics. Do the efforts of ALF activists to distance themselves from the actions of the ARM (brake 3b) reflect moral or strategic considerations? Are they even made in good faith?²¹ Our contention however is that what is important here is that in the act of distancing themselves from the ARM they both signal to other activists the parameters of acceptable strategies of action and acknowledge, and arguably seek to align themselves with wider public mores about the acceptable parameters of direct action and violence (see also Jasper & Nelkin, 1992, p. 49).

The observations here also raise questions about the extent to which dissociation from violence by a specific 'group' does in fact act as a brake on violence, or simply causes it to be carried out under another banner. The many different names under which animal liberation activists could operate was used to protect the reputation of groups who claimed to be relative 'moderates'. Lee even appears to actively encourage such an approach in 1981,

For tactical reasons I feel that it is best that the ALF retains its current policy on these matters...however there is nothing to stop fresh groups being set up under new names whose policies do not preclude the use of violence towards animal abusers. (Quoted in Henshaw, 1989, p. 58).

Yet the relative scarcity of physical violence directed at people during the 30 years after Lee's comment

indicates that such braking mechanisms did do more than simply displace the violence.

Brake 3a

Production of group narratives that emphasise non-violence or the limited use of violence either by themselves or by those they claim have inspired their movement.

Animal liberation activists were engaged in ongoing construction of themselves as part of a movement that only uses non- or limited forms of violence – particularly within those strands of the movement where activists sought to distinguish themselves from the most tactically radical elements of the movement. Henshaw (1989, p. 83) talks for example about how those activists involved in the animal liberation leagues 'were keen to present an image of reluctant and fundamentally decent activism; a kind of animals' SAS with all the cool efficiency and none of the nastiness.' This process is most obviously evident in movement publications and memoirs. First-hand accounts of raids by ALF activists frequently include comment, at least in passing, about how they ensured that the risk of physical harm was minimised, particularly in the case for actions where there was a greater risk of harm, such as arson attacks.²² In several of these accounts activists emphasise the fact that the non- or limited violence was a matter of their choosing. For example, recounting raid on Wickham Laboratories, Mann describes himself and colleagues on the roof observing lab workers;

Had we been the type of people they say we are, it would have been the easiest thing in the world to inflict some serious GBH on these people as they were doing to others far less capable of defending themselves right in front of our very eyes. (Mann, 2007, p. 626).

Such accounts must of course be read partly as statements intended to counter accusations from their opponents and critics that they comprise some form of 'extremist' organisation. However, they also serve to culturally embed practices that reduce the risk of harm and contribute to establish moral parameters.

²¹ Henshaw, for example, appears to consider that some ALF activists at least distanced themselves from 'groups' such as ARM simply to give themselves a 'degree of respectability' (Henshaw, 1989, p. 58).

²² See ALF SG Bulletin, 11, Jan 1984, for an account of an incendiary raid on a farm at Amptill in Bedfordshire

The other way that such group narratives were constructed was through the historic figures and movements from which they claimed to draw their inspiration, with famous leaders of non-violent resistance and liberation movements, such as Ghandi and Martin Luther King, particularly prominent. This was sometimes challenged to a greater or lesser degree. Those who advocated the limited use of illegal actions and even violence might, for example, de-emphasise the figures such as Ghandi and Martin Luther King and instead draw parallels with the underground railroad, the activists who sought to liberate prisoners during the Holocaust, the suffragists and the wider civil rights movement: all of whom, it is pointed out, deployed what at the time were illegal methods, and sometimes also violence, in pursuit of higher moral goals (Liddick, 2013). As discussed above, such points of reference nonetheless still only created moral opportunities for highly circumscribed forms of illegal or violent activity. Some on the radical flank argued that animal liberationists should not allow themselves to be inhibited by what, as described above, Lee once described as a ‘half-baked pacifist ideology’, but such occasional outbursts appear to have done fairly little to shift the broad identification of most activists as part of a movement committed fundamentally to non-violence and the reduction of harm.

