About Us

The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) is the UK’s hub for behavioural and social science research into security threats. CREST brings together the UK’s foremost expertise in understanding the psychological and social drivers of the threat, the skills and technologies that enable its effective investigation, and the protective security measures that help counter the threat in the first place.

With the majority of its funding from the UK’s Home Office and security and intelligence agencies, it carries out its work within a context of significant stakeholder and international researcher engagement. This funding is administered by the Economic and Social Research Council, guaranteeing the academic rigour and independence of CREST’s research.

CREST directly funds the work of over two hundred researchers (including doctoral students), in over thirty-five institutions. Through events and its magazine, CREST Security Review, also works with a larger community of leading researchers from around the world who are conducting, directly or indirectly, research that helps understand, mitigate and counter security threats. While CREST may not be the funder of all of this work, it offers a vehicle to promote academic-practitioner dialogue and exchange.

THE CATALOGUE

This catalogue provides an overview of the published outputs from CREST’s projects from October 2015 to June 2022. These outputs range from short ‘how-to’ guides to in-depth reports; policy briefs to videos; and journal articles and posters to CREST’s triannual magazine CREST Security Review.

All of these resources are available from our website. We have hyperlinked each resource and included a reference number to help you find and download it. New resources are being published all the time. You can be updated on these new resources by signing up for our newsletter at www.crestresearch.ac.uk/contact/newsletter and/or by following us on social media.

We have organised the catalogue into three parts. The first part groups our resources into four themes: Understanding beliefs and values; Gathering intelligence; Assessing risk; Deterring threats. These themes are not mutually exclusive and a resource may inform more than one theme. The second part links to all issues of CREST Security Review. The third part lists our resources by project.

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www.crestresearch.ac.uk

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in numbers...

- **£12.4m** FUNDING 2015-2023
- **£3.68m** HEI FUNDING 2015-2023
- **£26.7m** funds leveraged
- **222** RESEARCHERS
- **18** PHDS
- **64** PROJECTS
- **39** HEIs & SMEs

UK Home Office and security and intelligence agencies

Educating and informing people worldwide

Growing international research

Peer-reviewed journal articles and books

Research translated for users, into guides, reports, briefs and toolkits

REST in numbers...
CREST CATALOGUE 2022

- 104 Research Outputs
- 3364 Citations
- 250,000 Downloads
- 332 Resources
- £23m Follow-On Funding
- 222 Staff Trained 2020-2022

- Officers trained in UK Security and intelligence agencies; NCA; MOD and Policing
- Research translated for users, into guides, reports, briefs and toolkits
- Educating and informing people worldwide
- Growing international research
- Peer-reviewed journal articles and books

All figures Oct 2015-July 2022 unless stated otherwise.
UNDERSTANDING BELIEFS AND VALUES

OVERVIEW

This theme focuses on understanding the beliefs and values of individuals and groups that present a threat to national security in the UK. It offers an understanding of far-right, Islamic extremism and militant anti-fascism. To further understanding and counter ignorance, it offers guides on various aspects of Islam and British Muslims as well as exploring claims of Sikh radicalisation.

In addition to understanding belief systems, this theme considers how and why ideas are shared. It covers work on disinformation and social media, in part through consideration of Russia. It looks at the use of Russian fake social media accounts, and Russian-speaking foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. This is supplemented by work on violence promotion in Chan cultures, conspiracy theories, the direct and indirect effects of trauma on radicalisation, and reciprocal radicalisation.
In order to expand our knowledge of violence reduction and disengagement, this theme reports on the internal brakes on violent escalation, and work which seeks to learn lessons from the conflict in Northern Ireland. To enhance policy makers’ knowledge, the theme covers Countering Violent Extremism initiatives, and the effectiveness of existing deradicalisation programmes.
This CREST guide sets out the historical and ideological differences and similarities between Sunni and Shi’a Islam, and their contemporary relationships in the UK and beyond.

Guide 16-005-01

KIM KNOTT

SUNNI AND SHI’A ISLAM: DIFFERENCES AND RELATIONSHIPS

This CREST guide introduces the five pillars of Islam – the basic requirements of Islamic practice – and the teachings associated with them.

Guide 16-007-01

ISLAM: THE FIVE PILLARS

This CREST guide looks at the Counter Jihad Movement – a loose network of groups and individuals who believe that the West and Islam are at war.

Guide 16-008-01

PRIMER: THE COUNTER JIHAD MOVEMENT

This CREST guide outlines the process of converting to Islam, why some people choose to convert, what they experience – good and bad, and whether they are likely to become extremists.

Guide 16-024-01

ISLAM: CONVERSION

A series of outputs examining the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh’s earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian diasporas.

Executive Summary 17-038-01; Full Report 17-028-01; Guide 18-030-01

SIKH RADICALISATION

Guide 16-007-01

ISLAM: THE FIVE PILLARS

Guide 16-008-01

PRIMER: THE COUNTER JIHAD MOVEMENT

Guide 16-024-01

ISLAM: CONVERSION
A series of reports that covered the issues that led up to instability in the region (1) as well as key questions surrounding Russia and Yemen, (2) transnational mobilisations, (3) and the Islamic State’s long-term prospects (4).

SIMON COPELAND ET AL.

AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: FOUR REPORTS 17-007-01; 17-014-02; 17-015-01; 17-016-01

These reports, while focusing on the case of Sri Lanka, have wider implications to the transnationalisation of conflict-related diaspora politics, particularly in conflicts with large refugee and asylum cross-border flows.

CHRISTOPHER MCDOWELL ET AL.

THE CASE OF SRI LANKA: THREE REPORTS 18-036-01; 18-035-01; 18-034-01

This report explores how research on the direct and indirect effects of trauma might advance our understanding of radicalisation.

Executive Summary 21-032-02; Full Report 21-031-01

JAMES LEWIS, SARAH MARSDEN

TRAUMA, ADVERSITY, AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

How and why people learn and pass on ideas, beliefs, and practices that are important to them – a process which takes place in extremist cells, networks and movements, no less than in mainstream settings.

Guide 20-031-01

BEN LEE, KIM KNOTT

HOW AND WHY IDEOLOGIES ARE SHARED AND LEARNED

Are people fooled by disinformation and spread it because they believe it is true? Do they know the information is fake but spread it anyway? How does the way disinformation is presented influence our likelihood of sharing it? And are some people more likely to share disinformation than others?

Policy Brief 20-017-03

TOM BUCHANAN

WHY DO PEOPLE SHARE DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA?
UNDERSTANDING THE FAR-RIGHT LANDSCAPE

This CREST guide provides an introduction to the far-right in the UK, including an analysis of some of the groups and networks and the main security threats they present.

Guide 17-001-01

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM: PATHWAYS AND PROTECTIVE FACTORS

This CREST report explores the pathways and protective factors to right-wing terrorism.

Executive Summary 21-006-01; Full Report 20-004-01

CVE: AN INTRODUCTION

Two CREST guides: an introduction to Countering Violent Extremism initiatives, and examples that help explain the need for an evidence-based theory of change.

Guide 17-008-01; Guide 18-039-01

WORKSHOP REPORT: RECIPROCAL RADICALISATION

This CREST report highlights the topic of ‘reciprocal radicalisation’, which is the idea that extremist groups can feed off one another in a cycle of escalating rhetoric or even actions.

Full Report 18-037-01

DERADICALISATION GUIDE

This CREST guide explores deradicalisation programmes, setting out the types of interventions in operation, the methods they use, and how to evaluate their effects.

Guide 18-090-02
This series of reports look at the family (1), peer-to-peer relationships (including educations and prisons) (2), as well as political and religious organisations (3) as a context for ideological transmission of ideas, beliefs, and values.

**BEN LEE, KIM KNOTT**

**TRANSMISSION**

**IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION I: FAMILY**

Executive Summary 16-023-02; Full Report 16-022-04

**IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION II: PEERS, EDUCATIONS, AND PRISONS**

Executive Summary 17-039-01; Full Report 17-041-02

**IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION III: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS**

Executive Summary 18-041-02; Full Report 18-040-01

This series of CREST reports explores the intra-group mechanisms through which members of extremist groups contribute to, establish, and maintain parameters on their own violence.

**JOEL BUSHER ET AL.**

**THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION**

A DESCRIPTIVE TYPOLOGY Executive Summary 19-001-02; Full Report 19-005-02

THREE REPORTS: 19-002-02; 19-003-02; 19-004-02

**NIGEL COPSEY ET AL.**

**UNDERSTANDING 21ST-CENTURY MILITANT ANTI-FASCISM**

This CREST report presents evidence from interviews with anti-fascist activists and digital platforms used by anti-fascist groups to illustrate the role of militant anti-fascism in the 21st century.

Executive Summary 21-018-01; Full Report 21-019-02
A series of reports that investigate how Russian institutions and actors contribute in the promotion and means/methods of Russian disinformation, the deployment of disinformation in the Caucasus and how it operates in Ukraine such as the disinformation used as part of military deception.

### Russia and Disinformation

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### Martin Innes

**Russian Influence Following the 2017 UK Terrorist Attacks**

This CREST policy brief details how independent analysis has identified systematic use of fake social media accounts, linked to Russia, amplifying the public impacts of four terrorist attacks that took place in the UK in 2017.  
*Policy Brief 17-081-02*

**‘Soft Facts’ and Digital Behavioural Influencing After the 2017 Terror Attacks**

This CREST report examines how ‘soft facts’ influence individual and collective behaviours, and what are the most effective counter-measures for managing their consequences.  
*Executive Summary 19-008-01; Full Report 19-007-01*

### Cerwyn Moore

**‘Russian-Speaking’ Foreign Fighters**

This report examines the involvement of people from Russia and the former Soviet Union in the conflict in Syria and Iraq.  
*Executive Summary 17-040-01; Full Report 17-017-01; Policy Brief 17-042-01*

### John F. Morrison

**Post-2017 Research on Disengagement and Deradicalisation**

This CREST report identifies and analyses 11 themes from research published after 2017 on disengagement and deradicalisation.  
*Executive Summary 21-034-01; Full Report 21-033-02*
What role do /pol boards play in the far-right online ecosystem and how might security practitioners better mitigate the threat they pose?

Guide 21-003-0

MINING THE CHANS

What role do /pol boards play in the far-right online ecosystem and how might security practitioners better mitigate the threat they pose?

Guide 21-003-02

MEMETIC IRONY AND THE PROMOTION OF VIOLENCE WITHIN CHAN CULTURES

How does the visual culture of chan sites contribute to and encourage violent discourse?

Full report 20-026-01

WHY DO PEOPLE ADOPT CONSPIRACY THEORIES, HOW ARE THEY COMMUNICATED, AND WHAT ARE THEIR RISKS?

Drawing on research in psychology, information engineering, political science, and sociology, this report examines why people adopt conspiracy theories and how they are communicated.

Full report 17-082-01

THE VIOLENT EXTREMIST LIFECYCLE: 12 LESSONS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND

This CREST guide offers 12 lessons that are relevant to those working within the Northern Ireland context today as well as those working to reduce the threat from violent extremists elsewhere.

Guide 20-020-01

A series of outputs bringing together open source, humanities, and social science research on Muslims and Islam, drawing on academic literature (from islamic studies to political science) as well as information from a variety of websites produced by Muslim and Islamic groups.

BRITISH MUSLIMS

MUSLIMS AND ISLAM IN THE UK

Exe Sum 18-028-02; Full Report 18-018-01

BRITISH MUSLIMS GUIDES

History 18-010-01; Communities 18-011-01; Mosques 18-016-01; Gender 18-012-01; Families 18-013-01; Charities 18-014-01; Sects 18-015-01

STEPHANE BAELE ET AL.

