The Idea, Context, Framing and Realities of ‘Sikh Radicalisation’ in Britain

FULL REPORT
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Dr Jasjit Singh
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Dr Jasjit Singh
School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science
University of Leeds

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To find out more information about this project, and to see other outputs from the team, visit the CREST website at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/sikh-radicalisation-britain/

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of a project funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). The proposal was developed in November 2015 following media reports about 'Sikh radicalisation in Britain' and sought to examine the idea, context, framing and realities of this issue. Evidence was gathered from historic and contemporary media sources, academic literature, social media, internet discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews. The report is structured as follows and examines the following questions:

1. Framing Sikh activism in Britain:
Which incidents have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs including protests and flashpoints and how have these impacted on the discourse around Sikhs in Britain?

2. Narratives and issues:
Which narratives and issues are relevant in encouraging Sikhs in Britain to participate in these protests and incidents? Are there specific political /religious narratives and how are these linked to cultural issues?

3. The transmission of narratives:
How are these narratives transmitted? How are Sikh organisations / institutions involved?

4. Types of Sikh activism:
Are there different types of Sikh activism and what are the key issues of focus?

5. The impact of Sikh activism in Britain:
What is the impact of Sikh activism on the British public?

1. FRAMING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN

Sikh activism in Britain fundamentally changed in 1984 following the storming of Harmandir Sahib (often referred to as the Golden Temple) during Operation Bluestar in June 1984 and the violence that took place against Sikhs across India in November 1984 following the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister by her Sikh bodyguards. From a community who generally supported India and who were focused on campaigning for the right to maintain Sikh symbols in Britain, anger about the events of 1984 moved many Sikhs in Britain to protest about these incidents and about the lack of recourse from the Indian state.

The most frequently reported incidents of violence involving Sikhs in Britain have taken place against other Sikhs. In the immediate aftermath of 1984 some incidents of fatal political violence were committed in Britain by Sikhs supporting the establishment of a Sikh state, Khalistan, against Sikhs opposing this. Recent incidents have been related to doctrinal putes and/or the governance of gurdwaras (lit. house of the Guru, refers to a Sikh institution where the Guru Granth Sahib Ji is present). It appears that it is political, doctrinal, personal, factional and/or governance related Sikh vigilantism which is most likely to result in violence in the future.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF ‘SIKH RADICALISATION’ IN BRITAIN

Sikhs have most frequently been labelled as ‘extremists’, ‘fanatics’, ‘militants’, ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘radicals’ in both British and Indian media when campaigning against the state (in particular against the British colonial and Indian postcolonial state).

The bombing of the Air India flight 182 on 23rd June 1985 which caused the loss of 329 lives, remains the only large scale terrorist incident outside of India which has led to the conviction of a Sikh (Inderjit Singh Reyat, who has joint British and Canadian citizenship).

2. NARRATIVES AND ISSUES

A number of political, religious and cultural narratives have led to Sikh activism, including the lack of recourse for the events of 1984, instances of beadbi (disrespect) being shown to the Guru Granth Sahib Ji (regarded by Sikhs as the eternal living Guru, in the form of a book), the need to maintain the izzat (honour) of the Sikh community and the wish to uphold edicts issued from the seat of Sikh temporal authority (the Akal Takht).

For Sikhs, ‘1984’ can refer to the events of either June and/or November. Activism around 1984 does not automatically indicate support for the idea of Khalistan.

Many of the ‘Sikh on Sikh’ issues are a consequence of a) the contested nature of religious authority within the Sikh tradition and/or b) local factional politics which most often relate to personal and familial disputes. A number of recent issues have been caused by the lack of clarity around the processes by which Akal Takht edicts are disseminated to the Sikh diaspora. The large number of ‘Sikh on Sikh’ incidents highlights that Sikhs in Britain (and the diaspora) are often unable to address differences of opinion about Sikh doctrine and/or diverse opinions before incidents occur.

Cultural dimensions including the emphasis of maintaining izzat impact on Sikh activism with some male Sikh activists feeling the need to demonstrate their masculinity by ‘protecting the honour’ of Sikh females. Some Sikh activists also feel the need to continually maintain their honour among activist circles by regularly participating in activist events.

Concepts often used in relation to other religious traditions like ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘martyrdom’ have substantially different meanings in the Sikh tradition. For instance, martyrdom in the Sikh tradition is primarily regarded an act of resistance and rebellion rather than being viewed as a guarantee of an afterlife in paradise. With no concept of apostasy or need to proselytise to ‘non-believers’ in the Sikh tradition, a number of recent protests / incidents relating to religious narratives have taken place against those seen to have been excommunicated by the Akal Takht (the seat of Sikh temporal authority) or to have committed acts of beadbi against the Guru Granth Sahib Ji.

The narrative of Muslim grooming gangs targeting Sikh girls for grooming / conversion, and these cases not being sufficiently dealt with by the authorities, often feeds on existing historical narratives and contemporary Sikh/Muslim tensions. These narratives along with the promotion of Sikhs by the far right have led some Sikhs to engage with far right representatives and organisations.
Local context plays a key role in Sikh activism. In the UK, the Midlands has the highest concentration of Sikh organisations and *gurdwaras* (lit. house of the Guru, refers to a Sikh institution where the *Guru Granth Sahib Ji* is present) which impacts on the number of activities, networks, incidents and opportunities to mobilise in this region.

3. THE TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES
There are few places and spaces within the British education system for Sikhs in Britain to examine their heritage and history. This often leads them to undertake such engagement and learning on an ad hoc basis, primarily online.

Narratives which lead to activism are transmitted in different ways, through families, organised events, lectures, camps, music and Sikh media (newspapers, broadcast, online and social media). The now rapid transmission through social media of ‘issues of concern’, incidents and/or factional disputes occurring anywhere in the Sikh diaspora, often demands immediate responses from Sikh activists in order for them to continually demonstrate their status as activists. Once aware of these issues, geographical access to established organisations and networks plays an important role in facilitating mobilisation around these issues and disputes.

There are a wide variety of different types of Sikh organisations and institutions operating in Britain focusing on political engagement, doctrinal issues within the Sikh community, carrying out humanitarian relief, raising awareness about the events of 1984 and education about the Sikh tradition. Although there is no one Sikh organisation responsible for the transmission of relevant narratives, many support one another on social and broadcast media around campaigns and when highlighting issues.

4. TYPES OF SIKH ACTIVISM
There are a number of different types of publicly visible Sikh activism in Britain. These can be categorised as focusing on a) social justice and humanitarian relief (e.g., seeking justice for 1984, providing aid/food relief); b) diasporic nationalism around Khalistan; c) ‘enforcing’ Sikh practices so they are carried out according to established codes of conduct and/or *Akal Takht* decrees; d) ‘defending/policing’ the Sikh community against a variety of perceived ‘external threats’ and; e) personal / factional disputes leading to ‘Sikh on Sikh’ incidents in *gurdwaras*.

Sikh women regularly participate in Sikh activist rallies and protests but are underrepresented in Sikh organisations. A number of female Sikh activists in particular are highlighting the fact that issues including gender inequality, sexual abuse, domestic violence and substance abuse (drugs, alcohol) are rarely sufficiently addressed by Sikh organisations and institutions.

5. THE IMPACT OF SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN
The Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) is currently the only Sikh group proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the UK government, proscribed for being ‘a Sikh movement that aims to establish
an independent Khalistan within the Punjab region of India.'

There is no threat to the British state or to the wider British public from Sikh activism as there is no conflict with 'the West' or with Britain. Although the January 2014 revelations that the British government advised the Indian government in their planning for Operation Bluestar may have changed how some Sikhs view Britain, there has been no targeting of British state officials following these revelations, with the focus being on agitating for the release of relevant historical documents through political processes.

Sikh institutions, organisations and individuals in Britain are regularly reported in Indian media as funding Khalistani organisations in India, although the exact nature of these reported links remains unclear. Sikhs in Britain do certainly appear to be influencing Sikh doctrine and practice worldwide particularly through campaigns focusing on 'religious enforcement', which have led to specific Akal Takht edicts in response. Further detailed research is necessary on the various types of links between Sikhs in India and the Diaspora.

Sikh activism concerned with 'religious enforcement' tends to be focused around campaigns targeting specific issues. These campaigns emerge organically and are most often raised, circulated and organised through local and national networks, Sikh broadcast media and social media. Many Sikhs participate in campaigns without formally affiliating to Sikh organisations.

The main threat to community relations from Sikhs in Britain is from individual or group vigilantism resulting from internal Sikh issues/disputes or from the exploitation of local inter-community tensions.

Much Sikh activism in Britain actually contributes positively to the integration agenda, particularly in the form of humanitarian relief provided during disasters and incidents where members of the public require support.

This report was written by Dr Jasjit Singh, from the University of Leeds as part of a CREST-funded project on Sikh radicalisation in the United Kingdom. The full report is available from the CREST website at: www.crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/reports/
PURPOSE AND CONTENT

In the lead up to the November 2015 visit of the Indian Prime Minister to the UK, Indian media widely reported that Mr Modi would be raising the issue of ‘Sikh radicalisation in Britain’ with the British Prime Minister, David Cameron (Singh V, 2015). During the visit, headlines about ‘Sikh radicalisation in Britain’ appeared in both Indian and British media in relation to a dossier, which was allegedly being presented to David Cameron by Mr Modi (Bhalla, 2015). According to these Indian television and newspaper reports, the dossier included the following allegations about Khalistani terror activities being carried out by Sikhs in Britain:

1. Sikh groups in the UK are trying to revive the Khalistan movement by providing terror training to British Sikh youth and funding hate propaganda against India (Bhalla, 2015) including live demonstrations on how to make Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Guru Nanak Gurdwara, Sparkhill, Birmingham and Gurdwara Singh Sabha Glasgow are running classes to radicalise youth and impart terror training (Hindustan Times, 2015).

2. A new organisation called the ‘Miri Piri Foundation’ was launched by radical Sikh youth in a meeting in Smethwick on July 31st 2015 with the goal of the creation of Khalistan.

3. During the World Sikh Convention held in September 2015, delegates declared that the establishment of Khalistan as the goal of the Sikh Federation UK and highlighted the role of British Sikh youth in the struggle for Khalistan.

4. Members of Khalistani organisations are planning to hold radicalisation training classes for Sikh youth funded by the ISI (Inter-Service Intelligence, the Pakistan secret services). These organisations organised a conference on May 3rd 2015 at Guru Teg Bahadur Gurdwara in Leicester (DNA, 2015).

5. Radio stations and television channels controlled by pro-Khalistani forces freely operate in the UK.

6. The owner of the Sikh Channel UK donated approximately £2,500 to the chief of Dal Khalsa International based in Pakistan.

7. Funds being collected by radical members of organisations like the Babbar Khalsa (BKI), International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), Khalistan Commando Force (KCF), Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF) are sent to intermediaries based in Punjab and Pakistan.

8. Pakistan’s ISI is using Sikh militants who have taken refuge in Pakistan to gather political support from the Sikh community in the UK and Canada to revive the Khalistan movement.

Although the dossier, its contents and the fact that it was being handed over to the British Prime Minister were widely reported in Indian media, in UK Parliamentary questions the British government publically denied ever receiving a dossier. On 9th February 2016, Fabian Hamilton (the
MP for Leeds North East and the former chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group for British Sikhs) asked the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ‘whether he received a document on UK Sikhs from the Indian delegation during the Indian Prime Minister’s recent visit to the UK’ (Parliament, 2016a) with Mr Hugo Swire replying that he ‘did not receive a document on UK Sikhs from the Indian delegation during Prime Minister Modi’s visit’ (Parliament, 2016a). Following up on this question on 29th February 2016, Mr Jim Cunningham, the MP for Coventry South asked the Secretary of State ‘whether her Department has received a document from the Indian government on Sikh radicalisation in the UK’ (Parliament, 2016b). The response from Mr John Hayes was that ‘the department has not received any documents on Sikh radicalisation in the UK from the Indian government’ (Parliament, 2016b).

Representatives of Sikh organisations in Britain also condemned the reports about the alleged dossier and the use of the term ‘Sikh radicalisation’. Gurmel Singh, the secretary general of the Sikh Council UK stated that ‘this idea of radicalisation is a myth … people are using the wrong terminology and using terms used for Muslim young people for example. That terminology doesn’t translate straight across’ (Lapido Media, 2016).

Alongside the Indian media allegations about the dossier, recent years have seen those commentating on Sikh issues in Britain raising concerns about resurgent ‘Sikh fundamentalism’ (Dhaliwal, 2016) and rising levels of ‘Sikh extremism’ (Hundal, 2015b). Recent incidents in Britain include a Sikh community centre in Dudley being severely damaged by Sikh protestors (Daily Telegraph, 2011) as part of a campaign against the serving of alcohol and meat in halls owned by UK gurdwaras (lit. house of the Guru, refers to a Sikh institution where the Guru Granth Sahib Ji is present) and a protest against the screening of the film ‘Nanak Shah Fakir’ which led to the evacuation of a cinema in Wolverhampton in April 2015 (Beaumont-Thomas 2015). For Dhaliwal (2016) a focal point for the recent mobilisation around mixed faith weddings (Dearden 2015) is a desire of those involved to control Sikh women’s relationship choices, with a key component of this ‘resurgent Sikh fundamentalism’ being the close relationship between a number of ‘fundamentalist’ Sikh organisations in the UK including Basics of Sikh, the Sikh Awareness Society, the Sikh Federation UK, Dal Khalsa and Sikh Youth UK.6 Hundal (2015b) who defines ‘Sikh extremism’ as ‘open xenophobia that can fuel hate-crimes; and attempts by some to impose their views on others under the guise of religious puritanism’ raises concerns about what appear to be increasing links between Sikhs and the far right.

UK state organisations have also raised similar concerns particularly around the glorification of violence, with the UK media regulator OFCOM highlighting the risk of ‘radicalisation in the Sikh community’ in a report relating to the broadcast of a ‘Shaheedi Smagam’ (martyrs commemoration event) on the Sikh Channel on 15th November 2015:

Various statements in the programme clearly condoned and glorified various criminal acts ... Ofcom considered that this material carried a risk of harm in the form of potentially increasing the number of people holding extremist views about the acceptability of violence, and confirming the views of those already holding such opinions. The harm resulting from such radicalisation in the Sikh community is
that, particularly in the event of heightened tensions in future, there exists a larger and more entrenched category of individuals who may on their own initiative, or encouraged by others, commit acts of violence, as have occurred in the recent past, both in the UK (such as the violent attack on Lieutenant-General Brar in 2012 and the murder of Darshan Das in 1987) and elsewhere (Ofcom, 2016)

Elsewhere, the Crown Prosecution Service reporting on the attack on 30th September 2012 on General Kuldeep Brar, the Indian army general who led the attack on Harmandir Sahib (Golden Temple) in June 1984, referred to the perpetrators as ‘Sikh extremists’ stating that:

this was a violent and life threatening attack carried out by Sikh extremists on the streets of London's West End ... the group clearly targeted Lieutenant General Brar in revenge for his actions during his military career and today's convictions are another reminder that the UK will not tolerate extremism of any kind (CPS, 2013)

Given these examples, it is clear that an examination of the various activities of Sikhs in Britain is both necessary and timely. This report presents the findings of a six-month project funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) on ‘Sikh radicalisation in Britain’. The proposal was developed in November 2015 as a consequence of the reports in Indian media and sought to examine the idea, context, framing and realities of the incidents highlighted above. Evidence was gathered from historic and contemporary media sources (newspapers, radio, television, online), academic literature, social media, internet discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews. It is important to note that given time constraints, this evidence has been gathered primarily from English language open source materials. A number of routes into the literature were used, using various bibliographical and electronic searches, and taking advice from experts and interview respondents. The Bibliography contains references to the literature analysed although given the duration of the project, it is important to note that this reference list is not exhaustive. The report is structured as follows examining the following questions:

**METHODOLOGY:** Which research methods were used and why? What challenges were faced?

**FRAMING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN:** Which incidents have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs including protests and flashpoints and how have these impacted on the discourse around Sikhs in Britain? When did particular terms originate to describe the activities of Sikhs in Britain and how have they been used?

**NARRATIVES AND ISSUES:** Which narratives and issues are relevant in encouraging Sikhs in Britain to participate in these protests and incidents? Are there specific political / religious narratives and how are these linked to cultural issues?

**THE TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES:** How are these narratives transmitted? How are Sikh organisations / institutions involved?
TYPES OF SIKH ACTIVISM: Are there different types of Sikh activism and what are the key issues of focus?

THE IMPACT OF SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: What is the impact of Sikh activism on the British public? What possible routes to violence (if any) currently exist?

Recent media headlines regularly highlight links between ‘religious extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ (e.g., Arnett, 2014) with the UK government currently defining ‘extremism’ as ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (HM Government, 2015: 3) and ‘radicalisation’ as ‘the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups’ (HM Government, 2015: 12).

As ‘most researchers using the terms ‘radical’ and ‘radicalisation’ do not define these terms, either relying on their relative meaning or assuming that their absolute meaning is understood’ (Sedgwick, 2010: 483) it is necessary to establish what is being examined and the terms being used. This report uses the UK Government definition of ‘radicalisation’ as stated above, whilst also taking into consideration the work of Moskalenko and McCauley (2009:240) who distinguish between radicalism which indicates a ‘readiness to engage in illegal and violent political action’ and activism which is a ‘readiness to engage in legal and non-violent political action’. This report will use this distinction to examine the activities of Sikhs in Britain. As many Sikhs in Britain have never participated in any type of political action, protest or rally, it is important to emphasise that this report does not examine the activities of Sikh community in Britain as a whole, but only those who participate in activism of some kind and who would view themselves as Sikh activists.
EMPIRICAL DATA ON SIKHS IN BRITAIN

The England and Wales Census 2011 provides useful data on the demographics and location of the Sikh population in Britain.

Census data shows that the population of 423,158 Sikhs is mainly concentrated in London (29.8%) and the West Midlands (31.6%) with Southall, Hounslow, Coventry, Leicester, Slough, Derby, Wolverhampton, Birmingham and Ilford appearing in the top twenty areas with the highest concentrations of Sikhs as highlighted in the map below (ONS, 2012).

In addition, with 56.6% of the 423,158 Sikhs population in England and Wales being UK born and with 25 per cent (or 105,985 people) being between the ages of 15 and 29 the picture of the Sikh community in Britain is therefore of a relatively young, British born population.

Figure 1: Geographical distribution of Sikhs in England and Wales

Figure 2: Age Distribution of Sikhs in England and Wales
METHODOLOGY
THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF ‘SIKH RADICALISATION’ IN BRITAIN

This section outlines the methods used to gather data. In order to facilitate awareness of the project and to assist in the recruitment of respondents, the Principal Investigator (Dr Jasjit Singh) discussed the project on the BBC Asian Network ‘Nihal’ phone-in programme on 23rd September 2016 and on Sikh media (akaalchannel, 2017a, 2017b) where viewers and listeners were directed to the project website (https://arts.leeds.ac.uk/jasjitsingh). In order to ensure the reliability, validity and comparative value of the research conducted, data was gathered through the following research methods:

1/ LITERATURE REVIEW
An in depth systematic review of relevant literature was carried out which included an analysis of relevant academic research. A number of routes into the literature were used including bibliographical and electronic searches, and taking advice from academic and community experts and interview respondents. The review of literature highlighted that although much has been written about Sikh ethno-nationalism in Britain and about the political climate in the Punjab which led up to the events of Operation Bluestar, there has been little examination of the variety of different types of activism carried out by Sikhs in Britain.

2/ MEDIA ANALYSIS
Relevant media was analysed to ascertain what types of Sikh activism have taken place in Britain, how Sikhs in Britain have been represented in British media and under which circumstances certain terms evolved to describe Sikh activism. This analysis examined English language British and Indian historical and contemporary newspapers, British television reports and British radio programmes. Television programmes were located using Box of Broadcasts (https://learningonscreen.ac.uk/ondemand), the ITN archive (http://www.itnsource.com/en/) and online video hosting websites. Similarly, radio programmes were located through Box of Broadcasts, BBC iPlayer and online searches. In order to conduct the analysis of newspaper reports in the time permitted, two newspapers were examined in depth, ‘The Times of London’ and ‘The Times of India’ using online historical newspaper archives. For all of the media analysis listed above, the following search terms were used to find data and examples of relevant incidents:

- Sikh extremist(s), Sikh extremism
- Sikh fanatic(s), Sikh fanaticism
- Sikh radical(s), Sikh radicalism, Sikh radicalisation
- Sikh fundamentalist(s), Sikh fundamentalism
- Sikh terrorist(s), Sikh terrorism
- Sikh militant(s), Sikh militancy
- Sikh separatist(s), Sikh separatism
- Sikh protester(s), Sikh protests
- Sikh activist(s), Sikh activism
Although this examination of relevant media focused on those events reported by British media, for the purposes of examining the representation of Sikhs in British media in the time permitted, it is argued that this method of analysis is justified.

3/ SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
In total twenty interviews were conducted with a range of participants who were or who had been involved in one or more of a) Sikh organisations, b) gurdwaras and/or c) organising or participating in protests. Respondents were recruited either through social media or through email communication based on their involvement in Sikh activism.

All respondents were provided with an information sheet (Appendix A) and consent form (Appendix B). Finding respondents proved somewhat difficult, with some potential respondents raising concerns about how the information gathered would be used. In order to ensure the anonymity of the participants, which was a condition of their participation in the research and clearly stated in the consent form, all interviewees will simply be referred to as Respondent 1, Respondent 2 with no details of their location or role in the Sikh community being disclosed. As the protection of the identities of the respondents is paramount, the only quotations used are those from which there is no risk of identifying respondents.

