also lead to ‘tunnel vision’ and ill-thought-through decisions. This type of response can be with decision making in many ways. Under acute (short-lived, destructive social confl ict.

interpersonal pressures can become intolerable: being cooped up

What do sources mean when they say ‘I don’t know’?

What are the reasons why sources say ‘I don’t know’?

Physical transitions across borders are fraught with danger, but also require traumatic changes in living standards and social status. How identities and histories are represented can also change over time and Christopher McDowell charts the risks and dangers of these transitions for us on page 14.

Crisis negotiators frequently deal with people in high-pressure circumstances. Helping them transition to the point where loss of life is avoided requires a skill-set that is difficult to train. Simon Wells (page 6) shows us how research has helped track how negotiations progress, giving us examples from two hostage crises.

Also in this issue, on page 22, Martin Innes highlights evidence of Russian interference in public discourse following four of the 2017 terror attacks in the UK, and Sir David Omand writes for us on intelligence and security ethics (page 18). In particular, he focuses on concepts which can be useful to those managing intelligence activity.

In 2015, claims were made about the risks of Sikh radicalisation in the UK. Jasjit Singh (page 20) presents findings from his research into Sikh activism, describing the complex mix of actors and motivations. Like Martin Innes’ article, there is a free report available about this research and we give details for how to find it on page 30, along with links to key research about the featured topics.

On page 24, Paul Taylor writes about the difficulties of communicating across cultures, and why these matter. From small talk to empathising, he outlines some of the potential pitfalls and gaps in cross-cultural understanding. Lorraine Hope has undertaken a review of research relating to what people mean when they say ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t remember’. On page 28 she summarises those into a mindmap.

We publish all of our mindmaps as free downloadable resources. Check out the CREST website for past mindmaps on information elicitation and networks, these can be printed as posters or as small handouts.

Indeed, all past issues of CREST Security Review are available online, at www.crestresearch.ac.uk/csr/.

As always, I’m happy to have your suggestions for research to include in future issues, please send that and other feedback to me at m.d.francis@lancaster. ac.uk.
For the past 10 years I've been looking at efforts to engage with those involved in extremism. Based on extensive interviews and fieldwork with practitioners working with militant Islamists in the UK, I have developed a framework for interpreting involvement in extremism and examined what supports disengagement. Rather than broad-based process models informed by particular risk factors, such as victimisation or grievances, I argue that involvement in extremism can be understood as a way of securing particular types of goods in ways that break social norms.

**SO WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ARGUMENT FOR SUPPORTING THE MOVE AWAY FROM VIOLENT EXTREMISM?**

Knowledge about what causes the move away from violent groups is not well developed, nor is the field clearly conceptualised. The most commonly used terms are ‘deradicalisation’, usually taken to mean behavioural change indicating reduced support for violent extremism, and disengagement, generally taken to mean behavioural change. It is often assumed that one leads to the other. However, these terms are problematic, in part because the link between attitude and behaviour is not straightforward: many more people hold ‘radical’ views than actually engage in violence.

Similarly, there is a growing consensus that process-based accounts – so-called ‘conveyor belt’ models of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘deradicalisation’ – lack strong evidence. Rather than a sequential process, disengaging from violent groups is a heterogeneous, dynamic and highly individualised experience. Finally, ‘deradicalisation’ focuses too much attention on questions of individual psychology and ideology, neglecting the wider social, political and community context in which the individual is embedded. For these reasons, disengagement seems to be a more appropriate framework for interpreting the move away from violent groups and transition back into society.

Intervention programmes to move people away from violent groups have been initiated across the world. Most are delivered by statutory agencies, although some use community-based actors. Although varied, interventions typically combine one or more of the following: efforts to address ideological issues; offering psychological or counselling for those traumatised by violence; improving the individual’s socio-economic situation, for example providing jobs or education, or supplying wider social support, for instance to the prisoner’s family.

However, we know relatively little about how effective these interventions programmes are as few have been independently evaluated. In the UK, the Probation Services and the National Offender Management Service have developed some expertise in this area, involving in-house intervention packages and community mentors supporting the work of Offender Managers. It is extremely difficult to interpret the likelihood of someone re-engaging with a violent group following an intervention, and we lack a clear understanding of what ‘success’ looks like in this context. In the criminal justice system, the dominant model with non-extremist offenders assesses risk based on empirically validated factors linked to the likelihood of reoffending. However, these have proven inadequate for those involved in violent extremism, as the risk factors are very different.

Alternative frameworks for assessing risk with politically motivated offenders have been developed, but these are relatively new and demand much further evaluation and exploration. More generally, the risk paradigm has been criticised for neglecting the contextualised, embedded nature of people’s lives, focusing too heavily on particular risk profiles. One consequence of this approach is that interventions are less attractive to prisoners, neglecting issues of personal motivation.

An alternative framework – the disengagement or strengths-based approach – has been found useful in interpreting existing work with those convicted of terrorism offences in the UK. This assumes we are all motivated to pursue a number of goods, for example, positive relations with others and the wider community, achievement through work, and a meaningful sense of personal agency. Further, that the most appropriate way of achieving these goods is informed by the ideological setting the individual is embedded in.

By implication, extremism is inspired by the same drive to address common human needs we all share. The difference is the ideological framework the individual is committed to and how this informs how particular goods might be achieved, alongside practical enablers that make this possible.

If engagement in extremism involves pursuing goods in ways that break social norms, disengagement can be interpreted as a growing commitment to achieving goods in ways society deems acceptable. To support disengagement, it is therefore important to facilitate sustainable, pro-social ways of achieving goods. This involves redirecting, rather than necessarily deconstructing the initial motivation to become involved in extremism. For example, if someone is primarily motivated by a desire to help their co-religionists, finding ways of doing this in pro-social rather than illegal ways is likely to support long term disengagement.

It is also important to develop resilience to people and events that might undermine any growing commitment to disengage. In this way, it is possible to support the reintegration of those involved in extremism into society. There are several implications of these arguments:

- As well as focusing on risk assessment measures, identifying the goods people seek to pursue is an important part of learning how to support an individual, facilitate successful outcomes, and determine if progress is being made.
- Identifying credible change agents that are able to model appropriate routes to personal fulfilment and who can support the individual as they pursue them.
- Rather than a causal factor, ideology is perhaps best understood as a framework that determines what is important, and how goods should be pursued. Ideological change is less relevant to public protection than ensuring goods are pursued in legal ways. People should therefore be treated holistically, taking account of their social, political, cultural and community context, as well as addressing ideas and beliefs.
- Recognising the barriers to reintegration and disengagement is vital. Even where an individual is motivated to disengage, they face significant challenges: finding a job, developing a new social network, or even getting a bank account can be problematic. Acknowledging society’s role in supporting reintegration is therefore central to supporting successful long-term disengagement.