FLORENCE KEEN ET AL.

KAREN DOUGLAS ET AL.

NEIL FERGUSON ET AL.

EXE SUM 18-028-02; FULL REPORT 18-018-01
This theme focuses on ways to gather intelligence from, and about, groups and individuals. It covers specific interviewing techniques that help practitioners to elicit accurate information in interview or debrief settings, such as the Timeline Technique, the Cognitive Interview, the Model Statement Technique, the Unexpected Questions Technique and the RING task, which has been specifically designed to support the recall of information about people involved in networks. Relatedly, it considers the importance of rapport building to effective intelligence gathering, and illustrates this in both offline and in-person interviews.

To help practitioners make good judgements about where threats to accuracy lie, the theme covers different types of inconsistency and when they matter; what it means when someone says that they “don’t know” or “don’t remember” something; and techniques that help practitioners to detect deception such as the Verifiability Technique.
As well as looking at effective tools and techniques for eliciting information and assessing its veracity, the theme focuses on individuals carrying out the intelligence gathering. It examines the adaptive behaviour of practitioners in a law enforcement context, and provides an insight into coping under stress in security settings and the effects this can have on performance. Of course, not all intelligence is gathered by interviewing and so the theme considers surveillance in the form of spotting faces and rare targets.

In organisations that gather large amounts of intelligence, technological advances are being used to assist practitioners in their analysis. Here we consider software tools designed to help analysts process large volumes of data quickly and effectively, the role of explanation in systems which use artificial intelligence to help analyse intelligence, and technological advances, such as how to use keystroke dynamics to identify the name and native language of an anonymous user.
This CREST guide outlines strategies that can be used to detect if interviewees’ statements are true or false.

Guide 16-001-01

The Verifiability Technique

This CREST guide explores using timelines as a method to help recall by interviewees - known as the Timeline Technique.

Guide 16-002-01

The Timeline Technique

This CREST guide is an overview of an interviewing protocol – the Cognitive Interview – which aims to improve the recall of accurate and reliable information from interviewees.

Guide 16-006-01

At a Glance: The Cognitive Interview

This CREST guide is an overview of the Model Statement Technique – a simple technique for eliciting more information from cooperative interviewees.

Guide 16-011-01

The Model Statement Technique

This CREST guide is an overview of the Unexpected Questions Technique — a technique to improve the recall of accurate and reliable information from interviewees.

Guide 16-014-01

The Unexpected Questions Technique
A group of CREST guides looking at detecting targets. These focus on hidden and rare targets, spotting faces, and the effect of training on the ability to spot targets.

NICHOLAS DONNELLY ET AL.

Differences in the Ability to Spot Targets

A series of guides: 16-025-01; 16-026-01; 16-027-01; 16-028-01; 16-029-01

LORRAINE HOPE

ELICITING INFORMATION

This CREST guide distinguishes between different types of inconsistency to help make good judgements about where threats to accuracy lie.

Guide 16-031-01

LORRAINE HOPE

MASTERCLASS IN ELICITING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

This report summarises a Materclass on interviewing, during which international researchers shared their findings.

Full Report 16-030-01

ALDERT VRIJ

LIARS STRUGGLE TO PROVIDE CHECKABLE DETAILS

This CREST guide outlines the checkable details technique to aid in deception detection.

Guide 16-001-01

PAUL THOMAS ET AL.

COMMUNITY REPORTING THRESHOLDS

This CREST report looks at the reporting of potential violent extremism and terrorism, focusing on identifying triggers, thresholds and barriers which may stop someone from reporting.

Executive Summary 17-019-01; Full Report 17-018-01
This CREST guide looks at a new method for supporting the recall of information from memory to help source handlers elicit information about people involved in criminal networks.

Guide 20-019-01; Thesis 18-093-01

This CREST report introduces a new software tool designed to help intelligence analysts process large volumes of data quickly and effectively.

Guide 20-014-01; Full Report 20-018-01

This CREST guide looks at a new method for supporting the recall of information from memory to help source handlers elicit information about people involved in criminal networks.

Guide 20-019-01

This CREST report explores the effectiveness of conducting online witness interviews via chat compared to in-person interviews.

Executive Summary 21-014-01; Full Report 21-015-01

This CREST report examines adaptive behaviour in a law enforcement context and outlines a novel experimental set-up designed to elicit adaptive responses.

Executive Summary 21-017-01; Full Report 21-016-01
This CREST report outlines the development of an evidence-based training programme to test the extent to which individuals can be trained to better build rapport.

**QUANTIFYING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A RAPPORT-BUILDING TRAINING PROGRAMME**

This CREST report outlines the development of an evidence-based training programme to test the extent to which individuals can be trained to better build rapport.

**FULL REPORT 21-020-01**

**FIONA GABBERT ET AL.**

This CREST report explores the role of explanation in human engagement with artificial intelligence and machine learning.

**UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM OF EXPLANATION WHEN USING AI IN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS**

*Executive Summary 21-025-01; Full Report 21-024-01*

**TWO GUIDES ON AI For System Developers 21-027-01; For Senior Managers 21-026-01**

**CHRIS BABER ET AL.**

This guide outlines a new framework devised to help informant handlers better identify motivations.

**FIREPLACES AND INFORMANT MOTIVATION**

This guide outlines a new framework devised to help informant handlers better identify motivations.

**GUIDE 21-030-01**

**IAN STANIER ET AL.**

This CREST report explores how keystroke dynamics can be used to identify the name and native language of an anonymous user.

**COLLECTING AND LEVERAGING IDENTITY CUES WITH KEYSTROKE ANALYSIS (CLICKA)**

This CREST report explores how keystroke dynamics can be used to identify the name and native language of an anonymous user.

*Executive Summary 21-037-01; Full Report 21-036-01*

**OLI BUCKLEY**

This CREST report summarises presentations from a workshop on performance and coping under extreme stress.

**PERFORMANCE AND COPING UNDER STRESS IN SECURITY SETTINGS**

This CREST report summarises presentations from a workshop on performance and coping under extreme stress.

*Executive Summary 19-008-01; Full Report 19-007-01*

**EMMA BARRETT & NATHAN SMITH**
What do sources mean when they say, ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t remember’? This collection of posters categorises potential reasons for these hindering responses.

**WHAT SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY “I DON’T KNOW”**

**MIND MAP: WHAT SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY “I DON’T KNOW”**

*Poster 18-032-03*

**OVERVIEW**

*Poster 18-002-01*

**MEMORY ENCODING**

*Poster 18-004-01*

**MEMORY RETRIEVAL**

*Poster 18-005-01*

**INTERVIEW CONTEXT**

*Poster 18-007-01*

**DISTRUST, CYNICISM AND HOSTILITY**

*Poster 18-003-01*

**PERSONAL MOTIVATION -**

*Poster 18-006-01*
OVERVIEW

This theme focuses on the assessment of risk to specific people (such as staff), from a wide variety of actors (such as violent extremists) and via a range of techniques (such as disinformation campaigns).

It includes guides and reports on assessing risk of violence from groups and individuals such as Islamic extremists and far-right groups. We also have reports that enable a more nuanced understanding of risk of violence such as research on the internal brakes on violent escalation, research on trauma, adversity and engagement in violent extremism, understanding how terrorists and criminals make decisions, how countering violent extremism interventions apply to women, and the relationship between mental health and terrorism.
In this theme we also consider guides on technology enabled risk such as phishing attacks, the Internet of Things and risks from the spread of disinformation. It draws on Russia and disinformation, focusing on the Caucasus, Ukraine, and the annexation of Crimea, to illustrate this.

The theme looks at assessing risk to staff, including workshops that focused on performance and coping under stress, as well as understanding moral injury and trauma in child exploitation investigators.

From the opposite angle, other work explores the risk from staff, and we include a series of reports on organisational change and insider threat, as well as research on the cyber security risks of digital hoarding behaviour.
These two guides explore both criminal and terrorist decision-making in context, including how criminals manage their own security, and the insights criminology can provide into terrorist decision-making.

PAUL GILL

DECISION MAKING

TWO GUIDES: 20-015-01; 20-016-01

Drawing on research in psychology, information engineering, political science, and sociology, this CREST report examines why people adopt conspiracy theories, how they are communicated, and what their risks are.

KAREN DOUGLAS ET AL.

WHY DO PEOPLE ADOPT CONSPIRACY THEORIES, HOW ARE THEY COMMUNICATED, AND WHAT ARE THEIR RISKS?

Full report 17-082-01

How can we anticipate and counter future threats such as terrorism, cybercrime, organised crime, and financial crime?

MATH NOORTMAN ET AL.

IMAGINATIVE SCENARIO PLANNING

Guide 19-017-01; Full Report 19-018-01

This CREST report written by Emma Barrett and Nathan Smith summarises presentations from a workshop on performance and coping under extreme stress.

EMMA BARRETT ET AL.

PERFORMANCE AND COPING UNDER STRESS IN SECURITY SETTINGS

Executive Summary 19-008-01; Full Report 19-007-01

The ability to make critical decisions under pressure is vital for reducing risk to public safety. This CREST guide highlights the factors that affect decision-making in this context.

LAURENCE ALISON

FACTORS THAT AFFECT COMMAND DECISION-MAKING

Guide 16-018-02
A group of outputs looking at organisational change and insider threat. It outlines the individual, social and organisational factors that over time, can contribute to negative employee perceptions and experiences.

ROSALIND SEARLE ET AL.
What are the contributing factors to moral injury in child exploitation investigators, and how can these factors be mitigated? What does the term ‘moral injury’ mean and what are the causes and consequences of it for investigators of online child exploitation?

UNDERSTANDING MORAL INJURY

POLICE ONLINE CHILD SEX CRIME INVESTIGATORS  
TWO GUIDES  
Exploring Trauma 20-027-01; Moral Injury 20-028-01

CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRAINING DEVELOPMENT

This CREST guide looks at how to improve decision-making, communication, leadership, and interoperability in areas ranging from urban search and rescue and mass decontamination to hostage negotiation and counter-terrorism.

Guide 16-019-02

EXTREMISM RISK ASSESSMENT: A DIRECTORY

This CREST report documents frameworks to assess extremist violence.

Full Report 19-019-01

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE ADOPTION, SECURE USE, AND EXPLOITATION OF SMART HOME TECHNOLOGY

This CREST report gives recommendations on the secure adoption and use of smart home products among consumers.

Executive Summary 21-013-02; Full Report 21-012-02

CYBERSECURITY RISKS OF DIGITAL HOARDING BEHAVIOURS

This CREST report explores the psychological characteristics of individuals who engage in digital hoarding, and the risks these behaviours can pose to organisations.

Full Report 20-013-01
A series of reports that investigate how Russian institutions and actors (1) contribute in the promotion and means/methods of Russian disinformation (2), the deployment of disinformation in the Caucasus (3) and how it operates in Ukraine (4) such as the disinformation used as part of military deception.

**RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION**

**INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS**
- Executive Summary 19-026-01; Full Report 19-027-01
- Executive Summary 19-024-01; Full Report 19-025-01

**MASKIROVKA**
- Executive Summary 19-020-01; Full Report 19-021-01

**THE CASE OF THE CAUCASUS**
- Executive Summary 19-022-01; Full Report 19-023-01

**THE CASE OF UKRAINE**
- Executive Summary 19-024-01; Full Report 19-025-01

This series of CREST reports explores the intra-group mechanisms through which members of extremist groups contribute to, establish, and maintain parameters on their own violence.

**THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION**

**A DESCRIPTIVE TYPOLOGY**
- Executive Summary 19-001-02; Full Report 19-005-02

**THREE REPORTS:**
- 19-002-02; 19-003-02; 19-004-02

These CREST guides introduce key aspects of technology and security.

**TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITY INTRODUCTORY GUIDES**

**Messaging Apps** 16-003-02; **Phishing Links** 16-004-01
This CREST report explores how research on the direct and indirect effects of trauma might advance our understanding of radicalisation.

Executive Summary 21-032-02; Full Report 21-031-01

JAMES LEWIS, SARAH MARSDEN

This CREST report details empirical research into interventions and processes of engagement and disengagement in violent extremism.

Executive Summary 18-028-02; Full Report 18-018-01

JAMES LEWIS, SARAH MARSDEN

This CREST report reviews research on P/CVE interventions that explicitly focus on women.

Executive Summary 21-039-01; Full Report 21-038-01

ERIKA BRADY ET AL.

This CREST report addresses the question of why we see physical violence escalate beyond ‘normal’ levels during some waves of far right or anti-minority protest?

Executive Summary 22-006-01; Full Report 22-005-01

JOEL BUSHER ET AL.

In this report Noémie Bouhana examines whether better-known frameworks of radicalisation leading to terrorism involvement are readily observable through the available data.

Executive Summary 22-008-01; Full Report 22-007-01

NOÉMIE BOUHANA
This series of reports explore priority areas of policy and practice that fall within the four pillars of CONTEST (Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare).

**Public Experiences of the UK Counter-Terrorism System**
- Executive Summary 21-008-01; Full Report 20-006-01

**Terrorism-Related Simulations**
- Executive Summary 21-010-01; Full Report 20-008-01

**Evaluating Programmes to Prevent and Counter Extremism**
- Executive Summary 21-004-01; Full Report 20-002-01

**The Relationship Between Mental Health Problems and Terrorism**
- Executive Summary 21-011-01; Full Report 20-009-01

**Behavioural-Focused Protective Security Programmes**
- Executive Summary 21-007-01; Full Report 20-005-01

**Extremist Risk Assessment**
- Executive Summary 21-005-01

**Economic Influences on Radicalisation**
- Executive Summary 21-009-01; Full Report 20-007-01

**Right-Wing Terrorism: Pathways and Protective Factors**
- Executive Summary 21-006-01; Full Report 20-004-01

**Managing Terrorism-Related Offenders in Prison**
- Executive Summary 20-032-01; Full Report 20-002-01
OVERVIEW

This theme is broad in scope, addressing our need to better understand how we can deter threat and protect ourselves.

It addresses deterring threat from terrorism through examination of how criminals and terrorists make decisions, and reports on interventions that prevent and counter extremism. This includes interventions that offer promise in disrupting groups through Telegram, and those that consider effective management of terrorism-related offenders in prison.
It looks at public experiences of counter terrorism measures in the UK and overseas; reports on how members of the public can help deter threat by reporting suspicious behaviour; and how to inoculate against the spread of disinformation.

The theme also considers how security professionals can communicate better with employees about how to protect organisations; understanding and mitigating the risk of large-scale change to counterproductive workplace behaviour; and how to best protect staff from phishing attacks in order to deter cyber threat.

The innovative tools outlined in the imaginative scenario planning toolkit enables policy makers to consider future threat and how to deter it.
PHISHING YOUR STAFF: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD?
Naming and shaming. Taking away IT assets. Compulsory training. Lots of companies are doing it, but should they?
Policy Brief 20-011-01

INOCULATING AGAINST THE SPREAD OF ISLAMOPHOBIC AND RADICAL-ISLAMIST DISINFORMATION
This CREST report explores the potential usefulness of inoculation in combating extremist messaging associated with them.
Full Report 21-001-01

HOW TELEGRAM DISRUPTION IMPACTS JIHADIST PLATFORM MIGRATION
Investigating the impact of two Europol Action Days geared towards meaningfully disrupting jihadist networks on Telegram.
Full Report 21-002-01

BEHAVIOURAL-FOCUSED PROTECTIVE SECURITY PROGRAMMES
This CREST report explores the motivations and barriers for public reporting of suspicious behaviours linked to terrorism.
Executive Summary 21-007-01; Full Report 20-005-01

PUBLIC EXPERIENCES OF THE UK COUNTER-TERRORISM SYSTEM
This CREST report examines public perceptions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK and overseas.
Executive Summary 21-008-01; Full Report 20-006-01
SARAH MARSDEN, SIMON COPELAND

**EVALUATING PROGRAMMES TO PREVENT AND COUNTER EXTREMISM**

This CREST report provides an evaluative overview of programmes that have sought to prevent, and counter, extremism.

*Executive Summary 21-004-01; Full Report 20-002-01*

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JAMES LEWIS, SARAH MARSDEN

**TRAUMA, ADVERSITY, AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM**

This report explores how research on the direct and indirect effects of trauma might advance our understanding of radicalisation.

*Executive Summary 21-032-02; Full Report 21-031-01*

---

MATH NOORTMAN ET AL.

**IMAGINATIVE SCENARIO PLANNING**

How can we anticipate and counter future threats such as terrorism, cybercrime, organised crime, and financial crime?

*Guide 19-017-01; Full Report 19-018-01*

---

TOM BUCHANAN

**WHY DO PEOPLE SHARE DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA?**

Are people fooled by disinformation and spread it because they believe it is true? Do they know the information is fake but spread it anyway? How does the way disinformation is presented influence our likelihood of sharing it?

*Policy Brief 20-017-03*

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JOHN F. MORRISON

**POST-2017 RESEARCH ON DISENGAGEMENT AND DERADICALISATION**

This CREST report identifies and analyses 11 themes from the post-2017 research on disengagement and deradicalisation.

*Executive Summary 21-034-01; Full Report 21-033-02*
Two CREST guides: an introduction to Countering Violent Extremism initiatives, and examples that help explain the need for an evidence-based theory of change.

**Guide 17-008-01**; **Guide 18-039-01**

SARAH MARSDEN ET AL.

**CVE: AN INTRODUCTION**

**CVE: A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE**

Drawing on research in psychology, information engineering, political science, and sociology, this CREST report examines why people adopt conspiracy theories, how they are communicated, and what their risks are.

**Full report 17-082-01**

SARAH MARSDEN ET AL.

**MANAGING TERRORISM-RELATED OFFENDERS IN PRISON**

This CREST report, which is international in scope, looks at the effective management of terrorism-related offenders in prison.

**Executive Summary 20-032-01; Full Report 20-001-01**

PAUL THOMAS ET AL.

**COMMUNITY REPORTING THRESHOLDS**

This CREST report looks at the reporting of potential violent extremism and terrorism, focusing on identifying triggers, thresholds and barriers which may stop someone from reporting.

**Executive Summary 17-019-01; Full Report 17-018-01**

KAREN DOUGLAS ET AL.

**WHY DO PEOPLE ADOPT CONSPIRACY THEORIES, HOW ARE THEY COMMUNICATED, AND WHAT ARE THEIR RISKS?**

Empirical research into interventions and processes of engagement and disengagement in violent extremism.

**Executive Summary 18-028-02; Full Report 18-018-01**

JAMES LEWIS, SARAH MARSDEN

**COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM INTERVENTIONS: CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH**

SARAH MARSDEN, SIMON COPELAND

**MANAGING TERRORISM-RELATED OFFENDERS IN PRISON**
A group of outputs looking at organisational change and insider threat. It outlines the individual, social and organisational factors that over time, can contribute to negative employee perceptions and experiences.

ROSA LIND SEARLE ET AL.

These two guides explore both criminal and terrorist decision-making in context, including how criminals manage their own security, and the insights criminology can provide into terrorist decision-making.

PAUL GILL

This CREST report reviews research on P/CVE interventions that explicitly focus on women.

ERIKA BRADY ET AL.

This CREST report examines how ‘soft facts’ influence individual and collective behaviours, and what are the most effective counter-measures for managing their consequences.

MARTIN INNES
OVERVIEW

CREST Security Review: presenting accessible, informative, world-leading research on security threats. Produced by experts for the needs of government, police and security professionals.

The articles in CSR translate academic jargon to ‘so what’ answers and illustrate how behavioural and social science can be used effectively in everyday scenarios.

You can read the magazine online at:
www.crestsecurityreview.com

Available online, in print and via your app store.
Download our free app, available from both Google Play and the App Store.
CSR #1
Eliciting information

With a special focus on Information Elicitation this issue showcases research on why we are more trusting online, eliciting information the friendly way, and which lie detection techniques work. Other articles cover how your watch will soon know you better than yourself and what are the similarities and differences between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims.
CONTENTS

3  From The Editor

4  The Future Of Wearable Tech
   Your watch will soon know you better than you
   know yourself

12  The Promise Of Social Science
   Answering the human problems that are so central
to security

16  How Does Memory Work?
   It is fallible, malleable, and hugely impressive

20  Sunni And Shi’a Muslims
   One religion, two branches. Their similarities and
differences revealed

24  Creativity And Cyber Security
   Art and tech are unlikely but insightful bedfollows

INFORMATION ELICITATION

7  Eliciting Information Online
   Why are we more trusting online?

8  Improving Practice Through Research
   What is the impact of the US educing
   information study 10 years on?

10  The A-Z Of Information Elicitation
   Home of one of the most valuable Zs

14  Eliciting Information The Friendly Way
   The tricks of master interrogator Hans Scharff
   uncovered

18  Science And The Lie Detectors
   Lie detection techniques abound. We review
   which ones work.

22  Turning Research Into Practice
   The story of how the investigative interview
   evolved

26  Mind Map On Elicitation
   We chart the lay of the evidence land

Highlights

HOW DOES MEMORY WORK?
Suggestible, transient, social and in need of our
help... just how does the memory work? Lorraine
Hope sets out what interviewers need to know - p16

TURNING RESEARCH INTO PRACTICE
Research has helped bring about a transformation in
how police in the UK understand and use interviews.
Jordan Nunan and Rebecca Milne tell us how - p22
This issue of CSR considers social science contributions to cyber security. It highlights research on ‘everyday insider threats’ to organisations, the threat from cyber enabled and cyber dependent crimes and the hacker mind set. There’s also a long-read on the future of religious belief and extremism as well as findings from research on English Defence League activists.
CONTENTS

3  ___ From The Editor

4  ___ Terrorists’ Use Of Messaging Applications
   What features might be attractive to criminals and terrorists?

6  ___ Building Good Rapport In Interviews
   How to be friendly and interview people

20 ___ The Role Of Technology In An Emergency
   How has technology changed responses to emergencies?