4/ FIELDWORK VISITS
Fieldwork visits were made to a number of gurdwaras and events organised by Sikh organisations around the country in order to examine their role in Sikh activism. In order to maintain the anonymity of the fieldwork sites, the gurdwaras visited will not be named and the events attended will not be referenced. Any details about events provided online on publically accessible websites and social media platforms by gurdwaras and Sikh organisations will be used to discuss their impact on Sikh activism in Britain.

5/ CONSULTATIONS
A series of consultation events were organised following the completion of the draft report in June 2017. These events, advertised through social media, were open to the general public and sought to obtain feedback and facilitate discussion on the emerging findings. Where appropriate, relevant feedback and discussion fed in to the final report.
FROM ‘FANATICS’ TO ‘RADICALS’: MAPPING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN

Using the literature review, media analyses and interview data, this section outlines the incidents which have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs, and discusses the emergence of certain narratives and terms to describe the activism of Sikhs in Britain. All of the examples included on the timelines below have been taken from media reports included in the Bibliography.

COLONIAL ENCOUNTERS: SIKH ‘FANATICS’, ‘EXTREMISTS’ AND ‘MILITANTS’

It is interesting to find the term ‘Sikh fanatics’ being used by British commentators to describe the Sikhs they encountered in pre-colonial India, described as such due to their ‘striking religious dress’. 12

Following the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of April 1919 when a crowd of non-violent, mainly Sikh, protesters were fired upon by the British Indian Army, a new Sikh political party, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) was established alongside a gurdwara management committee, known as the SGPC (Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee). These organisations led morchas (non-violent agitations) to liberate gurdwaras from mahants (proprietors) who with British patronage, had been placed in charge of Sikh institutions. By the end of these morchas, 4000 Akalis died, over 2000 were wounded and 30000 men and women were jailed. Sikhs involved described as ‘fanatics’, ‘extremists’ and ‘militants’. 13

Sikhs participating in these morchas were regularly referred to as ‘fanatics’, ‘extremists’ and ‘militants’ in British newspaper reports (Times London, 1922). These terms continued to be used during the 1930s in the lead up to Indian independence, in reference to those Sikhs pursuing Sikh interests in discussions about the formation of a postcolonial Indian state.” References to ‘moderate Sikh opinion’ also emerged at this time referring to those Sikhs who were ‘anxious to see an end to the conflict between the Sikhs and the Government’ (Times London, 1924) with a
distinction being made between ‘Sikh extremists’ challenging British colonial rule, and ‘moderate Sikhs’ supporting it.¹⁵

**POST-INDEPENDENCE AND MIGRATION TO BRITAIN: ‘Sikh Protesters’**

After the independence of India in 1947, those Sikhs in India agitating against the Indian Government’s refusal to concede special privileges to the Sikhs or to grant them a homeland were regularly described as ‘Sikh militants’ with Master Tara Singh, the main Sikh negotiator, described as an ‘extremist Sikh leader’ (Times London, 1949). This labelling continued until the early 1980s as Sikhs continued to negotiate with the Indian government for greater autonomy for Punjab (Times London, 1983).

Following the mass migration of Sikhs to the UK due to the partition of India and post war labour shortages, Sikhs in Britain campaigned for the right to wear Sikh symbols in the workplace.

Reporting on the intention of Sohan Singh Jolly to set himself on fire in response to the turban and beard ban in Wolverhampton in 1969, the Times simply stated ‘Sikh plans to burn in protest’¹⁶ without any references to him being a Sikh fanatic, militant or extremist.

Similarly, the protests and mobilisations around turban issues in the 1980s again saw no references to Sikh extremists, militants, fundamentalists or radicals,¹⁷ as Sikhs protested for the right to wear religious symbols. Where the terms ‘Sikh extremists’ and ‘Sikh radicals’ did appear in British media in the 1970s / early 1980s, these either referred to the actions of Sikhs in India (Fishlock, 1982)¹⁸ or to members of the UK based Khalistan National Council including their leader, Dr Jagjit Singh Chohan, who was described as a ‘Sikh separatist’ leader.¹⁹ The early 1980s also saw the term ‘Sikh Fundamentalists’ entering British media discourse ‘transferred from its Western context to the Islamic movements associated in particular with Iran, and from there ... conveniently appropriated to describe the Sikh movement for Khalistan’ (McLeod, 1998: 15).²⁰ The media’s linking of ‘Sikh fundamentalism’ with the visible marks of uncut hair and the turban at this time, had repercussions for turbaned Sikhs in the diaspora as many began to be viewed with suspicion (Nayar, 2008).²¹
184: SIKH EXTREMISTS, FUNDAMENTALISTS, MILITANTS, RADICALS AND TERRORISTS
The storming of the Harmandir Sahib by the Indian army in June 1984 during Operation Bluestar led to a clear change in the nature of Sikh activism in Britain as many Sikhs across Britain protested against the desecration of their most important shrine. Following the attack on the Harmandir Sahib, reports in British media highlighted ‘Sikh extremists’ and ‘Sikh radicals’ living in Britain, with Jagjit Singh Chauhan the leader of the Khalistan National Council based in London being of particular concern to the Indian authorities.

Following the assassination of Indira Gandhi in Oct 1984 by her Sikh bodyguards, British media carried reports of ‘radical Sikhs’ and ‘Sikh radicals’ carrying out acts of violence in India during the post 1984 period (Financial Times, 1986). British newspapers also reported on ‘militant Sikhs’ singing in the streets of Britain (Times London, 1984a) and on how certain gurdwaras had been taken over by ‘Sikh militants’ and ‘Sikh extremists’:

The divisions in the British Sikh community will re-emerge this month in a High Court battle between moderates and extremists for control of one of the biggest temples in Britain ... There are about 2000 temples serving the Sikh community in Britain but only 60 of those are large enough to be politically significant. Thirty-two of those are said to be in the hands of the ‘extremists’, that is militantly supporting an independent Khalistan (Dowden, 1986)

British policymakers also began to refer to ‘Sikh extremists’, with the then Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth affairs Mr William Waldegrave stating that ‘the extremists number perhaps a few hundred at most ... but organisations are active in the Sikh community whose main purpose is to offer help and support to the extremists in India’ (Tatla, 1999: 134). References to ‘Sikh militants’ also increased in the mid-1980s in relation to the activities of Jagjit Singh Chohan (Times London, 1984b) and to ‘Sikh militants’ carrying out terrorist incidents in India (Ashford, 1986).

As well as changing the relationship between Sikhs and the Indian state, the events of 1984 also permanently changed how Sikhs were presented in Indian media as ‘the turbaned, bearded Sikh youth was fashioned by state propaganda into the stereotypical religious fanatic who threatened the integrity of the union with his seditious demands for a separate homeland’ (A Singh 2012:48). For Avinash Singh (2012:49) this has led to Sikhs being repeatedly projected by Indian state media as rebellious and treasonous.
Protests against the Indian state

The events of 1984 also saw the emergence of the annual rally, which is now held every June in London. This rally serves to both demonstrate against the events of June and November 1984 and to commemorate those who lost their lives.

As the timeline shows, the June rally which first took place in 1984 has continued to take place ever since, with other protests and campaigns against the Indian state also occasionally taking place. Although Sikhs had been settled in the United Kingdom in large numbers since the 1960s, for Berry (1988: 16) their image and relationship with the Indian and British governments changed radically after June 1984 as many Sikhs felt that their situation had not received a fair hearing by either state.

Terrorism

A number of Khalistani groups were reported as being responsible for terrorist attacks in India throughout the 1980s/1990s, including the Khalistan Zindabad Force and Khalistan Commando Force, with the bombing of the Air India flight 182 on 23rd June 1985 remaining the only large scale act of terrorism outside India which has led to the conviction of a Sikh, Inderjit Singh Reyat.

The bombing which claimed a total of 329 innocent victims led Sikhs to be interchangeably referred to as terrorists, extremists and fundamentalists at this time. The fact that Sikhs were referred to and regarded as a terrorist threat in India at this time meant that international media continued to use these terms throughout the 1980s and beyond. It is also important to note that a variety of opinions as to the permissible use of violence were expressed by Sikh groups at this time with Jagjit Singh Chohan in an ITN broadcast in June 1985, denying that the Air India bombing could have been carried out by a Sikh, as this would be 'against the fundamental teachings of Sikhism'.

CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS

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The post Bluestar period also saw a number of Sikhs in Britain being accused of plotting against Indian state officials visiting the UK. In October 1985, four members of the ISYF from Leicester were arrested for plotting to murder Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister at the time (Tatla 1999: 123) with two individuals Jarnail Ranuana aged 46 and Sukvinder Gill age 30, both of Leicester being jailed for 16 years and 14 years respectively (The Times, 1986).

In 1998, Jagroop Batth, 45, a shopworker from West London was jailed for four years for plotting to assassinate Sumedh Saini, a senior Indian policeman involved in quelling the Sikh insurgency movement in the early 1990s, who was visiting Britain at the time (Times London, 1998). The timeline above highlights the various plots against Indian officials by Sikhs in Britain, reported in British media since 1984. Of these incidents, the attack on General K.S. Brar that took place on 30th September 2012 remains the only incident in Britain during which violence actually took place (CPS, 2013).
1984 related fatal violence

Divides among Sikhs in Britain in the immediate aftermath of 1984 were highlighted by the murder of Darshan Das in 1987 by two Sikhs, Manjit Singh (who received a 20 year prison sentence) and Rajinder Singh Mughalwala (who received a 30 year prison sentence) both from Oldbury. This murder was regarded by the Police as a case of sectarian violence with Das being targeted because of his status as a ‘living Guru’ for his followers and his apolitical stance in relation to the Khalistan movement (Young, 1987). The two Sikhs accused were members of the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) (Singh & Tatla, 2006: 239) described as ‘Sikh fundamentalists’ (Times London, 1989) and as ‘Sikh separatist extremists’ (O’hanlon, 1989).

The 1980s saw further instances of Sikh fatal violence committed for political reasons including the trial in 1987 of Gurmail Singh Basra who was accused of hiring a hitman to murder Mr Tarsem Singh Toor and Mr Sangtar Singh Sandhu (Ellis, 1987) a Punjabi newspaper editor who according to Summers (2000) may have fallen out with certain ‘radical’ Sikh groups. Indeed, the Times of 20th March 1989 reported that ‘at least seven Sikhs living in Britain, all moderates opposed to the violence of the Khalistan separatist movement, have been shot in past three years, four fatally’ (Sapsted, 1989). Since the late 1980s there have been no fatal incidents of 1984 related violence being committed by Sikhs against other Sikhs.

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24th Jan 1986: Tarsem Singh Toor shot dead in Southall.
31st Oct 1987: Gurmail Singh Basra / Patrick Timlin jailed for 30 years for murder
11th Nov 1987: Darshan Das shot in Southall along with Joga Singh and Satwant Singh. Two Sikhs convicted: Manjit Singh (20 years), Rajinder Singh Mughalwala (30 years). Both from Oldbury
Beyond the fatal violence highlighted above, the timeline below illustrates how the vast majority of the instances of violence reported involving Sikhs from 1984 onwards have taken place against other Sikhs:

The timeline above highlights how ‘Sikh on Sikh’ issues in Britain have occurred in relation to a) the 1984 related ‘political’ violence around viewpoints on Khalistan, b) gurdwara governance issues, c) disagreements around Sikh practices and doctrine, d) factional disputes between Sikhs following particular groups or individuals (see Appendix D for a geographical mapping of the above incidents). Roughly half of the ‘Sikh on Sikh’ incidents listed have taken place due to gurdwara governance issues with the remaining half being a consequence of doctrinal and/or factional conflicts between groups. The number of such incidents appears to have increased in recent years as points of contention are now quickly disseminated online. As the timeline above only contains ‘Sikh on Sikh’ incidents reported in mainstream English language British media, it is important to note that other such incidents will have certainly taken place which have not been reported in mainstream media, or which have only been reported in Sikh and Punjabi media.
OTHER INCIDENTS / PROTESTS

Sikhs in Britain have also staged a variety of other protests, some to show solidarity around issues of discrimination e.g. with Sikhs in Europe around against issues with wearing the turban or 5Ks (the five symbols worn by an initiated Amritdhari Sikh) and others to protest against events or incidents where protesters believed that aspects of the Sikh tradition were being disrespected.

Whereas some of these protests received little coverage including the 2004 protest against Al-Muhajiron’s ‘Rally for Islam’ in Trafalgar Square, Sikhs appeared across British mainstream media following the events of Saturday 18th December 2004 when over 400 Sikhs protested against the staging of the Behzti play at the REP theatre in Birmingham. Although Sikhs had protested at the REP against the play’s depiction of rape and murder in a gurdwara in the days leading up to the 18th December, the weekend protest turned violent leading the REP to cancel all performances of the play. It is important to note that some Sikhs agreed with the need to protest against the play, but were unhappy that the protest had descended into violence. These protests including the Bezthi protest will be analysed in the section on narratives and issues.
LEGISLATION

This section outlines how legislation has impacted on the representation of Sikhs in Britain and on individual Sikhs. The extradition treaty signed in 1993 by the then foreign secretary Douglas Hurd, designed primarily to curb the activities of Sikh terrorists in Britain (Thomas, 1993) meant that some Sikhs immediately found themselves detained in British prisons awaiting deportation.

In July 2000, two ‘Sikh militant leaders’ accused of planning terrorist atrocities in India were allowed to stay in Britain, despite being branded threats to national security (Carrell, 2000). Mukhtiar Singh and Paramjit Singh were allowed to remain in the UK after British immigration ruled that there were ‘substantial grounds’ for believing they would be tortured if they returned to India. Commenting on the case, the Telegraph reported that ‘while Britain was the centre for the activities of Sikh extremist groups in the aftermath of the storming of the Golden Temple of Amritsar in 1984, there has been little evidence of activity in recent years’ (Millward, 2000).
Following the passing of the Terrorism acts of 2000 and 2001 the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) and Babbar Khalsa (BKI) were proscribed in March 2001, as terrorist organisations by the British government. Subsequently, any Sikhs who had been associated with these organisations were reported as being members of terrorist organisations (Evening Standard, 2008). The ‘Prevention of Terrorism Act’ 2005 introduced further restrictions on the activities of those suspected of being involved in terrorist-related activity with the Terrorism Act 2006 introducing a prohibition on the ‘glorification’ of terrorism.

Indeed, the rhetoric around Islamist extremism in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 Britain led Sikhs in positions of prominence to challenge the idea of ‘Sikh extremism’ with Swarn Singh Kandola, the general secretary of a large gurdwara in Ilford stating that ‘we do not have extremism ... [there is] no concept of the Hindu ‘untouchable’ or the Muslim division of people into mou’min (believer) and kufar (unbeliever)’ (Binyon, 2006).

The public launch of the UK government’s Counter terrorism strategy Contest in 2006, with its four strands Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare and the focus on stopping people ‘becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (Gov.uk, 2011a) has meant that close attention is now paid to identify any possible risks of individuals becoming ‘radicalised’ to commit terrorist acts. Consequently, Indian media references to Sikhs in Britain as ‘extremists’ and ‘radicals’, combined with the recent spate of publically visible Sikh incidents (particularly those involving violence) including Behzti, Nanak Shah Fakir and the mixed faith Anand Karaj protests has meant that these incidents are now all of interest to the media and government as issues of potential concern.

To date, based on the little data that exists in the public domain it appears that few Sikhs have been referred to the Prevent programme. The National Police Chief’s Council Freedom of Information requests 000117/13, 000099/15 and 000166/15 highlight that from April 2012 to January 2014, 0.6% of Prevent referrals were Sikh (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2014) and that the recent history of Sikh referrals is as follows: (National Police Chief’s Council, 2015a, 2015b).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total Referrals</th>
<th>Sikh Referrals</th>
<th>Percentage of Referrals</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011-2012</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>16-17 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>All 18+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2014</td>
<td>1252</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.04%</td>
<td>1 (16-17), 12 (18+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As of 07/09/2015</td>
<td>4206</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Sikh Prevent Referrals 2011-2015

The increased interest in ‘Sikh extremism’ has also impacted on the representation of Sikhs in mainstream media with recent examples including a broadcast in 2008 of a programme on ‘Sikh extremism’ on BBC Radio 4 and a BBC media report in April 2016 about a banner which was on display at a Birmingham Sikh Vaisakhi event (BBC News, 2016a). The banner included the Punjabi slogan 'Khalistan Zindabad' ('long live Khalistan') and a picture of an AK47, which led media reports to link this banner to the ‘Khalistan Zindabad Force’ (KZF) an organisation on the EU official list of...
banned terrorist organisations (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). This provoked an immediate response from a number of Sikhs refuting any links between the banner and the KZF (Brown, 2016).
NARRATIVES AND ISSUES

I now analyse the incidents described in conjunction with the interviews and literature to draw out the factors and narratives which are most common in relation to Sikh activism in Britain. It is important to state that none of these narratives or factors in themselves guarantees that an individual will participate in activism, but that these particular factors and narratives frequently appeared in the interviews, media analyses and literature. As it is beyond the scope of this report to examine the evidence or truth claims of these various narratives, I simply report on those narratives which appeared most frequently in discussions.

POLITICAL

The historical mapping highlights how the storming of Harmandir Sahib in 1984 changed the nature of Sikh activism in Britain and in the aftermath of 1984 ignited support for Khalistan in the Sikh diaspora. Before this event, most Sikhs in Britain generally allied to the Indian government, as Respondent 5 explained: ‘in the early ’70s there was the war with Pakistan ... and in those days in gurdwaras we raised defence funds for India and in our factories.’

However, for Tatla (2012), the lack of support from the Indian High Commission on issues of Sikh identity in the late 1960s and early 1970s (for instance during the turban campaigns) led some Sikhs to conclude that having a place in a multinational India ‘was no more than an inflated and merely self-serving rhetoric unless it was backed by a state which could threaten sanctions in cases of actual racial or religious discrimination’ (Tatla, 2012:70).

Nevertheless, until June 1984, ‘the theme of a Sikh homeland attracted no more than a fringe audience and only the Indian state’s blunder in ordering armies into the Golden Temple forced the issue into ordinary Sikhs’ homes and minds’ (Tatla, 2012:71). Respondents highlighted how 1984 and the storming of Harmandir Sahib had impacted on their relationship with the Indian state because of the status of Punjab as a ‘spiritual homeland’. Respondent 1 explained how he would ‘always have that connection to Punjab, because our Harmandir Sahib [Golden Temple] is in our Punjab’. Respondent 18 described how ‘rather than Punjab as a whole, it is the historical gurdwaras that most feel like home’. This explains why even those Sikhs without a direct familial link with the Punjab were emotionally impacted by the events of 1984. Key narratives emerging from the interviews and literature highlight the impact of:

- June 1984 - the events around Operation Bluestar particularly the storming of the Harmandir Sahib complex and the destruction of key Sikh shrines.
- November 1984 - the violence that took place against Sikhs in Delhi and across India
- Post 1984 - the violent quelling of the Sikh insurgency movement in the years that followed.
NARRATIVES AND ISSUES
THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF ‘SIKH RADICALISATION’ IN BRITAIN

June 1984

The Indian army’s attack on Harmandir Sahib in June 1984 led by General K.S. Brar ‘constituted one of the most traumatic experiences for the Sikh community worldwide. The destruction of the Akal Takht and extensive damage to the whole complex of sacred buildings was felt by most Sikhs at the time as nothing less than a declaration of war on the community itself’ (Tatla, 2006:57). These feelings were echoed by many respondents, with Respondent 3 reflecting on the attack as being

a life changing moment, you know, certain triggers in your life when you look back and they still stand out, and an attack on the Sikhs’ most holy shrine looked like a personal attack on Sikhs themselves

This sense of humiliation came through many of the interviews with those present in Punjab in 1984 recalling numerous incidents of violence and desecration. Respondent 3 explained how ‘to this date I still can’t get my head round of the 300 gurdwaras that were attacked ... when the person [Bhindranwale] is sitting there and you know where he is and you’ve surrounded him, and they obviously could have picked a week later or a week earlier, and that would have saved thousands of other lives, lost innocent lives that were lost. So sometimes it feels like the Indian government at that time wanted to teach the Sikhs a lesson.’

The events of June 1984 caused some Sikhs in diaspora to rethink their relationship with the Indian state with many feeling that ‘an independent Sikh homeland was the only solution to Sikhs’ humiliation brought on by [the] Indian state’s violation of Sikhs’ most sacred and venerated shrine’ (Tatla, 2012: 79). The need for Sikhs in Britain to ‘do something’ led many to re-engage with the Sikh tradition, with Respondent 7 remembering how ‘after 84 [there] was a big influx into the Sikh faith. I saw people who were drinking in pubs one night, and then becoming Amritdhari [initiated] the next day.’ Many took note of Bhindranwale’s statement that ‘if the Indian Army touches the Golden Temple, then the foundation stone of Khalistan will be laid’ (Mahmood 2002: 24).

Four particular traumatic narratives resulting from the June 1984 attack were present in the interviews and literature:

1. the deliberate targeting by the Indian army of innocent victims on an important commemoration anniversary.

2. the desecration of Harmandir Sahib and other important shrines including the Akal Takht and the Sikh reference library.

3. the deliberate humiliation of the Sikh psyche by the Indian state.