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TRANSITIONS IN NEGOTIATION – FROM CRISIS TO SUCCESS

An upset father barricades his daughter and himself inside the family home. He’s threatening to take her life and his own. How do you help him transition from this crisis to a state where he accepts help or at least ends the threat to life? A seasoned crisis negotiator, Simon Wells, walks through some of the research that has helped him do this job.

For many years crisis negotiators have drawn on rapport-based tactics such as active listening and social influence to help build rapport and gain trust, in order to affect behavioural change. Often portrayed as a staircase of phases, use of these techniques and the staircase model has proven useful for training negotiators. The model is used by the FBI and UK-based negotiation trainers as means of explaining the phases of negotiation. Recent research into the staircase, in particular the phases or steps, has led to a general acceptance that certain aspects, for example rapport, need to be established and maintained throughout the engagement.

The vast majority of crisis incidents are suicide interventions. In these cases, the staircase model is effective at bringing about a positive outcome: the subject in crisis not ending their life.

Another tactic that is frequently used is a ‘reality check.’ The kind of case where this tactic might be useful is in a crisis following a crime gone wrong, such as a burglary or bank robbery where the perpetrator has been cornered by the police. In these cases the negotiator may well challenge the subject along these lines:

‘When you woke up this morning and decided to carry out this crime you must have considered that the consequences may include being arrested, how does that effect your thinking now?’

OR: ‘I realise you don’t want to come out now, but at some stage you will have to and I am trying to understand what is preventing you from doing that?’

The subject can answer in any way that they see fit, but invariably their response leads to an explanation which highlights that they will come out when certain conditions are met or reassurances given. For example: ‘I am scared to come out as I don’t want to go back to prison’, or ‘I am afraid that I will be assaulted by the people who are going to arrest me’.

Both of these statements give the negotiator space for further exploration, which may lead to agreement, reassurance or some other resolution.

Traditionally, the development of these tactics was based on tacit knowledge, limiting the ability to train and test explicit skills and methods. However, research examining ‘sensemaking’ has helped negotiators, and researchers examining negotiations, codify these interactions and so understand better why certain tactics may work in certain situations.
THE CYLINDER MODEL

One way of helping negotiators understand the concept of sensemaking is to use the cylinder model. This model captures the way that people communicate through three dimensions. First, it characterises three orientations people have towards interaction. These are, avoidant (e.g., refusing to take responsibility for the event), competitive (e.g., attacking the negotiators ideas while boasting about their own) and cooperative (e.g., making concessions or giving compliments). Second, it characterises three motivational frames, related to people’s goals during the interaction. These are, identity (e.g., seeking to boost their own self-worth either through insulting the other person, or interrupting them), instrumental (e.g., trying to achieve an instrumental goal, like getting information, through bargaining) and relational (e.g., empathising with the other person, or seeking to show where they share common traits). Third, the model characterises the intensity with which these interactions take place. Someone showing a high degree of intensity (e.g., shouting that demands must be met) will not be able to move to a different frame of communication until that intensity has been reduced.

This final point is important, as what the cylinder model helps show us is that sense is made, and communication successful, when the negotiator has aligned their frame of communication with that intensity.

PULSE NIGHTCLUB

Having entered and killed many people the attacker, Omar Mateen, contacted the Police on the emergency line. The following is a transcript from that call, between OD (Orlando Police Dispatcher) and OM (Omar Mateen):

OD: Emergency 911, this is being recorded.
OM: In the name of God the Merciful, the Beneficent (in Arabic)
OD: What?
OM: Please be to God, and pray as well as peace be upon the prophet of God (Arabic). I wanna let you know, I’m in Orlando and I did the shootings.
OD: What’s your name?
OM: My name is I pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State.
OD: OK, what’s your name?
OM: I pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi may God project him (Arabic), on behalf of the Islamic State.
OD: Alright, where are you at?
OM: In Orlando.
OD: Where in Orlando? [End of call.]

HYPERCACHER SUPERMARKET

After Amedy Coulibaly had entered the supermarket and killed several people, he took several hostages and began to have contact with negotiators. At the conclusion of the siege, the following events and dialogue occurred:

The hostage-taker was aiming his gun at the hostages and there was an attempt to enter the supermarket by police at the rear door:

Subject: ‘If you keep trying to come in, I’m going to kill them all.’
Negotiator: ‘You wanted to fight and die like a soldier, come out we’re ready for you.’

The subject then raised the shutters at the front and ran towards the Police and was shot. No further hostages were killed.

ANALYSIS

Using the cylinder model to analyse these interactions, we can see that during the supermarket siege the subject was speaking through the avoidant orientation and identity motivational frame. He was blaming his potential actions on those of the police (if you keep trying, I’ll kill them) avoiding substantive dialogue about why he was holding hostages, which was probably driven by his sense of self, his identity.

Meanwhile, the negotiator used cooperative identity language in a frank and forthright way, yet still managed to give the subject choice to become cooperative. The subject wanted to be seen as a warrior, and sought this identity by directing his actions against the firearms team. The end result was that he did not kill any more hostages, but was himself killed.

Looking at the Pulse nightclub attack, we see the subject speaking through the cooperative orientation and identity motivational frame. He was giving the dispatcher information and seeking acknowledgment of his own identity as a soldier of the Islamic State.

The use of identity is predictable as we know from research that terrorist motivation is likely to be driven by identity motivations, their behaviour might be instrumental but the drivers are internal needs and values. In this case, it could have been useful to explore the identity issues, by using active listening. However, the opposite occurred and the initial call receiver became competitive by asking a series of instrumental questions, thus resulting in the subject going from cooperative to avoidant, and the information yield decreasing.

In this case, Omar Mateen remained in that avoidant frame with the negotiators, and there was little to no dialogue. The incident ended with the subject engaging the firearms team when they undertook a dynamic entry through two walls. Mateen did not kill any more hostages, but rather went towards the firearms team and engaged in a fire fight; perhaps also acting in a cooperative identity manner – his identity was to be seen as a soldier of the Islamic State, the engagement was part of his identity.
CITIZENS TO DEMOCRATIC LEADERS
FROM EXTREMIST TO DEMOCRATIC CITIZENS

Leaving an extremist environment is difficult. Some individuals need support to handle it, but the potential benefits in helping reduce acts of violence and potential terror attacks can be significant. An understanding of both these benefits and the complexity of the process of leaving extremist groups, has led to a global increase in exit intervention programmes for extremists.