22 ___ Expanding The Frontiers Of Interrogation
   Research And Practice
   An insight into the US High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group

24 ___ Loyal Footsoldiers
   The attractions of EDL activism

26 ___ The Continuing Growth Of Religious Extremism
   A long read on the future of religion

Highlights

BUILDING GOOD RAPPORT IN INTERVIEWS

Interviews are most effective when there is good rapport with suspects. Laurence Alison, Michael Humann and Sara Waring analysed 1,000 hours interviews to find out what works – p6

THE CONTINUING GROWTH OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM, AND HOW TO COUNTER IT

The extremist drift is not just Islamic - Linda Woodhead looks at what the future holds for religious belief - p26

CYBER SECURITY

8  ___ PETRAS - Cyber Security Of The Internet Of Things
   Research to make the Internet of Things safer

10 ___ Employees Behaving Badly?
   Understanding the problem of everyday insider threats

12 ___ Everyday Security
   A manifesto for new approaches to security modelling

14 ___ Cyber Security And The Politics Of Time
   Why we shouldn’t play catch-up to cyber crime

16 ___ Cyber Crime And The Social Web
   Research on the new frontier for international security and crime fighting

18 ___ The Hacker Mind Set
   There is no one-size-fits all profile

30 ___ Factcheck: The Cyber Security Attack Surface
   Seven facts on the size and complexity of vulnerable systems and devices
Understanding how extremist ideas are transmitted is a key priority of many governments and law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. This issue of CSR focuses on ‘transmission’ – the transmission of ideas, beliefs and values. Studying transmission focuses attention on how, where and by whom extremist ideologies are acquired and spread. Most ideas and values are not extreme, and the issue includes articles on transmission of religious identity within families and on how the internet has affected transmission.
3  From The Editor
4  Why Transmission?
   What we learn from studying the transmission of ideas
6  Learning To Be A Muslim
   How families nurture religious identity
8  Religious Transmission Among Young Adults In The Digital Age
   The internet helps young Sikhs explore their religion
10  Transmitting Terrorism - A Family Affair?
    Not everyone does what their parents tell them. Why?
12  How Beliefs May Come And Go
    Why do people join, and leave, cults?
14  Transmitting Legitimacy And Victimhood
    The use of prisoners in Northern Ireland to confer legitimacy
16  Transmission In Context
    Innovation in the suffragettes and loyalist family solidarity
18  From Ideological Material To Targeting Choice In Leaderless Jihad
    Does the consumption of jihadist material determine targets?
20  A Different Perspective On CVE
    An interview with Ray Hill, grassroots CVE activist
22  Disrupting Transmission Of Extremist Messaging
    How can schools counter extremism?
24  How Radical Ideas Spread And Take Hold
    Progress is not irreversible
26  Just Another Face In The Crowd?
    What makes spotting unfamiliar faces difficult?
28  When Does Inconsistency Matter?
    Should we worry when interviewees change their stories?
30  Mindmap On Transmission
    Where does socialisation take place?

Highlights

GRASSROOTS CVE
It isn’t just governments seeking counter violent extremism - one former far-right activist has been challenging it for years in his local community – p20

TRANSMITTING LEGITIMACY AND VICTIMHOOD
How have violent dissident Irish Republicans sought to keep their quest for legitimacy alive – p14
The Islamic State’s territory is in decline. Squeezed on all sides, it is facing a future where it can no longer lay claim to statehood. In this issue of CREST Security Review (CSR), leading scholars from around the globe consider ‘what happens after Islamic State?’ Topics include the plight of children forced to join Islamic State; the effects on countries like Yemen – which may become an ideal location for retreating fighters; and how al-Qaeda may benefit from Islamic State’s decline.
## CONTENTS

### AFTER ISLAMIC STATE

**REGIONAL GUIDES**

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### Highlights

- **Remainers And Leavers: Foreign Fighters After The ‘Islamic State’**
  What drives decisions for foreign fighters, and what options are available to them? – p18

- **Conspiracy Theories Are For Losers**
  Conspiracy theories are on the fringes of public opinion, and yet so many of us believe them – p28
Studying networks not only gives us an insight into our human behaviour. It also helps us understand weak points in critical networks, be it food or energy supply, or in the way a company is run. This issue of CSR highlights how studying networks can help us understand security threats and how understanding weak points in networks can be useful in both offensive and defensive applications.
CONTENTS

3  From the Editor
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    What is it and how can you increase it?
24  Community Reporting
    The key to defeating terrorism?
26  Female Participation In Violence
    Did the women of the Red Army Faction aid social progress?
28  The Far-Right
    An overview of the complex far-right landscape

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KIM KARDASHIAN AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Can we predict and prepare for a co-ordinated event disrupting a complex system? – p10

BLUFFERS GUIDE TO NETWORKS
Don’t know your betweenness centrality from your boundary spanner? Read our guide – p30

NETWORKS

4  Why Networks Matter
    Networks and their implications for security practitioners
6  Leadership Is A Social Network
    Rethinking leadership through a social network lens
8  Bad Apples
    Using networks to predict their impact on team performance
10  Predicting Failure Of Complex Systems
    Can Kim Kardashian’s photo break the internet?
12  Things That Spread
    Understanding how epidemics spread on networks
14  Social Network Messaging
    How Islamic State uses Telegram to communicate
16  Covert Networks
    Social network analysis can help us study terrorist groups
18  Trust And Insider Threat
    How can organisations retain the trust of their employees?
20  Extremist Prose As Networks
    Analysing the structure of extremist communications
30  Bluffers Guide
    Learn the technical terms of network analysis
CSR #6
Decision Making

From teams operating in extreme environments, to the emergency services, to people responsible for cyber security, understanding decision making is very important. Current research can help decision makers avoid misleading biases, from being paralysed by the choices available, or failing to get information out to the people who need it. In this issue we feature some of the latest research, including decision-making processes in cyber security, decision making under stress, and terrorist decision making.
CONTENTS

3  From The Editor
18  Communicating With Casualties
    Helping casualties help themselves
20  Understanding Engagement In Violent Extremism
    Lessons from Northern Ireland
22  Social Engineering
    How we’re tricked in to falling for scams
24  Error Handling
    Getting past mistakes in interviews and negotiations
26  How Smugglers Behave
    Research disproves the myth that jittery behaviour is easy to spot
31  Read More
    Find out more about the research we’ve featured

Highlights

MORE GULLIBLE THAN YOU THINK
We might think we wouldn’t give our keys to a stranger, but most of us would - p22

DECISION MAKING UNDER STRESS
What factors affect the decision-making capability of groups in extreme or remote environments? – p4
From helping extremists reintegrate back into society, to looking at cults and the reasons why people both leave and stay, this issue explores the series of difficult transitions some individuals and groups make. It includes research on programmes that help extremists make the transition from violent groups back into society; research that helps crisis negotiators train successful negotiation techniques, and research that looks at Russian interference on Twitter following the 2017 UK terror attacks.
 CONTENTS

3  From The Editor

18  Intelligence ethics: not an oxymoron
Applying intelligence and security activities to ethical concepts of the ‘Just War’ tradition

20  Sikh Radicalisation In Britain
Events in 1984 changed Sikh activism in Britain, but did they lead to radicalisation?

22  Russian Interference On Twitter
Evidence of attempts to influence UK public discourse following the 2017 terror attacks

24  Communicating Across Cultures
We’re awful at spotting deception across cultures. Why?

28  Mindmap: ‘I Don’t Know’
What are the reasons why sources say ‘I don’t know’?

31  Read More
Find out more about the research we’ve featured

Highlights

DRUNK, LOOKING THE WRONG WAY OR PLAIN LYING?
What do sources mean when they say ‘I don’t know’ in an interview?
This mindmap highlights what the evidence says about possible reasons – p28

SIKH RADICALISATION
There’s plenty of activism around issues like 1984 and Khalistan but, despite claims to the contrary, research finds there is no threat to Britain from Sikh radicalisation – p20
This issue gives an insight into some of the latest research on influence, from the ethical challenges of some techniques, through how people can be primed to be persuaded, to how to inoculate people from being influenced by fake news. Other articles in this extra-long issue cover understanding how cultural stereotypes can improve rapport in interviews, the need to find a way to account for mental disorder in terrorism and mass murder without pathologising violence, and whether or not being under the influence of alcohol makes for more unreliable witnesses, or not.
CONTENTS

3 __ From The Editor

36 __ The Far Right And Reciprocal Radicalisation
Could fragmentation within the far right contribute to increasingly extreme responses to Islamist terrorism?

38 __ Mental Disorder In Terrorism, Mass Murder And Violence
Moving away from pathologising violence

42 __ Read More
Find out more about the research we’ve featured

INFLUENCE

4 __ The Power Of Persuasion And Pre-Suasion To Produce Change
Preparing people to agree with a message, before they receive it

6 __ Subtle Influence And Information Disclosure
How priming works in intelligence interviews

8 __ Gaining Influence Through Genuine Connection And Rapport
Eliciting information without force or trickery

10 __ Can We Inoculate Against Fake News?
Combating misinformation by preventing it from sticking in the first place

12 __ The Partisan Brain
Why people are attracted to fake news and what to do about it

14 __ Did You Really See It, Or Just Hear About It?
In the misinformation age, remember that your memories might be fake news

16 __ Influence In Extremist Messaging
Establishing patterns in the language of extremist groups

18 __ The Trade Of The Tricks
How principles of magic can influence people’s understanding

20 __ Under The Influence
Can intoxicated informants provide accurate information?

22 __ Lingering Problems With The Mr Big Technique
Problems with a psychologically invasive and manipulative influence tactic

26 __ Positively Influencing Individuals During Organisational Change
Strategies for mitigating the risk of insider threat from disillusioned employees

30 __ Try To See Things My Way?
The role of perspective in influencing information elicitation

32 __ Cross-Cultural Dimensions Impacting Persuasion And Influence
Influence tactics rooted in Western culture may fail in other cultures, what should we look out for?

34 __ Using Stereotypes To Prepare For Interviews
Stereotypes can inform rapport building and increase information gain

40 __ A-Z Of Influence Tactics And Topics
Learn the difference between a door in the face and a foot in the door

Highlights

UNDER THE INFLUENCE
What does alcohol-intoxication mean for the reliability of evidence? Research shows it affects the quantity of information but crucially, not the quality – p20

USING STEREOTYPES TO PREPARE FOR INTERVIEWS
Stereotypes are often seen as contributing to barriers to rapport. But the opposite can be true and they can even be used to influence interviewees to disclose more information – p34
This issue highlights research on Data, and in particular on how the social and behavioural sciences can help us see the value that data and computer science can bring to understanding and countering security threats. Articles include a look into how algorithmic decision-making can be improved, to help build trust between governments and citizens; the challenges of applying big data solutions to small data problems and the risks and opportunities in using big data to predict behaviour. Two further articles address issues relating to extremism: one on why some extremists or groups choose not to engage in violence; and the second provides us with an introduction to good practice in countering violent extremism.
DATA

4  Data And The Social And Behavioural Sciences
   How can data science and behavioural science enhance each other?

6  Psychological Profiling Using Computational Language Analysis
   Understanding the person behind the text

8  Words As Data
   The vulnerability of language in an age of digital capitalism

10 The Challenges And Opportunities Of Big Data
    What are the challenges in predicting behaviour based on our digital footprints?

12 Algorithmic Decision Making
    How can re-designing system interactions help build trust between governments and citizens?

14 From Data To Datum - What Should I Do In This Case
    How can security professionals successfully combat the ecological inference problem?

24 A-Z Of Data
    Master the difference between deep learning, machine learning and unsupervised learning.

CONTENTS

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16 Untangling The Past
   Remembering details of repeated events

18 Cognitive Load At Interview: The interviewer’s Perspective
   Interviewers have a lot to process. How does it affect their performance?