4. a lack of awareness among non-Sikhs about the events of June 1984.
November 1984

A number of respondents highlighted how in addition to the attack on Harmandir Sahib in June 1984, the lack of recourse for the violence that took place against Sikhs across India in November 1984 was also a continuing issue. In her ‘20 years of Impunity’ report, Jaskaran Kaur (Kaur J, 2006) draws on first-person accounts and unpublished Indian government records to paint a picture of a systematic set of events, which are still referred to in Indian media as a ‘riot’ (Singh R, 2017). For Kaur, the labelling of the events as a riot ‘not only mischaracterises the massacres, but it also purposefully masks the most brutal dimensions’ (Kaur J, 2006: 102). She systematically explains why, rather than a ‘riot’ or ‘disturbance’ the events of November 1984 should be defined as a ‘genocide’42 a cause supported by many Sikhs in the diaspora.43

Despite the appointment of ten commissions and committees to investigate and inquire into the events of the first week of November 1984, ‘those four days in which about 2733 people were killed in the capital of our Republic still remain largely unaccounted for, with most organisers and perpetrators of violence going unpunished’ (Saluja, 2015:344). A number of respondents including Respondent 3 explained how ‘it’s been 33 years and still no justice for all the Sikhs that lost their lives, innocent Sikhs who had nothing to do with what happened in Delhi’. Indeed, despite an extensive body of academic literature and numerous reports that have examined the November 1984 violence against Sikhs including Grewal (2007) and Mita and Phoolka (2007), for Ahluwalia (2010: 108) ‘there remains a deep scepticism amongst Sikhs in both India and the diaspora about real justice and adequate reparations.’

Recent years have seen a number of organisations in the Sikh diaspora raising awareness of the events of November 1984 and seeking to address the lack of recourse from the Indian state. The US based organisation Ensaaf which works ‘to end impunity and achieve justice for mass state crimes in India, with a focus on Punjab, by documenting abuses, bringing perpetrators to justice, and organising survivors’ (Ensaaf, n.d) has been particularly active in this area. The work by Ensaaf and others and the production of documentaries like ‘The Widow Colony’ (Kaur H, 2006) has highlighted these issues to new generations of Sikhs across the diaspora. Indeed, regular candlelight vigils are now held across the UK to remember those who lost their lives in the violence of November 1984.44

Given the lack of awareness among non-Sikhs regarding the events of 1984, many Sikh activists feel compelled to highlight these events. For Metha (2010: 153) ‘the 1984 anti-Sikh pogrom in India, involving the massacre of thousands of Sikhs in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, is one such incident that most Indians do not want to discuss and instead relegate its history into oblivion.’ The fact that Sikhs across the diaspora are learning about the events of November 1984 was repeatedly highlighted on phone in shows on the BBC Asian Network. Speaking on the Nihal show on the BBC Asian Network on 8th June 2012, Imandeep Kaur who worked with Sikh Widows as part of her undergraduate dissertation on the effects of the violence of 1984 explained:

I was only perhaps 20, 21 when I became aware of fully aware of what had happened in 1984. It wasn’t something that was discussed in my household ... [and] I have to say ... it shapes me personally, academically and professionally ... [as] there isn’t
A number of respondents narrated personal experiences of engaging with victims of the November 1984 violence. For Respondent 3, November 1984 was ‘very hard, very traumatic … my in-laws live in Delhi, so we were trying to contact them, and all phone lines were dead … I think it was on the fifth day or the sixth day that we finally got through, and they were telling us about their experiences and how it was scary to even walk to the nearest shop … they’re memories that are … they’re still in your head.’ Respondents also narrated how the recentness of the events of 1984, meant that they themselves could have been victims had they not been born in Britain. For Respondent 13 ‘a lot of it comes down to the fact that if our parents or grandparents didn’t decide to move to this country, we could have been in those illegal cremation grounds.’ The main narratives that emerge in relation to the events of November 1984 were:

- Sikhs as the victims of state sanctioned violence.
- A lack of justice for these victims with perpetrators often gaining important positions in government.
- A lack of awareness of the events of November 1984 among non-Sikhs.
- The continued framing of the events of November 1984 as ‘riots’ indicating that Sikhs had an equal role in causing the violence which occurred.

In these narratives, a number of Indian state officials are referred to as having been implicated in varying degrees of involvement in orchestrating the violence against Sikhs in November 1984 including Kamal Nath, Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler, all three of whom were named in the ‘Who are the Guilty?’ report (Kothari, 1984) published by the People’s Union For Civil Liberties.

The post 1984 period

A number of recent protests in Britain have been against the continued incarceration of Sikhs imprisoned during the post 1984 period as Punjab was converted into a ‘theatre of war’ (Tatla, 2006: 62). In addition, those in charge of the Punjab Police force at this time, KPS Gill and Sumedh Saini, have been accused of being responsible for human rights violations in the name of stamping out terrorism in Punjab (Singh J, 2005). Indeed, many of the Sikhs who came to the UK from the Punjab as asylum seekers during the 1990s claimed that Punjab police had tortured them. In their study of 95 Sikh refugees seeking asylum in the UK, 82 of the Sikh refugees interviewed by the Medical Foundation claimed that they had been beaten unconscious on one or more occasion with 57 reporting that they had been suspended by the wrists, ankles or hair and then beaten (Forrest et al, 1996).
Recent years have seen an increased focus by Sikh activists in Britain on the plight of Sikh political prisoners in particular those on a tentative list of 85 political prisoners in Indian jails, many of whom had been imprisoned under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) an anti-terrorism act enforced between 1985 and 1995. A recent trigger was the scheduled execution set for 31st March 2012 of Balwant Singh Rajoana who had openly confessed to being an accomplice in the assassination of Beant Singh, the Chief Minister of Punjab in the early 1990s who was accused of a number of human rights abuses while quelling the Sikh insurgency movement at this time (Kumar 2003, 53). Rajoana’s scheduled execution led to the emergence of a worldwide #IPledgeOrange protest movement against the plight of Sikh political prisoners in India, with the corresponding grassroots ‘Kesri Lehar’ campaign maintaining a presence outside Number 10 Downing Street for six months from April 2013. Following this campaign, high profile hunger strikes by Gurbaksh Singh and Surat Singh aimed to further raise the profile of Sikh political prisoners in India.

The shooting in October 2015 by the Punjab police of Sikhs protesting against beadbi (desecrations) of the Guru Granth Sahib Ji (BBC News, 2015b) led to the emergence of the #SikhLivesMatter (BBC News, 2015c) movement, leading to a protest on the BBC ‘Sunday’ programme (BBC News, 2015d) and outside the Indian High Commission in London in the same month. Many respondents highlighted how reports of injustices against Sikhs in Punjab drove their activism. Respondent 10 explained how he saw his role as being ‘to actually work towards highlighting the injustices and working towards what a free Sikh homeland would look like, but the decision is for the people of Punjab to make, no-one in the diaspora can make that.’

As highlighted in the section on ‘Sikh on Sikh’ incidents, Sikh political violence did occur in Britain in the immediate aftermath of 1984, some of which was fatal. There is little data publically available on the numbers of Sikhs from Britain who travelled to participate in the Sikh insurgency movement in the 1980s, although an online list entitled ‘Shaheed Singhs from the West’ includes two Sikhs from the UK, Gurcharan Singh Kandola and Hardev Singh Bhappu (BiggChan, 2009). Although there have been no recent incidents of Sikh political violence in the diaspora, it is clear that 1984 remains the main political issue for many Sikhs worldwide. It is also important to recognise that for Sikhs, ‘1984’ can refer to the events of either June and/or November and that activism around the events of 1984 does not automatically indicate support for the idea of Khalistan.

**Religious**

This section outlines which narratives from the Sikh tradition were most frequently highlighted in the analysis of the interviews and media reports relating to the events listed above. They provide a useful guide to understanding why some Sikhs become involved in Sikh activism. At the outset, it is clear that there is no link between religious adherence and support for Khalistan. Indeed, Nayar found that ‘even though some orthodox Sikhs support the establishment of a separate country of Khalistan, many do not’ (2008: 23).
**Respect: ‘Beadbi’ of the Guru Granth Sahib**

More than simply a ‘Holy Book’, the Guru Granth Sahib is seen by Sikhs to contain the jot (light) of the ten Gurus in a scriptural body and is respected and treated accordingly. The pages of the single continuous volume are often referred to as angs (limbs) further highlighting how many Sikhs regard the Guru Granth Sahib as a living Guru who should be treated as such.

Many of the campaigns highlighted above have centred on the importance of maintaining the sanctity and respect of the Guru Granth Sahib and of counteracting any incidents of beadbi (disrespect).\(^{53}\) Instances of beadbi taking place in Punjab and around the world are regularly highlighted in Sikh print, broadcast and online media (e.g., Singh R, 2009), with examples being:

1. The writings contained in the Guru Granth Sahib (Gurbani) being treated disrespectfully (e.g., being thrown in dustbins, being burnt or torn, being used in ‘inappropriate’ contexts).
2. The Guru Granth Sahib not being treated with sufficient respect (e.g., not being kept in a bed at night).
3. The Guru Granth Sahib being taken to or installed in ‘inappropriate’ locations (e.g., where meat and alcohol are served or near idols going against the Sikh Rehat Maryada\(^{54}\)).
4. Individuals being promoted as the ‘living Guru’ in place of the Guru Granth Sahib.

Varying notions of what is and is not ‘inappropriate’ have led to a number of the issues highlighted above. To date, there has been little analysis of the impact of the narrative of beadbi in analyses of instances of Sikh activism. The strength of feeling towards the Guru Granth Sahib was regularly highlighted in interviews with Respondent 1 stating that:

> we will die for our guru. If you're putting our guru in any disrespect, you might as well chop off our arm. We're not going to do nothing, you're taking a part of us. The guru's light is shining into us, and we'll do anything for the guru.

The evolution of campaigns against beadbi also highlights how the status of gurdwaras for first generation migrants as places that ‘served to alleviate the loneliness, heartache, and sense of unease that came from being in an alien land’ (Helweg, 1979: 81) has changed for many Sikhs in Britain. The place of gurdwaras as ‘one-stop shops where Sikhs could congregate for both religious and cultural events’ (Kalsi, 1992: 121) is being challenged by a number of British born Sikhs, particularly where they view Punjabi cultural practices taking precedence over their idea of Sikh teachings. The Satkaar (‘respect’) campaign for instance emerged in June 2010 in response to the Grays gurdwara in Essex allowing alcohol, meat and tobacco to be served in a hall owned by and located next to the gurdwara. Things came to a head on 16th October 2010 when a demonstration was organised to protest against a party due to be held in the hall. After the committee in Grays had disallowed the use of meat and alcohol on their premises, those at the protest formalised the Satkaar movement.\(^{55}\)
Many of these recent beadbi protests follow on from the protests against the Behzti (dishonour) play in December 2004. Speaking about the reasons behind the Behzti protest, Mohan Singh who now runs the Sikh Awareness Society (SAS) highlighted the centrality of the concept of beadbi:

we do believe that rape and homosexuality and all these things that the play wanted to bring out - they do exist in the community, but by setting the play inside the gurdwara it was actually not just tarnishing a person but was tarnishing the whole religion ... we treat the holy scriptures as our living, breathing Guru ... we never asked for it [the play] to be stopped - all we've asked is take it outside the gurdwara, set it in a community hall, put it in a park, put it in a school whatever you feel like.

The Satkaar campaign followed on from the earlier R4G (Respect for Sri Guru Granth Sahib Ji) campaign of 2005 during which Sikhs demonstrated against the practice of taking the Guru Granth Sahib to party halls or hotels for wedding ceremonies (Booth, 2005). Recent mobilisations including the #SikhLivesMatter (BBC News, 2015b) movement of October 2015 have also been concerned with desecrations of the Guru Granth Sahib:

When pages of the Guru Granth Sahib, Sikhism’s central text, were found ripped up, protests spread across the Indian state of Punjab. Police used water cannons, batons and live rounds to disperse the crowds, and at one protest last week police opened fire, leaving at least two dead and more than 50 injured ... Online and in the streets, a movement quickly sprang up. Tweets showing his body, and photos of other injured protesters were shared widely along with the hashtag ‘Sikh Lives Matter’ on Twitter (BBC News, 2015c)

Diversity: Doctrinal and Factional

The mapping of Sikh incidents in Britain highlights how the vast majority of incidents involving Sikhs have taken place against other Sikhs. As described, around half of these incidents occurred due to differences of opinion regarding authority and doctrine. One of the main issues relates to the status of the Akal Takht, the headquarters of the SGPC located inside the Harmandir Sahib complex in Amritsar which is often described as the Parliament of the Sikhs and which acts as ‘a forum to legislate on all issues concerning the community’ (Shani, 2008: 317). Having been built by the sixth Guru, the Akal Takht is important because of the status of its Jathedar (head) who is often described as the ‘Pope’ of the Sikhs, despite the fact that the Jathedar is answerable to the SGPC and is not seen to possess the gift of infallibility (Shani, 2008: 317).

The Jathedar regularly makes pronouncements on behalf of the Sikhs which ‘although not binding, have a normative status within Sikhism’ (Shani, 2008: 317). For some Sikhs however, as the Jathedar of the Akal Takht is appointed by the organisation responsible for gurdwaras in the Punjab (the SGPC) which is itself controlled by the SAD, a political party (Shani, 2008: 37) these edicts are often seen as being influenced by the political status quo rather than being in the best interests of the Sikhs. In addition, there does not appear to be a clear process through which members of the Sikh diaspora are made aware of new edicts or amendments to previous edicts.
Consequently, edicts are not respected or adhered to by all Sikhs or followed in all Sikh institutions. Indeed, given the perceived undue influence on Sikh religious authorities by politicians in the subcontinent, some respondents highlighted how they regarded Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as an authentic Sikh leader and as an individual who stood up to state hegemony unlike the incumbent Jathedar.

Nevertheless, regardless of their own affiliations, the wish for some Sikh activists to uphold edicts issued by the Akal Takht Jathedar was clear in many of the campaigns. Imandeep Kaur, a Sikh female from Birmingham who participated in the protest at the Dudley Sikh Cultural Centre in May 2011 explained on the Nihal show on the BBC Asian Network on 31st May 2011 that she had protested to uphold the sanctity of the Akal Takht:

So, recently in 2006, Akal Takht actually made an order that there would be no meat, alcohol or tobacco in any gurdwara premises or any premises associated with a gurdwara ... so on a total faith level, to step above Akal Takht Sahib is to then take yourself out of the Sikh faith because there is no higher authority than that.

As the first generation of Sikh migrants established gurdwaras through local fundraising efforts, those running gurdwaras may not affiliate to any Sikh organisations and may not see why they should be unduly influenced by edicts from the Akal Takht. This often brings them into conflict with Sikhs who do regard the edicts of the Akal Takht as binding for all Sikhs, leading to incidents such as the Dudley protest above. This focus on upholding edicts of the Akal Takht also led to the April 2015 protests in cinemas across the West Midlands against the screening of ‘Nanak Shah Fakir’, a film banned by the Akal Takht (Beaumont-Thomas, 2015). Again, not all Sikhs agreed with the protest and banning of the film despite the edict from the Akal Takht. Although many Sikhs do regard the Akal Takht as the supreme temporal authority for Sikhs, others may instead regard a Sant (‘charismatic individual’) or a leader of a jathabandi (‘ideological group’) as their main religious authority and therefore not be concerned about Akal Takht edicts at all. Affiliation to particular groups (jathabandis) also leads to factional disputes in gurdwaras.
Whatever their personal feelings about the status of the Akal Takht, as an institution symbolising Sikh sovereignty it remains important for many Sikhs. Linked to the status of the Akal Takht is the Sikh Rahit Maryada (SRM) a document described as ‘the Official Sikh Code of Conduct and Conventions’ published by the SGPC in 1950 following a twenty year consultation with Sikh scholars of the time. The continued impact of this document on Sikh activism in Britain is highlighted in this poster (Image 1) which demonstrates how Sikh activists campaigning against mixed faith Anand Karaj ceremonies in gurdwaras quote from this maryada (‘code of conduct’) to support their claims:

The ‘Karaj Campaign’ followed on from the R4G and Satkaar campaigns described above. To date, I have found evidence of five mixed Anand Karaj protests taking place at gurdwaras in Britain, although a number of related incidents of intimidation have also occurred. The first gurdwara protest took place on 5th July 2012 at a gurdwara in Swindon when ‘protesters occupied the Kembrey Street temple and locked the gates to halt the marriage between a Sikh woman and a Christian man’ (Swindon Advertiser, 2012). Those protesting argued that the main focus of the protest was to uphold the edicts of the Akal Takht, with an ex-president of the gurdwara, Mr Mudhar explaining that ‘we are not militants, we are standing up for what was right and to uphold the law [of the Akal Takht]’ (Swindon Advertiser, 2012). The second protest took place in Bradford on 19th July 2014 (Yorkshire Sikh News, 2014) and received little coverage in mainstream media, presumably due to the fact that the protest occurred relatively peacefully. The protests, which took place in Southall on 11th August 2015 (Dearden, 2015) and in Birmingham on 18th August 2015 (Fricker, 2015) were widely reported in mainstream media, as was the Leamington protest which took place on 11th September 2016 (Taylor, 2016) for which Sikh Youth UK claimed responsibility (Taylor, 2016).

In all of these protests, the challenging of the authority of the Akal Takht was highlighted by the protesters as one of the main reasons for the protest (Sawer, 2015) although a number of commentators have noted that protests are most often targeted against Sikh women marrying non-Sikhs and rarely against Sikh men (Hundal 2015c, Dhaliwal 2016, Jhutti-Johal 2017b). Indeed, the recent wedding protests in particular have been described as being indicators of the ‘rise’ (Hundal 2016) and ‘resurgence’ (Dhaliwal 2016) of ‘Sikh Fundamentalism’. For Hundal (2016), this is mainly about ‘maintaining Sikh purity’ whereas for Dhaliwal (2016) ‘the protests indicate ‘an exponential rise in the numbers and confidence of Sikh fundamentalist forces in the UK’.

A number of scholars have examined ‘Sikh fundamentalism’ (Madan, 1991 and Oberoi, 1993). For McLeod (1998: 16) Sikh fundamentalists ‘(if the term is permissible) do not seek to build walls
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around themselves and to live lives separated from the remainder of their community or other communities. There is no thought of a border which should be sealed, nor of modernist ideas which must be shut out.’ Mahmood argues that the fundamentalism of the Sikhs ‘is certainly of a different sort than other fundamentalisms we have become familiar with; it implies no missionisation and fully respects the possibility of other paths to religious truth’ (Mahmood, 2001: 34). However, while many Sikh activists (including some involved in the wedding protests) do contribute to their local societies (e.g., through food banks) and while the Sikh tradition is not a proselytising tradition, the recent increase in the number of Sikh on Sikh incidents highlights that Sikhs in Britain are often unable to discuss internal doctrinal issues and/or diverse views before these incidents occur.

Beyond the mixed faith Anand Karaj protests, a number of the ‘Sikh on Sikh’ incidents relate to factional disputes and differences of opinion regarding Sikh doctrine. Although it is not the place of this report to examine the nature of all of the various doctrinal and factional differences in depth, these protests often appear to involve members of particular jathabandis (ideological groups) protesting against Sikh preachers who challenge the authority of these groups either by promoting different interpretations of Sikh doctrine or by directly challenging the authority of the leaders of these groups.

Service to Society: ‘Miri/Piri’ & ‘Sewa’

Another frequently mentioned driver for Sikh activism was the concept of miri/piri, best symbolised by the two swords first worn by the sixth Guru, Guru Hargobind, with piri signifying spiritual engagement and miri signifying societal engagement. Respondent 6 explained how he saw the importance of ‘getting involved in your local level, national or international level in society and community ... the main source of us doing this is sewa and miri/piri.’ The recent emergence of humanitarian charities including Sikh foodbanks, where food is prepared in gurdwaras to be distributed to the homeless (Singh J, 2015), can also be regarded as a consequence of sewa (selfless service) and miri/piri (spiritual/societal engagement). It is interesting to note that some of those involved in humanitarian activism are also involved in some of the other types of Sikh campaigns highlighting that Sikh activists participate in a range of different types of activism once engaged to do so.

Respondents also highlighted how they gained inspiration from the lives of the Sikh Gurus. Respondent 11 explained how Sikh history included numerous examples of activism including ‘Guru Nanak Dev Ji standing up to the Mughal emperor Babar ... [and] the Gurus ... standing up to the governments of the time.’ The repeated focus was on how Sikhs should stand up for the truth with Respondent 13 explaining how ‘as a Sikh, it is about once you seek the truth, you've got to do something about it, it's not enough to just sit quietly and idly by ... Sikhi is never a spectator sport’. This rhetoric was highlighted by many as a key reason why Sikhs should be challenging the injustices carried out by state actors as Respondent 10 explained, ‘when you follow the history of our Sikhs throughout 300 years ... they opposed the governments of the day, whether it be the Mughals, the British government or this government in India.’
Sovereignty: ‘Khalsa Raj’
Respondents also highlighted how the concept of Sikhs being a sovereign people impacted on their activism. Respondent 10 explained how there was always ‘this notion of internal or external self-determination and freedom, the Sikhs were always free, they had their homeland, people forget that actually we are not asking for anything new, novel, we fought, we won it.’ The status of the Akal Takht as the temporal throne of the Sikh tradition, further explains why its destruction in 1984 led many Sikhs to regard this as a direct challenge to Sikh sovereignty. Speaking on the Nihal show on the BBC Asian Network on 21st March 2016, Shamsher Singh of the NSYF (National Sikh Youth Federation) explained ‘we are a sovereign nation and it is built in within our consciousness to pursue our sovereignty.’ Similarly in a speech at the Vaisakhi mela in Birmingham in April 2017, Sarbjit Singh RajoanaTV made references to historical examples of Sikh rule when lamenting the fact that in the post 9/11 climate, many Sikhs were suffering for their external appearance: ‘we want to live as free people ... in Baba Banda Singh Bahadur’s Khalsa Raj did we have these problems? In Maharajah Ranjit Singh’s times did we have these problems? When Sant Jarnail Singh Khalsa Bhindranwale was ruling Punjab like a lion did we have these problems? Without freedom our people will suffer and suffer and suffer’ (RajoanaTV, 2017).

Resistance: Morchas and Martyrdom
The mapping of the protests highlights the important role played by morchas (campaigns) in Sikh activism. From the Akali morchas in the 1920s to the turban campaigns in the 1960s to the various campaigns in the early 2000s, Sikhs have a long history of mobilising and being mobilised around single-issue campaigns, or morchas. In their analysis of Sikh political engagement in Britain, Singh and Tatla (2006: 95) view this as a consequence of Sikhs in Britain failing to establish national and local institutions and organisations that command legitimacy across the whole community. Taking action on single issues provides organisations with status in the community while simultaneously undermining other factions and groups.