I have undertaken several months of anthropological fieldwork at EXIT, a Swedish Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) that supports right-wing extremist disengagement. During this time, I came to understand why the transition from being a right-wing extremist into a democratic citizen in a western liberal society is so difficult.

My research was informed by the understanding that an individuals’ development of an extreme identity is the outcome of a situated learning process. ‘Situated learning’ focuses on the relationship between learning and the social situation in which it occurs. For example, a member of a right-wing group acquires their cultural knowledge through being part of the group, which over time shapes the individuals’ way of interpreting the world and cements what they see as the key issues of the day.

Any newcomer to a fresh social setting goes through this process of learning to get the ‘native’ group’s view of the world. However, because we have different experiences, positions and interests we still have unique understandings within the social worldview.

This understanding of the importance of the social setting, coupled with the unique ways in to, and interpretation of it, helped show me what participation in an extremist group can entail, what people looking to leave an extremist group can need, and how to support them in this process.

AFTER-EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION IN EXTREME GROUPS

Individuals who join extremist right-wing groups experience two parallel and mutually reinforcing processes: inclusion and socialisation into withdrawn and stigmatised communities, whilst severing ties with ‘normal’ society. The process is most commonly mutually reinforcing due to the stigmatisation of being associated with a neo-Nazi group.

Through immersion in the everyday practice of this sort of sub-culture, people – right-wing extremist or not – also form bodily and mental dispositions associated with it. For example, the emotional side of an extremist life often involves intense feelings of hatred, aggression, violence and highs of adrenaline causing some individuals to experience symptoms similar to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

This intense emotion and withdrawal from wider society can leave former extremists struggling when they attempt to leave groups. These struggles can include social disabilities in the form of finding it hard to resolve conflict, manage stress as well as cope with feelings of loneliness, shame and meaninglessness.

AIMS OF THE EXIT PROGRAMME

EXIT Sweden is one of the oldest organisations of its kind and over the years it has developed into a very successful example of an exit program. This is due to several factors, including its use of former right-wing extremists (‘formers’) as mentors. These mentors, using therapeutic dialogues and activities, support people seeking to leave extremist right-wing groups.

By using ‘formers’, EXIT creates legitimacy in a very hard-to-reach target group. Their shared past positions mentors as role models to the mentees, as they are living proof that leaving the extremist right is possible.

People involved in the extremist right can become accustomed to world-views, such as the idea that there is a conspiracy against society, as well as believing that all people outside the group are enemies to be fought. With this in mind, the main goal of EXIT’s approach is to support the mentees in developing alternative world-views, ways of self-understanding and identities.
For an mentor-mentee relationship to be successful, trust has to evolve between the two. This helps the mentee to become open to their mentor’s advice and example. Initially, they can spend months doing sports and other kind of activities to develop a strong relationship.

AS THEY ESTABLISH MUTUAL TRUST, THE MENTORS WILL HELP THE MENTEES IDENTIFY ACTIVITIES THAT THEY ENJOY.

Encouraging the mentees to engage in new social environments is seen as essential to help sustain motivation to leave their former extreme group.

This time also marks the beginning of a process whereby the mentee learns to identify and express emotions – other than hate and aggression. The mentor will also discuss the personal challenges and issues that the mentee faces, and give examples to help with these from their own life. These can be everyday examples such as recounting discussions with their girlfriend over who has to do the cleaning – to show the importance of compromise. They can also be life-changing examples, such as their experiences of transitioning out of extremist groups.

Using these personal experiences, especially the day-to-day ones, helps broaden the mentees’ perception and reflection on their own journey and expand their understanding of themselves and others.

Whilst the mentors represent a different world (society outside the extremist milieu), their shared experiences help challenge the often rigid world view of the mentees. The mentors introduce alternative perspectives on world views by pointing out different signs of significance and providing additional information, bit by bit. These, over time, can help mentees draw different conclusions from those informed by their extreme worldview.

The mentors do not tell the mentees what is right or wrong, rather they help the mentees identify it themselves by increasingly questioning or adding new perspectives to the mentees perception. This gradual expansion of the context for world views, coupled with the avoidance of offering premature answers, seems to make it much harder for the mentees to reject new insights and revert to old perceptions.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALTERNATIVE LIFE

While a lot of exit interventions and programs are dialogue based, EXIT’s approach also entails getting the mentee to engage with an alternative environment. They take this approach because formers can struggle with particular ways of acting, which they developed as a consequence of their engagement in an extreme environment. This makes it difficult for some to decide what to do in certain situations when they cannot react with aggression, violence or intimidation.

For example, Kate, a former right-wing extremist who had left an extreme group ten years previously, explained to me that in certain situations she still had a very strong inclination to act aggressively, which she did not want to. She still had doubts about how to react to these situations. She explained to me in an interview:

I think the thing was that, when I came out of [the extremist right wing], I was an adult, and this thing about grey areas - compromises – for example, to try to see both sides of the context took so MUCH damned time. And it might be what made it so tormenting for me in the beginning when I left, especially in my personal life, to try to find out about all those things; that I knew who I was, but I did not know how I should be and how to learn it, and I can still feel confused; WHAT DO I DO NOW?

Well, it has to do with having an instinct, but you also know somewhere that the instances I get about how to behave, it is not like you ought to behave if you ought to consider how society perceives it. Because I often feel like... I am in such a way that if I get mad, I can get really mad, and I realise that now I am very angry about a tiny little thing, and I need to back off. But I am still inside myself with rage over things, for example, I will be furious at someone, and then I must just try to back off and say: 'I'm very sorry, I know I overreacted'. But the fact is that it is not all natural, and it may very be that it will never be in such a way that it becomes natural to think twice and see...

The mentees participation in new social activities helps to deal with these doubts, and are crucial to help them develop alternative social relations and skills. They also help them acquire new routines on which their successful reintegration into society seems to depend.

The EXIT Sweden programme, and my research into it, shows that the transition from being a right-wing extremist into becoming a democratic citizen depends in many aspects on a situated learning process. This is as complex as peoples’ initial development into becoming a right-wing extremist, and necessitates a lengthy re-socialisation into mainstream society.

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DISPLACEMENT AND TRANSITION RISKS

The refugee journey from a place of danger to a place of safety involves a series of transitions. At each stage of the displacement cycle individuals become defined by legal-bureaucratic and descriptive labels that may include an ‘internally displaced person (IDP)’, an ‘asylum seeker’, a ‘refugee claimant’, a ‘registered refugee’, a ‘prioritised or deprioritised “resettlement case”’, a ‘rejected asylum seeker’, or a ‘returnee’.