20 Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide To Good Practice
   What good CVE practice should look like

22 The Role Of ‘Internal Brakes’ On Violence
   New research helps explain why some extremists choose not to engage in violence

26 Read More
   Find out more about the research we’ve featured

Highlights

LEVERAGING LANGUAGE DATA
Computational Language Analysis can help profile the person behind a text and gives us important clues about their future behaviours - p6

THE PROBLEM OF PREDICTING SOME OF THE PEOPLE, SOME OF THE TIME
While patterns of data exist, it is difficult to know which elements apply to subjects of interest. We still need to rely on humans to help us navigate ecological inference problems - p14
To varying degrees, stress is a factor in all our lives, but security work is inherently stressful. Individuals working in security often make high-consequence decisions, in complex and potentially dangerous situations, and sometimes whilst exposed to extreme environments. It is therefore crucial to operational success to identify sources of stress and implement effective coping strategies. Guest edited by Emma Barrett and Nathan Smith, this 10th issue of CREST Security Review (CSR) helps develop understanding on how we can identify, learn about and apply lessons from how stress manifests as well as how resilience can be developed.
CONTENTS

3  From The Editor

38  Increasing Accurate Recall In Human Sources
    How focusing on context can enhance memory recall

40  Understanding The Roles Women Play In Violent Extremism
    What role did female members of Islamic State play and why does it matter?

42  Read More
    Find out more about the research we’ve featured in this issue

STRESS AND RESILIENCE

4  Stress And Resilience In Security Contexts
    Guest editorial

6  Conflict Management In Extreme Environments
    Practical strategies for managing conflict in isolated teams

8  Challenge Or Threat
    Understanding how people cope in demanding environments

10  Memory And Stress
    Examining the impact of stress on memory for high-pressure incidents

14  Stress And Resilience In Al-Qaeda Terrorists
    How al-Qaeda sought to train resilience to stress

18  Strengths And Vulnerabilities In (Covert) Network Structure
    How might terrorist networks be susceptible to disruption

20  Go With The (Information) Flow
    How to develop more resilient sociotechnical systems

22  Cyber Resilience
    What is it and how do we get it?

24  Developing Resilience For Sustained Success
    Optimising social and organisational environments to promote resilient responses to stress

28  Refugee Resilience
    Identifying the effects of stress and funding ways to strengthen resilience in refugee communities

30  The Deep Effects Of Armed Conflict
    Intervening in the complexities of post-conflict reconciliation

34  Remote Combat Readines And Resiliency
    Supporting the resiliency and performance of remote combat operators

Highlights

UNDERSTANDING THE ROLES WOMEN PLAYED IN THE ISLAMIC STATE
Assumptions made about female members of Islamic State can lead to underestimating or misunderstanding the threat they may pose when they return - p40

HOW TO DEVELOP MORE RESILIENT SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS
Research on a submarine control room simulator helps us understand how technologies, human operators and interactions between the two can be optimised to create systems that are more resilient to changing demands and operational requirements - p20
In this issue of CREST Security Review magazine, we highlight some of the latest research on risk and draw attention to the challenges and potential solutions to assessing and managing the risk of violent extremism.
RISK

4 ______ Risk, Benefits, And The Affect Heuristic In Security Behaviours
How to reduce reliance on affective processes when making risk judgements

8 ______ Communicating Effectively With The Public About Terrorism In Crowded Places
How effective is public messaging in promoting protective health behaviours?

10 ______ Protecting Publicly Accessible Locations From Terrorism
What are the barriers to and incentives for the inclusion of protective security measures?

14 ______ Terrorism Risk Assessment: What Makes A ‘Good’ Risk Assessor?
Little is known about risk assessors and what they think is vital to the role

16 ______ Violent Extremism: The Assessment And Management Of Risk
8 recommendations for why and how practitioners should use developments in the risk and threat assessment field

20 ______ Risk Factors For Violent Extremist Beliefs And Parallel Problem Areas
Does a strong conspiracy mentality lead to violent extremist intentions?

22 ______ If This Then...What? Security And Privacy In Trigger-Action System
Can people be primed to think about security and privacy when setting trigger-action rules for smart home devices?

36 ______ A–Z Of Risk Assessment Tools And Topics
Understand the difference between quality assurance and quality control

Highlights

COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY WITH THE PUBLIC ABOUT TERRORISM IN CROWDED PLACES
Research on the effectiveness of existing campaigns (e.g. ‘See it, Say it, Sorted’) in preventing attacks by increasing reporting behaviours – p8

VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF RISK
Eight recommendations for why and how practitioners should use developments in the risk and threat assessment field – p16
The COVID-19 pandemic triggered the biggest global crisis of our time, with lasting changes to society from how we shake hands, where we work, how we hold meetings, travel and socialise, to our perceptions of risk, law and order, and privacy. As we grasp its continuing impact on society, this issue of CSR highlights some of the responses of behavioural and social science researchers to the pandemic, applying novel lessons to security threats caused or exacerbated by the outbreak.
CONTENTS

3  From The Editor

24  The Phoenix Model: Disengagement And Deradicalisation
    A new model for understanding disengagement and deradicalisation processes.

28  Islamic State, Filters, And Photoshop
    How the Islamic State edits its images to support its narratives.

30  The Eliciting Information Framework: A Vehicle For Research Into Practice
    A framework to help practitioners whose role is to elicit information, negotiate or build relationships with others.

34  Read More
    Find out more about the research we’ve featured in this issue.

COVID-19

4  How Has Covid-19 Changed The Violent Extremist Landscape?
    The reordering of democratic state-citizen relations can breed violent extremist thinking.

6  Lessons From A Rapid Response
    How one team’s rapid response process to COVID-19 can be applied to similarly demanding situations.

10  Where Was I Last Wednesday?
    Why contact tracing needs a dose of memory science.

12  Intelligence Gathering During A Pandemic
    How did informant handlers adapt to the measures implemented during the pandemic?

14  Multi-Agency Emergency Response
    How can effective communication across agencies be maintained during crises?

16  The "Infodemic", Inoculation, And Insurrections
    A COVID-19 vaccination communication handbook tackles misinformation.

18  The Ground TRUTH After-Action Review Tool
    The after-action review tool Ground TRUTH helps prepare for, adapt to, and recover from critical incidents.

20  Balancing Cybersecurity And Privacy In The Remote Workforce
    As remote working increased during the pandemic, so too did the cyber-attacks aiming to exploit it.

22  Covid-19 Conspiracy In Ireland And The Far-Right Nexus
    Is there a link between a rise of the far right and COVID-19 related conspiracy theories?

Highlights

THE GROUND TRUTH AFTER-ACTION REVIEW TOOL

The after-action review tool Ground TRUTH helps prepare for, adapt to, and recover from critical incidents – p18

BALANCING CYBERSECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE REMOTE WORKFORCE

Remote working will only truly work if we get the balance of security and privacy right – p20

Read More

Find out more about the research we’ve featured in this issue.
Emerging technology can give us a unique opportunity to anticipate, plan, counter, and respond to security threats as we move forward in an ever-changing world. But that same advancing technology can also be weaponised against us. This issue of CREST Security Review highlights the new opportunities and problems that advances in technology bring through a behavioural and social science lens.
CONTENTS

3  From The Editor

28  NCITE
A look at the designated counter terrorism and targeted violence research centre for the US Department of Homeland Security.

30  Evaluating The Channel Programme’s Vulnerability Assessment Framework
An outline of the results of a process evaluation of the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF).

32  How (Not) To Make A Violent Copycat: Lessons From ‘Dark Fandoms’
How ‘Dark Fandoms’ may incite ‘copycats’ – one path to violent extremism.

34  Read More
Find out more about the research we’ve featured in this issue.

Highlights

CONVERGING SECURITY
Without evidence and guidance, organisations seeking to adopt convergence may be setting themselves up for failure – p18

CHINA’S DIGITAL DIPLOMACY
Social media platforms are places where China, amongst many other states, are seeking to increase reach and influence watching publics around the world – p20

TECHNOLOGY

4  Bad Data, Worse Predictions
How does measurement error in crime data affect crime prevention?

6  Identity Fraud In The Digital Age
How are advances in technology bringing new problems to the task of detecting identity fraud?

8  “Give Me A Ping, Vasili. One Ping Only”
Why the success of machine learning depends on empowered people.

12  Linguistic Threat Assessment: Challenges And Opportunities
Large-scale linguistic analysis may help security practitioners make sense of violent communications.

14  Converging Security
Why cyber and physical security should collaborate, and what it takes to achieve this.

16  SPECIAL: Lightning Articles
• It’s not what you typed, it’s the way you typed it…
• The identity in everyone’s pocket.
• “OK Google, should I click on that email?”
• CCTV analysis of violent emergencies.

20  Mapping A New Biometrics Landscape
Law enforcement and researchers collaborate to develop an understanding of new biometrics.

22  China’s Digital Diplomacy
We get the message… China’s social media war on foreign criticism.

26  Why AI Systems Need To Explain Themselves
The question of ‘explanation’ in human interaction with Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems.
Trust permeates most aspects of our lives and allows us to function on a daily basis. We trust the food we order has not been tampered with. We trust a vet to care for our sick pet. We trust our house to keep us warm, safe, and dry. Security contexts are no exception. Trust offers a mental shortcut that allows us to make immediate (and at times automatic) decisions. In some cases, this is useful as it frees up thinking space to focus on other tasks. In other cases, trust-as-a-heuristic, can be problematic.
Happen if you do? – p
What can organisations do to repair trust?

CONTENTS
3 From the Editor
28 Right-wing Extremism Online – Can we use Digital Data to Measure Risk?
   Combining psychology and computational science methods to identify whether online behaviour can be used to infer the risk offline.
30 What is Siege Culture?
   Siege Culture is the most extreme interpretation of fascism and national socialism seen yet.
32 Read more
   Find out more about the research we’ve featured in this issue.

Highlights

RECOVERING FROM FAILURE
What can organisations do to repair trust? – p20

MY LIFE IN YOUR HANDS
Is it a problem to blindly trust AI? What might happen if you do? – p22

SUMMARY
NO ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL APPROACH

TRUST
4 Trust in Security Contexts
   An overview of the articles focusing on our special topic of trust.
6 Rapport and Trust: What’s the Difference?
   Rapport and trust are not the same: how research is attempting to disentangle these concepts.
8 Evaluating Trust And Rapport: A Practitioner’s Guide
   Using the Eliciting Information Framework to distinguish between trust and rapport.
10 Trust Thy Enemy: Trust and Relationship-Building between Source Handlers and Informants.
   A look at trust in information disclosure.
12 Trust Signals
   Can our automatic behaviours tell us more about how much we trust than our thought-out beliefs?
14 Lessons For Security Practitioners from the Science of Betrayal
   Betrayal in defence, security, and policing contexts.
18 Trust = Confidence + Vulnerability. The Role of the Leader
   How do leaders promote trust and reduce security risks?
20 Recovering from Failure: What can Organisations do to Repair Trust?
   Trust is crucial for organisational effectiveness, but how can companies respond if they violate stakeholder trust?
22 Emotional (over) Trust in AI
   Emotional-based trust in AI can easily become a problematic over-trust.
24 Trusting a Centre Model
   Trust is hard to earn, yet easy to lose. How can organisations rebuild trust?
26 A-Z of Trust
   Your guide to the multi-faceted nature of trust.
CREST has a large and growing number of projects focused on providing evidence-based solutions to problems faced by those on the front-line in mitigating and preventing security threats. In this section we list the variety of outputs produced by each project. These are added to continuously, even by projects whose funding has now finished, as peer-review articles are published, follow-up studies conducted, and research translated into toolkits, guides and briefs for direct application.

If you’d find it useful to have some of this research summarised and translated for use in your area of work, please get in touch. Likewise, if you’re a researcher who thinks we’ve missed some of the relevant work out, let us know and we’ll make sure it is added to the list!
ACTORS AND IDEOLOGIES IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

PI: KIM KNOTT

This project improved our understanding of where and how beliefs and values, including from extremist ideologies, are transmitted and learned and why and how people engage and disengage from terrorist violence.