Another aspect of Sikh activism mentioned by respondents was the role played by shaheeds (martyrs) in resisting those attacking the Sikh faith. Although most frequently discussed in relation to Islam, Mahmood makes an important distinction between Islamic and Sikh notions of martyrdom, explaining that ‘though the concept of the righteous martyr (shaheed) is related to Islam, death in a holy war for Sikhs is not conceptualised as some kind of entry ticket to paradise’ (2002: 32) as ‘Sikhs who die in battle do not look forward to an eternal life in paradise’ (Mahmood, 1996: 196). Martyrdom in the Sikh tradition is primarily an act of resistance where ‘resistance to injustice is an existential stance, as something one does as a mode of worship with no other necessary aim than the fact of resistance itself’ (Mahmood, 2002:48). As martyrs are valorised for their acts of resistance, rather than simply for committing acts in which they become martyrs, there is a clear distinction between ideas of martyrdom in the Sikh tradition and in Islam. Furthermore, in her discussion of the place of violence in the Sikh tradition, Mahmood (2013:71) notes that ‘the Sikh stance of militancy evolved through the leadership of the ten gurus who originated and led the community; violence emerged as a last resort when all other means of maintaining Sikh had failed.’
This section discusses social and cultural issues which have contributed to some of the Sikh incidents highlighted above. Again, not all of these issues in themselves contribute to the incidents discussed, but were highlighted in the interviews as being important factors.

**Honour, Masculinity and Vulnerability**

A number of respondents stated that an important reason for their activism was to uphold the *izzat* (honour) of the Sikh community. Although honour and shame are universal terms that play a significant role in all societies, both concepts are culturally constructed and defined (Lindisfarne, 1998), and act as a compelling influence on individuals’ behaviour. For British South Asians, Toor (2009:244) notes how:

> The role of the community is paramount in affirming *izzat* as it provides a marker of one’s status within the cultural community, which is where traditions and morality – which are, in turn, governed and determined by *izzat* – are continually reinforced and sustained from generation to generation.

The documentaries ‘A Warrior’s Religion’ (Amar, 2012) and ‘Warrior Boyz’ (Sangra, 2008) both examining the Punjabi Sikh community in Canada, highlight how notions of *izzat* play out often leading to ‘violent altercations in gurdwaras, instances of domestic violence and gang warfare … [which] may or may not include violent action’ (Jakobsh, 2014: 171). Respondents, regardless of their own religiosity and identity practices, highlighted the importance of defending the honour of the Sikh tradition. Respondent 1 explained how although he did not maintain long hair, a beard and turban himself, he had the right to expect those that did, to uphold the tradition:

> it doesn’t matter if we're mona [have a haircut] or anything, we will punish a guy with a turban because … he belongs to the guru. You can judge me, I could be in the pub the next day, but I've not become a Khalsa [taken initiation] ... it’s all about Pride and Honour and to be Defenders of the Faith.

With the attack on *Harmandir Sahib* in June 1984 and violence against Sikhs in November 1984, many respondents felt that the honour of the Sikh community had been tarnished, and that this was a wrong that needed to be addressed. The interviews highlighted that *izzat* plays an important role in Sikh activism in a number of different ways:

1. The need for usually male Sikh activists to protect the *izzat* of ‘Sikh females’. Those commenting on the inter faith wedding protests (e.g., Hundal 2015c, Dhaliwal, 2016) argue that Sikh activists only tend to focus on policing the behaviours of Sikh women with the concept of sharam (shame) also playing an important role in maintaining the traditional patriarchal framework of Punjabi society (Mooney, 2010).
2. Individuals with personal issues (e.g., substance addiction / mental health problems / victims of sexual abuse) not seeking sufficient medical / psychological attention, so that the izzat of their families can be maintained in the community.

3. The need for activists to continually maintain their izzat among activist circles by regularly attending and participating in activist events. As Respondent 11 explained ‘it’s about how people look at you and what you say ... if you don’t turn up you’ll get labelled and get asked ‘where were you?’ ... then a list, an informal list circulates between people saying ‘he didn’t speak.’

Related to izzat is the idea of hyper-masculinity. As Jakobsh (2014: 172) explains ‘a commonly heard phrase used to describe powerful Punjabi Sikh males is ‘Sher-Punjabi’ or ‘lions of the Punjab’ with Punjabi males often encouraged to demonstrate their masculinity’. For Respondent 4: ‘this is where the whole question of mixed marriages comes in, because mixed marriages themselves are seen as a threat to Sikh male masculinity, because the opposition to mixed marriage is always to do with a Sikh girl marrying a non-Sikh boy.’ There has been much recent discussion both in media and academic circles about a ‘crisis of masculinity’ resulting from changes in the labour market including the replacement of labour intensive industries with office work, which have reduced the emphasis on physical strength (Beynon 2002: 94). It appears therefore that some Sikh males in particular may participate in Sikh activism to demonstrate their masculinity given the ‘historical representations of Sikh masculinities, in part informed through the colonial encounter, [which] have constructed a hyper-masculine, martial, Sikh warrior (often Jat) as the ideal and ‘authentic’ Sikh male’ (Gill, 2014: 336). Further research on the relationship between notions of masculinity and the propensity to participate in violence is certainly required.

A number of the members of Sikh Youth UK, the group behind the mixed marriage protest in Leamington in September 2016 have publically described how they were raised in a climate of substance abuse and domestic violence.64 The abuse of alcohol in the Punjabi Sikh community has been well noted in media (Severn 2014) and in academic studies (e.g., Rao 2006). Respondent 1 remembers ‘when we was growing up and we used to come home, the tables used to be set and for me the alcohol, the drinks and everything would come up.’ Respondent 12 recalled ‘the amount of Punjabi, because I’m not calling them Sikh, Punjabi youth, I went to Uni and everyone I knew was taking something or other ... but our community say it’s not a problem.’ In response to these issues, some Sikh individuals and organisations are beginning to focus on helping ex-offenders and those suffering from drug and/or alcohol addiction with the social media campaign #SikhiSavesLives highlighting such examples.65 Respondents also noted the number of vulnerable Sikh illegal immigrants now living in the UK, suffering from some of these issues (BBC News, 2012a). Again, further detailed research on links between vulnerability, ideology and the propensity to commit violence is necessary.
Muslims and the Far Right

What is somewhat surprising is that one of the earliest references to the ‘radicalisation of Sikhs’ can be found in the Birmingham Mail of 11th June 2007, in a report on a protest which took place on 9th June 2007 during which Sikh youth were demanding police protection from Muslim extremism, ‘over allegations that young Sikh girls were being forced to convert to Islam’ (Birmingham Mail, 2007b). Numerous reports since the 1980s have highlighted clashes between Sikhs and Muslims in Britain particularly in the form of ‘gang violence’ (Malik 1997). For Malik, this antagonism was a consequence of an ‘identity crisis’, with each side protecting ‘their’ space from the ‘other’.

Sian (2011) notes that antagonism between Sikhs and Muslims in the UK is present in large sections of the Sikh community and is not exclusive to members of Sikh gangs and Sikh youth. From an analysis of Sian’s work in conjunction with the examination of Sikh / Muslim community relations (Moliner, C., 2007) and issues in Britain (Singh, G, 2010: 34-38) it appears that there are a number of contemporary and historical reasons for tensions between the two communities in Britain:

1. Historical accounts in the Sikh tradition highlighting instances of Sikhs having to deal with the threat of Mughal ‘tyranny’ combined with stories of violence during the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.

2. Sikh narratives of settlement in Britain regularly speaking of them being a ‘model minority’ and the ‘favoured sons of the empire’ a status which many seek to protect by disassociating themselves from Muslims.

3. The demographics of traditional areas of Sikh settlement changing in recent years due to new waves of immigration. Consequently, the ‘Little Punjabs’ of Southall and Smethwick for instance seeing increases in the size and settlement of Muslim communities leading to competition over resources such as housing, and education.

4. The profile of both Muslim and Sikh communities in the UK being very young leading to mixing within both communities in certain locales.

5. The proselytism of Sikhs by Muslim students on University campuses.

6. The narrative of ‘forced’ conversions being regularly expressed in the British Sikh diaspora where it is widely circulated that ‘predatory’ Muslim males are attempting to ‘aggressively’ target and convert ‘vulnerable’ Sikh girls into Islam.

7. Following 9/11 and 7/7 many turban-wearing Sikhs becoming victims of anti-Muslim hate crime as they were targeted by racists who made no distinction between Sikhs and Muslims.

8. Some Sikhs supporting far right organisations including the BNP and EDL.

9. In internet discussions young Sikhs drawing a sharp contrast between the Sikh view of women’s rights and those under Islam, often in derogatory communal caricatures.

For Sian, the narrative of large numbers of Sikhs girls being targets for conversion by ‘predatory’ Muslims exists to allow Sikhs in Britain ‘to preserve the integrity of their community and this
sustain Sikh identity in circumstances in which the traditional means of identity maintenance are no longer effective’ (2013: 118). Furthermore, she argues that this narrative encourages patriarchy by discouraging Sikh girls in particular from 'bad habits' and highlighting fears among certain Sikhs ‘of women’s agency, the fears of the shifting balance between men and women, the fears of being and at the same time not being accepted as part of the West’ (2013: 119).

In recent years, the narrative around Muslims targeting Sikh girls for conversion has evolved to also focus on 'grooming', particularly following the recent media discourse around the activities of Pakistani grooming gangs in cities across the UK (Oldham, 2015). These narratives were present in many of the interviews, with Respondent 10 explaining that 'grooming's been going on for years – Sikh girls being groomed, totally overlooked and acknowledged.' Respondents frequently cited a BBC 'Inside Out' documentary which aired in 2013 on the issue of Sikh girls being groomed by Muslim men (Adesina 2013) as evidence of the phenomenon. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to empirically examine the truth behind these claims, the narrative of Sikh girls being groomed by Muslim men has been a key factor in some of the recent incidents of Sikh / Muslim tensions, in particular the Mughal Darbar incident in Leicester in 2013 (BBC News, 2013d).

Respondent 6 explained how many Sikhs highlighting issues of grooming and conversion lived in areas with high Muslim and Sikh populations: 'I'm saying it accounts for certainly one or two of them, who happen to be at the forefront ... that’s why it’s Midlands based ... like if you come down South, Slough is one of those hotspots where it happens a lot.67 Indeed, data from the 2011 Census demonstrates how many of those involved in highlighting these narratives live in areas with high concentrations of both Sikhs and Muslims:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Postcode</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Sikh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West London (UB1, UB2, TW5, UB3)</td>
<td>33089</td>
<td>37473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slough (SL3, SL1)</td>
<td>22344</td>
<td>11822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birmingham (B20, B21)</td>
<td>18702</td>
<td>11135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coventry (CV6)</td>
<td>9089</td>
<td>7011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leicester (LE5)</td>
<td>28083</td>
<td>6639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derby (DE23)</td>
<td>15203</td>
<td>5837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Postcodes with high concentrations of Sikhs & Muslims

There is evidence of engagement between Sikhs in Britain and far right groups going back to 2001, when a member of a Sikh group in Southall 'admitted to links with the right wing British National Party (BNP)' (BBC News, 2001). To date, Tommy Robinson the co-founder and former leader of the English Defence League (EDL) has publically engaged with three Sikh groups online; the Sikh Awareness Society, Sikh Youth UK and Dal Khalsa UK around the issue of Muslim grooming and conversion which for Hundal (2017) highlights that ‘some Sikhs are still so consumed by their hatred of Muslims they will happily align with far-right white nationalists’. Indeed, Tommy Robinson has been present at an event organised by Sikh Youth UK has been interviewed on the Sikh Channel.
(Sikh Channel, 2015) and regularly tweets examples from Sikh history to demonstrate the persecution of Sikhs under the Mughal Empire:

Image 2: A Tweet from Tommy Robinson about Sikh historical engagement with the Mughals

The interview data highlighted that Sikh engagement with the far right appears to most often occur on a local level between individuals rather than organisations. Respondent 17 explained how in his local area ‘people knew about Sikh girls who’ve been brought over from Punjab on student visas – they’re abused and can’t go back. Lots of Sikh guys got frustrated with the Police and pretty much all of them have had contact with EDL. There’s contact between local Sikh guys and local EDL guys especially when the Police insist there have been no issues with grooming.’ Although the ‘Sikh Division of the EDL’ have been present at some EDL protests there is little evidence available on its membership or continued existence. It is also important to note that ‘Sikhs against the EDL’ emerged ‘in response to the EDL’s attempt to breed anti Muslim sentiment within the Sikh community’ (Operation Black Vote, 2013).

Purely based on online evidence it appears that Sikh engagement with Tommy Robinson and with the far right is both supported and opposed by Sikhs in Britain (e.g. Singh H: 2017) and that Sikh links with the far right are neither wide spread nor non-existent. Further empirical research is required on the extent and reasons behind Sikh engagement with the far right and on the impact of these anti Muslim narratives.

Gender

Although both male and female Sikh activists participate in protests and campaigns, few Sikh women have been convicted of violence. One female respondent highlighted that Sikh institutions and organisations remain highly patriarchal and that ‘the female is expected, even in today’s age, to go home and look after the kids whereas the men can basically step out and do other things.’ Another explained that a key reason why Sikhs participating in protests tend to be male is because Sikh men have:

got a bit more flexible and disposable time to do it in, if I had to sit down for two hours at a protest, a female is going to look at that and think ‘In two hours, I can get 10-15 jobs done, forget about sitting down for one meeting’, that’s why I hate going to gurdwara politics or Sikh politics, sitting down for a three hour meeting and getting one action point, that is a waste of time, you know.
Respondent 4 noted how ‘due to the utter denial of the gurdwaras to address questions of gender abuse and domestic violence ... women’s organisations would see this resurgence of religious fundamentalist groups just as another manifestation of patriarchy asserting itself.’ Female Sikh activists in particular are beginning to highlight the fact that certain issues including honour killings, domestic violence, sexual abuse and substance abuse are rarely addressed by Sikh organisations and institutions. Beyond the few spaces established by Sikh women there appears to be little involvement from Sikh women in the organisation of protests. Indeed, Respondent 18 (a turbaned Sikh female) questioned ‘why do the protesters protest weddings and not the committee? And there are so many other issues we should be protesting as well, like female foeticide’.

**Religious Identity and Belonging**

Some respondents highlighted issues with ‘belonging’ in Britain, particularly having learned about the history and impact of colonialism. Respondent 7 explained how ‘they killed us, they destabilised our homeland and then they brought us here to work for them ... we’re the bastard children of colonialism, you know? We don’t belong here at all and we only fit in as much as we assimilate.’

The impact of this ‘lack of belonging’ on Sikh activists became clear, for ‘as long as a significant number of the majority white population continues to see the presence of people with a different hue of colour as temporary and illegitimate, then, naturally, minorities will need to maintain an interest in the political life of their original homelands’ (Goulbourne 1991:6). Writing in the early 1990s, Goulbourne found the flames of Khalistani ethnic nationalism being fed both by exclusion from the British national community and also by the dynamics of developments ‘back home’ in the Punjab. This may be one of the reasons why some Sikhs still feel the need to engage with this discourse.

In her study of religion, race and ethnicity among second generation young Indian Americans, Joshi (2006) found many of her respondents feeling like ‘perpetual foreigners’ (2006: 110) as their non-white appearance manifested itself in questions such as ‘Where are you really from?’ Scholarly examinations of the ethnic and religious identities of young adult members of South Asian communities in Britain (Singh 2010) have found that of all of the various social identities available to them religious identity has an especially strong appeal as ‘while religious commitment expresses one’s acceptance of a set of absolute truths ... ethnic identity is not much more than loyalty to disparate customs from a distant place’ (Jacobson 1997: 240). Raj concludes that religious resurgence among young South Asians is ‘connected to wider processes of identity politics partially informed by the assumption of difference as the core of multiculturalism’ (2000: 552) and that British multicultural policy actually encourages religious revival. It is clear therefore that there are a number of reasons why religious identity is becoming increasingly important for young South Asians living in diaspora leading them to want to engage in some way with their religious heritage.

In addition, some Sikhs born in diaspora may engage with homeland issues primarily because they feel marginalised from mainstream political agendas and that their engagement with 1984 ‘reflects a deeper conversation about what it means to be a Sikh living within both the diaspora and within
nations outside of India that continue to engage in racist nativist politics with shifting targets of ‘Otherness’ (Verma 2011:55).

**Generational Differences**

The interviews also highlighted some generational differences in the approach to Sikh activism. Respondent 11 highlighted how ‘people have memories of 1984 and don’t want to relive it … if you talk to elders, they’ll say ‘we want to live our lives, we don’t want to have another period of that time’, it’s too traumatic.’ The lack of discussion about the events of 1984 in many UK gurdwaras can leads British born Sikhs to look to learn about the circumstances behind and the lead up to 1984 from other sources, often as part of a wider journey to learn more about their Sikh heritage.

In participating in the beadbi campaigns, Respondent 8 found ‘elders questioning ‘why are you doing this?’ and I was thinking ‘we’re only doing what you told us to do, respect Guru Granth Sahib Ji’ … you were telling us to do this, now we’re doing it, you’re telling us what we’re doing is wrong.’ Although many respondents clearly respected the first generation of Sikh migrants for establishing gurdwaras and organisations, Respondent 8 ‘felt that complacency had kicked in and it was almost like shaking the system a bit … you can use the word ‘extremist’ or whatever but I call it duty bound.’
TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES

This section examines how Sikh activists learn about some of the narratives above. The interviews and literature highlighted a number of different channels through which Sikhs in Britain learn about the key events and narratives which impacted on their participation in Sikh activism.

FAMILY

Parminder Bhatthal (2015) found Sikh youth in Canada using the concept of Khalistan to develop and reinforce a sense of differentiation from other Canadians, with participation in Khalistani movements allowing ‘men to build a masculine Sikh identity in interaction with each other, women to build a general social identity based on interactions with each other, and men and women to interact with each other on the basis of collective socio-religious identity exploration and affirmation’ (2015: ii).

Respondents described how they had been shaped by the impact of 1984 on members of their families, particularly their fathers. Respondent 13 explained how he saw his father become inspired by Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as ‘through his own life, all he ever saw was compromise in leaders, that’s the one man he never saw compromise in.’ The histories passed on by parents to their children clearly impacted on engagement with Sikh activism. Respondent 6 explained how his involvement ‘stems back from when I was around about 8 or 9 years old, and involved in the Khalistan movement where my father was involved in it too ... it also involved me singing songs on stage, promoting things that would probably today get me classed as a terrorist.’ For Respondent 8, ‘being of East African background or whatever, you were quite disconnected from ’84 … but a lot of the Sikhs I met coming to Sikhi were very active and had relatives involved in movements from ’84.’

Writing in 1999, Tatla noted a number of distinctions around which parts of the Sikh community supported the idea of Khalistan, describing how while ‘Ramgharia gurdwaras have contributed to Delhi’s Sikh victims [and] ... the Bhatras have shown enthusiasm for the homeland cause, ... Namdharis have shown little interest ... the Ravidasis have been unambiguous in standing aloof from the Khalistan issue ... [and] Jat Sikhs have dominated the Khalistan movement though divided by ideology and patronage’ (1999: 120). The statement by Respondent 8 however highlights how although Sikhs migrants from India and Jat Sikhs in particular may initially have been more concerned with the impact of 1984, Sikhs in Britain from a diversity of backgrounds now appear to be learning about the events of 1984 and in particular about the storming of Harmandir Sahib. Respondent 10 explained, ‘my father’s very much impacted by it so visually seeing all of the change and the dynamics from post 1984 ... I remember the attack happening, I remember the outcry feeling for most people ... and I think the biggest impact was it turned my whole family from let’s say, passive Sikhs ... into practising Sikhs overnight ... I remember going on coaches to various events ... obviously my mum and dad were fully immersed in it ... we were all going but then all of my friends were.’ Parental involvement in 1984 related activism clearly impacted on the propensity for future generations to participate. Respondent 7 explained how these ‘1984 related networks are still really important – they keep the talk about 1984 going’.
TRanSMISSIon oF nARRATIVES
THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF ‘SIKH RADICALISATION’ IN BRITAIN

GURDWARAS
As highlighted in the timeline mappings above, one of the main reasons for Sikh on Sikh incidents relates to the management of gurdwaras. Disputes most frequently take place in gurdwaras run by committee where the management is open to change and most often occur around gurdwara governance and personal disputes. Given the number of disputes taking place in gurdwaras organisations like the Sikh Council UK are looking to offer a mediation service for gurdwara disputes (Sikh Council UK, 2017).

Having analysed incidents in gurdwaras in Britain over the past ten years, it is clear that a number of Sikh on Sikh incidents have occurred in those gurdwaras managed by elected committees, rather than those managed by a charismatic individual, or Sant. These committee based disputes have usually occurred around gurdwara governance and/or personal/factional disputes.

The gurdwaras in Britain most likely to hold events to commemorate the events of 1984 are primarily those which affiliate to political or ideological groups (jathabandis). Indeed, the management of a number of large gurdwaras in Britain changed in the immediate aftermath of 1984 as the ISYF gained control of these gurdwaras through various means, with some of these struggles leading to factional violence as highlighted in the incident in Belvedere, Kent in 1987 (Tatla 1999: 119-120).

Having examined the types of images on display in twenty gurdwaras of differing types across the UK, I found all twenty of the gurdwaras visited displaying paintings and images which can be categorised as follows:

1. **Sikh Gurus** – All twenty gurdwaras visited displayed paintings of the Sikhs Gurus.