These labels are important because they underpin a set of legal rights, a documented pathway to official protection processes and an entitlement to humanitarian support. Conversely labels can also signal the withdrawal of rights, support and protection.

The route from danger to safety is rarely linear, but rather families and groups of friends move frequently between different statuses; and as of playing a game of snakes and ladders they can come close to achieving a high level of entitlement (to be accepted on a resettlement programme, for example) only to be knocked back and obliged to wait for a later opportunity. There is no certainty in the process and the quality of character that refugees most need is patience.

DETERMINING IDENTITIES

Transitions in status demand also statements of identity. The bureaucratic processes to confer entitlement involve a series of determinations that require registrations, health and other assessments, interviews, case reviews, and the gathering of biometric data including Iris scanning.

One’s identity is crucial in this process as individuals are required to constantly restate who they consider themselves to be and why they merit protection. Repeated interviews expose inconsistencies in personal biographies and experiences of conflict.

REPEATED DATA GATHERING

Accurate information, it is argued, should lead to better humanitarian outcomes as vulnerability can be identified and those most in need accelerated through the referral system.

However, the repeated gathering of data and the need for retelling of stories expose the underpinning concern that humanitarian systems have that, during registration (which occurs once an individual has crossed a border), or in refugee status determination, there is an ever-present possibility of fraud. Concerns about identity theft and substitution, fraudulent family composition, and multiple registrations are transition risks that UN agencies seek to manage.

So too are these transition risks for refugees, for whom the possibility of misrepresenting in their statements increases with each retelling, each misspelled name or misremembered date. As individual family members’ records are bundled together in one “case”, so the likelihood of factual inconsistencies increases and credibility is once again brought into question.

SECURITY CONCERNS

While the bureaucracy of the humanitarian system creates uncertainty for refugee-claimants at each stage of the refuge cycle, wider security concerns add to the precariousness of transitions between the stages of forced migration. The United Nations takes the lead in vetting resettlement applicants, ‘deprioritising’ those who are thought to present a risk by virtue of their previous engagement in conflict or the continued engagement of their family members, or because of past criminal activities or a government security role that may be implicated in potential war crimes.

The ‘refugee condition’, frequently linked to traumatic events, manifests in physiological, psychological and sociocultural stress compounded by the struggle to secure short-term and longer-term protection for the immediate and extended family. Material hardships, poor living conditions inside and outside of camps, unemployment or exploitative work, children missing out on education, growing indebtedness and unaddressed health needs shape the precariousness of displacement.

RISK OF EXTREMISM

Refugee receiving states in the region of conflict, as well as western governments who play host to asylum populations are increasingly concerned about the risk of extremist movements seeking to recruit and radicalise amongst displaced peoples.

The stress and insecurity of refugee-seeking are likely to intensify with each transition where opportunities for legal and safe escape routes do not exist. The condition permits opportunities for agents of radicalisation to exploit vulnerabilities. In particular, to target young men who have lost the opportunity of education and a normal growing-up, who have been forced to hustle on the streets and who do not have the means to support their parents and siblings in the way that is expected of them.

Extremist narratives offer ready explanations for conflict, directing grievances at Western states. Refugees can be drawn into extremist networks that offer social support as well contacts and resources for onward movement.

The United Nations is leading the diplomatic drive for a new Global Compact on managing large-scale refugee movements to include addressing the protection risks identified in this article at those key transition stages in the displacement cycle. Addressing the security dimensions of those risks, in particular those around recruitment and radicalisation, are likely to be some of the most contentious topics discussed.

In asylum-providing countries, interventions should seek to address the problem of protracted displacement while at the same time providing meaningful education, employment, and other livelihood support to reduce the risk of marginalisation and impoverishment.

Support will be required to prepare refugees for either permanent settlement in their chosen country of asylum or to enable them to return home with the resources to rebuild their lives. Any new global compact to achieve these objectives will have to secure international agreement among states to cooperate in addressing refugee crises. This necessitates a shift in attitude towards forced displacement and migration underpinned by a rethinking of current displacement risk management. Safe and legal routes out of situations of danger would go some way to removing the opportunities that extremist organisations exploit in the patterns of movement recently witnessed in the Middle East and Europe.

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**DISENGAGEMENT: LESSONS FROM CULTS AND SECTARIAN GROUPS**

Violent extremist ideologies, particularly those associated with ‘Islamic terrorism’, cause the same kind of headline concern in the media that ‘cults’ did forty years ago. For example, the mass suicide-murder of 918 individuals in Jonestown, Guyana in November 1978, at the behest of a charismatic religious leader, shook public opinion in a similar way to current Islamic State-inspired atrocities.

As we see in some accounts of young people joining Islamic State, the assumption for cults was that the converts were blameless and in some way vulnerable. They were brainwashed into joining those groups. A cottage industry of ‘deprogrammers’ developed, which at times forcibly kidnapped the ‘brainwashed’ and implemented an enforced programme of ‘thought-reform’ through physical control and mental intimidation.

Eileen Barker’s seminal study of coverts to the Unification Church (often referred to as ‘Moonies’ after their founder-messiah figure Sun Yung Moon) proved that this popular model of understanding conversion to extreme groups was not backed up from evidence. What was needed was a more nuanced explanatory model to understand the factors for sudden turns towards extreme beliefs and behaviour.

Only a small proportion of cults ever engaged in violence, but many of those that didn’t might still be seen as extreme and extracting a high personal cost for membership. In this, we can see parallels between these groups and some terrorist movements. So, what we can learn from forty years of research into how people transition out of membership in high-demand religious groups?

**WHY DO THEY LEAVE?**

People leaving extremist groups voluntarily in both frequent and normal – whilst membership figures often remain constant many high-demand groups have high rates of turnover.

Sometimes a specific event that ‘goes too far’ triggers exiting. Sometimes the ideology itself suddenly appears illogical or untenable.

**WHY DON’T THEY LEAVE?**

Of course, some never leave. This, despite what might appear to be obvious disconfirming evidences of the leader or belief system. What explains this behaviour? For some, exit costs are very high. They may have several contact with friends and all social support outside the group. They may have given all financial assets to the group. They have been reliant on the group for employment, housing, and all social needs. There may also be a lingering mistrust of organisations which could help, based on years of antagonism towards the ‘system’.

In other cases, the main issue is a lack of basic knowledge of what structures and organisations might be able to support them, should they leave.