Brake 3b

Disassociation from more violent groups or factions and/or association with less violent groups or factions.

As early as 1974, a ‘local figure’ in the HSA in Lee’s hometown of Luton

...offered a reward of £250 for information leading to the identification of the Band of Mercy. The ‘area commander’ told the press, ‘we approve of their ideals, but are opposed to their methods’. (Henshaw, 1989, pp. 15-16).

Disassociation in the animal liberation movement is made complicated by the chaotic nature of movement structures and the extent to which organisational titles were used as banners of convenience. Disassociation was most evident after incidents had taken place that were deemed to have exceeded established parameters

of acceptable action. For example, activists in groups such as BUAV, LACS and Animal Aid distanced themselves from the ALF when ALF activists adopted their campaign of personal targeting; after the desecration of the grave of the Duke of Beaufort (1984) activists from LACS and the HSA ‘roundly condemned the “ghoulish” adventure’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 97) and even ‘some of the harder elements of the movement’ described it as being ‘somewhat excessive’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 99), and ALF activists distanced themselves from ‘groups’ such as ARM, JD and the Animal Abused Society after their attacks. While disassociation might at times have been undertaken for fairly instrumental reasons (Carnell, 1998) it is likely that such distancing inhibited proliferation of these strategies by marking them as being incompatible with the group identity.

Meanwhile, some of the most radical activists defined their activism in contrast to that of what they considered comprised genuine ‘extremist’ groups. Prior to the 2000s this tended to entail distinguishing their actions from those of the IRA. Activists operating under the ARM banner, for example, sought to differentiate themselves from the IRA by emphasising that they were not going to undertake ‘indiscriminate violence’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 68). After 2000, the comparison point shifted to extreme Islamist groups.

The extent to which disassociation resulted in any change on the ground rather than comprising simply a symbolic distancing is unclear. On some occasions at least however there is evidence that attempts at disassociation did entail efforts to inhibit the organisational influence of more radical factions. When ALF activists undertook an incendiary device campaign, for example, Animal Aid distributed criticism of the ALF to their members in the form of a circular to local groups calling for organisational separation from the ALF.

‘If we are to continue to build on our successes then (we) must exclude from our groups those individuals whose views on campaigning are fundamentally at odds with ours’... ‘We believe that the ALF as an organisation has behaved irresponsibly by allowing advocates of premeditated violence to operate within its ranks; by publishing articles advocating violence; and through

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its constant refusal to issue an outright condemnation of campaigns of violence'. (Quoted in Mann, 2007, p. 180).

Local Animal Aid groups were then provided a model resolution to be adopted stating that they would sever links with anyone who supported the ALF.

Brake 3c

(The threat of) sanctions for activists who advocate or undertake violence beyond the established parameters of the group's action repertoire, and/or opportunities to achieve intra-group respect and prestige without undertaking or encouraging the use of violence at or beyond the parameters of the group's action repertoire.

This sub-brake is less visible within the animal liberation case. This sub-brake is less visible within the animal liberation case. Indeed a number of accounts of the evolution of the movement indicate that leadership positions were often occupied by individuals or small groups of actors with a greater appetite for and record of participation in violence than many of the supporters. Describing the early evolution of the ALF, for example, Henshaw argues,

By 1981 a new generation of much harder, un sentimental leadership had taken charge of the direction of ALF policy, with the approval of Ronnie Lee. These included figures whose political background lay in anarchism and some whose experience lay in the violent confrontationism of the far right. (Henshaw, 1989, p. 91).

Similarly, Respondent C3 observed that the SHAC leadership appeared to have a far greater appetite for radical strategies of action than most with the movement.

There is however some evidence that activists whose actions clearly exceed established action repertoires were sanctioned. In most cases this appears to be limited to criticism from co-activists. Such criticisms can often be found in movement publications. Henshaw notes for example that after one ARM communiqué was published in the *ALF SG Bulletin*,

there were several dissenting voices to be heard in the Supporters Group Bulletin, accusing the Militia of being "wankers" who were using the animal rights cause as a vehicle for their own ludicrous fantasies. (Henshaw, 1989, p. 122).

After the arson attack on the White Hart pub, which broke movement protocol by putting at risk the lives of people considered 'innocent', sanctions also included a decision from the ALF supporters group to withhold financial support for those who had carried out the attack.

The White Hart episode caused a serious dilemma for the ALF SG. For the first time in its history, it was faced with having to deal with an action, which had crossed the defining line between that deemed acceptable and unacceptable under the ALF 'statutes'. A great deal of energy was expended on the debate that followed the attacks and arrests, and the SG members narrowly voted that financial support should not be offered to the defendants, though moral support should. (Mann, 2007, p. 454).

It is likely that such decisions served to consolidate established parameters of action, and perhaps dissuaded others from pursuing similar courses of action.

Brake 3d

Circulation of limited expectations that they will be involved in greater levels of violence.

This brake is not prominent in any of the accounts of animal liberation activism accessed. However, it is unclear whether this is because the brake was relatively unimportant, or whether it reflects the somewhat taken for granted nature of this particular sub-brake. They anticipated violent confrontations with hunt supporters. However, expectations of violence varied depending on the hunts that they were attending, and there was an expectation that these confrontations would usually remain within established levels of violence (Respondents C1 and C2). Activists did not prepare themselves for greater levels of violence.

2.5 BRAKE 4

Boundary softening in relation to putative out-groups (e.g., opponents, opponents' perceived supporters, the general public or state actors).

One of the ways in which animal liberation activists generated and accentuated moral outrage was through forms of 'boundary making', including the de- or -infra-humanization of some of their opponents – a common mobilisation strategy within social movements. Individuals involved in animal experimentation for example were often portrayed as monsters, akin to the Nazi doctors experimenting on concentration camp inmates; as sick perverts getting their kicks out of making animals suffer; or simply as mercenary profiteers oblivious to the suffering of the animals. Similarly, as described above, activists engaged in boundary hardening with regards to the general public, positioning them as at best unaware and at worst uncaring or even actively colluding in the suffering of animals. Forms of boundary softening were however also apparent and appear to have contributed to support intra- and inter-group brakes on violent escalation.

Brake 4a

Resistance to generalizations about their opponents.

For ALF activists, resistance to generalisations about opponents is at least in principle institutionalised through the ALF Credo that states that one of the commitments of ALF activists is:

To analyse the ramifications of any proposed action and never apply generalizations (e.g., all 'blank' are evil) when specific information is available.²³

Apart from contributing to inhibit the dehumanisation of their opponents, resistance to generalisations also on some occasions appears to have enabled processes of strategic adaptation and attempts to achieve a form of negotiated conflict balance. As already noted above, hunt saboteurs often drew distinctions between more and less violent hunts. By not treating all hunts the same, cases developed over time in which some groups of hunt saboteurs and hunt supporters were able to

interact with one another without violent escalation taking place. Mann for example recalls,

We had an odd relationship with the Holcombe Hunt. Years of intense pressure by 'antis' had restricted their freedom and the endless encroachment of urbanisation had engulfed the hunt's former territory so that it was closed by Manchester's suburbs to the south, Liverpool to the east and Preston to the north...We knew where they all lived, and they knew it, especially whenever there was any trouble and someone on our side got hurt. In response to a big day of killing, a home visit could be guaranteed; someone's horsebox might get sabotaged or they'd be treated to a Sabbing Special when hundreds would descend on their Saturday get-together and cause havoc! It got to the stage where the thinkers among their ranks began to appreciate the stupidity of trying to beat everyone up, and a situation developed in which it became possible to sab alone or monitor them without fear of attack. I often did and got away with it unscathed. Such was the relationship with the hunt that one or two even went out of their way to be polite and would buy me a drink in the pub at the end of the day. One would even give me the dates of meets if I rang him! He was himself grateful, knowing that although we had his name, phone number and address, he only ever got called occasionally for meet details and at a reasonable hour. He was also respectful and one of the few who never engaged in violence towards us. (Mann, 2007, p. 216).

While this negotiated conflict balance emerges through what are essentially movement – countermovement interactions, it is enabled by individuals on both sides resisting the temptation to generalise about their opponents.

'De-humanisation' as a concept fits somewhat awkwardly with AL activism given the limited value placed by animal rights activists on human lives and human well-being as opposed to non-human animal well-being. However, the basic idea of not reducing

23 Accessed via http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm

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the value of the life of their opponents by placing them within in an inferior ontological category does apply and is prominent within animal liberation activism, being used to highlight the contradiction if, for example, harm is done to animal scientists in the course of a supposed struggle for animal liberation. In the statement from the Peace News Collective in which they explained why they were withdrawing the PO Box from the ALF, they argued:

'The use of violence to liberate animals is itself a contradiction. At its crudest, humans are animals too, even vivisectors are animals.' (Quoted in Henshaw, 1989, p. 95).

Brake 4b

Identification of segments of the public beyond their previously-imagined support base as potential converts to their cause.

While activists are often disparaging of the general public, they are usually constructed as potential supporters for the cause. There are only relatively few sub-groups (animal scientists, butchers, farmers) who are positioned as necessarily comprising opposition groups, and even here these are all categories that individuals could potentially leave. It is the perceived potential support from a broad spectrum of the public that is used to reinforce arguments described under brake 1b about the importance of not alienating the public through the use of violence.

Brake 4c

Limited intra-movement pressure to 'burn-bridges' with social contacts outside of the movement or outside of the radical flank of the movement.

While animal rights comes to dominate the lives of activists, this does not usually entail isolating themselves from the outside world (Postuszna, 2015, p. 89). It is likely that this contributed to inhibit potential small-group processes of radicalisation. Of note, where tactical radicalisation has taken place, it usually appears to have done so within factions or cliques that became increasingly isolated from the wider movement community. Henshaw for example notes that the radical flank actors that he meets tell him,

We're not organized in the sense that most people would understand it...there's a small group of us and we trust each other implicitly. We don't discuss things on the telephone and we no longer get involved in local animal rights groups. (Henshaw, 1989, p. 62).

In the early 1990s, both Aujla and Horne operated largely in isolation, and the tactical radicalisation of the SHAC campaign coincided with the SHAC leadership becoming increasingly insular and disconnected from the wider animal rights movement (Respondent C3).

Brake 4d

Expressions of reluctance to conceive of the state security forces as 'the enemy'.

There is scant comment within the animal liberation movement about the legitimate exercise of power by security forces: perhaps to be expected given the anarchist influences within the movement. At least at the radical flank of the movement, the police are identified as part of the state-industrial complex against which they are fighting.

However, there is a consistent reluctance to conceive of them as part of the opposition. It seems likely that this is largely a product of strategic logics, with widespread concerns about increased state repression and declining public support if they target the police directly.

2.6 BRAKE 5

Organisational developments that either (a) alter the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent collective identities and/or processes of boundary softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of unplanned violence.

Brake 5a

Limited investment in capabilities to escalate violence, and/or development of capabilities to undertake strategies of action that either entail non- or limited violence or more controlled violence.

The development of capabilities to undertake strategies of action that use non- or limited violence is arguably so ubiquitous within the animal liberation case study

that it becomes almost invisible, since most of the activities undertaken entailed non- or very limited forms of violence. Where the brake is more evident is when there is a concerted tactical shift away from more radical strategies of action, as happened with the rise of the animal liberation leagues in the 1980s. In this case, activists reduced the amount of violence likely to take place by developing techniques to enter laboratories while causing minimal damage and train activists not to carry out violence during the raids. Henshaw for example observes that Tim Johnston, the leader of the Central Animal Liberation League

was proud of the professionalism of CALL, he said. Stealthy, informed, careful operations had meant few arrests: there was no room for macho displays of reckless violence. 'Units like this train very hard. We're not going to raid places every week in order to prove we exist.' (Henshaw, 1989, p. 81).

During the planning phase of raids on laboratories and other installations activists sought to identify how they might minimise the risk of confrontations with security guards and other personnel. For example, describing planning for a campaign targeting a chain of chemists, Mann recalls,

It was decided very early on to focus on the kennels rather than the lab, since the latter posed a greater risk of confrontation with security. As valuable as entering the lab would surely have been, this was to be about rescuing animals and shaming Boots as vivisectioners. (Mann, 2007, p. 277).

Movement publications also provided information about reducing the risk of harm during actions. For example, while *Interviews with Animal Liberation Front Activists* provided information about how to carry out a campaign using incendiary devices, it also provided advice on how to minimise the risk of harm from such actions. Henshaw, for example, notes a passage that states,

Before a device is placed in a vehicle, two things must be done... Firstly, we check that there is not a driver sleeping overnight in the vehicles, and secondly we catter "Scoot" all around the vehicle. This is a product we get from pet shops that puts off cats and dogs

from going under the vehicles. (Henshaw, 1989, p. 107).

In terms of developing capabilities to limit violence, the obvious example from this case study is the development of timed incendiary devices. While this enabled animal liberation activists to cause considerable property damage, it also enabled them to minimise the risk to human and other animal life.

Brake 5b

Foregrounding more modest or intermediate objectives and de-prioritising revolutionary goals.

As we would expect, tactical escalation was often motivated, or at least justified, through calls for objective widening and the adoption of more revolutionary campaign outlooks. SHAC provide one of the most obvious examples of this. Mann, for example notes,

The campaign against HLS galvanised the movement and changed the rules of the game against vivisection. It opened up the fact that the battle against HLS is a war against vivisection between the people and the entire petrochemical/ pharmaceutical/ governmental machine, whose activities are sanctioned, protected, and funded by the State and its various branches, who in turn profits from the power and wealth of those industries. (Mann, 2007, p. 596).

However, within the animal liberation movement there are repeated impulses in the other direction e.g., calls for campaigns around getting changes in the law regarding animal experimentation rather than a total ban on experimentation. These campaigns do not necessarily give up on the longer term goals of an end to animal experiments and the meat trade, but they do mean that strategic equations are tipped more towards forming relationships with lawmakers, building public support etc. It is unclear the extent to which the circulation of such modest or intermediate objectives acted as a brake on radical flank actors.

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Brake 5c

Construction and maintenance of spaces in which a range of activists that includes and extends beyond the radical flank are able to freely discuss tactics and movement objectives.

There are multiple forums through which radical flank actors come into contact and engage with activists from beyond the radical flank. In some of these forums, such as within *Arkangel* magazine, the most tactically radical actors face considerable criticism from within the wider movement. The impact of these spaces is difficult to discern, but it is clear that such forums served to expose radical flank activists to a broad spectrum of intra-movement criticism.

Brake 5d

Concerns among some group members that violent escalation will compromise their ability to shape the direction of the movement and/or negatively affect their position within the movement.

No examples identified in this case study, although it is possible that such dynamics contributed to efforts by some of the movement moderates to inhibit attempts by groups associated with the ALF to gain greater influence within some of the larger pro-animal organisations.

Brake 5e

Concentration of energy on targeting movement rivals, leading to reduced capability to prosecute campaigns of violence against their external enemies.

There is no shortage of internal feuds within the animal liberation movement. Henshaw notes that by 1984 ‘the purest vitriol...seemed reserved for those who the ALF contemptuously referred to as the “enemy within”’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 99). It is less clear however that this saps activist energy in the way that it did in the extreme right scene (Annex B), or that it acted as a brake on violence.

3. TIMELINE

YEAR	SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS	SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Band of Mercy is formed by Ronnie Lee and Cliff Goodman 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Band of Mercy begin campaign of economic sabotage and immobilisation of hunt vehicles
1973		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First Band of Mercy arson attack
1974	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lee, Goodman and Robin Howard arrested for a raid on Oxford Laboratory Animal Colonies in Bicester 	
1975		
1976	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lee and 30 others form the ALF 	
1977		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desecration of John Peel's grave in Caldbeck, Cumbria, by a group of anti-bloodsports campaigners, including Mike Hutchisson
1978		
1979		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First laboratory break-in by the American ALF
1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Northern Animal Liberation League (NALL), the first of several animal liberation leagues (ALLs), is launched People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) formed in the US by Ingrid Newkirk and Alex Pacheco 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First NALL evidence gathering raids First ALF home visit to an employee of a pharmaceutical company: messages are painted on target's property
1981		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multiple and coordinated ALF home visits
1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ALF SG is formed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nov: ARM sends 'letter bombs' to leaders of the main political parties in Britain
1983		
1984	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May: BUAV expel ALF SG from their London offices Sept: Peace News Collective expels ALF SG from their PO Box The ALLs close down after mass arrests; prisoner support schemes set up 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multiple largescale (up to 300 people) daylight 'invasions' by regional ALLs, generate evidence and attract public support but result in multiple arrests. ALF burn down Aintree grandstand: estimated £100k damage Nov: Mars Bar hoax represents first use of contamination scams Dec: HRS desecrate the grave of the Tenth Duke of Beaufort

TIMELINE

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YEAR	SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS	SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1985	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Arrests of national ALF leadership in Sheffield, including Lee Major internal struggle for control of BUAV 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two scientists have their homes attacked with Molotov cocktails ALF's first use of pocket-sized incendiary devices set off sprinklers in department stores selling fur. Devices timed to go off at night Publication of <i>Interviews with Animal Liberation Front Activists</i>, containing guidance on how to carry out incendiary attacks. ARM claim 6 minor bomb attacks on scientists' homes and vehicles.
1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lee receives 10 year prison sentence ALF offices in Hammersmith are raided and shut down and publication of <i>ALF SG Bulletin</i> is halted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Jan: coordinated car-bomb attacks on 4 animal scientists Apr: a communiqué from ARM after a car-bomb attack, published in the <i>ALF SG Bulletin</i>, announces 'no more warnings' policy.
1987	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NAVS staff are replaced as more radical activists gain control of the organisation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Debenhams department store, Luton, gutted by fire when the sprinkler system happens to be turned off for maintenance at the time of an incendiary attack
1988		
1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Arkangel</i> Magazine is launched 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bombing at Bristol University claimed by the Animal Abused Society. The attack is condemned by the ALF BUAV set up Sarah Kite to infiltrate Huntingdon Research Centre
1990	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Barry Horne arrested with incendiary devices for the first time. He receives a 3 year sentence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mike Huskisson and Melody MacDonald Infiltrate National Institute for Medical Research, leading to revocation of Dr. Feldberg's licence June: two car bombs attacks, targeting a veterinary surgeon working at a research defence laboratory and a Bristol University academic
1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 9 Feb: hunt saboteur Mike Hill (18), dies after an altercation with hunt supporters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More than 100 meat and animal transportation vehicles burnt out over 12-month period
1992		
1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3 Apr: hunt saboteur Tom Worby (15) is killed when he falls under the truck of a huntsman. No charges are brought against the driver. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Animal rights activists disrupt the Grand National. JD claims 31 attacks, including 13 devices sent by post comprising poster tubes with explosive devices and HIV infected needles.