2. **Historical Martyrs** – Eighteen gurdwaras of all types displayed paintings of historical martyrs particularly those who resisted Mughal oppression, in particular Bhai Taru Singh and Bhai Mani Singh.

3. **Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale** – Five gurdwaras displayed paintings of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale with the damaged Akal Takht in the background.

4. **Contemporary Martyrs** – Two gurdwaras displayed paintings and photographs of ‘contemporary martyrs’ involved in the events of 1984. These were displayed with short biographical statements.

The images on display in gurdwaras transmit particular aspects of the Sikh tradition including historical examples of Sikh resistance during Mughal rule and the more contemporary events of 1984. Respondent 5 highlighted how he had attended a gurdwara with ‘lots of photos of 1984 victims … of a lot of shaheeds from the 1980s’. Respondent 12 who had served on a gurdwara committee which displayed four of these various image types explained that for young Sikhs, pictures of contemporary martyrs ‘are still a symbol of rebellion.’ As discussed, this post-1984 tradition of what Mahmood (1997) terms ‘massacre art’ exhibited in gurdwaras and online, allows Sikhs to valorise historical and contemporary shaheeds in particular for their acts of resistance.
Although it is not possible to generalise around clear generational divides, the interviews demonstrated that on the whole, first generation Sikhs are more likely to find out about events in Punjab through Sikh media (newspaper/ television / radio) and Sikhs born in Britain are more likely to receive their information online. Indeed, if a divide does exist it appears to be along linguistic rather than generational lines, around the proficiency (or lack of) in the Punjabi language. When asked how they learned about the various narratives every single respondent highlighted the role of the internet. Indeed, one of the main reasons why 1984 continues to play such an important role in the Sikh diaspora is due to the role of technological advances in the late 1980s, which continually provide information about the events that took place. For Ahluwalia (2011: 107) ‘the most powerful images of 1984 in the nascent days of the communications revolution were those smuggled by Sikhs, and not those released by the propaganda machine of the state controlled media.’ Indeed, for Tatla (2012) the exponential growth in websites has led to Sikh homeland issues online replacing the organisational structure of the community.

The online environment has raised the profile of the events of 1984 through campaigns run by Sikh organisations including the NSYF and Ensaa. In addition, the Internet ‘has enabled graphic images of tortured political prisoners and an obliterated Golden Temple, previously exhibited outside gurdwaras, to be transmitted to a younger generation many of whom do not go regularly to gurdwaras or know about the events of 1984’ (Shani 2008: 98). The online environment also constitutes an ‘emergent archive – indeed a cyber-archive – of Khalistani struggles’ (Axel 2005: 131) including in particular images of the shaheed’s tortured body. For Ahluwalia (2006: 109) due to the globalisation and communications revolution ‘the terror and horror of seeing the holiest seat of the Sikhs so blatantly violated and the pain and anguish of the victims of the Delhi pogroms is etched firmly in the memory of the Sikh diasporic imagination.’

The online environment offers numerous resources for Sikhs to engage with these narratives. Resources available include numerous lectures, documentaries, reports, discussion programmes, articles and books. Though there is no one group, website or organisation which acts as the main source of information about the political and religious narratives outlined above, certain groups are clearly more active on social media than others and raise ‘issues of concern’ more frequently than others with groups like Sikh Youth UK being quick to highlight suspected indiscretions including examples of beadbi. For Hundal (2017) Sikh Youth UK are also particularly active in peddling anti-Muslim narratives online.

The online environment is also impacting on the number of ‘Sikh on Sikh’ issues as individuals are able to closely scrutinise and challenge the teachings of Sikh preachers and practices of Sikh groups they disagree with and raise these as issues. Once these ‘issues of concern’ are raised, they quickly spread through social media (Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp) leading to widespread awareness of these narratives to those participating in these networks. There is no clear link between those who have an awareness of these issues and those who are then moved to participate in Sikh activism, although clearly, geographical access to activist networks plays an important role in facilitating such participation.
TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES
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The online environment is also impacting on the transmission of the Sikh tradition enabling a new generation of English speaking parcharaks (preachers) to present aspects of the Sikh tradition in English particularly on YouTube. Organisations including Basics of Sikhi, Sikh2Inspire, Nanak Naam and others have become increasingly popular in recent years with further research necessary into the impact of this new type of preaching.\textsuperscript{84} For Jhutti-Johal (2017b) the online environment has allowed a number of these Sikh organisations to ‘claim they are the true representatives of Sikh and its values’.

ORGANISATIONS AND INITIATIVES

The question of the role played by Sikh organisations in Sikh activism in Britain is of particular relevance given the repeated concerns about the Sikh diaspora funding Khalistani activities in India. Analyses of Sikh organisations in Britain have noted how factionalism is endemic, ensuring that most Sikh organisations ‘have a short shelf-life, regularly undergo multiple reincarnations or reinvent themselves with grandiose titles’ (Singh and Tatla 2006: 95). Building on Tatla (1999: 139) and Singh and Tatla’s (2006) mapping of Sikh organisations in Britain, it is clear that a large number and wide diversity of types of Sikh organisations currently exist in Britain (see Appendix C).

A number of commentators have discussed the role played by Sikh organisations in protests and activism with Dhaliwal (2016) describing how ‘Sikh fundamentalist’ organisations including Sikh Youth UK, Basics of Sikhi, the Sikh Federation UK, Dal Khalsa, the I Pledge Orange campaign and the Sikh Awareness Society have been active in the mixed faith weddings protests. Similarly, Jhutti-Johal (2017) argues that Sikh organisations like the Network of Sikh Organisations, Sikh Council UK, and City Sikhs ‘aim to provide a professional voice on Sikhi’ compared to other groups ‘whose raison d’êtres are more often than not associated with a specific, some may say fundamentalist, agenda’.\textsuperscript{85} Having analysed Sikh organisations in Britain, it is clear that many would be better described as ‘initiatives’ as they are often run by one individual rather than being organisations with a recognised membership. Of relevance to this report is the question of how Sikh organisations and initiatives impact on Sikh activism in Britain and on the transmission of the narratives discussed. The tables in Appendix C map these organisations according to a) the main language used, b) their membership, c) their location, d) their recent outputs and e) their role(s) in Sikh activism in Britain. This analysis highlights that there are a number of different types of Sikh organisations in Britain playing different roles, with some acting as ‘all-rounders’ and others tackling specific issues which can be framed as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Policy and Representation}: These national organisations including the Sikh Council UK, the Sikh Federation, the Network of Sikh Organisations (NSO) and City Sikhs Network focus on engaging with policy makers and representing Sikhs in an official capacity (Singh J, 2013). In terms of activism, these organisations have been active in providing statements on behalf of the Sikh community, intervening in cases of discrimination against Sikhs in the workplace and working on policy issues (in particular the Sikh Council UK), ‘mainstreaming’ issues of 1984 (in particular the Sikh Federation)\textsuperscript{86} and providing responses to government policies such as Prevent (Parliament, 2009) and Hate Crime legislation (Chester, 2017) with the NSO particularly active in this area.
\end{enumerate}
2/ Homeland Focused: These organisations raise awareness of issues faced by Sikhs in the Punjab including the status of Sikh political prisoners. These homeland organisations tend to be run by first generation Sikhs targeting a first generation audience with few British born members. Although the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF) and BKI (Babbar Khalsa International) were certainly present across the Sikh diaspora in the late 1980s / early 1990s (Razavy 2006) following their proscription by the UK government in March 2001 they no longer visibly appear to exist in Britain.87 The annual June 1984 rally is organised by the ‘Federation of Sikh Organisations’ (FSO) whose members include the Sikh Federation UK, United Khalsa Dal UK, Dal Khalsa UK, International Panthic Dal, Shiromani Akali Dal UK, International Khalsa Organisation and the National Sikh Youth Federation (NSYF). It is also important to note that some of the ‘Policy and Representation’ organisations listed above including the Sikh Federation and NSO are also concerned with homeland issues (for example, see Singh H, 2015).

3/ Grooming: These initiatives raise awareness of issues of grooming and child sexual exploitation affecting Sikhs in Britain with their focus being primarily on the dangers of Pakistani Muslim gangs targeting Sikh girls for conversion (Sian 2013, Jhutti-Johal 2017). Two organisations in particular play an active role in this regard. The ‘Sikh Awareness Society’ regularly presents lectures on the topic of grooming in gurdwaras and on University campuses. Similarly, ‘Sikh Youth UK’ also focuses on grooming issues, recently producing ‘Misused Trust’, a film telling the story of a Sikh girl being groomed by Pakistani men which has been screened around the country and is now available online (Sikh Youth UK, 2017). This issue has also been highlighted by a number of the ‘Policy and Representation’ organisations with Lord Singh of the NSO making the following statement in a letter published in the Times on 5th March 2015:

the Sikh and Hindu communities have for decades been at the receiving end of predatory grooming by members of the Muslim community and have for some time been campaigning in the UK for the recognition that there seems to be a clear pattern emerging in recent high-profile sexual grooming gang cases. This pattern clearly highlights that these gangs seem to predominantly originate from a Pakistani Muslim community, while their victims are almost always of a white, Hindu or Sikh background (Times London, 2015)

Similarly, the Sikh manifesto published by the Sikh Network made reference to ‘evidence of a disproportionally high number of people from the Pakistani Muslim community that have been found guilty of committing crimes’ (Sikh Federation UK, 2014). This highlights that a number of different types of Sikh organisation focus on grooming, although unlike Sikh Youth UK and the Sikh Awareness Society, none of the other ‘Policy / Representative’ organisations have publically engaged with Tommy Robinson. While the Sikh Awareness Society and Sikh Youth UK focus primarily on highlighting the need for Sikhs (women in particular) to be aware of the risks of being groomed (by Pakistani Muslims in particular) the focus on external grooming and CSE threats rather any internal issues appears to be changing with the Sikh Awareness Society recently highlighting issues within the Sikh community.88
4/ Humanitarian: A number of Sikh organisations have emerged in recent years tackling humanitarian issues including providing free food for the homeless in conjunction with local _gurdwaras_ (Singh J, 2015). These organisations are run by Sikhs in Britain and highlight a desire to use concepts from the Sikh tradition like _langar_ (lit. 'community kitchen') to provide food to the needy. Organisations like Khalsa Aid, Midland Langar Seva which assisted in the floods in the Somerset in 2014 (Sky News, 2014) and in Hebden Bridge in 2016 (Pidd and Halliday, 2016) are concerned with wider humanitarian issues and with contributing to their local societies. In terms of Sikh activism, many of those involved in these organisations highlight how the religious narratives of _sewa_ and _miri/piri_ in particular have driven them to this type of activism (Desitoday, 2016).

5/ Education: A number of organisations and initiatives including the Sikh Education Council, Basics of Sikh, Sikh2Inspire and Akaal Publishers provide educational resources. The focus of these various educational initiatives primarily established by British born Sikhs is varied, with some teaching Sikh history, others teaching how to read the Guru Granth Sahib, others explaining key concepts from the Sikh tradition and others focusing specifically on the events of 1984. The National Youth Sikh Federation for example has developed a series of resources which are posted annually on social media including the #10DaysOfTerror campaign about June 1984 and the #6DaysOfTerror campaign about the events of November 1984:

Further examples include the media channel Naujawani.com run by Harwinder Singh Mander which produces articles and films on Sikh issues and RajoanaTV a youtube channel which hosts talks by Sarbjit Singh, a British born Sikh from Birmingham who regularly produces videos on Sikh issues. Indeed, a 2012 article in the Indian newspaper 'The Hindu' recognised the role being played by these two individuals in particular noting that these 'young educated Sikhs living abroad, are beginning to question, in democratic ways, if what happened in Punjab in the 1980s was justified.
after all. Their questions now are not so much about the old territorial or river waters issues but whether Sikhs have been discriminated against by India’s politico-legal system in the last two decades. What is worrying is that the voices are becoming insistent and even moderate Sikhs find it hard to fault their logic’ (Dogra, 2012).

The flyers which advertise events commemorating the lives of 1984 martyrs regularly list a whole host of organisations and initiatives run by British born Sikhs including 1984Tribute.com, NeverForget84.com, Sikh Youth UK, Sikh2Inspire and RajoanaTV.90 Indeed, examining the history of these initiatives it is clear that many appear and then disappear after a short period of activity91 to be replaced by newer initiatives. Many of these initiatives highlight the events of 1984 and often engage with the ‘Sikh Rebellion’ subculture.

‘SIKH REBELLION’ SUBCULTURE
The release of dharmik (religious) rap music, or what Kalra and Nijhawan (2007: 67) term ‘Dhadi Urban’ music appears to be linked to the emergence of what I am terming the ‘Sikh Rebellion’ subculture of social media, music and clothing.92 The music which emerged in 2002 with the release of the album ‘Shaheedi Immortality 1’ on the label ‘Immortal Productions’, mixes urban rap music with renderings of dhadi music. Described by Nijhawan (2006) as ‘eulogatory singing’, dhadi music ‘acquired public recognition as the musical voice of Sikh militancy’ (Nijhawan 2008: 144) during the 1980s. Dhadi performers traditionally sing ballads from Sikh history which serve ‘as a popular mode of producing a Sikh martyr history’ (Nijhawan 2006) including a number of elements of braggadocio. In its current form, ‘Dhadi Urban’ music is often aired at outdoor events organised throughout the diaspora including the various Vaisakhi melas or fairs. Indeed, as Kalra and Nijhawan (2007:73) conclude, it is only in the diasporic context ‘that music of this type can be produced ... but because in the Indian context these texts, for their lyrical content, would be banned.’

In a 2013 interview on the music channel Britasia, Shamsher Singh (of the NSYF and Immortal Productions) explained how this genre of music was created ‘to inspire the youngsters and it was really almost a reinvention of a tradition ... of singing ballads about your heroes and about your history’ (Immortal Productions, 2013). He highlighted how the music evolved to educate rather than entertain with the message being ‘to learn more about your roots and to learn more about your history and your culture and why we have the Sikh identity and to learn about the social issues of Punjab ... the revolution that took place in Punjab during the 80s and 90s, the civil war that took place and the characters, the personalities that were involved’ (Immortal Productions, 2013).

As a means of transmission, this music appears to be playing an increasingly important role. Respondent 20 explained how ‘I’ve got the albums in my car. When we listen to these songs I’m in tears, my mum’s in tears, we’re all in tears. My brother who’s not that in to Sikhi gets so upset when he hears this music.’ The evolution of this music highlights how some Sikhs are moving away from the traditional ‘Asian’ music of Bhangra, explained by Shamsher Singh as being a consequence of young people wanting ‘something with a deeper message ... bringing the philosophy of the Sikh faith in a way that’s relatable to a much younger audience that may not consider themselves to be Sikh that may not go to the gurdwara’ (Immortal Productions, 2013). A number of music labels
produce these albums including Immortal Productions, Revolution Records and Dharam Sewa Records with the main focus of this music being:

1. The need for justice for 1984: Much of this ‘Dharmik Rap’ music focuses on the events of 1984. Many of the songs highlight the need to seek justice for 1984 with lyrics on the track Attwadi (‘terrorist) by Robb Singh Ft Manvinder Singh & Spyder Black (Dhillon, 2015) stating ‘we’re not getting justice. If we seek our own kind of justice, then you will label us terrorists.’ The names most often mentioned as targets for ‘justice’ are the aforementioned Indian state officials Kamal Nath, Sajjan Kumar, Jagdish Tytler, Sumedh Saini, KPS Gill and General KS Brar for their involvement (actual or alleged) in various aspects of 1984.

2. Valorising those who have ‘taken justice’: The video to the track ‘Beant Satwant Da Badla’ (Immortal Productions, 2012) by Tru-Skool & Pavitar Singh Pasla shows a cartoon celebrating the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. Other tracks valorise the actions of Sukha and Jinda (who assassinated Arun Vaidya the Chief of Indian army at the time of Operation Blue Star) (DharamSevaRecords, 2015) and acts committed in India by members of Babbar Khalsa International (Shingari, 2014).

3. ‘Defending the Faith’: Tracks focus on protecting the Sikh tradition. The track ‘Beadbi’ by Jagowale highlights instances of disrespect to the Guru Granth Sahib and the need for Sikhs to address these (Jagowale TV, 2014). Other tracks including ‘PAGG (TURBAN)’ by Popsy highlight the importance of maintaining the respect of the turban and of upholding the ‘honour’ of the Sikh community (Moviebox, 2015).

The 'Sikh Rebellion' subculture also incorporates clothing, some embodying the slogan 'Khalistan Zindabad' (long live Khalistan) which is readily available online.\textsuperscript{93} In her analysis of an incident in April 2008 in which twenty students went to their local high school in Surrey, British Columbia wearing Khalistan T-shirts bearing an image of ‘a popular Khalistan militant leader holding a spear and a revolver strapped to his side’ Nayar (2014: 224) highlights what she terms the ‘rap-ization’ of the Sikh tradition. She notes how many of those wearing Khalistan T-shirts and listening to this music are not Khalsa Sikhs and are actually using these images and objects as an act of rebellion.

A blogger writing about the incident on the LangarHall blog, explained that ‘the guns of the Babbar Khalsa logo has become ‘cool’. It has become the Sikh youth Che Guevera T-Shirt.’ (Jodha, 2008). For Nayar (2014: 230) engagement with this type of clothing is a consequence of Sikh youth expressing their perceived or actual experiences of marginalisation in Canada through the ‘rap-ization’ of their religious tradition.
EVENTS, TALKS AND PROTESTS

As I have discussed elsewhere (Singh J, 2011, 2016) talks and lectures are regularly organised at University Sikh societies and at Sikh camps catering for young Sikh adults. These societies regularly host Sikh activists as speakers who often speak on the events of 1984 and other issues including grooming. In addition to these events, the annual June 1984 protest which has taken place every year since 1984 plays an important role in ensuring the discourse around 1984 continues. Indeed, having begun in the UK, 1984 protest marches are now being held across the diaspora including in San Francisco (Patton, 2015) and Vancouver (Singh G, 2016).

The placards on display in Hyde Park and on route to Trafalgar Square serve to remind the attendees of why the rally is taking place. Recent years have seen these events playing another important role in providing online content. The talks and speeches at camps, rallies and in universities are often recorded and hosted online and are consequently widely available for all.

SIKH BROADCAST MEDIA

The recent emergence of Sikh television and radio stations all based in the UK appears to be playing an important role in informing members of the Sikh community in Britain about events taking place in Punjab and in the rest of the diaspora. In addition to the numerous radio stations broadcasting Sikh related content on AM, FM and DAB and online, there are currently four specifically Sikh television channels, all based in the UK.
TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES
THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF ‘SIKH RADICALISATION’ IN BRITAIN

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<th>Channel</th>
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<th>Main Studios</th>
<th>Sky Frequency (2017)</th>
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<td>Sikh Channel</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sangat TV</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>836</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akaal Channel</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
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<td>KTV</td>
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*Table 3: Sikh television channels in Britain*

To date, there has been little research conducted on these channels in terms of their audiences and programming. It is clear that their focus on broadcasting homeland news is having some impact in the diaspora for instance making Sikhs in Britain aware of instances of *beadbi* taking place in Punjab leading to the #SikhLivesMatter protest in October 2015.

These channels have on occasion breached OFCOM regulations in relation to the content being broadcast. Anecdotal evidence indicates that few British born Sikhs watch these channels and that their audiences are primarily first generation Punjabi speakers. Nevertheless, these channels appear to be playing an important role in facilitating the discussion of subjects which Sikhs in diaspora may not previously have engaged in. For instance Sikhs attending *gurdwaras* where the events of 1984 were rarely discussed may have previously been unaware of some of the details of the events of June and November 1984. Further research is required on the impact and role of Sikh media in the transmission of these narratives.
TYPES OF PUBLICLY VISIBLE SIKH ACTIVISM

Based on the literature review, interviews, media analysis and fieldwork, this section proposes a model of the different types of publically visible Sikh activism. It is important to note that these are not exclusive categories and that the majority of Sikhs in Britain do not engage in any type of activism. The categories listed propose further detail about different types of Sikh activism in Britain beyond the simplistic labels of ‘fundamentalist’, ‘extremist’ and ‘radical’. I propose that there are five main types of Sikh activism in Britain based on the self-description of those participating and the analysis of the incidents which have occurred to date:

1. **HUMANITARIAN / SOCIAL JUSTICE**: This category of activism focuses on a number of issues including the challenging of discrimination faced by Sikhs in relation to the maintenance of Sikh articles of faith (turban, 5Ks), human rights abuses faced by Sikhs relating to the events of 1984 and the provision of aid relief to the needy. This activism involves providing online educational resources, physically providing aid relief, pursuing legal channels to investigate human rights abuses and standing in solidarity with other similar campaigns. This type of activism is most publicly prominent in Britain in the form of the various Sikh food banks that have been established in recent years and in the provision of aid relief for instance during the Somerset floods (Sky News, 2014). Those participating in providing aid relief and free food to the needy can be seen to be using the concepts of *sewa* (selfless service) and *langar* (the community kitchen) in a contemporary context.

2. **RELIGIOUS ENFORCEMENT**: This activism is usually organised around campaigns which target *gurdwaras* for not obeying the *Sikh Rehat Maryada* and *Akal Takht* edicts. This activism is presented as ‘enforcing’ Sikh practices so that they are used as decreed by the *Akal Takht* and *Sikh Rehat Maryada*. Other examples of ‘religious enforcement’ include the protesting against Sikh preachers who have either been formally excommunicated by the *Akal Takht* or whose views or interpretations some sections or groups disagree with. Although this type of activism is most prominent in the form of protests taking place at *gurdwaras*, it is important to note that although many Sikhs may agree with the need to understand the meaning behind and ensure the appropriate use of Sikh practices, fewer agree with the use of violence to achieve these aims.