**HELPING PEOPLE LEAVE**

Beliefs are messy and complicated. The same individual may present their belief system differently in special social contexts. This is normal. Expressions of belief are both performative and contextual. It is important to take aspects of religious worldviews seriously and literally.

It is important to separate out behaviour from beliefs. Just because someone is expressing violent ideas, it does not necessarily mean that they intend to carry them out.

Some individuals continue to hold an ambiguous middle-ground of affiliation or not being affiliated for years, expressing sympathy with the group but also distancing themselves from certain activities and ideas. Sometimes these ‘marginal’ individuals can have an important role in criticising and critiquing the group’s worldview, influencing positive organisational change over time.

Beliefs are messy and complicated. The same individual may present their belief system differently in special social contexts. This is normal. Expressions of belief are both performative and contextual. It is important to take aspects of religious worldviews seriously and literally.

But it is also important to leave room for an individual’s interpretations to change. If an individual becomes defined by a specific presentation of the ideology, she may feel pushed to defend it. Commitment to a specific credo may become more rather than less extreme when it is challenged directly.

It is far better to avoid backing people into conceptual corners or defining them by expressed beliefs. Whilst beliefs can certainly justify extreme behaviour, they do not necessarily lead to action. It is important to separate out behaviour from beliefs.

Dr Suzanne Newcombe is a Lecturer in Religious Studies and a Research Fellow at Inform, based at the London School of Economics. Inform was founded in 1998 to empower decision making and present the harm that can arise from misinformation about minority religions, sects, and related movements. It has 30 years experience in this field, acting as a bridge between academics, current and former members of cults, their friends and family, law enforcement, mainstream churches and government. Its database includes over 5,000 different groups and affiliated organisations.

Jim Jones by Nancy Wong (Own work) [CC BY-SA 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons
All professions have codes of ethics, often incorporated into legal regulation. We trust solicitors not to embezzle, teachers not to seduce students and scientists not to cheat on their results. Ethical codes are a mix of (teleological) consequentialist reasoning [judging the rightness of an act by its results such as saving life]; (deontological) imposition of wider moral constraints (thou shalt not steal); and (aretic) personal value ethics (this is how a decent human being should behave towards another).

WHY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY AGENCIES ARE DIFFERENT

The intelligence and security agencies are a special case. Whilst society wants national security and public safety, obtaining the necessary intelligence inevitably involves acting in ways that society considers to be immoral, espionage involves stealing secrets.

People with secrets of value, be they hostile states, dictators, terrorists, proliferators of narcotics or people traffickers, child abusers, cyber or other serious criminals, will go to huge lengths to prevent their secrets being known. For this reason, intelligence professionals argue that their difficult and sometimes dangerous job requires a licence to break normal moral conventions, precisely so that the governments that employ them can have done in the dark what ethically they dare not be caught doing in the day.

Ethically questionable methods to obtain these secrets can include covert surveillance, recruiting agents and informants, eavesdropping and intercepting communications. Ethical questions arise over how and when to justify manipulative and exploitative behaviour towards others, including spying on friends, invasion of personal privacy, and deception through sting and fake flag operations.

Issues also arise when sharing intelligence with countries that have different moral attitudes to the use of intelligence, such as for interrogation, or targeted killing. Adding to this complexity, these methods and sources must remain hidden, or the secret-keeper will easily be able to dodge the attentions of those trying to obtain it.

Democratic societies and their secret agencies are going through unprecedented self-questioning about the ethics of methods used to obtain secret intelligence and the extent to which society needs to rein in its intelligence agencies. This has come about not least because of the publication of top secret documents showing the power of modern digital intelligence methods, stolen from NSA and GCHQ by Edward Snowden. Intelligence and security ethics has now become a major politically charged research topic in the 5-eyes intelligence communities and the European Union.

JUST WAR AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

One approach I have researched with the political scientist Professor Mark Phillipson, looking at the ethical concepts of the ‘Just War’ tradition that underpins the Geneva Conventions and the Laws of War.

A straightforward adaptation is needed but the main concepts have clear usefulness to those accounting or managing intelligence activity:

• just cause – only in accordance with the rule of law for the UK, this would be actions deemed to be in the interests of national security, including in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK, from outside threats; or in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime and where the intended meaning of terms such as ‘national security’ is explained in published government documents such as the UK National Security Strategy;

• right intention – acting with integrity and having no hidden political or other agendas behind the authorisation of intelligence activity or the analysis, assessment, and presentation of intelligence judgments to decision-makers;

• proportionality – keeping the ethical risks of intelligence operations, and operations based on intelligence, in line with the harm that the operations are intended to prevent, as part of the balancing act required by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights;

• right authority – obtaining the level of approval appropriate to the ethical risks that may be run (under the IP Act 2016, the most intrusive investigation warrants might be signed by a Secretary of State and judicially reviewed by a senior judicial authority, and that, all down the line, no decisions taken and independent oversight of the process); and

• reasonable prospect of success – having adequate justification for individual operations based on sound probabilistic reasoning that also has given the highest levels of accountability for decisions taken and independent oversight of the process

A reasonable prospect of success would be hard to achieve if the filtering and search algorithms used can be sufficiently targeted, using seeds or precise search criteria, to avoid that ethical taint.

Recent UK studies have confirmed that intelligence officers develop ways of behaving well, even knowing knowingly encouraging betrayal or intruding on the privacy of private communications and family life. Experimental psychology nevertheless also demonstrates that even those who see themselves as highly moral agents can be led to behave in unacceptable ways when placed in an unhealthy environment.

So ethical issues in intelligence have a situational as well as a personal dimension, not least when it comes to designing organisational structures, and statutory safeguards and internal processes to ensure that future governments cannot misuse the powerful intelligence capabilities that the UK intelligence and security agencies must continue to possess.
Sikh Radicalisation in Britain

Jasjit Singh

In November 2015 the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the UK, according to Indian media, during this visit he presented a dossier on ‘Sikh radicalisation in Britain’ to his counterpart David Cameron, which included information on Sikh groups in the UK trying to revive the movement for a separate Sikh state (Khalistan), providing training on how to make explosive devices (IEDs) and funding hate-propaganda against India. Despite these Indian media reports, the British government publicly denied ever receiving this dossier when formally asked in Parliament.