YEAR	SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS	SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fighting breaks out at the BUAV EGM between ‘modernisers’ and ‘dissidents’ • Pre-emptive detention used to avoid disruption of Grand National in response to 1993 disruption • Gurjeet Aujla arrested and charged for Stena Sealink campaign. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JD claim approx 100 attacks, including posting metal mousetraps fitted with superglued razor blades. Use of secondary targeting, e.g., campaign against Stena Sealink for their role in live animal exports. • Multiple incendiary attacks claimed by ARM.
1995		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National campaign against live animal exports, during which Jill Phipps (31) is killed by a truck at Baginton airfield, Coventry. • Petrol bombing of White Hart pub in Henfield. The landlord and their family were in the flat above the pub at the time.
1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barry Horne arrested in possession of incendiary devices in Bristol. Receives a 10-year sentence. • Launch of the Consort Beagles campaign, led by Greg Avery and Heather James. 	
1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robin Webb (ALF UK press officer) and Simon Russell (ALF SG newsletter editor) convicted for Conspiracy to Incite Criminal Damage, along with prominent figures from the Green Anarchist. The convictions are subsequently overturned. • Hill Grove Cat Farm campaign begins • Consort Kennels closes in September 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horne’s first hunger strike, 6 Jan – 9 Feb • Horne’s second hunger strike, 11 Aug – 26 Sept • ARM threatens to kill 5 vivisectors if Horne dies, and publishes a ‘hit list’
1998		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Horne’s third hunger strike 6 Oct – 13 Dec, accompanied by further death threats against named scientists • 6000 mink released into the New Forest provokes media furore and public backlash
1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Save the Shamrock Monkeys (STSM) campaign launched • Save the Newchurch Guinea Pigs (SNGP) campaign launched against Darley Oaks Farm • SHAC launched, led by Greg Avery and Heather James 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kathleen Brown, wife of Christopher Brown, director of Hill Grove Farm, is ‘accosted while out walking the dog one evening in the woods at the rear of the farm’ (Mann, 2007, p. 536). Hill Grove closes shortly after

TIMELINE

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YEAR	SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS	SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RSPCA appoint former Shamrock Farm employee Paul West as Assistant Chief Veterinary Officer, provoking outrage from ALF and STSM campaigners Hunt saboteur, Steve Christmas (41), is run down by a hunt supporter. Subsequent raids by hunt saboteurs on hunt kennels result in 18 arrests and a 4-year legal campaign for compensation for Steve Christmas. Close Down Regal Rabbits campaign launched 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feb: bomb threats made against HLS's major shareholders Apr: Phillips and Drew fund management group sell 11% stake in HLS after receiving death threats and hate mail Aug: several HLS workers have their cars firebombed Dec: mass sell-off of HLS shares after <i>The Sunday Telegraph</i> prints a list of shareholders given to it by SHAC
2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SHAC leaders, Heather James, Greg Avery and Natasha Dallemagne, arrested and receive 12 month sentences David Blenkinsop is sentenced to three years in prison for the attack on Brian Cass. Horne dies 5 Nov 2001 during a hunger strike 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feb: HLS managing director in the UK, Brian Cass, beaten outside his home by three masked men. Andrew Gay, HLS marketing director, is also attacked on his doorstep with a chemical spray to his eyes that left him temporarily blinded.
2002		
2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SPEAC campaign prevents construction of primate research centre at Cambridge University 	
2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> SPEAK set up to challenge primate lab in Oxford 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Oct: body of Gladys Hammond, mother-in-law of one of the partners at Darley Oaks Farm, is disinterred
2005		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ALF activists claim responsibility for an arson attack at the home of Phil Blackburn, the corporate controller of GlaxoSmithKline, in Beaconsfield. ALF activists claim responsibility for firebombing a car belonging to an executive of a Canadian Brokerage firm associated with Life Sciences Research (LSR), the name under which HLS had incorporated in the USA.
2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Donald Currie is jailed for 12 years in connection with fire-bombing offenses against HLS customers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An anonymous group begin a postal and email campaign of intimidation against GlaxoSmithKline's small investors.

YEAR	SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS	SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operation Achilles sees 700 police officers in England, the Netherlands and Belgium arrest 32 prominent SHAC activists. • Mel Broughton, co-founder of SPEAK, arrested following the discovery of incendiary devices at Oxford University colleges 	
2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Seven members of SHAC’s senior leadership charged with blackmail. They are sentenced to between 4 and 11 years in January 2009. • Close Highgate Farm campaign is launched, including an ALF liberation raid. 	

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RESPONDENTS

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Respondent C2	Former animal rights activist
Respondent C3	Academic expert

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