JOURNALS


GUIDES

A Short Guide To Narratives Of The Far-Right

Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide To Good Practice - 10, 34

British Muslims: A History - 13

British Muslims: Charities And Organisations - 13

British Muslims: Demography & Communities - 13
British Muslims: Families - 13
British Muslims: Gender & Generations - 13
British Muslims: Mosques - 13
British Muslims: Sectarian Movements - 13
Deradicalisation Programmes: Introductory Guide - 10
How And Why Ideologies Are Shared And Learned - 9
Islam: Conversion - 8
Islam: The Five Pillars - 8
The Counter Jihad Movement - 8
Understanding The Far-Right Landscape - 10

ARTICLES

Affect And Emotion In Extremist Discourse
Are Converts To Islam More Likely To Become Extremists?
From Ideological Material To Targeting Choice In Leaderless Jihadist
Grassroots Counter Messaging In The UK
How Does The Family Pass On Religion? - 42
How Do Teachers Engage With Prevent?
MindMap: Ideological Transmission - 42
One Peaceful March Doesn’t Change Pegida’s Disturbing Ideology
Paris Attacks: There Is No Simple Explanation
Reintegrating Extremists: ‘Deradicalisation’ And Desistance - 50
Research Drives Understanding And Disruption Of Terrorism
Terrorists’ Use Of Messaging Applications - 40
The Importance Of Terrorists’ Families And Friends
The Role Of Gender In Violent Extremism
Transmitting Terrorism: A Family Affair? - 42
Understanding The Counter-Jihad
Understanding The Roles Women Play In Violence Extremism And Why It Matters - 56
What Are The Five Pillars Of Islam? - 8
What’s The Difference Between Sunni And Shi’a Muslims? - 8
Why Transmission? - 42

REPORTS

Extremism Risk Assessment: A Directory - 26
Ideological Transmission: Families - 11
Ideological Transmission: Peers, Education, And Prisons - 11
Ideological Transmission: Political And Religious Organisations - 11
Muslims And Islam In The UK - 13
Reciprocal Radicalisation - 10

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/ideas-beliefs-values/

ACTORS AND NARRATIVES

PI: CERWYN MOORE
This project examined the narratives of people who get involved in, and disengage from, terrorism.

ARTICLES

After St Petersburg: Russia And The Threat From Central Asian Terror Networks
Lessons From The Decline Of The North Caucasus Insurgency
Loyal Footsoldiers: The Attractions Of EDL Activism
Remainers And Leavers: Foreign Fighters After The ‘Islamic State’ - 44
Russia’s Domestic Terrorism Threat Is Serious, Sophisticated, And Complex
Transnational Activism Through The Ages - 44

REPORTS

After Islamic State: Workshop Reports 1-4 - 9
Russia And Disinformation: Institutions And Actors - 12, 33
Russia And Disinformation: Maskirovka - 12, 33
Russia And Disinformation: The Case Of The Caucasus - 12, 33
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY
Of Expertise And Inertia In Emergency Service
Responses In A Counter-Terrorism Live Exercise
PI: LAURENCE ALISON
This project examined police and emergency
service response during a counter-terrorism
live exercise, with a specific focus on expertise,
team decision making, and decision command-
level inertia.

GUIDES
Considerations For Training Development -
26
Factors That Affect Command Decision-Making -
24

ARTICLES
Persuasion And Influence Or Genuine Connection
And Rapport
Communicating With Casualties In Emergencies
Building Good Rapport In Interviews

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/
expertise-and-inertia/

BEHAVIOURAL ANALYTICS
PI: PAUL TAYLOR
This project looks at whether organised crime
can be prevented by predicting people’s
characteristics, networks, and intentions from
the way they have previously behaved?

JOURNALS
and Behavioral Examinations of Online Terrorism
[Chapter]. Violent Extremism: Breakthroughs in
Same Kind of Different: Affordances, Terrorism,
and the Internet. Criminology & Public Policy,
16(1), 127–133. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-
9133.12285
Mimicry in online conversations: An exploratory
study of linguistic analysis techniques. Advances
in Social Networks Analysis and Mining
(ASONAM) : 2016 IEEE/ACM International
Conference On, 732–736. https://doi.org/10.1109/
ASONAM.2016.7752318
Predicting Collective Action from Micro-Blog
Data. In J. Kawash, N. Agarwal, & T. Özver
(Eds.), Prediction and Inference from Social
Networks and Social Media (pp. 141–170).
Springer International Publishing. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-51049-1_7
from the extreme: What business negotiators
can learn from hostage negotiations. The
utwente.nl/en/publications/lessons-from-the-extreme-
what-business-negotiators-can-learn-from
Taylor, P. J., Larner, S., Conchie, S. M., &
changes in linguistic self-presentation and
detail provision when deceiving others. Royal
org/10.1098/rsos.170128
Zee, S. van der, Poppe, R., Taylor, P. J., &
Anderson, R. (2019). To freeze or not to freeze:
A culture-sensitive motion capture approach to
detecting deceit. PLOS ONE, 14(4), e0215000.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215000

ARTICLES
7 Things Worth Knowing About Groups
Apple Or Android? What Your Choice Of
Operating System Says About You
COMMUNICATING ACROSS CULTURES - 50
From Data To Datum: What Should I Do In This Case? - 54
The A–Z Of Information Elicitation - 38
The Future Of Wearable Technology
The Promise Of Social Science

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/behavioural-analytics/

BEST PRACTICES
For Disruption And Measures Of Effect
PI: STACEY CONCHIE
This project aims to develop novel, precise, and ethical ways to measure operational outcomes.

RESOURCES
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

JOURNALS

CLICKA
Collecting And Leveraging Identity Cues With Keystroke Analysis
PI: OLI BUCKLEY
This project examines keynote dynamics, which is the study and analysis of an individual's typing behaviours. These typing patterns can be as uniquely identifying as a user's signature or handwriting and as such can be used to confirm the identity of an individual.

ARTICLES
CLICKA - 19
A To Z Of Data - 54

REPORTS
Collecting And Leveraging Identity Cues With Keystroke Analysis (CLICKA) - 19

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/clicka/

COMMUNITY REPORTING
Of Violent Extremist Activity And Involvement In Foreign Conflict
PI: PAUL THOMAS, MICHÈLE GROSSMAN
This project examined the dynamics and barriers to community reporting in the UK.

JOURNALS

ARTICLES
Community Reporting On Terrorism: Bystanders Versus Social Intimates
Community Reporting Of Terrorist Involvement During Covid-19 - 60
What Are The Barriers To Reporting People Suspected Of Violent Extremism?
Community Reporting: The Key To Defeating Terrorism? - 46
Manchester Attack: An ‘Arms Race’ Against Ever Adapting Terror Networks

REPORTS
Community Reporting Thresholds - 17, 34

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/reporting-violent-extremism/
CON.CEL: Tracking The Online Contagion Of InCel And Male Supremacist Ideology

PI: LEWYS BRACE
This project focused on InCel ideology — a misogynistic worldview whose proponents blame women for their lack of sexual activity, to map out the online “InCelosphere” and tracks its dynamics of contagion.

ARTICLES
A Short Introduction To The Involuntary Celibate Sub-Culture

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/tracking-online-contagion-incel/

CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND EXTREMISM

PI: PAUL GILL, BETTINA ROTTWEILER
This project examines the types of conspiracy theories that are most closely aligned with violent intentions (e.g. belief in QAnon vs. flat-earth) as well as articulating the relevance of conspiracy and extremist beliefs to one another.

Resources and journals for this project will be available soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/conspiracy-theories-and-extremism/

CONSTRAINING VIOLENCE

PI: SARAH MARSDEN
“This project examines the individual and social level protective factors and subcultural constraints to identify when and why violence fails to emerge from extremist contexts.

Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/constraining-violence/

COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIOUR
Assessing And Mitigating The Impact Of Organisational Change On CWB

PI: ROSALIND SEARLE
This project builds on existing evidence to produce the first (dis)trust-based framework for predicting, identifying, and mitigating counterproductive working behaviours and insider threat within an organisational change context.

JOURNALS

GUIDES
Animation: Positively Influencing Individuals During Organisational Change - 69
A Manager's Guide To Organisational Change - 69
Managing Organisational Change: Practitioner Toolkit - 69
Managing Organisational Change: Organisational Culture Toolkit - 69
Managing Organisational Change: Individuals Toolkit - 69
Managing Organisational Change: Leaders Toolkit - 69
Managing Organisational Change: Team Relations Toolkit - 69
Video: Managing Organisational Change - 69
Managing Organisational Change: Using The CWB Toolkits - 69

ARTICLES
Positively Influencing Individuals During Organisational Change - 69, 37
How Messing With Employee Pensions Can Backfire On Companies

Trust And Insider Threat: Ensuring We Don’t Look Back – Or Forward – In Anger

Trust And Citizenship: The Insider Threat

REPORTS

Managing Organisational Change - 69, 37

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/counterproductive-work-behaviour/

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: Methods, Processes And Outcomes

PI: KIM KNOTT
This project identified what we know about how to prevent and counter violent extremist (CVE) through a narrative synthesis of CVE programmes delivered in the UK and Internationally.

GUIDES

Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide To Good Practice - 28, 34, 29

Countering Violent Extremism: An Introduction - 28, 34, 29

REPORTS

Women And Preventing And Countering Violent Extremism Interventions - 28, 34, 29

Countering Violent Extremism Interventions: Contemporary Research - 28, 34, 29

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/counterproductive-work-behaviour/

DEVELOPING BEST PRACTICES For Online Elicitation

PI: LORRAINE HOPE
This project aims to identify the best elicitation techniques for use online, with a focus on building rapport and communication strategies.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/developing-best-practices-for-online-elicitation/

DEVELOPMENT OF RISK ASSESSMENT SCHEMES For Channel

PI: PAUL GILL AND ZOE MARCHMENT
This project will develop a prototype risk assessment scheme for individuals referred to Channel through the refinement of existing guidance and the production of a new process.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/risk-assessment-schemes-for-channel/

DETECTING HYBRID SOCIAL IDENTITIES

A Computational Analysis Of Influence And Resilience In Online RWE Communities

PI: ANASTASIA KORDONI
The project aims to provide evidence-based guidelines on the identity dynamics and types of norms that are effective in building influence within hybrid Right-Wing Extremist online communities as well as the dynamics that weaken influence.

Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/detecting-hybrid-social-identities/

DIFFERENCES IN THE ABILITY TO SPOT Rare, Non-Salient Or Hidden Targets

PI: NICK DONNELLY
This project reviewed the literature on individual
differences in the ability to detect rare, hidden, or non-salient targets, and conducted a reanalysis of existing data to pull out the impact of individual differences.

GUIDES

What Makes Spotting Faces Difficult? - 17
Finding Hidden Targets - 17
Individual Differences In Ability To Search - 17
Detecting Rare Targets - 17

How Training And Professional Experience Affect The Ability To Spot Targets - 17

ARTICLES

Just Another Face In The Crowd – What Makes Spotting Unfamiliar Faces Difficult? - 42

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/spotting-hidden-targets/

ELICITING INFORMATION

PI: ALDERT VRIJ
This project identifies how social and cognitive processes contribute to promoting complete recall and accurate deception detection.

JOURNALS


Vrij, A., Mann, S., Leal, S., & Fisher, R. P.


GUIDES
A Timeline Helps Interviewees Recall And Report Events - 16
Eliciting Information From Cooperative Sources About Single And Repeated Multi-Actor Events - 17, 18
Eliciting Information From Memory About Criminal Gangs And Terrorist Cells - 18
The verifiability technique - 16
Memory And Consistency In Eliciting Information: When Does (In)Consistency Matter? - 17, 17
The Cognitive Interview - 16
The Model Statement Technique - 16
The Unexpected Questions Technique - 16
Using Self-Generated Cues To Elicit Information - 17, 18

ARTICLES
Connecting Culture To Deception Detection
Developing An Evidenced-Based Approach To Enhance Recall Of Intelligence
From The Lab To Operational Response: Examining The Impact Of Stress On Memory For High Pressure Incidents
How Does Memory Work? - 38
How Do We Measure Rapport In Interviews? - 40
Increasing Accurate Recall In Human Sources
Memory At The Sharp End: The Psychology Of Eliciting Information - 38
Memory Recall: The Challenge Of Eliciting Reliable Information - 38
Try To See Things My Way? The Role Of Perspective Taking In Eliciting Information
Untangling The Past: Remembering Details Of Repeated Events - 54

POSTERS
Complete series of What Sources Mean When They Say ‘I don’t Know’ posters - 19

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/eliciting-information/

ENVIRONMENT AND INTERVENTIONS:
Assessing The Environmental Risk Of Terrorism
PI: NOÉMIE BOUHANA
Operationalising an existing SAT (Situational Action Theory)-supported framework known as “SS” the resulting risk assessment framework from this project seeks to aid the design and evaluation of interventions aimed at preventing radicalisation through influencing context.
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/environment-and-interventions/
ETHNO-NATIONAL, RELIGIO-CULTURAL OR ANTI-MUSLIM?
Investigating Sikh Radicalisation In Britain.
PI: JASJIT SINGH
This project explored the current state of Sikh radicalisation in the UK, including an open-source evaluation of the threat and likelihood of violent Sikh extremism, and the involvement of Sikhs in far-right and anti-Muslim movements.

JOURNALS
Singh, J. (2020b). Narratives in Action: Modelling the Types and Drivers of Sikh Activism in Diaspora. Religions, 11(10), 539. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11100539

GUIDES
Sikh Activism In Britain: Narratives And Issues - 8

ARTICLES
Religious Transmission Among Young Adults In The Digital Age - 42
Sikh Activism In Britain - 50

REPORTS
The Idea, Context, Framing, And Realities Of ‘Sikh Radicalisation’ In Britain - 8

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/sikh-radicalisation-britain/

EVALUATING SECURITY INTERVENTIONS IN PUBLIC LOCATIONS:
Developing And Testing A Co-Created Framework For Protective Security
PI: DAIVD MCILHATTON
This project will help understand unintended consequences of flawed protective security logic, and more importantly provide a framework to consider success from the earliest possible stage across the protective security spectrum (e.g., training, physical security, people and personnel, and procedural).
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/evaluating-security-interventions-in-public-locations/

FACTORS THAT DETER
Threat Actors And Reconnaissance
PI: PAUL GILL
This project aims to develop our understanding of hostile actors’ experiences and behaviour, including their target selection and reconnaissance, with the purpose of informing existing and new forms of deterrence.
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/factors-that-deter-threat-actors-and-reconnaissance/

‘HOT PERIODS’ OF ANTI-MINORITY ACTIVISM
And The Threat Of Violent Domestic Extremism: Towards An Assessment Framework
PI: JOEL BUSHER
Keystroke dynamics is the study and analysis of an individual’s typing behaviours. These typing patterns can be as uniquely identifying as a user’s signature or handwriting and as such can be used to confirm the identity of an individual.

ARTICLES
The Escalation And Inhibition Of Violence During Waves Of Far-Right Or Anti-Minority Protests (also available in German).
**REPORTS**
The Dynamics Of Violence Escalation And Inhibition During ‘Hot Periods’ Of Anti-Minority And Far-Right Activism (Executive Summary also available in German translation) - 28

**PROJECT PAGE:** https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/anti-minority-activism-violent-domestic-extremism/

**HOW DOES ISIS’ ONLINE PROPAGANDA DEMONSTRATE MECHANISMS OF RADICALISATION?**
**PI: STEPHANE BAELE**
This project identified how ISIS’ online propaganda demonstrates the dynamics of radicalisation by conducting a large-scale, computer-assisted analysis of ISIS’ online content.

**JOURNALS**

**ARTICLES**
**Article:** Extremist Prose As Networks - 46

**PROJECT PAGE:** https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/isis-online-propaganda/

**HUMAN ENGAGEMENT**
Through Artificial / Augmented Intelligence
**PI: CHRIS BABER**
‘Augmented intelligence’ uses Artificial Intelligence / Machine Learning (AI / ML) to extend human cognitive ability. An experienced analyst plus augmented intelligence ought to produce a performance that is superior to either entity alone. The capabilities of the AI / ML for exploring vast data resources and discovering patterns exceeds that of the human, whereas the human’s expertise will allow insight into unusual or unfamiliar patterns. Thus, there is a need to ensure collaboration in pursuit of sense-making.

**GUIDES**
**Guide:** AI And System Developers - 19
**Guide:** AI And Senior Managers - 19

**ARTICLES**
**Article:** Why AI Systems Need To Explain Themselves - 62

**PROJECT PAGE:** https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/human-engagement-through-ai/

**IMAGINATIVE SCENARIO PLANNING**
For Law Enforcement Organisations
**PI: MATH NOORTMANN, JULIETTE KONING**
This project investigated scenario planning for future security threats by engaging with law organisations in the Netherlands and the UK.

**GUIDES**
Imaginative Scenario Planning Toolkit - 24, 33

**REPORTS**
Imaginative Scenario Planning - 24, 33

**PROJECT PAGE:** https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/imaginative-scenario-planning/

**INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES**
In The Adoption, Secure Use, And Exploitation Of Smart Home Technology
**PI: EMMA WILLIAMS**
This project used home-based IoT technology and cyber-enabled crime as a basis to explore the relationship between individual differences
in the adoption and use of new technology, and the exploitation of such technologies for nefarious purposes.

**ARTICLES**

If This Then...What? Security And Privacy In Trigger-Action Systems - 58

What Influences Consumer Adoption And Secure Use Of Smart Home Technology?

Mapping Smart Home Vulnerabilities To Cyber-Enabled Crime

**REPORTS**

Individual Differences In The Adoption, Secure Use, And Exploitation Of Smart Home Technology - 26

**PROJECT PAGE:** [https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/adoption-and-exploitation-of-smart-home-technology/](https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/adoption-and-exploitation-of-smart-home-technology/)

**INOCULATING AGAINST THE SPREAD**

Of Islamophobic And Extremist Islamist Disinformation

**PI: STEPHAN LEWANDOWSKY**

This project examined the efficacy of inoculation against misinformation.

**REPORTS**

Inoculating Against The Spread Of Islamophobic And Radical-Islamist Disinformation - 32

**PROJECT PAGE:** [https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/inoculating-islamophobic-extremist-islamist-disinformation/](https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/inoculating-islamophobic-extremist-islamist-disinformation/)

**KEEPING SECRETS ONLINE**

**PI: WENDY MONCUR**

This project drew together a wealth of research into how people keep secrets online, what helps them to keep those secrets, what acts as barriers, and how these vary based on age, gender, and culture.

**JOURNALS**


**PROJECT PAGE:** [https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/keeping-secrets-online/](https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/keeping-secrets-online/)

**KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT**

Across The Four Counter-Terrorism ‘Ps’

**PI: SARAH MARSDEN**

This project presented a series of nine reports exploring priority areas of policy and practice that fall within the four pillars of CONTEST (Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare).

**REPORTS**

Public Experiences Of The UK Counter-Terrorism System - 32

Terrorism-Related Simulations - 29

Evaluating Programmes To Prevent And Counter Extremism - 29

The Relationship Between Mental Health Problems And Terrorism - 29

Behavioural-Focused Protective Security Programmes - 29

Extremist Risk Assessment - 29

Economic Influences On Radicalisation - 29

Right-Wing Terrorism: Pathways And Protective Factors - 29

Managing Terrorism-Related Offenders In Prison - 29

**PROJECT PAGE:** [https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/the-four-counter-terrorism-ps](https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/the-four-counter-terrorism-ps)
LEARNING AND UNLEARNING TERRORISM:
The Transition From Civilian Life Into Paramilitarism And Back Again During The Conflict And Peace Process In Northern Ireland

PI: NEIL FERGUSON

This project examined over 20 years of data relating to the Conflict and Peace process in Northern Ireland to draw lessons on terrorism.

JOURNALS


GUIDES

The Violent Extremist Lifecycle: 12 Lessons From Northern Ireland - 13

ARTICLES

Understanding Engagement In Violent Extremism In Northern Ireland - 13

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestrsearch.ac.uk/projects/learning-unlearning-terrorism/

LINGUISTIC TOOLS

To Measure Source Motivation And Intent

PI: RYAN BOYD

This project explores the identification and verbal/behavioural quantification of motives and processes involved in the disclosure of sensitive information.

Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestrsearch.ac.uk/projects/linguistic-tools-to-measure-source-motivation-and-intent/

MICE2

Mapping And Modelling Influence Interactions Between Conspiracy Communities And Extremist Entities

PI: MARTIN INNES

This project will develop an empirically informed, conceptual model of the interactive influences between contemporary forms of political extremism and conspiracy theories.

Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestrsearch.ac.uk/projects/mapping-influence-between-conspiracy-communities-and-extremist-entities/

MAPPING TERRORIST EXPLOITATION

Of And Migration Between Online Communication And Content-Hosting Platforms

PI: SHIRAZ MAHER

This project explored how and why jihadist extremists use online communication and content-hosting platforms, and under what circumstances they migrate between them.

REPORTS

How Telegram Disruption Impacts Jihadist Platform Migration - 32

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestrresearch.ac.uk/projects/mapping-terrorist-exploitation
MEMETIC IRONY
And The Promotion Of Violence Within Chan Cultures
PI: GUILLERMO SUAREZ-TANGIL
This project investigated the role of alt-right online subcultures in the promotion and escalation of real-world violence.

ARTICLES
After 8chan /K/ And The Visual Culture Of Weapons Boards

REPORTS
Memetic Irony And The Promotion Of Violence Within Chan Cultures - 13

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/promotion-of-violence-within-chan-cultures

MINIMAL SOCIAL EXCLUSION:
A Means To Increased Information Gain In Human Intelligence Interviews?
PI: PÅR-ANDERS GRANHAG
This project addressed the challenge of increasing the willingness of interviewees and informants to share reliable information with law enforcement and security/intelligence agencies.

JOURNALS

REPORTS
Masterclass In Eliciting Intelligence Information - 17

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/minimal-social-exclusion/

MINING THE CHANS
Exposing The Visual And Linguistic Dynamics Of Radicalisation In Far-Right Image-Boards
PI: STEPHANE BAELE
The MineChans project sought to expose and analyse the visual and linguistic practices of two image-boards (4Chan/pol, 8Chan) that play a central role in the emergence and cementing of a new transnational far-right subculture linked to several recent instances of terrorism.

JOURNALS

GUIDES
Mining The Chans - 13

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/mining-the-chans/

MISOGyny, HOSTILE BELIEFS AND THE TRANSMISSION OF EXTREMISM:
A Comparison Of The Far-Right In The UK And Australia
PI: ALEXANDRA PHELAN
This project examines the role of online channels in amplifying gender ideology and misogyny across transnational networks.

Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/misogyny-hostile-beliefs-and-transmission-of-extremism/
MODELLING ONLINE ENGAGEMENT PATTERNS
To Infer Risk
PI: ADAM JOINSON
This project explores the link between online engagement and offline action within right-wing extremism and whether it is possible to distinguish the keyboard warriors from those who pose genuine threat for offline violence.
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/modelling-online-engagement-patterns-to-infer-risk/

ONLINE EFFICACY
Of Cognitive Credibility Assessment
PI: ALDERT VRIJ
This project examines the use of Cognitive Credibility Assessment techniques regarding omissions when reporting on past events and genuine/deceptive beliefs and attitudes.
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/online-efficacy-of-cognitive-credibility-assessment/

PRACTICE CONSOLIDATION AND ASSESSTMENT
PI: ZAINAB AL-ATTAR
This project aims to consolidate best practice in assessing the risk of extremism in individuals.
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/practice-consolidation-and-assessment/

PROSECUTING EXTREMISTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM:
An Exploration Of Charging, Prosecution And Sentencing Outcomes
PI: RACHEL MONAGHAN
This project will deliver a comprehensive insight into the prosecution landscape for extremist actors in the UK from charges brought, offences prosecuted, and for those extremist actors guilty of criminal offences, the sentences received using an interdisciplinary mixed method approach.
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/prosecuting-extremists-in-the-united-kingdom/

PROTECTIVE SECURITY & RISK ASSESSMENT
PI: DEBI ASHENDEN
This project increased understanding on how we can ‘patch with people’ and considered security as a social practice enacted in an organisational context.

JOURNALS


ARTICLES
Algorithmic Decision Making - 54
Converging Security - 62
Creativity And Cyber Security
Data And The Social And Behavioural Sciences - 54
Employees Behaving Badly
Fact Check: The Cyber Security Attack Surface
Phishing Scams Are Becoming Ever More Sophisticated And Firms Are Struggling To Keep Up
TalkTalk Data Breach Is A Wake Up Call For CEOs
Your Employees: The Front Line In Cyber Security

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/protective-security-risk-assessment/

RAPPORT BUILDING:
Online Vs In-Person Interview
PI: EWOUT MEIJER
This project explored the effectiveness of conducting online witness interviews via chat compared to in-person interviews

REPORTS
Rapport Building: Online Vs In-Person Interviews - 18

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/rapport-building-online-vs-in-person/

RAPPORT-BUILDING TRAINING
Quantifying The Effectiveness Of An Evidence-Based Programme
PI: FIONA GABBERT, GORDON WRIGHT
This project maps the existing literature on rapport-building and uses the findings to develop an evidence-based training programme to test the extent to which individuals can be trained to better build rapport.

REPORTS
Quantifying The Effectiveness Of A Rapport-Building Training Programme - 19

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/evidence-based-rapport-building-training-programme/

SPEC
Simulated Phishing And Employee Cybersecurity Behaviour
PI: JOHN BLYTHE
This project conducted two studies with differing approaches to investigate (i) how policies on simulated phishing emails are currently implemented in organisations using a cross-sectional survey and (ii) the impact of simulated phishing emails policies on employees’ cyber security awareness and their perceptions of key factors (organisational trust, procedural fairness, stress and perceived monitoring) through an experimental study.

BRIEFS
Phishing Your Staff: A Double-Edged Sword? - 32

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/spec/

STARS:
Situational Threat And Response Signals (STARS): Understanding Overt Communications in Terrorism Deterrence Across Different UK Contexts
PI: CHARIS RICE
The project will establish and elaborate a sophisticated and flexible appreciation of how and why communication campaigns designed to deter terrorism and deliver influence over public behaviour, achieve differing outcomes.
Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/understanding-overt-communications-in-terrorism-deterrence/
SOFT FACTS AND DIGITAL BEHAVIOURAL INFLUENCING
PI: MARTIN INNES
This study examined how ‘soft facts’ attached to security events influence individual and collective behaviours, and what are the most effective countermeasures for managing their consequences.

JOURNALS

ARTICLES
Russian Influence And Interference On Twitter Following The 2017 UK Terrorist Attacks - 12

REPORTS
Soft Facts And Digital Behavioural Influencing After The 2017 Terror Attacks - 12, 35

BRIEFS
Russian Influence And Interference Measures Following The 2017 UK Terrorist Attacks - 12

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/soft-facts-digital-behavioural-influencing/

STATE OF THE UNION:
A Synthesis Of Recent Evidence For Multilevel Drivers Of Involvement In Terrorism
PI: NOÉMIE BOUHANA
This project aims to synthesise the most recent thinking and evidence on terrorism involvement in the West and, to explore whether the key models of terrorism involvement remain applicable to the UK’s most recent homegrown cases.

REPORTS
Are Conceptual Frameworks Of Radicalisation Leading To Involvement In Terrorism ‘Observable’? - 28

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/state-of-the-union/

TAKING DECISIONS ABOUT INFORMATION VALUE
PI: ASHRAF LABIB
This project developed and evaluated an innovative approach to address errors in judgement in the decision-making process.

GUIDES
A Sea Change For Intelligence Analysis? - 18

REPORTS
Taking Decisions About Information Value - 18

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/taking-decisions-information-value/

TERRORIST DECISION-MAKING Regarding Security And Risk
PI: PAUL GILL
This project built a better understanding of how terrorists make judgements about risk and security, and how this informs their actions (e.g., operational security measures, targeting decisions, hostile reconnaissance).

GUIDES
How Do Criminals Make Decisions? - 24, 38
How Do Terrorists Make Decisions? - 24, 38
ARTICLES
8 Things You Need To Know About Terrorist Decision-Making - 48

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/terrorist-decision-making/

THE ADAPTABLE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER:
Developing A Measure Of Adaptive Effectiveness
PI: SIMON OLESZKIEWICZ
This project developed a behavioural measure of adaptability relevant to police contexts through the use of a novel experimental paradigm.

ARTICLES
The Adaptable Law Enforcement Officer - 58

REPORTS
Developing A Paradigm To Assess And Measure Adaptability - 18

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/human-engagement-through-ai/

THE CYBER SECURITY RISKS OF DIGITAL HOARDING
PI: NICK NEAVE
This project explored the psychological characteristics of individuals who engage in digital hoarding, and the risks these behaviours can pose to organisations.

JOURNALS

ARTICLES
The Risks Of Digital Hoarding - 26

REPORTS
Cybersecurity Risks Of Digital Hoarding Behaviours - 26

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/cyber-security-risks-digital-hoarding/

THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT ONLINE MEDIUMS
And Variable Formats On Information Disclosure In Vetting Interviews
PI: CALVIN BURNS
This project examines how different online mediums (audio and video) affect disclosure of information during interviews.

Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/evaluating-countering-violent-extremism/

UNDERSTANDING TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MILITANT ANTI-FASCISM:
An Analytical Framework And Matrix
PI: NIGEL COPSEY
This project enhanced our understanding of 21st-century militant anti-fascism as a form of ‘violent domestic extremism’.

JOURNALS

REPORTS
Understanding 21st-Century Militant Anti-Fascism - 11

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/twenty-first-century-militant-anti-fascism/
THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION

PI: JOEL BUSHER
This project enhanced our understanding of decision making within extremist/terrorist groups and movements by enabling analysis of a largely neglected dimension of their decision-making: the mechanisms through which group members themselves seek to inhibit or set parameters around the adoption of new or more extreme forms of violence – what we refer to as the ‘internal brakes’ on violent escalation.

JOURNALS

ARTICLES
Credibility Contests And The Ebb And Flow Of Anti-Minority Activism
Explaining Non-Or Limited Escalation Of Violence: The Role Of ‘Internal Brakes’

REPORTS
The Internal Brakes On Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology - 11, 32
The Internal Brakes On Violent Escalation: The Transnational And British Jihadi Scene - 11, 32
The Internal Brakes On Violent Escalation: The British Extreme Right - 11, 32
The Internal Brakes On Violent Escalation: The Animal Liberation Movement - 11, 32

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/internal-brakes-on-violent-escalation/

INTEROP
The Psychology Of Interoperability: Building Better Multi-Agency Counter-Terrorism Training

PI: NICOLA POWER
This project will identify the behavioural and verbal indicators of challenges to interoperability with the aim of developing and testing a training intervention.

Outputs and publications from this project coming soon.

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/trauma-adversity-and-violent-extremism/

TRAUMA, ADVERSITY AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

PI: SARAH MARSDEN
This project focuses on understanding how trauma and adversity are implicated in violent extremism’s causes, processes and outcomes as well as considering the implications of these insights for intervention policy and practice.

REPORTS
Trauma, Adversity, And Violent Extremism - 9, 28, 33

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/trauma-adversity-and-violent-extremism/

UNDERSTANDING & COUNTERING ONLINE BEHAVIOUR

PI: ADAM JOINSON
This project provided an understanding of online behaviours and how the internet can be used in recruitment and radicalisation.

JOURNALS
Bowden-Green, T., Hinds, J., & Joinson, A. (2020). How is extraversion related to social media use? A literature review. Personality and


ARTICLES

Behaviour Prediction: The Challenges And
Opportunities Of Big Data - 54
Eliciting Information Online - 38
How Does Phishing Work?
Is There Something Missing? Terror Finances And The UK Review Of Economic Crime
Mind Map: The Bluffers Guide To Networks - 46
The Criminal Finances Bill
The Future Of Wearable Technology
What Is The Role Of Technology In An Emergency? - 40
Where Does The Islamic State Get Its Money?
Why Networks Matter - 46

GUIDES
2017 Messaging Applications - 27
Introductory Guide To Phishing - 27

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/understanding-and-countering-online-behaviour/

UNDERSTANDING MORAL INJURY
And Belief Change In The Experiences Of Police Investigators In Child Exploitation Units
PI: PETER LEE
This project examined the effect of continuous exposure to visual imagery in the police and other law enforcement professionals who investigate child exploitation.

GUIDES
Moral Injury In Child Exploitation Investigators - 26
Exploring Trauma In Child Exploitation Investigators - 26

REPORTS
Understanding Moral Injury In Police Online Child Sex Crime Investigators - 26

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/understanding-moral-injury-child-exploitation/
WHY DO PEOPLE ADOPT CONSPIRACY THEORIES, How Are They Communicated, And What Are Their Risks?

PI: KAREN DOUGLAS
This project developed our understanding of conspiracy theories: their emergence, transmission and methods to counter them.

JOURNALS


REPORTS
Conspiracy Theories: How Are They Adopted, Communicated, And What Are Their Risks? - 13, 24, 34

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/conspiracy-theories/

disinformation. PLOS ONE, 15(10), e0239666. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0239666

BRIEFS
Why Do People Share Disinformation On Social Media? - 9, 33

PROJECT PAGE: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/disinformation-on-social-media/

WHY DO PEOPLE SPREAD DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA?

PI: TOM BUCHANAN
This project identifies the characteristics of disinformation messages (e.g., authoritative source, digital media literacy) that determine whether they are shared online, and the moderating effect of social media context.

JOURNALS
Buchanan, T. (2020). Why do people spread false information online? The effects of message and viewer characteristics on self-reported likelihood of sharing social media
The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), is funded by the UK’s Home Office and security and intelligence agencies to identify and produce social science that enhances their understanding of security threats and capacity to counter them. CREST also receives funding from its core partners (the universities of Bath, Lancaster and Portsmouth). Its funding is administered by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC Award ES/V002775/1), one of seven UK Research Councils, which direct taxpayers’ money towards academic research and training. The ESRC ensures the academic independence and rigour of CREST’s work.

CREST has established a growing international network of over 220 researchers, commissioned research in priority areas, and is tackling some of the field’s most pressing questions.

For more information on CREST and its work visit www.crestresearch.ac.uk