Recent years have also seen a number of incidents involving Sikhs in Britain, including modifications around mixed faith weddings in gurdwaras (literally ‘house of the Guru’, refers to a Sikh institution where the Guru Granth Sahib Ji is present) and campaigns against the serving of alcohol and meat in halal linked to gurdwaras. There have also been reports in UK media about Sikh/Muslim tensions and links between Sikhs and the far right. In response to these incidents and reports, I led a research project to examine the idea, context, framing and realities of ‘Sikh radicalisation in Britain’. I gathered evidence from historic and contemporary media sources, academic literature, social media, internet, discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews. The report from this project is available to download for free.<LINK>

Two events in 1984 fundamentally changed Sikh activism in Britain. The storming of the Harmandir Sahib (often referred to as the Golden Temple) during Operation Bluestar in June 1984 and the violence that took place against Sikhs across India in November 1984, following the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister by her Sikh bodyguards. Before these events, Sikhs in Britain generally supported India and were mainly focused on campaigning for the right to maintain Sikh symbols in Britain. However, anger about Operation Bluestar remains an issue which continues to move Sikhs in Britain to protest (against India) about this incident.

For Sikhs, ‘1984’ can refer to the events of either June and/or November 1984, or November with activism around 1984 not automatically equating the ‘1984’ timeframe. For Sikhs, ‘1984’ can refer to the events of either June and/or November 1984, or November with activism around 1984 not automatically equating the ‘1984’ timeframe.

Sikhs in Britain do certainly appear to be influencing Sikh doctrines and practices worldwide, particularly through campaigns focusing on religious enforcement, which have led to specific Akal Takht edicts in response.

In conclusion, the main threat to community relations in Britain is from individual or group vigilantism resulting from internal Sikh issues/disputes or from the exploitation of local intra and inter-community tensions. Much Sikh activism in Britain actually contributes positively to the integration agenda, particularly in the form of humanitarian relief provided during natural disasters (e.g. the floods in Somerset and Shrewsbury bridge) and incidents (e.g. Grenfell) where members of the public require support.

Jasjit Singh is a Research Fellow in Religious and Cultural Traditions at the University of Leeds. Dr Singh’s report ‘The idea, context, framing and realities of Sikh radicalisation in Britain is available to download at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/. This article originally appeared on the CREST website.
Following the UK terror attacks in 2017, there was a significant level of influence and interference by Russian-linked social media accounts, trying to engineer division in the UK.

This was the finding from a CREST-funded report by researchers at the Cardiff University Crime and Security Research Institute. As part of our project looking into soft facts and digital influencing, the team gathered data from across four terrorist attacks in 2017 (the Westminster, Manchester Arena, London Bridge and Finsbury Park attacks). We collected a dataset containing approximately 30 million datapoints from various social media platforms. Whilst processing these data, we detected some anomalies, which upon further investigation have been revealed to be associated with fake accounts.

By comparing these accounts with open-access datasets on Russian-linked accounts we were able to show that 47 accounts were Russian-linked. We also identified other accounts with similar identifying features, which had not at that time been confirmed to be Russian.

Terrorist violence is fundamentally designed to ‘terrorise, mobilise and polarise’ its audiences. The impacts of these events are increasingly shaped by social media, and reflect the speed and scale with which such platforms can make information travel. With this in mind, our evidence suggests that a systematic strategic political communications campaign has been directed at the UK, designed to amplify the public harms of terrorism attacks. Many of the accounts described themselves as ‘breaking news’ sites. Following the Manchester and London Bridge attacks, at least one account was sending inflammatory messages within 15 minutes. This is significant because, in influence terms, responding rapidly to ‘frame’ how an event should be defined is important in being able to subtly shape how and what people subsequently think about it. There is an ‘early mover advantage’ to be accrued from getting in at the inception of an incident to try and sow seeds of antagonism and anxiety.

Eight out of the forty-seven accounts were especially active, posting at least 475 Twitter messages across the four attacks, which were reposted in excess of 153,000 times. Rather than generic news accounts, these accounts were based on personal, highly opinionated and ideologically driven identities. Messages from these accounts were reposted in excess of 153,000 times.

Some of these eight, personal accounts had a large number of followers. To take three as an example: @TEN_GOP (the right-wing, anti-Islam account mentioned above) had circa 127,000 followers on the 26 June 2017; @Crystal1Jonson (adopting a civil rights stance) had nearly 46,000 followers; and @SouthLoneStar (another with a right-wing stance) had almost 54,000.

What’s also striking from just those examples, is the range of ideological standpoints these accounts took. The use of these accounts as ‘sock puppets’ allowed for interventions to be made on both sides of polarised debates, amplifying their message and ramping up the level of discord and disagreement within public online debate.

An example of these contrasting positions was in regard to the infamous image of a Muslim woman on Westminster Bridge walking past a victim being treated, apparently ignoring them. This became an internet meme propagated by multiple far-right groups and individuals, with about 7,000 variations of it according to our dataset. In response to which the far right aligned @Ten_GOP tweeted: She is being judged for her own actions & lack of sympathy. Would you just walk by? Or offer help? Whereas, @Crystal1Jonson's narrative was: so this is how a world with glasses of hate look like - poor woman, being judged only by her clothes.

While most attention around terror attacks is quite rightly focused on the planning, motivations and behaviours of terrorists, the downstream consequences have often been neglected. There is potential for better managing and mitigating the harms associated with successful attacks.

The hostile intervention after the attacks we looked at suggests that we should focus upon rapidly establishing what counter-measures are effective in offsetting the impact of soft facts propagated by overseas interests, as they seek to do the work of terrorist organisations by amplifying the capacity and capability of violent acts to mobilise and polarise citizens.

Professor Martin Innes is Director of the Crime and Security Research Institute at Cardiff University. This research was funded via CREST as part of a project focused on how soft facts / rumours / fake news / conspiracy theories / propaganda influence the aftermath of terrorist attacks. For more information and to download the report this article is based on, visit the project page at https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/soft-facts-digital-behavioural-influencing/
COMMUNICATING ACROSS CULTURES

Have they understood what is at stake? Why do they avoid answering the question? Why are they being aloof and distant? In cross-cultural interactions, such questions can easily come to the fore. The usual challenges of interviews are compounded by the need to decipher what an interviewee’s actions reflect, deceit, or a culturally influenced way of interacting?

So, why can interacting across cultures end in misunderstanding? The answer stems from the fact that humans rely on a set of internal norms and expectations to guide their actions. These develop over childhood and are refined by daily experiences. As a consequence, they are different for each one of us. Differences in beliefs about how to interact with authority, in how to express emotions and thoughts, in how we respond to persuasion, in how we take turns and follow the ‘etiquette’ of interaction, and even in what we understand by ‘crime’ and ‘lying’. These examples just scratch the surface.

Ordinarily, such norms simplify interaction by allowing us to anticipate the other person’s behaviour. In cross-cultural interactions, the norms of one person are often not those underpinning the behaviour of their counterpart. The result is that norms mislead how the other person’s behaviour is understood.