3. **DIASPORIC NATIONALISM**: This activism publically articulates the need for Khalistan as a sovereign and independent Sikh state by providing educational resources and by organising conferences, events, exhibitions and online campaigns to raise awareness of 1984 and the context behind these events. Although those participating in ‘diasporic nationalism’ may vocalise the need for Khalistan, at this time there appears to be no workable strategy in place to achieve this aim. Indeed, there appear to be a number of reasons for those participating in diasporic nationalism to publically articulate the idea of Khalistan. For some, this continued talk is primarily an act of resistance against the Indian state. For others, particular Sikhs born in diaspora, ‘diasporic nationalism’ can be viewed as a meaning-making practice and a form of self-articulation (Nijhawan 2014). This type of activism is most publicly prominent in the
form of the rallies, protests and events relating to the events of 1984 in relation to the lack of recourse from the Indian state.

4. **COMMUNITY DEFENCE**: This activism focuses on ‘defending’ the Sikh community against the real or perceived threats of the Indian state, Muslim conversion and grooming gangs, secular modernity, those Sikhs (particularly women) marrying out of the faith, incidents of beadbi (Sikh/non-Sikh) and those promoting a diverse view of the Sikh community. This type of activism is most publicly prominent in the form of protests taking place at gurdwaras and/or at public institutions.

5. **PERSONAL / FACTIONAL**: This activism is usually focused around gaining control of gurdwaras or influencing gurdwara policy. Many of the Sikh on Sikh incidents listed have been a consequence of these types of disputes and are most publically visible in the form of incidents at gurdwaras.

As much of this activism involves protesting, there is a risk of some protesters becoming violent, particularly those who are prone to carry out vigilante actions, or who belong to networks and groups which encourage vigilante action. It is also important to reiterate that the types of activism listed above are not discrete. For instance some participants in mixed faith Anand Karaj protests could be focusing on ‘religious enforcement’ with the key driver being on maintaining the ‘authenticity’ of the Anand Karaj (wedding) ceremony and upholding the Sikh Rehat Maryada, whereas others could be participating in ‘community defence’ concerned with discouraging Sikh women from marrying out. Similarly, participants in 1984 rallies could be participating for ‘social justice’ relating to the events of November 1984, in ‘diasporic nationalism’ relating to the establishment of Khalistan, in ‘community defence’ against the Indian state or as a combination of some or all three of these different types of activism. Rather than labelling Sikh activists, the categories above highlight some of the different drivers for Sikh activism in Britain explaining why people participate. Indeed, as Nijhawan (2014: 214) found in his study of Sikh activists in Canada many ‘resist being neatly packaged into the ideological clusters (‘Khalistan supporters’) and identity categories (‘orthodox’ versus ‘secular’ Sikhs) that are often projected from the outside’.
The impact of Sikh activism will now be examined using Sedgwick’s (2010: 479) model of the different contexts and agendas which are concerned with ‘radical’ activity: 1) the security agenda, 2) the integration agenda, 3) the foreign-policy agenda and 4) religious community agendas.

The security agenda is concerned with radical activity if it constitutes a direct or indirect threat to the security of the state or to individual citizens of the state and focuses on preventing terrorist attacks on citizens of the state. This report has highlighted how there is no threat to the British state or to the wider British public from Sikh activists as there is no conflict with ‘the West’ or with Britain. Although the revelations that the British government advised the Indian government in their planning for Operation Bluestar may have changed some Sikhs’ relationship with Britain, as Respondent 10 explained, ‘Where was the violence? Not one arrest, there was a protest outside No. 10 Downing Street, there was a mass lobby, there were meetings and Sikh gatherings across the UK … but where was the violence?’ Even following the revelations that the UK government sent advisors to India before the events of Operation Bluestar, there has been no targeting of members of the British government, with the focus being on agitating for the release of historical documents through political processes (Walker, 2014). The response of Sikh activists to any further revelations about British involvement in the events of Operation Bluestar will depend on the level of involvement of the British state. Given that there has been no evidence to date of direct British involvement in the storming of Harmandir Sahib during Operation Bluestar, it is most likely that if further revelations were released, the response of Sikh activists in Britain would be to look to understand and learn about the level and type of involvement.

The integration agenda highlights concerns about citizenship (Sedgwick 2010: 486) focusing on the importance of a ‘shared vision’ for society which includes the recent emphasis on the ‘British values’ of ‘democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ (Gov.uk, 2014). Consequently, according to the focus of the integration agenda, those engaging in activities which appear not to tolerate the views of others could be deemed radical. In this regard, the main threat to the integration agenda from Sikh activists is from vigilantism, primarily against other Sikhs. This vigilantism resulted in the murders of Darshan Das and Tarsem Singh Toor in the immediate aftermath of 1984, and although there have been no instances of fatal violence in recent years, there is a risk that Sikh on Sikh issues may result in violence in the future. In addition, existing Sikh / Muslim tensions and the propagation of narratives around issues of conversion and grooming of Sikh girls by Muslim gangs may also lead to violence although as has been demonstrated, instances of violence around these issues are usually around specific localised cases. It is also important to note that much Sikh activism actually contributes to the integration agenda, particularly the humanitarian relief provided by Sikh activists for instance during the Somerset floods (Sky News, 2014).

Foreign-policy agendas consider the agendas of other state governments, resulting in actions and viewpoints that would not otherwise be of concern for either the security agenda or the integration agenda to be classified as radical. Sedgwick (2010) notes how although groups may hold radical
views about the practices of foreign governments, they may not pose a domestic security threat and may actually contribute to the integration agenda by contributing in their local societies. As this report has shown, Sikh activism around the lack of recourse for the events of 1984100 and the sense of injustice and hurt felt about the events of 1984 continue to drive many Sikhs towards activism across the diaspora. The risk of violence from Sikhs in Britain in relation to foreign policy, relates to the targeting of named Indian state officials, in particular General K.S. Brar for his involvement in Operation Bluestar, Jagdish Tytler, Sajjan Kumar and Kamal Nath for their alleged involvement in the violence against Sikhs in November 1984 and Sumedh Saini for their role in quelling the Sikh insurgency in the Punjab in the early 1990s. Although KPS Gill was named as a target, he passed away following a heart attack on 26th May 2017 (Express Web Desk, 2017). The fact that Sikhs, along with other minority groups, protested outside Downing Street (Addley, 2015) and Wembley (Al-Othman, 2015) during the November 2015 visit of the Indian Prime Minister Narendera Modi indicates that the risk of violence in Britain is not against Indian state officials per se, but only those directly involved in the events of 1984 and its aftermath.

Although Indian media regularly reports on the activities of Khalistani organisations in India and their links to Sikh individuals in Britain, the exact nature of these links is unclear though many of these reports focus on funding related links101. For Singh and Shani (2015: 275) even before 1984, the Sikh diaspora ‘despite its best efforts, was a marginal player in terms of its engagement with the homeland ... more often than not, the diaspora mirrored homeland developments rather than carving out a space for independent activity that could set the agenda for Punjab politics.’ Indeed, the proceedings at the Sarbat Khalsa of 2015, presented as a ‘meeting of Sikh radicals’ (HT Correspondent, 2015b) highlighted how few members of the Sikh diaspora were involved, with a North American Sikh delegation playing the most prominent diasporic role.102 Sikh organisations in Britain do certainly appear to be influencing Sikh doctrine and practice worldwide particularly through social media campaigns focusing on ‘religious enforcement’, which have led to specific Akal Takht edicts in response. Further detailed research is necessary on the various types of relationships between Sikhs in India and in the diaspora.

Finally, regarding the religious community agenda, Sedgwick (2010: 488) notes that religious and community organisations can often have their own private agendas. For instance, when government funding is made available to ‘moderate’ groups, religious and community organisations may emphasise how ‘moderate’ they are in comparison to other more ‘radical’ groups. Even when funding is not an issue, religious and community groups may still have their own reasons for delegitimising other groups. As the report has shown, instances where Sikhs have described other Sikhs as ‘extremists’ and ‘radicals’ are often a throwback to the language used to describe Sikhs in the 1980s and may actually be a consequence of doctrinal differences, personal grievances, factional disputes and differences of opinion within the community.
CONCLUSIONS

This report has highlighted how Sikh activism in Britain fundamentally changed following the events of 1984. From a community generally supporting the Indian state, who had been campaigning for the right to wear Sikh symbols in Britain, the events of 1984 traumatised many British Sikhs, leading them to protest against the storming of *Harmandir Sahib* and the violence which took place against Sikhs in November 1984. As the mapping of events has shown, a number of incidents of Sikh political violence occurred in the aftermath of June and November 1984 including fatal incidents of violence against Darshan Das and Tarsem Singh Toor. Since then, most incidents of Sikh violence have occurred against other Sikhs for doctrinal, personal or political reasons.

A number of narratives and issues are present in Sikh activism in Britain, with 1984 remaining the most important political narrative. Although Sikh activists may legitimise the use of violence through narratives in the Sikh tradition particularly relating to the historical resistance of state hegemony, where violence has been used it is usually targeted towards specific individuals. In addition, concepts often used in relation to other religious traditions including notions of ‘martyrdom’ and ‘fundamentalism’ have substantially different meanings in the Sikh tradition. Martyrdom’ in the Sikh tradition for instance, is primarily an act of resistance as opposed to being conceptualised as some kind of ‘entry ticket to paradise’ (Mahmood, 2002: 32). Also, as there is no concept of the ‘non-believer’ or no notion of apostasy in the Sikh tradition, there is no targeting of non-Sikhs or those who have formally renounced the Sikh faith.

The fact that the most frequently occurring incidents of violence have related to factional disputes or doctrinal disagreements within Sikh institutions, highlights the contested notions of authority within the Sikh tradition. Although these have little impact on non-Sikh publics, there is a cost to the state in terms of the use of resources when dealing with these issues. In terms of violence, given that Sikh political violence has led to fatalities in the past, it appears that it is political, doctrinal or governance related vigilantism which is most likely to result in violence in the future. The large number of ‘Sikh on Sikh’ incidents highlights that Sikhs in Britain (and the diaspora) are currently unable to address internal doctrinal disagreements and/or diverse opinions before incidents occur.

Cultural dimensions including the emphasis of maintaining honour also impact on Sikh activism with some seeing it as their duty to ‘protect the honour’ of Sikh females by policing their behaviour. Others feel the need to continually maintain their status among activist circles by regularly attending and participating in activist events. It has been found that although Sikh women do participate in rallies and protests, they remain underrepresented in Sikh institutions and organisations in Britain. It appears that some Sikh organisations are making attempts to include more Sikh women, although patriarchal attitudes regarding the place of women in society still hinder their full participation. Until Sikh women are fully included in Sikh organisations and institutions, issues including domestic violence, sexual abuse and female foeticide will not be addressed and will continue to be ignored due to misplaced notions of maintaining ‘honour’.

In terms of its impact on the British state and British public, it has been demonstrated that Sikhs in Britain do not pose a security threat as there is no conflict with ‘the West’. In terms of integration,
the main threat of violence is from the exploitation of inter-community and/or intra-community tensions and any resulting vigilantism. The report has shown that although there are a number of different reasons and types of Sikh activism, the instances most frequently reported in mainstream media involve those participating in vigilante actions which have led to violence.

The delisting of the ISYF in UK Parliament in March 2016 due to the Home Secretary concluding 'that there is not sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the ISYF is currently concerned with terrorism' (Hansard, 2016) has left only the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) as a proscribed Sikh terrorist organisation in the UK. Given the definition of ‘radicalisation’ as ‘the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups’ (HM Government, 2015) there is little evidence that Sikhs in Britain are being 'radicalised' to support the BKI or to commit terrorist acts.

Indeed, beyond the Sikh on Sikh incidents, 1984 clearly remains an issue of trauma and anger for many Sikhs across the diaspora with some aspects of Sikh activism continuing to be a reaction to community and state responses to 1984 related issues. Rather than Sikh organisations ‘recruiting’ Sikh activists, many Sikhs in India and in the diaspora are engaging with historical narratives themselves, with new generations learning about the events of 1984. This report has also shown how Sikh activists in Britain have a number of different focuses and priorities and that terms such as ‘orthodox’, ‘conservative’, ‘liberal’, ‘progressive’, ‘extremist’, ‘radical’ and ‘fundamentalist’ often lose their meaning when they are used to generalise about the activities of groups of people. It has been shown that it is possible for religious Sikhs to be liberal and progressive, for non-religious Sikhs to be conservative and that individuals can take a whole range of religious, political, social and cultural positions in between.

Finally, this report has also highlighted how the image of Sikhs in media has in large been defined by their representations by the British colonial state and the Indian postcolonial state, particularly when Sikhs have agitated against state hegemony. Although the presentation of members of non-Christian traditions as ‘fanatics’ was established in the colonial period, the events of 1984 and the presentation of Sikhs as ‘extremists’, ‘radicals’, ‘militants’ and ‘fundamentalists’ caused this language around Sikh activism to re-emerge. It has been shown that particular political contexts and the actions of state actors have led to certain terms being used to describe the activities of Sikhs, with the focus on preventing violent extremism in the post 9/11 context in Britain combined with regular reports about the activities of Sikhs in Indian media, leading to the recent headlines and concerns about ‘Sikh radicalisation’ in Britain.
ENDNOTES

1. The term ‘Sikh radicalisation’ was first used in Indian media in the Economic Times on Jan 8th 2015 (Sharma, 2015) as topping the agenda for an Indo-UK counter terrorism joint working group meeting. The article reported that ‘The issue of Sikh radicalisation activities in the UK will be top on the agenda of an Indian team headed to London for an Indo-UK Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group meeting on January 15-16’.

2. A segment on the Indian TV channel ‘TimesNow’ stated that their reporters had accessed a dossier on “ISI sponsored Khalistani terror and the details of this dossier is what is going to be discussed between the two Prime Ministers when they meet each other” (TimesX, 2015)

3. These reports highlighted the role of a Khem Singh who “appealed to Sikh youths to participate in formation of a separate Sikh land. He emphasised that it is the foremost responsibility of the Miri Foundation to propagate the Khalistan ideology among the Sikh masses” (Hindustan Times, 2015).

4. These members included Avtar Singh Khanda, vice-president youth wing of Shiromani Akali Dal (Mann) a close associate of Khalistan terrorist organisations Jagtar Singh Tara, and Paramjit Singh Pamma (associated with Babbar Khalsa International).

5. The owner of the Sikh Channel, D.S. Bal complained to OFCOM about PTC News, a channel based in the Punjab for including allegations that the Sikh Channel was being run by secessionist groups and broadcasting news stories and images in order to provoke a violent reaction from the Sikh youth. In their response, PTC Punjabi stated that they had made “serious attempts” to check the accuracy of the information but that as it was not possible to access the dossier itself, the production team had checked the reports with other news agencies (BizAsia, 2016)

6. In particular Dhaliwal (2016) links the protests against inter-faith marriages to the growth in the influence of the Birmingham based Sikh Awareness Society and Sikh Federation UK who she argues arrange for “young men from the Midlands [to be] ... bussed into areas around the country to stop inter faith marriages from taking place.”

7. In their examination of ‘religious radicalization’ in Canada, Bramadat et al (2014: 3) define ‘securitization’ as “the way the state and society frame the individuals and groups drawn to radical religious subcultures” and ‘religious radicalization’ as “the processes by which individuals and groups with a wide range of motivations come to embrace religious feelings, beliefs and practices that put them very severely at odds with their society and (often) family members.”

8. Schmid (2013: iv) notes that the term “radicalization” itself, is a recent term, rarely mentioned in the media before 2001 (Sedgwick, 2010: 480) and in Europe “brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) by policymakers who coined the term ‘violent radicalisation’.”

9. A number of academics have criticized the concept of radicalisation for emphasizing individuals and, ideologies and de-emphasizing any wider circumstances (Sedgwick, 2010: 481, Kundnani, 2012: 9). Furthermore, (Kundnani, 2012: 8) usefully critiques much of the scholarship on radicalisation for a) merging a number of meanings within the term
‘radicalisation’ – disaffection, youth alienation, radical dissent, religious fundamentalism, propensity to violence – which ought to be kept analytically distinct, b) focusing on the religious beliefs and psychology of individuals while downplaying social and political factors, c) rejecting any links between terrorism and either poverty or political causes as many groups who suffer poverty or oppression, but not all resort to violence, d) not focusing on causality in favour of examining patterns of belief and behaviour that correlate with terrorist risk.

10. Some Sikh organisations disagree with the size of the Sikh population in England and Wales based on the Census data. In the lead up to the 2011 Census, Dabinderjit Singh of the Sikh Federation for instance claimed that ’At the last census in 2001 the number of Sikhs that we believe were recorded in the census were actually half the number of Sikhs in the UK’ (BBC News, 2010)


12. Leech (1845) describes the Akali Nihang Sikhs as “the fanatics of the Sikh religion - literally covering themselves with iron, generally wearing, besides 2 swords at their side, from 1 to 7 quoits on their turbans which they make very high by means of a knife stuck in the centre, and an iron chain wound round ... their women are also armed like the men, and are said to be expert horsemen - and to be able to make good use of these arms when required.”

13. These campaigns often led to Sikh arrests and loss of life with a number of Akalis being killed in the process including the killing of 100 Akali protestors in Feb 1920 by the mahant in charge of Nankana Sahib, arrest of 2500 Akalis by the British when attempting to free Guru Ka Bagh in 1922. It is important to note that another group known as the Babbar Akalis who did not agree with the SGPC stance on non-violence also formed at this time (Mukherjee, 2004).

14. Sikh activists at this time also began to use the term qaum (nation) rather than panth (religious group) to emphasize the politico-spiritual status of the community, a nation in their own right alongside other nations that made up the Indian subcontinent. At this time, the Akali Dal and SGPC were regarded by the British colonial state as religious bodies whose primary responsibility was for religious rather than political affairs (Mandair, 2013: 96). However, as Mandair (2013: 96) explains, the Sikhs involved were “deeply resistant to any separation of religion and politics or religion and the secular, which was something that the colonizer had tried to impose on the Indian mind-set.”

15. It is important to note that Udham Singh who assassinated Sir Michael O’Dwyer (the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab at the time of Jallianwala Bagh) on 13th March 1940 was not referred to as a ‘Sikh extremist’, rather as a ‘fanatic’ resorting to “terrorist methods which have long been discredited and discarded by the many schools of Indian Nationalism” (see "The Trial of Udham Singh." Times, 6 June 1940, p. 7). In this incident which remains the only occasion during which a Sikh has murdered a British official in Britain, Udham Singh was also described as a “Sikh, though perhaps not a practicing Sikh” (See "Shooting of Sir M. O’dwyer." Times, 23 Mar. 1940, p. 2).
16. “Sikh plans to burn in protest” Times, 7 Jan. 1969, p. 3. Mr Jolly explained to the BBC that he regarded himself as “a moderate and religious man and would never have taken the extreme step of threatening my life if they had not refused to listen to reason” (BBC On this Day, 1969)

17. In reference to the Mandla / Dowell Lee case the Times simply stated "Sikh sues school over ban on turban." Times, 8 Feb. 1980, p. 3

18. Reporting on clashes between Sikhs and Nirankaris on November 11th 1978 an article in The Economist described how “the extremists in the Akali Dal have always hankered after a separate Sikh homeland, but they have been kept under control by the Sikh moderates.” See ‘Trouble in turbans’, The Economist (London, England), Saturday, November 11, 1978, Issue 7054. A number of incidents were reported involving ‘Sikh militants’in the lead up to Operation Bluestar including the hijacking of an Air India flight to Pakistan on 30th Sept 1981 by members of the Dal Khalsa (Kaufman, 1981) and the killing of 11 Hindus in Punjab unrest (Stevens, 1984).

19. In a Times report, Chohan denied the existence of a “hit list” of leading Indian politicians which had begun with the assassination of Mrs Gandhi. See "British Sikhs deny link to terror." Times, 15 Apr. 1985, p. 34

20. Media descriptions of Bhindranwale as someone who “exercises a powerful influence on Sikh thinking in the way that Ayatollah Khomeini exercised over the insurgency against the Shah of Iran” (Hamlyn, 1979) highlight how this term came to be applied to Sikhs at this time.

21. Nayar (2008) notes how while some of her turban wearing respondents respected Bhindranwale and supported Khalistan, others respected Bhindranwale but disassociated themselves from the Khalistan movement. At the same time, some of her non-turbaned Sikh respondents supported Bhindranwale and the Khalistan movement because they support the ethno-nationalist struggle for greater autonomy for the Punjab. Following the events of Operation Bluestar, the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi wrote about the Sikh issue to the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, stating that ‘of all malefactors, those who wear the religious garb are the most dangerous.’ (Gov.uk, 2014b)

22. For an in-depth but accessible account of the lead up to the events of 1984, see Devinderjit Singh’s ‘Sikhs, Arms and Terrorism’ available at: https://weblearn.ox.ac.uk/access/content/user/3675/Sikhism/CUSS86.pdf (accessed 04.02.17)

23. On June 12th 1984 following Operation Bluestar, Chohan was interviewed on a BBC Radio 4 programme during which he stated that “within a few days you will have the news that Mrs. Gandhi and her family has been beheaded. That is what the Sikhs will do, I tell you” (Milmo, 2015). A full transcript of the interview is available in the National Archives, Title: INDIA. UK/Indian relations: situation in Punjab; activities of Sikh extremists; proposed. Catalogue reference: PREM 19/1536


25. To date, Inderjit Singh Reyat is the only person convicted in the Air India bombing (AFP, 2017). Although it is beyond the scope of
this report to examine the Air India bombing in depth, a wealth of literature about the bombing and subsequent trial is readily available. Some interview respondents viewed the Air India bombing as an Indian government conspiracy to defame Sikhs in Canada, with many highlighting the findings of Kashmeri and McAndrew’s (2005) book ‘Soft Target’. This was also noted in the 1991/92 SIRC (Security Intelligence Review Committee) Annual Report which found that statements by leaders of the Sikh community and media articles produced a storm of controversy. The publication of the book, “Soft Target” in 1989 synthesized the allegations and accused the Government of India (GOI) in general and its foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in particular, of complicity in the crash. The conspiracy theories became widely known and still endure years after the tragedy’ (SIRC, 1992: 13). Responding to these theories, a dossier on Canada’s response to Sikh terrorism states that ‘on November 21, 1985, the RCMP publicly denied allegations that the Government of India was involved in the Air India bombing. The Indian Prime Minister and High Commissioner to Canada also denied the allegations’ (Commission of Inquiry, 2007: 25).

At the time of writing, a number of analyses of the Air India investigation have been published (e.g. Bolan, 2005) with the RCMP in 2015 stating that the Air India investigation is still ongoing (Dyck, 2015).

26. One of the main suspects of the bombing, Talvinder Singh Parmar, the then leader of the Babbar Khalsa (BKI) was described as ‘the founder of an extreme Sikh fundamentalist group dedicated to the creation of an independent Sikh homeland in Punjab’ (Best, 1985).

27. This was also demonstrated by the fact that Mr Warren Anderson, the chairman of Union Carbide at the time, claimed that sabotage by Sikh extremists had caused the Bhopal disaster, a claim proven to be completely fabricated (Broughton, E., 2005)

28. In the lead up to the 1985 visit to India by Margaret Thatcher, Indian media described all Sikhs supporting the idea of Khalistan as “Sikh radicals”. An article in the Times of India on April 14th 1985 titled “Britain to curb Sikh radicals” stated that ‘Mrs Thatcher said she deeply shared India’s concern over the activities of Sikh extremists.”

29. Q. So, could a Sikh terrorist group based abroad have bombed the Air India jet over the Atlantic, as one has already claimed? Chohan: ‘No Sikh, because Sikh psyche is such they would not do such an action. This is very heinous crime and to kill innocent people in the air, I think this is the most cold blooded and no Sikh will ever do it. This is against the fundamental teachings of Sikhism” (ITN Source, 1985a)

30. Krishnan Malik of The Times of India reporting in 1985 recalled how Jagjit Singh Chohan had spoken from a gurdwara stage saying ‘you should give me more money ... because the money you have given so far can't even buy one gun and we want not guns but much more sophisticated armaments ... of course Chohan has changed his tune in the past months and I think this is pressure from this country.’ (ITN Source, 1985b).

31. The lawyer acting on behalf of the men, argued that the case was a ‘political conspiracy’ ‘designed to assist the Indian Government to deal with Sikh separatists ... [and] manufactured from the start by police officers’ (Seton, 1986).
32. On 12th July 2014 a petition on ‘Sikh radicalisation’ was released online addressed to the then home secretary Theresa May (Stop Injustice, 2014). Although the petition only gathered 93 signatures, its appearance was linked to an incident of Sikh on Sikh violence which took place in Coventry in July 2014. Details about this incident are outlined on a publically accessible Facebook post available at: https://www.facebook.com/kamalroop.singh/posts/10152162248521695. The petition referenced highlights how ‘the main hub of activity is seen in the West Midlands, Leicestershire, Coventry, Birmingham and Luton.’ In response to the emergence of the petition, Dr Gurnam Singh a Sikh media personality who regularly conducts discussion programmes on Sikh broadcast media explained how ‘on more than one occasion I have been approached by prominent Sikh leaders who were expressing concerns and the need to have an open debate on the whole question of ‘Sikh on Sikh’ violence’ (Singh G, 2014).

33. Although none of the incidents listed have resulted in fatalities, the axe attack by Harjit Singh Toor on the Namdhar Guru Uday Singh in Leicester in August 2013 could quite easily have (BBC News, 2014a).

34. Sukhjinder Singh, from the Sikh Secretariat, an advisory body, said the different community groups needed to examine how they could have better organised their protest. ‘Nobody is saying this is a fantastic victory for the Sikh community ... a legitimate protest was marred by violence.’ (O’Neill and Woolcock, 2004).

35. According to the Independent (Carrell, 2000), this ruling was embarrassing for the then Home Secretary, Jack Straw who had attempted to deport the men who posed ‘a danger to national security’ by allegedly orchestrating terrorist attacks in India from their base in the UK. The case details revealed that the QC, acting for Mr Straw, had informed the commission that Mukhtiar Singh, 27, had entered the UK illegally in 1995 but continued to play ‘a crucial role in the development of a series of conspiracies to carry out terrorist attacks in India’. Along with Paramjit Singh, 26, he was allegedly involved with a violent faction of the International Sikh Youth Federation that supports Paramjit Singh Panjwar, leader of the Khalistan Commando Force operating from Pakistan. The QC explained that in September 1998, MI5 identified Mukhtiar as a co-organiser of a shipment of 15kg of high explosive, detonators, timers, and other weapons to Sikh militants on the sub-continent.

36. An interview with Salman Rushdie in 2000 highlights how the Indian High Commission in London may also have been trying to influence the presentation of Sikhs in Britain at this time. Rushdie explains how when making a BBC television documentary on the 40th anniversary of Indian independence, ‘we included an interview with a Sikh woman, Ravel Kaur, who had seen her husband and sons murdered before her eyes by gangs known to be led and organised by Congress people ... the Rajiv Gandhi government prosecuted nobody for these murders, in spite of much hard evidence identifying many of the killers ... Through the Indian High Commission in London ... the Rajiv Government did its best to prevent our film from being shown, because of the interview with the Sikh widow. Even though she was no Sikh terrorist but a victim of anti-Sikh terrorism; even though she remained opposed to radical Sikh demands for a state of their own, and asked no more than justice for the dead, India sought to stifle her voice. And, I’m pleased to say, failed’ (Times London, 2000).

37. The Terrorism Act of 2000, created the new offence of inciting terrorism and outlawed a
number of groups including the International Sikh Youth Federation and Babbar Khalsa (Parliament, 2012). It appears that there was concern among the Lords about the inclusion of the ISYF in the list of proscribed groups with Lord Tomlinson stating that although he had "frequently disagreed with some of the political aspirations of the International Sikh Youth Federation, but that does not make me right, and it does not make its members terrorists" (Hansard, 2001). Furthermore a recent House of Commons briefing paper stated that both the ISYF and BKI had 'never targeted Western interests' (Godec and Lipscombe, 2017: 19-20).

38. The programme looked to examine whether the British authorities were "doing enough to counter the activities of UK-based Sikh groups supporting the violent campaign for an independent homeland in the Punjab" (BBC Radio 4, 2008) by including interviews with 'a minority of hardcore Sikh militants'. In terms of its engagement with British Sikhs, the programme interviewed Avtar Sanghera, a former vice president of Babbar Khalsa speaking at a rally in Trafalgar Square in 2006. Sanghera explained that although no longer a member of Babbar Khalsa, he was still a Babbar meaning "a lion, who is the [sic] brave Sikh." Sanghera explained how "we call for justice from the Indian Government or the Punjab Government, right, and we ask them, why don’t you stop them? But there is nobody going to stop them."

39. For Juergensmeyer (1989) many Sikhs in Diaspora became part of the Khalistan movement as they felt marginalized from the homeland and wished to involve themselves in a movement where they could be central. For Helweg (1989) activism on behalf of Khalistan provided opportunities for achieving honour, status and respect in the diaspora in a context of marginalization from the mainstream host society.

40. As Tatla (2006) explains, many Sikhs now refer to the invasion of Harmandir Sahib in 1984 as the third ‘Ghallughara’ or holocaust, a term not lightly used in Sikh historical discourse and only used to date to apply to two episodes in Sikh history. The first, which occurred in 1746, is called Chhota Ghallughara (Small Holocaust), and the second, which came in 1762, is known as Vadda Ghallughara (Great Holocaust). For many Sikhs the Indian government’s action was "not only an unpardonable sacrifice, it broke an implicit trust that had existed since 1947 between the Sikh community and the Indian government" (Tatla 2006).

41. For Tatla (2006) the only logical conclusion for the actions of the Indian government was that Indira Gandhi’s motive was to win the forthcoming elections by projecting herself as a saviour of India who saved the country from disintegration.

42. Kaur, J (2006:102) provides a number of rationales for this including (1) The targeting of a religious group for murder and extermination, as evidenced by a) Slogans calling for the death of all Sikhs; b) Repeated attacks by gangs to ensure that all Sikhs were killed; c) Direct targeting of Sikh property; d) Destruction of symbols and structures of the Sikh faith; and e) Perpetration of other crimes such as rape and sexual assault, beatings and physical attacks, looting and stealing, extortion, acts of humiliation such as stripping, and mutilation of corpses. (2) Police participation and instigation of the murders, as well as manipulation of records and destruction of evidence precluding criminal accountability; and (3) Organized and systematic implementation of the carnage, characterized by a) A systematic
and uniform method of killing; b) Public meetings the night before the initiation of the massacres where leaders distributed weapons and exhorted attendees to kill Sikhs; c) Organized dissemination of rumors; d) Effective identification of Sikhs through lists; e) Organized transportation of gangs of assailants; and f) Large-scale provision and distribution of weapons and kerosene. Kaur also exposes the role of senior police and government officials in the violence, detailing sexual abuse suffered by Sikh women and highlighting how the government has not established a witness protection program (2006: 140).

43. Commentators have highlighted how rather than being a ‘riot’ or conflict between two communities, Sikhs were “hunted down through the length and breadth of the national capital as well as in many other parts of India in a series of fully orchestrated and planned attacks” (Saluja, 2015: 343)

44. Examples include vigils held in Birmingham: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B0-HyzpIUAMl1Sx.jpg (accessed 10.10.2016) and across the UK: https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/SikhNewsletter/conversations/topics/1181 (accessed 10.10.2016)

45. Kamal Nath was indicted by the Nanavati Commission on allegations that he was involved in the 1984 anti-Sikh violence (Jolly 2014) although Nath responded that he had in fact tried to urge peace as the violence escalated. He remains a target for some Sikh activists in Diaspora highlighted by the protests by Canadian Sikhs during his visit to Toronto in 2010 (Aulakh, 2010)

46. Sajjan Kumar has frequently been accused of involvement in the 1984 anti-Sikh violence with eyewitness reports testifying that he incited mobs to kill Sikhs (Indian Express Archives, 2011)

47. The Nanavati Commission which investigated the 1984 anti-Sikh violence on the behalf of the Indian Government found 'credible evidence' against Tytler, saying he 'very probably' had a hand in organising the attacks. However, Tytler was not prosecuted by the Indian government (Kumar, 2005)

48. ‘Who are the Guilty’ is a report published by Rajni Kothari of the People’s Union For Civil Liberties (Kothari, 1984). The report was an inquiry into the causes and impact of the anti-Sikh violence in Delhi in November 1984 and contains a ‘List of people identified by survivors’ including ‘Politicians,’ ‘Police’ and ‘Others Involved’

49. Tatla (2006) explains how the rebellion lasted almost a decade, claiming an estimated toll of 80,000 lives. Punjab “was abandoned to the security forces armed with draconian anti-terrorist powers” as fake encounters, extrajudicial killings and torture became the norm. The murder of the Chief Minister Beant Singh on 31 July 1995 'effectively signalled the end of the Sikh resistance movement, whose origins lay in the army invasion of the Golden Temple.' (Tatla 2006). For Shani (2008, 80) although the Indian military succeeded in reducing the Sikhs of the Panjab to silence during the 1990s, this ‘opened up an alternative site for nationalist activity in the ‘diaspora’. It is important to note that in the post 1984 period, Khalistani organisations claimed responsibility for terrorist incidents which caused the killing of non-Sikhs innocents, e.g. where the Khalistan Commando Force claimed responsibility for an attack on a bus station in Haryana in 1987 leading to the death of 34 Hindus (Hazarika, 1987) and where the Khalistan Zindabad Force claimed responsibility
for a blast at a Bus depot in June 2006 leading to the killing of three individuals (Press Trust of India 2006).

50. A ‘Tentative list of 85 sikh political prisoners in different jails in India’ is available at: https://ia801406.us.archive.org/11/items/SikhPoliticalPrisonersList2014/TENTATIVE%20LIST%20OF%2085%20SIKH%20POLITICAL%20PRISONERS%20IN%20DIFFERENT%20JAILS%20IN%20INDIA.pdf

51. Gurbaksh Singh Khalsa started a 44 day hunger strike in November 2013. As none of the detained Sikhs were released he restarted his hunger strike on 14 November 2014 which ended on the 15th January 2015. On the 16th Jan 2015, Surat Singh Khalsa began a hunger strike seeking the release of Sikh political prisoners which at the time of writing is still ongoing.

52. The protest led to a policeman being injured (Evans, 2015). In the days following the incident the Met Police apologised for their treatment of the protestors and for breaking a Sikh flag, the Nishan Sahib (Proto 2015).

53. A number of ‘maryadas’ or codes of conduct place the responsibility on Sikhs to ensure that the Guru Granth Sahib is treated respectfully. The Sikh Rehat Maryada for examples states that: The Guru Granth Maryada “should remain open so long as a granthi or attendant can remain in attendance, persons seeking darshan (seeking a view of or making obeisance to it) keep coming, or there is no risk of commission of irreverence towards it. Thereafter, it is advisable to close it ceremonially to avoid any disrespect to it.” Pettigrew (1978) notes that although Bhindranwale constantly emphasised the importance of peaceful activism, this ended at attacks on gurdwaras or defilement of the Holy Book.

54. The Sikh Rehat Maryada states that ‘No book should be installed like and at par with the Guru Granth. Worship of any idol or any ritual or activity should not be allowed to be conducted inside the gurdwara. Nor should the festival of any other faith be allowed to be celebrated inside the gurdwara.’ (Sikh Rehat Maryada, Chapter IV, Article V, Section e)

55. The Satkaar campaign describe themselves as ‘a UK Sangat (community) led grassroots Gurdwara (Sikh religious place of worship) reform movement focussed on preventing the gross sacrilege of parties, meat, alcohol and tobacco being permitted on the holy Gurdwara premises or any premises funded with the Sangat’s donations which is against the basic tenants of the Sikh faith and specifically against the Sandesh (edict) issued by the Akal Takht (supreme temporal authority of the Sikh religion) in 2006.’ http://satkaarcampaign.blogspot.co.uk/search?updated-max=2011-12-07T20:41:00Z&max-results=10. Since Grays, the Satkaar campaign has campaigned against the serving of meat and alcohol at the Guru Nanak gurdwara in Edinburgh (Satkaar, 2011b) at the Maharajah Jassa Singh hall run by the Ramgarhia Sikh Temple in Birmingham (Satkaar, 2011c) and at a party hall run by the Guru Nanak Singh Sabha gurdwara in Dudley (Satkaar, 2011d) among others.

56. An ITN report on the Bezthi affair broadcast on 19th Dec 2004 highlighted that protesters had come from a variety of backgrounds, with a Sikh teenager stating how he “was horrified because everyone laid down a vow to say that it would be peaceful and it was just small people that let us down.”
57. Although the REP had "consulted" with Sikh community leaders who had requested that the play be altered to change the setting of controversial scenes from a Sikh temple to a community centre (O'Neill and Woolcock 2004) the play had been performed setting these scenes in the gurdwara. Details about the consultation can be found in the Channel 4 documentary 'Holy Offensive' broadcast in 2005 in which the director of the REP theatre, Stuart Rogers explained that the approach to the community "wasn't about how would you like us to change the play because we made it clear also that we'd never change the play ... what it was about was how can we work together to minimise any offense this might cause to some members of your community."

58. Sukhvinder Kaur, an Amritdhari Sikh from Birmingham stated that she did not agree with the protests or ban and indeed, 'all the people that were there, because we spoke to them, were actually very moved and found the film a very very moving experience.' Speaking about the protest on BBC Midlands, the same Bhai Mohan Singh interviewed in relation to the Bezthi affair stated that "the sister of Guru Nanak is played by a human being and also we're led to believe that a human actor played the role of Guru Nanak Dev Ji which is blasphemy and that is one part why a lot of Sikhs around the world is [sic] objecting." (BBC News, 2015)

59. A number of articles have highlighted that 'the debate is specifically about what is and isn't allowed as a standard for the Anand Karaj ceremony specifically. So it's not accurate to frame it as "interfaith marriages in a Gurdwara", because it is not the location that should be in debate, it is the ceremony.' (Singh G, 2016b). Also see Faith Matters (2016)

60. These include an arson attack at the home of the president of the Ramgharia Sikh temple in Birmingham for allowing a mixed faith Anand Karaj to take place (Birmingham Post, 2007c) and an attack on the home of a Sikh family whose daughter was about to marry a man from a different religion (BBC News, 2012b).

61. An example is Randeep Singh from SWAT (Sikh Welfare & Awareness Team) who as well as running foodbanks in London also participates in protests against mixed faith Anand Karaj in Gurdwaras (BBC World Service, 2015).

62. A publically accessible discussion forum highlights some of the discussions around organising a protest against the visit of Prof Darshan Singh in 2008: http://sikhsangat.com/index.php/?/topic/40538-nutty-professor-darshan-singh-in-uk/

63. Another example is Ravi Singh, the head of Khalsa Aid who assists in humanitarian issues around the world and who also regularly comments on the events of 1984 (e.g., https://twitter.com/RaviSinghKA/status/871636490941587456)

64. Deepa Singh of Sikh Youth UK explains how "ever since I was little I see my Dad come home from work, get drunk and beat my Mum up ... I didn't use to like being at home so I used to be out all the time ... I was binge drinking each weekend, using cannabis ... [and] to fund the habit you have to commit crimes ... so I committed crimes daily, hundreds times a day, sell drugs, commit fraud, robberies ... I've been in and out of jails all my life, I've done a six and three and half and a two ... that's most of my life gone ... some of my crimes are on Google ... Sikh is the only way forward". See Sikh Youth UK (2015) 'Crime and
Addition - Real Life Experiences by Sikh Youth Birmingham.

65. Recent examples include members of Sikh Youth UK who have been recognised locally for their community work with one of their main volunteers, Deepa Singh, winning Outstanding Volunteer award at the Sandwell Local Community Awards in 2016 (Horst, 2016) and Jaz Rai of Derby running events in Derby to address the "taboo" in the Sikh community (BBC News, 2017).

66. In 2007, the Birmingham Mail reported on a case relating to claims that a Sikh girl had been recently forced to convert to Islam (Birmingham Mail, 2007a).

67. For instance in a speech at a gurdwara in Smethwick, Deepa Singh of Sikh Youth UK stated that "people are shy to say it. But 90% of the time when it comes to grooming gangs, it comes from the Pakistani community ... not everyone from that community is bad, I'm not saying that, but a lot are" (Essence of Sikhi, 2016).


69. In a tweet from 12th April 2017 Tommy Robinson states that he ‘Had an brilliant night with @SikhYouthUK_ in Huddersfield tonight . honour & respect sikhs so much. Islam is targeting our children’: https://twitter.com/trobinsonnewera/status/852258011020234753

70. Available at: https://twitter.com/trobinsonnewera/status/813342310427688962 (accessed 09.12.2016). Shamsher Singh from the NSYF responded to Tommy Robinson’s tweet with the statement “Difference is we don’t blame the entirety of Islam, nor do we use the sacrifice of the Shaibzadeh to incite hatred”: https://twitter.com/anandpur_exile/status/813530881390481408


72. The most recent was Harjit Kaur convicted of her participation in the 2012 attack on General K.S. Brar.

73. See Sukhi Kaur at: https://www.facebook.com/SikhPA/videos/1633874963317868 (1:01:36) who states that ‘I have been dealing with sexual abuse and sexual grooming cases for the last five years ... and the biggest issue that no-one is talking about is sexual abuse within our own community ... I’ve also dealt with two, a fifteen year old and a seventeen year old who were being targeted and groomed by a Pakistani gang ... [Sikh organisations] are saying we’re listening to you, but nothing is done ... and what our community does very very well is blame the girl – we have honour, we have bezthi ... I’ve had a case where we had five victims not one of those victims was reported to the police because their parents suppressed it ... we need to create an environment where girls are willing to speak out and know they’re not going to be prejudiced for that’.

74. Examples of organisations established by and for Sikh women include Kaurageous.
75. For Jhutti-Johal (2017) what is often noticeable in Sikh discussions on female issues is that "women are virtually absent from the conversation. The debate is almost entirely between men, who see themselves as ‘protectors’ of women’s honour.”

76. It is also important to note that in January 2014 the Akal Takht issued an andesh (order) agreeing 'for the Sikh Council UK to work to resolve matters concerning UK Sikhs' (Sikh Council UK, 2014).

77. For further analysis of different types of gurdwara see Singh J (2014c)


79. A copy of this painting is available at: https://c4.staticflickr.com/4/3120/2617011660_8a81614a7b_z.jpg (accessed 14.05.2017)

80. Some of the paintings on display included the following individuals: https://www.sikh24.com/2013/10/23/10-shaheeds-of-the-1980s (accessed 14.05.2017)

81. An example occurred in Bradford in August 2016 when an individual was caught on CCTV throwing the Guru Granth Sahib over a fence at Leeds Rd Gurdwara in Bradford. Sikh Youth Birmingham immediately stated that they ‘believe whoever has committed this disgusting act has done so with the clear and direct intent to hurt the sentiments of the Sikh community’ (https://goo.gl/1tkdWg) On further investigation, the Guru Granth Sahib had in fact been left at the Gurdwara by a woman who was simply attempting to return the Guru Granth Sahib to the community (BBC News, 2016c).

82. In his Facebook article, Hundal (2017) examines how Sikh Youth UK make a number of (false) allegations about the mayor of London, Sadiq Khan’s involvement in the organisation of the 2017 Vaisakhi event held in Trafalgar Square. He notes how this is ‘an example of how some British Sikh groups are aligning themselves with the white far-right and spreading rumours that incite hate against Muslims’.

83. For instance this public Facebook post from June 2017 highlights issues at the GNP gurdwara in Coventry: https://www.facebook.com/hsinghkhalasa13/posts/780836405418927 (accessed 30.06.2017)

84. The Basics of Sikhi channel has a number of videos which have been viewed over 100000 times (e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePhDUBWXf80). Although there has been little analysis on the aspects of the Sikh tradition most emphasised by these groups, for Jhutti-Johal (2017a), the worldview of Basics of Sikhi “is based on a narrative that suggests that only Sikhs initiated into the Khalsa can claim to be ‘true’, or ‘good’ Sikhs, and those who are uninitiated have no claim to call themselves Sikhs of the Guru.”

85. For Jhutti-Johal (2017) the Sikh Federation UK "have used various means of promoting their ultimate goal of creating Khalistan", BasicsOfSikhi suggest that “only Sikhs initiated into the Khalsa can claim to be ‘true’, or ‘good’ Sikhs” and the online videos produced by Sikh2Inspire are “bordering on the conservative or ultra-conservative, with any Sikhs who do
not conform with their world view being seen as non-Sikhs or, at worst, a threat to Sikhism."


87. Re the ISYF, according to the Evening Standard (2008) "after it was banned the ISYF dissolved, creating a successor body, the Sikh Federation UK, whose executive committee and senior members ... are largely the same as the ISYF's, and whose objectives are the same". A number of Indian media reports (e.g. Sharma 2013) allege links between the BKI and the Sikh Organisation for Prisoners Welfare (SOPW) although these links were directly refuted by the SOPW (2012).

88. In January 2017, Mohan Singh CEO of the Sikh Awareness Society travelled to Toronto to interview a victim of CSE, whose own uncle was her abuser. Interview available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eI9APnuGbLQ (accessed 04.03.2017)

89. These posters are available here (https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CkPoBCOWsAAzexl.jpg) and (https://twitter.com/theNSYF/status/794149976456695808) – accessed 05.06.2017


91. Examples include Singhrow (for a reference to the Singhrow initiative from 2010, see http://sikhsangat.com/index.php/?topic/49779-singhrow-productions/) and 1GUK (http://www.1guk.com/)

92. Campell and Muncer (1989: 272) define a youth subculture as “a geographically diffuse social movement of teenagers and young people who share a common set of values, interests, and a tacit ideology, but who are not necessarily dependent on face-to-face interaction with other members and do not have any rigid criteria of entry, membership, or obligation.” Also see Roy (2010: 160)

93. Image available at: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CevBL6KXEAAoB5k.jpg. A wide range of T-shirts are available on websites including Cafepress (http://www.cafepress.co.uk/+khalistan+t-shirts) and Zazzle (https://www.zazzle.co.uk/khalistan+tshirts) produced by companies including ‘Virsas Clothing’ and ‘Politically Incorrect’, accessed 05.06.2017

94. Examples of such events are readily available online at https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CwNgzjvWEAEwy-9.jpg and: https://pbs.twimg.com/media/CtrixuIWYAAC5pd.jpg (accessed 30.03.2017)

95. A copy of the flyer is available at: https://i.ytimg.com/vi/mEm6YqBxuuU/maxresdefault.jpg (accessed 30.03.2017)

96. Indeed, specific concerns about these channels were raised in the alleged dossier. The British MP, Mr Aman Bhogal also expressed concerns that some of the Sikh channels ‘have been fined in the past by the broadcast regulator here in the United
97. Details about these breaches are available in the OFCOM Broadcast bulletins available on the OFCOM website. Examples include: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0027/51975/issue_297.pdf. Breaches relate to a) the Glorification of violence where programmes have included positive references to individuals involved in violence including the broadcast of a song glorifying Sukha and Jinda broadcast on Sangat TV on 17th February 2013, b) Speakers in *gurdwaras* making ‘harmful’ statements, e.g. a Sikh Channel broadcast on 7th June 2016 of *The Shaheedi Smagam* which included statements about how ‘Sikhs in the UK should not wait for a separate homeland of Khalistan in the Punjab’ and that they should create one in the UK and c) a lack of impartiality where a viewer alerted Ofcom to a programme broadcast on the Sikh Channel on 30th April 2013 which sought the views of the acquittal of Sajjan Kumar of crimes during the events of November 1984, stating that the broadcast incited hatred against Hindus.

98. As per the three specific strategic objectives of the UK Prevent strategy which are to 1) respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; 2) prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and 3) work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to address (Gov.uk, 2011b).

99. Sedgwick highlights the example of Arab regimes who “have an obvious interest in labeling their internal oppositions as “radical” since this helps justify the repressive measures they routinely take against individuals and groups” (2010: 487). He highlights how although these three agendas often coincide, they may also conflict (2010: 489) for instance where members of a group may promote views contrary to the integrationist agenda, they may however be useful in providing information in relation to the security agenda.

100. For Tatla (2012) the movement for Khalistan is primarily “a highly emotional reaction, an angry and loud protest at the desecration of the holiest shrine and did not lead to any serious movement for political sovereignty.” He concludes that the idea of Khalistan as an imagined Sikh Homeland “does not correspond to any existing boundaries at all but to a ‘spiritual space’ encompassing the Sikh gurus’ historic shrines.” In this regard, “Sikh mobilization is best seen as an anguished and loud cry in bewilderment in the wake of Amritsar tragedy, its dwindling legacy being prompted up through cyber-nationalism with its emphasis on graphical display of Indian state repression” (Tatla 2012).

101. Indeed, a recent House of Commons briefing paper stated that the BKI ‘uses the UK as a base for fundraising, recruitment and co-ordination of activists in the Indian sub continent’ (Godec and Lipscombe, 2017: 20).

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103. Given the current UK government definition of ‘terrorism’ as ‘an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people; causes serious damage to property; or seriously interferes or disrupts an electronic system. The use or threat must be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause’ (Educate Against Hate, n.d.) any future ‘Sikh on Sikh’ incidents which cause ‘serious violence to a person/people’ or which cause ‘serious damage to property’ could potentially be labelled as terrorist incidents.


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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: PROJECT INFORMATION SHEET

CREST Exploring Sikh ‘Radicalisation’ in Britain: Interview Participant Information Sheet

You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

The Purpose of this Project

This research project has been funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) — an independent Centre commissioned by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and which is funded in part by the UK security and intelligence agencies.

This aim of the project is to investigate ‘Sikh radicalisation’ in Britain, an issue which has received much political and media attention, but little academic attention to date. As part of this project I will:

1. Undertake an in depth review of relevant literature on Sikh local/transnational networks, mobilisation and activism in Britain.

2. Examine the activities which have been labelled as having been carried out by ‘Sikh radicals’ in Britain, exploring who participates and why.

3. Investigate the continuing impact of historical events on British Sikhs (including the events of June and November 1984, 9/11, 7/7)

4. Interrogate the idea, context and framing of ‘Sikh radicalisation’ in the UK and consider the changing nature of Sikh activism in Britain.

Why Have I Been Chosen?

I am interviewing a number of key individuals who are aware of, have experience of, or who have participated in activities which have been labelled as highlighting ‘Sikh radicalisation in Britain’. You have been chosen as one of these individuals.

Do I have to Take Part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any time up to one month following the interview. You do not have to give a reason.

What Do I Have to Do?

If you agree to be involved in this study, I wish to interview you on one occasion, and anticipate that the interview might last approximately one hour. I will travel to you, at a time that is conve-
nient for you. I will ask you questions about your awareness of, experience of and/or participation in 'Sikh radical' activity, what it means to be a Sikh 'radical', the main issues in question and what participation in this activity requires. I would also be interested in looking at any materials that you might have in relation to these events (flyers / newspaper articles etc.)

**What are the benefits of taking part?**

By participating, you will be contributing to increasing the understanding of 'Sikh radicalisation in Britain', improving knowledge and providing factual information about the nature of this phenomenon in contemporary Britain. We do not foresee there will be any disadvantages to you, or your organisation, in taking part.

**Will my taking part be kept confidential?**

Yes. All personal information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. You will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications.

The outputs of this research will be blogs, written policy reports and academic journal articles. The research team may use the anonymised data gathered in future research, and if you agree to this, we will ask you to indicate consent on the participant consent form.

**Will I Be Recorded, and How Will the Recorded Media Be Used?**

I intend to audio record and then transcribe the interviews and store the transcriptions on a secure server at the University of Leeds. The audio recordings will then be destroyed. No other use of the recordings will be made without your permission. The transcriptions will be used only for analysis and in publications, presentations or lectures. No other use will be made of the transcriptions without your written permission, and no one besides the PI (Dr Jasjit Singh) and Co-I (Dr Sean McLoughlin) will be allowed access to the full transcriptions.

**What will happen to the results of the research project?**

The research findings will be published. You will not be identified in any report or publication. Your organisation will not be identified in any report or publication. If you wish to be given a copy of any reports resulting from the research, please ask to be put on our circulation list.

**Who has ethically reviewed the project?**

This project has been ethically approved by the University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee and the CREST Security Research Ethics Committee (SREC).

**Is there anything else I need to consider?**

We are aware of the potentially sensitive nature of this research and hope the above provides you with the reassurance to take part.

**Contact for further information**

Dr Jasjit Singh: LG06 Baines Wing, School of PRHS, University of Leeds, LS2 9JT.
Tel: 0113 3430692. Mob: 07952983283. Email: j.s.singh@leeds.ac.uk
Twitter: @DrJasjitSingh. Web: [http://arts.leeds.ac.uk/jasjitsingh](http://arts.leeds.ac.uk/jasjitsingh)

You will be given a copy of this information sheet to keep and also a signed copy of the consent form will be emailed to you immediately following our interview. Thank you very much for considering taking part in the project, I hope you enjoy it.
APPENDIX B: PROJECT CONSENT FORM

CREST Exploring ‘Sikh Radicalisation’ in Britain Research Project

Interview Participant Consent Form

Add your initials next to the statements you agree with

I confirm that I have read and understand the project information sheet explaining the research project and agree to take part.

I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the project.

I understand that this research is being funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats—an independent Centre commissioned by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and which is funded in part by the UK security and intelligence agencies.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw up to one month after the interview without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. If I wish to withdraw, I can contact Dr Jasjit Singh (j.s.singh@leeds.ac.uk)

If I withdraw, any data already provided will be destroyed.

I understand that I will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications, unless I give express permission. I understand that I can give / remove permission up to one month after the interview by informing Dr Jasjit Singh (Email: j.s.singh@leeds.ac.uk / Mob: 07952983283)

I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my responses.

I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential, i.e. no-one outside the project will be able to access any of personal information.

I agree that the anonymised data collected can be archived and used in relevant future research only by the research team.

I understand that all information provided will be treated in confidence except where it involves current or future criminal activity.

I agree to inform the lead researcher should my contact details change.

Name of participant
Participant's signature
Date
Name of lead researcher Dr Jasjit Singh
Signature
Date

Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, the information sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project’s main documents which must be kept in a secure location.
**APPENDICES**

THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF ‘SIKH RADICALISATION’ IN BRITAIN

**APPENDIX C: SIKH ORGANISATIONS IN BRITAIN**

Given that a number of Sikh organisations exist at local, national and international levels, only organisations which currently play an active role in Sikh activism are included in the mapping below. Although some organisations may be concerned with a number of different types of engagement, the mapping below highlights their main focus.

1/ **Policy and Representation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| APPG British Sikhs | **Language:** English  
**Location:** Westminster  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Regular events in Parliament in conjunction with the Sikh Federation  
2. Linked to Sikh Federation and Sikh Network |
| BSCF (British Sikh Consultative Forum) | **Language:** English & Punjabi  
**Location:** National  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1/ Key role played by Dr Jasdev Rai, former head of the ISYF  
2/ Kirpan Consultation 2002  
3/ Annual Vaisakhi event in Parliament |
| City Sikhs Network | **Language:** English  
**Location:** Primarily based in London  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Press releases re: Sikh protests  
2. Publish British Sikh Report  
3. Targets Sikh professionals in the city of London |
| Network Sikh Organisations | **Language:** English  
**Location:** National  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Key role played by Lord Indarjit Singh present in the House of Lords  
2. Representation of Sikhism in education curricula  
3. Sikh chaplaincy service  
4. Responses to government policy e.g., Prevent, recent Hate Crime legislation |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Role in Sikh activism:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sikh Council UK</td>
<td>English &amp; Punjabi</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>1. Press Releases on issues affecting British Sikhs</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. Largest representative body of Sikhs in the UK (Gurdwaras and Individuals)</td>
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<td>3. Mediation of internal Sikh issues</td>
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<td>4. National advocate for British Sikhs in the UK and at the European Union</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Members include affiliated Gurdwaras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh Federation</td>
<td>English &amp; Punjabi</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>1. Annual conference in Wolverhampton</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Regular statements on issues affecting Sikhs in India and UK</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Part of the FSO and therefore assist in organisation of June 84 rally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Members include affiliated Gurdwaras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sikh Network</td>
<td>English &amp; Punjabi</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>1. Events in Parliament celebrating Guru Nanak’s birthday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Social media campaigns including the #350SikhWomen campaign</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Events to engage Sikh women in politics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Published the ‘Sikh Manifesto’ and the ‘The Sikh Report’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2. Takes the form of human rights activism, academic reports, organization.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2/ Homeland Focused Sikh organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</table>
| Dal Khalsa (UK) | Language: Punjabi  
| Location: West London  
| Role in Sikh activism:  
| 1. Protesting in UK against the Indian state. Organised protest against Modi at Wembley 2015. Regularly work with Kashmiri community in UK |
| DharamYudh Jatha (Damdami Taksal) | Language: Punjabi  
| [https://www.facebook.com/DHARAMYUDHJATHA/](https://www.facebook.com/DHARAMYUDHJATHA/)  
| Location: West Midlands  
| Role in Sikh activism:  
| 1. Split off from ISYF  
| 2. Focused on upholding status of Damdami Taksal. Challenging Sikh preachers who speak out against code of conduct of Damdami Taksal.  
| 3. Contribute to discussions on internal Sikh issues |
| Federation of Sikh Organisations (FSO) | Language: Punjabi  
| Location: National  
| Role in Sikh activism:  
| 1. Umbrella organisation  
| International Panthik Dal (IPD) | Language: Punjabi  
| [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5gGScsVQG8A&t](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5gGScsVQG8A&t)  
| Location: West Midlands  
| Role in Sikh activism:  
| 1. Split off from ISYF. Aligned to Damdami Taksal (Baba Harnam Singh)  
| 2. Annual Conference  
| 3. Putting forward SGPC Members. Focusing on issue of Sikh prisoners |
| Kesri Lehar / IPladgeOrange | Language: Mainly Punjabi  
| [http://kesri-lehar.co.uk](http://kesri-lehar.co.uk)  
| [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6edOFHunWtQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6edOFHunWtQ)  
| Location: National  
| Role in Sikh activism:  
| 1. Raising awareness of Sikh prisoners who have been illegally imprisoned and tortured in India. Established to campaign for Balwant Singh Rajoana |
| Sikh Organisation for Prisoner Welfare (SOPW) / Sikh Relief | Language: Punjabi  
| [http://www.prisonerwelfare.org](http://www.prisonerwelfare.org)  
| Location: Southall  
| Role in Sikh activism:  
| 1. Raising funds to achieve justice for Sikh prisoners who have been illegally imprisoned and tortured in India |
# 3/ Grooming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</table>
| Sikh Awareness Society           | **Language:** English  
                                 | **Location:** National, based in Midlands  
                                 | **Role in Sikh activism:**  
                                 | 1. Run by Bhai Mohan Singh (involved in various protests inc Bezthi, Nanak Shah Fakir)  
                                 | 2. Established in 1998 to address issues relating to ‘grooming’ and conversions  
                                 | 3. Presentations in *Gurdwaras* and in Universities about grooming and conversion  
                                 | 4. Provides a confidential 24-hour telephone and call-out service |
| Sikh Youth Birmingham            | **Language:** English  
                                 | **Location:** National, based in Midlands  
                                 | **Role in Sikh activism:**  
                                 | 1. Organised Mixed Faith Anand Karaj protests  
                                 | 2. Present talks in Universities re: Grooming and #SikhiSavesLives  
                                 | 3. Produced ‘Misused Trust’ film  
                                 | 4. Run programs to help those with alcohol and drugs issues in the Sikh community  
                                 | 5. Many members from vulnerable backgrounds |
### Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</table>
| Sikh Welfare and Awareness Team (SWAT): [http://www.swatlondon.com/](http://www.swatlondon.com/) | **Language:** English  
**Location:** National  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Provide *langar* for the Homeless in London  
2. Often work in conjunction with Gurdwaras  
3. Activists often involved in a number of different types of Sikh activism |
| Midland Langar Society: [http://midlandlangarseva.com/](http://midlandlangarseva.com/)      | **Language:** English  
**Location:** National  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Provide *langar* for the Homeless across the UK  
2. Often work in conjunction with Gurdwaras  
3. Activists often involved in a number of different types of Sikh activism |
| Nishkam Sewa: [https://www.facebook.com/Nishkam-Help-1474292339462040/](https://www.facebook.com/Nishkam-Help-1474292339462040/) | **Language:** English  
**Location:** National  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Provide *langar* for the Homeless across the UK  
2. Often work in conjunction with Gurdwaras  
3. Activists often involved in a number of different types of Sikh activism |
| Guru Nanak’s Free Kitchen: [https://www.facebook.com/Gurunanaks-freekitchen/](https://www.facebook.com/Gurunanaks-freekitchen/) | **Language:** English  
**Location:** National  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Provide *langar* for the Homeless (Doncaster, Preston, Edinburgh)  
2. Often work in conjunction with Gurdwaras  
3. Activists often involved in a number of different types of Sikh activism |
| Khalsa Aid: [https://www.khalsaid.org/](https://www.khalsaid.org/)                          | **Language:** English  
**Location:** National / international  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Provide national and international humanitarian relief |
| Khalsa Seva: [https://www.facebook.com/KhalsaSeva1/](https://www.facebook.com/KhalsaSeva1/) | **Language:** English  
**Location:** Punjab  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Khalsa Seva working with the families of those affected by the events of 1984 |
### Sikh Relief

**Language:** English  
**Location:** National / International  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Disaster Relief Work  
2. Welfare for Sikh Political prisoners and their families

**http://www.sikhrelief.org**

### United Sikhs

**Language:** English  
**Location:** National / International  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Campaign on policy issues re: Sikh articles of faith  
2. Provide humanitarian relief

**http://www.unitedsikhs.org/**

### 5/ Education

<table>
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<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</table>
| Akaal Publishers                    | **Language:** English  
**Location:** West Midlands  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Publications mainly focused on the events of 1984 and on Sikh martyrdom  
2. Published Damdami Taksal code of conduct |
| Basics of Sikhi                      | **Language:** Mainly English (some Punjabi)  
**Location:** International, Online  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. 1000+ Youtube videos on aspects of Sikh  
2. International Sikh camps in India and Canada, events in **Gurdwaras**  
3. Academy established to train the next generation of Sikh preachers in the UK  
4. Educational leaflets, posters and other printed material in 18+ languages  
5. Speakers delivering talks at universities, interfaith discussions, prisons, camps etc. |
| BOSS (British Organisation of Sikh Students) | **Language:** English  
**Location:** West Midlands based, with a national presence  
**Role in Sikh activism:**  
1. Resources for Sikh Student societies  
2. BOSS Annual Camp for 16+  
3. Sikh student events  
4. Many individuals inspired by Damdami Taksal |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Role in Sikh activism</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaurageous</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>1. Established in 2006 as an organisation for Sikh women</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. ‘network loosely coordinated by a group of young Sikh</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>women who are based in Wolverhampton in the West</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Midlands.’ (Qureshi 2016)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Linked to BOSS and inspired by Damdami Taksal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalsa Foundation</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>North / Midlands</td>
<td>1. Khalsa Camps</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Talks at Sikh societies, Gurudwaras, Camps</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Educational resources including software</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Key individuals inspired by AKJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh 2 inspire</td>
<td>English / Punjabi</td>
<td>West Midlands, North, Online</td>
<td>1. Sikh2Inspire camps, events in Gurudwaras</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. Online videos focusing on aspects of the Sikh tradition</td>
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<td>3. Literature and resources</td>
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<td>4. British born preachers many of whom have attended the</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Damdami Taksal seminary</td>
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<td>5. Focus on teaching Santhiya (correct pronunciation of the</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Guru Granth Sahib)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSYF</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>West London, Online</td>
<td>1. Production of research and education around the events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(National Sikh Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. 1984 Awareness through social media campaigns, including</td>
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<td></td>
<td>#10DaysOfTerror and #6DaysOfTerror</td>
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<td>3. ‘Candle in the Dark’ exhibition tour</td>
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<td>4. Events showcasing arts about 1984 (From Kartarpur to</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khalistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naujawani</td>
<td>English and Punjabi</td>
<td>National, Online</td>
<td>1. Educational resources, Linked to Sikhisiasat in Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Blogs / Videos / Articles on Sikh Issues. Focus on 1984,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>injustices.</td>
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<td>3. Screenings of relevant films relating to Punjabi issues</td>
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<td>(e.g., Outjusticed 2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Role in Sikh activism:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Rajoana TV                          | English                 | Online                          | 1. Key individual: Sarbjit Singh RajoanaTV  
2. Lectures online and at various events on 1984 and Punjab issues |
| Sikh Education Council              | English / Punjabi       | London, West Midlands, Online   | 1. Social/religious studies classes, conferences  
2. Publish the International Journal of Sikh Studies  
3. Sikh Studies Course (London, Midlands) |
| USYS (United Sikh Youth Slough)    | English                 | Slough                          | 1. Regular talks, martial arts classes and youth activities for Sikh youth in Slough and West London.        |
APPENDICES
THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF ‘SIKH RADICALISATION’ IN BRITAIN

APPENDIX D - A MAPPING OF ‘SIKH ON SIKH’ INCIDENTS
For more information on CREST and other CREST resources, visit

www.crestresearch.ac.uk