CROSS-CULTURAL JUDGMENTS ABOUT DECEPTION

If you need convincing that cross-cultural interactions carry their own challenges, then consider research on the age-old task of spotting a liar. Most of us are poor at spotting liars, and we get worse when those we are judging have a different cultural background. In 1990, Charles Bond and his colleagues asked Jordanian and US undergraduate students to judge the genuine and fabricated statements of their peers. The students identified deception with a better-than-chance accuracy rate for within-culture judgements, but rates little better than chance when judging across cultures. Interestingly, these students report basing their judgements, in part, on how they feel others from their culture would react. They are not therefore relying on some absolute criteria of what liars do. Rather, they are relying on culturally determined cues, apparently unaware that these may not remain valid across cultures.

So, why does the accuracy of our judgements decrease across cultures? One explanation is known as the expectancy violation model. It proposes that people infer deception when a communicator violates what the observer anticipates seeing and hearing. They seek a plausible explanation for the behaviour and, in the absence of other information, that plausible explanation becomes ‘this person is lying’. For example, in one study, observers perceived actors who perform strange and unexpected behaviours (e.g. head tilting and staring) as more dishonest than those who did not perform such behaviours. This was true regardless of whether the actor was telling the truth or lying.

The lying example gives us some idea of why cultural differences in behaviour lead to misjudgements. How, then, to overcome such biases? One approach would be to learn the theories and findings that science has produced, and apply that knowledge to individual cases. The difficulty with this approach is that investigations would need to remember a significant amount of material and translate that material ‘on-demand’ to the situation at hand. When under pressure that’s quite a challenge. Is it realistic to expect a careful and considered application of aggregate research findings in those kinds of circumstances?

A second approach is to substitute making prescriptive suggestions with a descriptive account that highlights the kinds of issues that arise. In this top-down approach, the focus is on providing investigators with an understanding of why differences are observed, rather than encouraging them to memorise a range of cultural differences. A number of researchers have shown that this kind of exposure to characteristic problems improves cross-cultural sensemaking.

Chart 1 gives an example of a top-down approach. In Chart 1, the top half – Communication Features – describes issues that have been shown to result in misunderstandings. The bottom half – Learning points – summarises a point worth remembering. The Chart is structured around four kinds of dialogue: orientation, which seeks to establish the nature of the engagement, relational, which seeks to manage the interpersonal dynamic (e.g., attempts to put them at ease); problem-solving, which seeks to develop acceptable solutions or exchange information; and resolution, which occurs as interactions, or particular parts of dialogue, conclude.

ORIENTATION DIALOGUE

Orientation dialogue dominates early stages of interaction. An orientation may be as short as a few sentences to initiate dialogue, such as occurs during an airport screening. Or, it may take longer as parties define their relationship and the way forward, such as occurs within a police interview.

Two factors that often raise confusion during this time are small talk and role differences. Small talk serves a number of purposes, which are often described as ‘ticking over’ behaviours. In investigative contexts, small talk helps to get the interaction going with the interviewee.
RESOLUTION DIALOGUE

The final phase in Chart 1 concerns the closing stages of interaction, where decisions are made and resolutions achieved.

While the closure of interaction can emerge naturally out of persuasion, in cross-cultural interaction it is often the case that each party has a different understanding of what has been agreed. For example, research suggests that many police detectives are unaware about what to do when a suspect shows signs of resistance, and that they often interpret the resistance as an indication of guilt. Yet, suspects may show resistance for a number of reasons, even when they are not guilty. They may not trust the investigator, they may be concerned about inculpating themselves in the enquiry. This is why current interviewing training focuses less on how to obtain a confession and more on how to gather information about the circumstances surrounding the time in question.

A second issue that is often prominent at the end of interactions, though clearly important throughout, is ‘face’. Face is an individual’s claimed sense of positive image in the context of social interaction. For some cultures ‘face is a paramount concern of social standing. In contrast, the Western culture that emphasizes equality and debating relative values, are characteristic of a persuasion approach that is successful in cultures where communication focuses on message content. These cultures are referred to as ‘low-context’ cultures – the meaning of the interaction is mainly in the words exchanged. However, this is not true of all cultures. Many solve problems and resolve conflicts in ways that are less direct, where meaning is located in the social or physical context of the interaction rather than solely in its content. Persuasion is less central to the interaction of these, ‘high-context’, cultures. It is often left un-reciprocated, giving the feeling that one is rude or unforthcoming. That’s not always a correct interpretation of others’ behaviour.

A related influence on role on cross-cultural interactions concerns miscommunication. Studies show there are more likely to conform to the story presented to us by someone perceived as high-powered compared to someone perceived as low-powered, and this effect is more pronounced in stressful contexts. This is perhaps why, in some cross-cultural interactions, investigators are confronted with agreement to everything that they say. The interviewer’s answers relate to what she or he thinks the investigator wants to hear, rather than what is in fact true.

RELATIONAL DIALOGUE

Relational dialogue refers to interaction that is focused on issues such as personal reputation, identity, and social belonging. It is often left un-reciprocated, giving the feeling that one is rude or unforthcoming. That’s not always a correct interpretation of others’ behaviour.

One example of this, referred to as ‘storytelling’ in Chart 1, is the different ways in which people convey narratives. Native speakers of English typically tell stories through a short, descriptive narrative, and little or no context. Dutch suspects, research found the use of ultimatums to be most effective when focused on personal issues. In contrast, with ‘low-context’ Moroccan suspects, ultimatums were more effective when focusing on personal issues. This highlights again the different values that cultures place on different forms of communication.

A second example of relational misunderstanding concerns the use of empathy. Investigators often express empathy to ‘get on side’ and gain the trust of another. They present a willingness to listen and to express sympathy for their situation, or suggest a common experience or perspective on an issue.

When this approach is used in interactions with those from cultures in which social group is valued (e.g., as is typical of people from China, Kurdistan, and Suriname), the reaction is suspicion rather than trust. This can be particularly true in these interactions often elicits a negative response. Although the reason for this is not clear-cut, the current thinking is that it has to do with ‘face’ or ‘honour’, which are dominant within these cultures. Empathising in situations where empathy is not particularly warranted may be perceived as undermining face, and as a challenge rather than an attempt at increasing affiliation.

PROBLEM-SOLVING DIALOGUE

The third type of dialogue in Chart 1, problem-solving dialogue, typically emerges out of the orientation and relational phases. The focus of this dialogue is exploring issues and resolving suspicions. It may be a sequence of questions and answers to gather information or an attempt to elicit information by systematically presenting evidence.

To many from Western cultures, the typical way of eliciting information is to engage in argument and persuasion. Identifying inconsistencies in a story, pointing out the absence of evidence, and debating relative values, are characteristic of a persuasion approach that is successful in cultures where communication focuses on message content. These cultures are referred to as ‘low-context’ cultures – the meaning of the interaction is mainly in the words exchanged. However, this is not true of all cultures. Many solve problems and resolve conflicts in ways that are less direct, where meaning is located in the social or physical context of the interaction rather than solely in its content. Persuasion is less central to the interaction of these, ‘high-context’, cultures. It is often left un-reciprocated, giving the feeling that one is rude or distant because they don’t engage in small talk. In contrast, many with Middle-Eastern cultural backgrounds will respect but mistrust authority. This can lead to avoidance and/or resistance, and that they often interpret the resistance as deliberate evasion by some

In this context, the ‘yes’ is used to not embarrass the businessman at the end of the meeting, rather than an indication of agreement to the proposed deal. It is perhaps inevitable that such behaviour will be seen as deliberate evasion by some cultures, although the motivation behind the message is more complex than it may first appear.

One interesting consequence of examining cross-cultural interactions using the four kinds of dialogue outlined in Chart 1 is that it becomes apparent how misunderstandings can accumulate over time. Arguably, out of the phases, it is the early orientation and relational aspects of dialogue that are most vulnerable to misunderstanding. If people struggle over problem-solving aspects of interaction, there is a good chance that such misunderstandings will surface during their discussion. In contrast, issues relating to relationship or role may be difficult to spot, and easier to undo as an interaction unfolds.

Being aware of such issues is the first step to avoiding cultural misunderstandings.

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**WHAT SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY “I DON’T KNOW”**

**MOTIVATION & STRATEGY**
- **EXAMPLE**
  - I’m afraid/I feel trapped or under pressure.
  - I was asked to keep it a secret/don’t want anyone to find out.
  - I need to protect some people close to me.

**EXPLANATION**
- Revealing the information may bring other people into the investigation/put other people at risk/betray friends or family.
- Ideological or group allegiances.

**RESPONSE**
- Acknowledge and provide assurances (where possible).
- Explore issues and concerns.
- Develop rapport and trust, highlighting the benefits of disclosed information.
- Reframe: not a secret, not a betrayal; benefits others, still within in-group.

**DISTRUST, CYNICISM & HOSTILITY**
- **EXAMPLE**
  - I don’t trust you with this information.
  - You might use this information against me.

**EXPLANATION**
- Doubts about the interviewer’s intentions towards them or their ability to look after their safety.
- A perception of loss of control and they are entering a process that once started cannot be stopped.

**RESPONSE**
- Rapport, acknowledge, assurances (where possible).
- Develop rapport and trust, highlighting the benefits of disclosed information.
- Explore issues and concerns.
- Explain processes for information security and source protection.

**PERSONAL MOTIVATION**
- **EXAMPLE**
  - I was intoxicated/high.
  - I was extremely tired/disoriented/feeling confused.

**EXPLANATION**
- May not want to admit to self-inflicted states or perceived weaknesses.
- Worry that admitting to these states may make them appear incompetent or unreliable.

**RESPONSE**
- Establish what the state at encoding was – but do not dismiss memory.
- Use memory-enhancing techniques (mental reinstatement of context, open-questions, free recall).
- Avoid leading questions, option-posing, suggestions.

**MEMORY & COGNITION**
- **EXAMPLE**
  - It happened so many times I’m not sure what exactly happened on the occasion.

**EXPLANATION**
- Difficulties with particularisation of a single instance when distinguishing between similar events (e.g., repeated abuse, domestic violence).
- Problems identifying source of a particular memory (source monitoring).

**RESPONSE**
- Ensure clarity when questioning about repeated events.
- Use methods that might assist discrimination between repeated events (specific dates, times, details or temporal placing, i.e., ‘the time before last’).
- Seek particularisation (if relevant).

**INTERVIEW CONTEXT**
- **EXAMPLE**
  - I think I was wrong on a previous answer so I don’t want to get it wrong again.
  - The information I have contradicts or doesn’t fit with what you have told me/implied, so I don’t want to say.
  - I saw/recall something, but several people are being interviewed and I want to avoid being contradicted by another source.

**EXPLANATION**
- Interviewees may feel embarrassed/worried they have provided incorrect information; go along with interviewer (or fabricate) to avoid conflict.
- Interviewees make assumptions about what the interviewers think/know.

**RESPONSE**
- Develop rapport and trust, highlighting the benefits of disclosed information.
- Use metacognitive evaluations (confidence evaluations).
- Assure that their account is important and people can witness/observe things in different ways.
- Normalise error (e.g., acknowledge that task is difficult and errors may occur).
WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY ‘I DON’T KNOW’?

There are many reasons why a source might respond to a question with an ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t remember’. This taxonomy of the potential reasons for these responses, aims to help interviewers explore, understand and potentially respond in ways that help elicit further information.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND INTERFERENCE MEASURES FOLLOWING THE 2017 UK TERRORIST ATTACKS

This CREST report identifies the systematic use of fake social media accounts, linked to Russia, which sought to amplify the public impacts of four terrorist attacks that took place in the UK in 2017. The report was written by researchers at the Cardiff University Crime and Security Research Institute (CSRI) and is available to download at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/tag/i-dont-know/
CREST Security Review provides a gateway to the very best knowledge and expertise. Its articles translate academic jargon to ‘so what’ answers and illustrate how behavioural and social science can be used effectively in everyday scenarios.

THE CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS

CSR is produced by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST). CREST is funded by the UK’s security and intelligence agencies to identify and produce social science that enhances their understanding of security threats and capacity to counter them. CREST also receives funding from its six founding partners (the universities of Bath, Birmingham, Cranfield, Lancaster, Portsmouth and West of England). Its funding is administered by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC Award ES/N009614/1), one of seven UK Research Councils, which direct taxpayers’ money towards academic research and training. The ESRC ensures the academic independence and rigour of CREST’s work.

CREST has established a growing international network of over 100 researchers, commissioned research in priority areas, and begun to tackle some of the field’s most pressing questions.

‘There really is some impressive work going on. Yet, all that effort is irrelevant if practitioners, policy-makers, and other stakeholders do not get to hear about it. CREST Security Review is one way we will keep stakeholders informed not only on what CREST is doing, but also on the best research from around the world.’

Professor Paul Taylor, CREST Director

For more information on CREST and its work visit www.crestresearch.ac.uk and find us on Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn.