Muslims and Islam in the UK: A Research Synthesis

FULL REPORT
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An executive summary and seven CREST Guides were also produced from this research. They are available to download at www.crestresearch.ac.uk/BritishMuslims

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PURPOSE AND CONTENT

This Executive summary draws together the principal points identified in the CREST review, *Muslims and Islam in the UK: A Research Synthesis*.

The review brings together open source, humanities and social science research on Muslims and Islam, and draws on academic literature from Islamic studies, religious studies, history, sociology, anthropology, political science, education, social psychology, and security studies, as well as information from a variety of websites produced by Muslim and Islamic groups.

The review is divided into eight sections, on (1) the history and demography of British Muslims and their communities, (2) mosques, (3) families, gender and generation, (4) education, (5) transnational connections, (6) Islamic movements and networks, (7) representative bodies, civil society organisations and campaigning groups, and (8) cultural, secular and ex-Muslims. A number of CREST guides have also been produced in association with the review.

1. BRITISH MUSLIMS: HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHY AND COMMUNITIES

1.1 There have been Muslims in Britain since the 16th century, with communities developing from the late-1900s in the port cities of London, Cardiff, Glasgow, Liverpool, Tyneside and Hull.

1.2 Major Muslim populations in the UK have their origins in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Yemen and Somalia.

1.3 Following migration from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) in the 1950s and 1960s, South Asian Muslims settled in the major industrial towns and cities of the Midlands, northern England, and parts of London, particularly Tower Hamlets.

1.4 Civil wars and political unrest in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Eastern Europe since the 1980s resulted in the arrival in the UK of asylum seekers and refugees, including Muslims from Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia.

1.5 There is a long history of conversion to Islam in the UK, including early seafarers and elite converts from the mid-19th century, to those who married migrants in the 1950s and 1960s, and more recently to those who have converted for personal spiritual reasons.

1.6 In 2011, there were about 2.8 million Muslims in the UK. Under 5 per cent of the population of England and Wales was Muslim; in Scotland the figure was 1.4 per cent.

1.7 Nearly half the UK’s Muslims were under 25 years old in 2011.

1.8 On education and employment issues, the 2011 population census showed an improving picture of attainment and progress for British Muslims compared to 2001. There was evidence of a ‘Muslim penalty’, however, for both women and men, as a result of the impact of Islamophobia.

1.9 In three separate scenarios, the US Pew Research Centre projected the Muslim population in the UK in 2050 to be 9.7 per cent (zero migration scenario), 16.7 per cent (medium migration scenario) and 17.2 per cent (high migration scenario).

1.10 British Muslim communities are characterised by religion, kinship, language and ethnicity. Research has often focused on Muslims from a single ethnic group settled in a city or neighbourhood, e.g., Yemeni Muslims in South Shields or Bangladeshi Muslims in Tower Hamlets.

1.11 Muslim differ from one another historically, socially, politically and demographically. They are internally differentiated too, for example by religious sect, political faction and generational differences.

1.12 A major problem for Muslims in the UK has been the way they have been perceived by others. Anti-
Islamic sentiment has a long history in Europe, but Islamophobia (fear and dislike of Islam and Muslims) has been especially pronounced since 9/11.

1.13 In popular discourse Muslim communities are often associated with conflict, oppression, extremism and terrorism. Reports of hate speech and physical attacks have increased.

1.14 There is a long history of research on Muslims in the UK. Researchers have differentiated Muslim communities on the basis of national or ethnic origin, areas of settlement, and sectarian identity. Research on young Muslims has become important in recent decades.

2. MOSQUES

2.1 Eighty-five per cent of British Muslims are Sunni; 15 per cent are Shi’a. South Asian and Middle Eastern Islamic reform movements remain important for the identity and management of mosques.

2.2 In 2017, there were 1,825 mosques in the UK. The majority were associated with South Asian reform movements (72 per cent). Drawing on Middle Eastern traditions, nine per cent were Salafi, with three per cent representing mainstream Arab or African Sunni Islam. Around six per cent were run by and for Shi’as (including Ismailis). The remainder were non-sectarian prayer rooms.

2.3 In 2017, 72 per cent of mosques had facilities for women, though the nature and extent of these varied.

2.4 Mosques provide space for daily prayer, the weekly *Jum’a* and other community gatherings. They are an important social and sometimes political hub. They offer Qur’an classes for children, and the larger ones host *Shari’ah* Councils.

2.5 Internal mosque disputes concern management and election issues. At times, conflicts also take place between neighbouring mosques, or mosques of different sects.

2.6 Mosques have become a target for hate crimes.

2.7 Although many mosques are religiously conservative, few have been linked to jihadist networks, a key exception being Finsbury Park Mosque in north London.

2.8 The suitability, training and standards of mosque leadership have been discussed by Muslim communities and Government. A Muslim Faith Leaders Review was published in 2010.

3. FAMILY, GENDER AND GENERATIONS

3.1 The family is important for religious and cultural socialisation, and the home is an environment where norms and values are shared and reinforced, including those relating to gender.

3.2 Kinship structures and traditions vary according to country of origin and exposure to western society and culture, but tribe and clan arrangements and transnational ties remain important, especially for the first generation of migrants.

3.3 Kinship relationships had an impact on the migration process. They affected where families chose to settle, and often where men worked, as well as with whom they socialised. Extended families were bound together by a ‘gift economy’, through the exchange of marriage partners as well as material goods and favours in the UK and back home.

3.4 Marriage in Islam is a solemn civil contract between a man and a woman. For most couples marrying in the UK, both a civil and an Islamic marriage is undertaken, the former being a state requirement and the latter a religious and social custom.

3.5 Most British Muslims marry within their own ethnic group, and many from South Asian families still marry a blood relative. Most young Muslim women, however, express a preference for marrying a Muslim from the UK on the grounds that they will be more compatible.

3.6 Fewer marriages are arranged solely by parents, though parental approval is generally sought. British Muslims are getting married older than previously, often after graduating and moving into work, and some are choosing ‘Islamic marriages’ rather than arranged ones.
3.7 Muslim marriage and divorce in the UK have come under increasing public scrutiny, with forced marriage and sham marriage criminalised, and underage marriage, polygamy and the role of Shari’ah councils receiving media attention.

3.8 A minority of Muslim homes have separate spaces for men and women. In general, self-segregation is only practised when visitors who are not close family relatives are present. The home is often referred to as the domain of women and children, as opposed to public space which is seen as male. Nevertheless, Muslim women of all ages can be found in universities and colleges, work places, shopping malls, public transport and in mosques.

3.9 Muslim women in the UK continue to be less economically active than men, although their participation in the labour market and in higher education is increasing.

3.10 Muslim women take roles as prayer leaders and teachers of other women, active civil society organisers, and charity fundraisers. They have campaigned for more inclusive mosques and against violence against women.

3.11 Muslim women in the UK have been the subject of academic research and wider public debate, but discussion of their identities has too often focused around the subject of veiling.

3.12 Male gender issues are under-researched. Common stereotypes of British Muslim men mask diverse masculinities, based on religion, class, educational achievement and other variables.

3.13 There are significant generational differences in British Muslim communities. Religiously-minded young people have often been attracted to a culturally unadulterated form of Islam, and criticise their elders for a narrow focus on ethnic culture and traditions.

4. EDUCATION

4.1 There is a rich tradition in Islam of educational thought and practice. Education is held to cover individual development, the transmission of knowledge, an understanding of social and moral conduct and God-consciousness.

4.2 Family and home are where children learn to be Muslims. They are where the primary stage of socialisation takes place, in which they acquire and internalise cognitive and embodied knowledge, practices, skills and traditions. This early stage of education may also be influenced by religious organisations and by minority-consciousness.

4.3 Muslims have in some respects been more successful than others in the UK at passing on their religious beliefs and practices from one generation to the next. Higher rates of intergenerational transmission have been found among Muslims than among Christians, those of other religions and non-religious people.

4.4 Most Muslim children in the UK learn to read the Qur’an in Arabic, whether they do this at a daily mosque school, at the home of an independent teacher, in their own homes or even on Skype. In addition to the Qur’an and Arabic, many Muslim supplementary schools offer other aspects of Islamic Studies, as well as formal instruction in an ethnic language and culture.

4.5 Despite calls by parents for a variety of state school accommodations to be made over modesty issues, food, holidays and timetabling, the curriculum, and the provision of single-sex education, the responses of local education authorities have been inconsistent and sometimes confused.

4.6 Although most parents send their children to state-run non-religious or Christian schools, some prefer Muslim schools which offer a faith-based Islamic education.

4.7 The first state-funded, voluntary-aided Islamic faith schools were established in 1998. By 2015, there were ten primary schools and eleven secondary schools of this kind in England. There were approximately 150 Muslim schools in total, the vast majority of which were independent.

4.8 The rising number of Islamic schools and other schools with a Muslim majority has raised questions about social divisiveness, segregation, extremism and the risk of radicalisation.
Between 2001 and 2011, there was a reduction in the percentage of Muslims with no qualifications, an increase in the percentage of women participating in higher education, and the number of Muslims with a degree-level qualification more than doubled.

University or college offers the opportunity for young Muslims to experiment away from family, community and mosque, and to forge their own identity.

Islamic extremism on campus is considered a problem by higher education systems around the world, including in many Muslim nations.

Whilst some British Muslim students have expressed concerns about student Islamic societies and their politics, they have also felt targeted by Government (as a result of the Prevent duty) and by the negative reporting of media and think tanks. They have complained that their positive contribution, critical judgement and charity work have been ignored, and that they have been implicated in the activities of an extremist minority.

The extent to which university campuses and student societies are open to the risk of radicalisation and extremist infiltration has been a matter of debate. There have been cases of Islamic Societies providing platforms for the expression of extremist views, but there has been no evidence that students have been radicalised as a result of this.

Some Muslims study at Islamic seminaries or dar al-'ulum. There are now more than 25 registered seminaries, most catering for male students, though several are female-only, and a number are now co-educational. Many are still conservative and traditional, but others have sought to engage faith with modernity, and to prepare their students for academic and religious leadership in secular contexts as well as mosques.

There have been improvements to imam training, and attempts have been made to connect Islamic seminaries to the higher education sector.

Studying at a dar al-'ulum remains a cheaper alternative than further and higher education. As yet there is no Islamically acceptable loan system for those Muslim students and their families who eschew interest-based loan arrangements for the repayment of tuition fees.

Islam has been described as a travelling faith. In addition to the Hajj, British Muslims may make visits to Sufi shrines, Shi’a mosques or sites associated with the Prophet Muhammad, in the Middle East or South Asia. Religious travel is important both as an individual spiritual commitment and as a communal practice.

Some British Muslim communities have active transnational links with their countries of origin, involving regular family visits, the sending of remittances, marriages, and religious and political ties.

Other British Muslim communities are conscious of diasporic memories and cultural connections, but their practical ties have been severed by war or conflict, and by family displacement and dispersal.

Many second and third generation British Muslims have espoused a universalising Islam which they believe transcends culture and ethnicity, one which accords with their more cosmopolitan consciousness.

British Muslim communities use a wide array of media and information technology to communicate with family and friends and to stay in touch with political and religious events in their countries of origin or elsewhere in the diaspora.

The first generation of British Muslims made extensive use of ethnic media, including newspapers, radio and satellite TV, in Urdu, Punjabi, Bengali, Turkish and other community languages. Later generations are less familiar with these languages, less directly involved in homeland politics, and more at ease with an English language minority media directed at their needs and interests and with the global Islamic media.

The connections that migrants maintain, to families, diasporic communities and transnational networks, raise development opportunities and security issues for governments and international organisations.
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5.8 As well as sending money and investing in projects ‘back home’, diaspora communities – including those in the UK – can mobilise quickly in support of a cause, raise funds, exploit social media, lobby political leaders, and use networks to transfer information and resources.

5.9 British Muslims have founded charities to provide humanitarian aid and development funding worldwide (including for UK causes), and to collect and distribute the obligatory Islamic alms, zakat. Many young Muslim volunteers are motivated by opportunities for active citizenship and ethical living.

5.10 Allegations about links and the provision of support to terrorists have been made but not substantiated.

5.11 The move to digital platforms and to social media, whilst empowering for British Muslims, has raised some security concerns, especially in relation to potential online radicalisation and the recruitment of young people to international jihadi activism. But assumptions about the causal role of the Internet in terrorism are not borne out by the evidence. The Internet helps facilitate radicalisation and recruitment rather than causing them.

5.12 Some British Muslims have travelled abroad to fight alongside other Muslims in civil, national or global struggles. Only a minority of these has taken up arms, though; most have stayed in the UK and joined public protests, run fundraising events or distributed aid.

5.13 In the 1990s and 2000s, small numbers of British Muslim men travelled abroad to fight, either with compatriots in homeland conflicts, for example in Somalia, or alongside Muslim brothers in civil struggles, such as in Bosnia. From 2012, British Muslims, including women and children, travelled either independently or as part of a network to join those fighting in Iraq and Syria, under the banner of the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra or other jihadi groups.

5.14 British Muslims have given various reasons for participating in violent international jihad. Some have been moved by the suffering of Muslims in conflicts abroad, some by the idea of martyrdom and the promise of paradise. Others have sought adventure, or travelled as seasoned foreign fighters. Of those who travelled to join Islamic State (IS), many wanted to be part of the project to build an Islamic state or Caliphate, and to live under shari’ah law.

6. BRITISH ISLAM: SECTARIAN MOVEMENTS AND NETWORKS

6.1 Three quarters of Muslims in the UK consider British to be their only national identity. But some are ‘Muslim first’, seeing religion as more important than other aspects of identity.

6.2 In the UK today, a large number of Islamic movements and networks are represented, most with their origins in either South Asia or the Middle East.

6.3 In the 1960s, in the initial stages of community development, Muslims in Britain made little reference to different schools of thought or Islamic traditions. Once communities were able to finance and support more than one mosque, traditional divisions began to have an influence. In areas of South Asian Muslim settlement, for example, Deobandis and Barelwais began to establish separate community organisations and mosques.

6.4 South Asian reform movements include the Deobandis, Tablighi Jama‘at, the Barelwais, and Jama‘at-i Islami. Although the latter was never formally established in the UK, it generated several organisations, including the UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Foundation, the Markfield Institute of Higher Education, Young Muslims UK, Dawatul Islam, and the Muslim Council of Britain. Some of these have since cut their ties to Jama‘at-i Islami.

6.5 There is a difference between Islam and Islamism, the former referring to the global religion as a whole in all its unity and diversity, and the latter to what is often referred to as ‘political Islam’. In the UK, ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist’ have been used generally of groups and individuals informed by the revivalist Islamic movements, Jama‘at-i Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood.

6.6 The chief Middle Eastern influences on Islam in Britain have been the Salafi beliefs and practices associated with the 18th century scholar, Ibn Abd
Al-Wahhab (exported by the Islamic regime in Saudi Arabia and by various Wahhabi institutions and scholars). Another key influence has been the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1920s Egypt).

6.7 Since the 1990s a number of Salafi groups with their roots in the Middle East have appealed to young British Muslims. The principal Salafi movements and trends in the UK include JIMAS, a range of Salafi mosques and initiatives, and radical groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun.

6.8 Although Salafi movements share a commitment to reviving ‘authentic’ Islam, their views have differed on issues such as khilafah (an Islamic state or society based on shari’ah), jihad, and engagement with Government and wider society. Despite being considered extreme in their personal piety and desire to pursue a pure form of Islam, only a small minority have been violent.

6.9 The promotion of violence is predominantly associated with nomadic jihadis, such as Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Muhammad, Abdullah al-Faisal and Anjem Choudary, some of whom had served in conflicts abroad and all of whom used extremist rhetoric sanctioning violence against those they considered to be apostates.

6.10 Neither al-Qaeda nor IS were formally constituted in the UK, although their ideologies were disseminated in person by extremist preachers and activists, and online via websites, forums and social media. Despite the absence of a physical base, they were able to recruit and mobilise potential supporters.

7. BRITISH ISLAM: REPRESENTATIVE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND CAMPAIGNING GROUPS

7.1 Since the late 1980s British Muslims have founded Islamic organisations to represent their interests nationally and to work with government and other civil society groups. These have included the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs, the Muslim Council of Britain, the British Muslim Forum, the Sufi Muslim Council, the Federation of Student Islamic Societies, and the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board.

7.2 In addition to mosques, Islamic reform movements and Muslim charities, there are several other types of Islamic organisation in the UK: civil society groups, campaigning bodies and think tanks.

7.3 Muslim organisations have been established with diverse objectives in mind, including open debate and discussion, advocacy, campaigning, critique of Government policy, the reporting and recording of anti-Muslim attacks and media coverage, consciousness raising of gender issues, and countering extremism.

7.4 Such organisations are not aligned in their interests or wider relationships; in some cases, they are in competition or dispute with one another. Claims by some that others work too closely with Government are common, whilst others critique those they hold to be extremist or Islamist.

8. CULTURAL, SECULAR AND EX-MUSLIMS

8.1 Although many young people from Muslim families think of themselves as ‘Muslim first’, not all Muslims are overtly religious. There are many who see themselves as ‘cultural Muslims’, ‘secular Muslims’ or ‘ex-Muslims’.

8.2 The term ‘cultural Muslim’ refers to members of the Muslim community who are non-practising but may retain a degree of attachment to Islamic culture and family traditions. It is possible that they account for 75-80 per cent of all Muslims.

8.3 Secular Muslims include those whose primary allegiance is to secularism though they may retain an ethnic and even nominal religious identity. One group that represents their interests is British Muslims for Secular Democracy.

8.4 A minority see themselves as ‘ex-Muslims’. Some are non-believers or atheists; others have converted to another religion. Those who choose to leave Islam (technically referred to as ‘apostates’) are frequently judged harshly by more conservative Muslims and even by family members, leading some to keep their new identity and views hidden.
INTRODUCTION

This CREST review draws on research evidence to give an overview of Muslims and Islam in the UK. It is fully annotated, but is produced in association with a number of shorter CREST Guides intended for those who want the information without the details of where it all comes from. The review and guides together are intended for practitioners, policy-makers, academics, journalists and a wider interested public.

I am not a Muslim myself, and that means there are areas about which I am ignorant and probably those about which I am insensitive and unaware. I apologise in advance for any errors and omissions. I am a sociologist and historian of minority religions in the UK, and I have written this review from that perspective. Although I have aimed to present a balanced view, it is likely that there will be some matters of interpretation where my account differs from others. However, I have had the benefit of advice and constructive feedback from colleagues with established expertise in the field, and would like to thank Claire Dwyer, Ron Geaves, Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Sadek Hamid, Seán McLoughlin, Carl Morris, Jonathan Scourfield and Riyaz Timol for their generous help.

As Muslim communities have been settled in the UK for more than a century, the research literature is extensive, although most of it has been produced – at an increasing rate – since the 1990s. It has been impossible to read and include every book, article, essay, news story and website about Muslims and Islam in the UK because of their sheer number. Inadvertently, I will have excluded some potentially useful sources, and for that I can only apologise.

I began my study of South Asian migrants in Britain (including Muslims) in the 1970s, and have been fortunate to supervise the doctoral theses of several researchers whose work has made a substantial contribution to the field, as well as many others who helped keep me in touch with the literature. In addition, I have researched subjects and issues of direct relevance, such as migration, ethnicity and diasporas, public discourse and media representations of religion, and – most recently – ideological transmission. So, even though I have not specialised on Muslims and Islam in the UK, I have had a long history of relevant reading on which to draw. As the bibliography shows, however, in order to reflect the current state of knowledge, analysis and discussion, it has been necessary to consult the very substantial body of work produced in the last decade or so across a range of disciplines.

The review synthesises open source, humanities and social science research on British Muslims and Islam, and draws on academic literature from Islamic studies, religious studies, history, sociology, anthropology, political science, education, social psychology, and policy and security studies, as well as information from a variety of websites produced by Muslim and Islamic groups, and material from news websites.

The review is divided into eight sections, on (1) the history and demography of British Muslims and their communities, (2) mosques, (3) families, gender and generation, (4) education, (5) transnational connections, (6) Islamic movements and networks, (7) representative bodies, civil society organisations and campaigning groups, and (8) cultural, secular and ex-Muslims.
1. BRITISH MUSLIMS – HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHY AND COMMUNITIES

1.1 HISTORY

1.1.1 MIGRATION HISTORY AND THE FORMATION OF COMMUNITIES OF MUSLIMS

There have been Muslims in Britain since the 16th century, when North African and Turkish galley slaves were released from ships captured from the Spanish Armada (Ansari 2004; Gilliat-Ray 2010). Sea-faring continued to play a part in Muslim settlement until the 20th century, and was also the context for Ottoman Islamic conversions of English sailors, travellers and merchants (Zebiri 2008: 32-33).

With the colonial expansion of its activities in the 18th century, Britain’s East India Company required more sailors for its trading ships. Many merchant seamen or lascars – mostly from India, but including Turks, Arabs, Somalis and Malays – jumped ship because of cruel treatment and poor conditions (Ansari 2004; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 24-25; Winder 2004). Increasing numbers then settled in port towns and cities, in London, Cardiff, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, Tyneside and Hull. By the middle of the 19th century there were some 10-12,000 lascars in Britain, and double that number by the end of the century (Ansari 2004: 35). They were joined by a growing number of Indian and Arab students arriving to study at English and Scottish universities (Ansari 2004: 32; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 26).

Dockland communities developed in port cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, with boarding houses as the focal point (Gilliat-Ray 28-31). Although largely male, they included local women who married settlers. Together they ran these houses and provided services to meet the needs of the migrants. Richard Lawless’s (1995) history of Yemenis in South Shields in north-east England shows that they maintained their Islamic practices – of prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, festivals and life-cycle rites – and invested in facilities such as mosques and burial arrangements. Similar Yemeni communities also developed in Cardiff, Hull and Liverpool (where the first mosque in the UK was established in 1887, by Henry Quilliam, a convert to Islam) (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 29, 39-41; cf. Geaves 2010; Halliday 2010; Seddon 2014).

Relationships and connections were maintained between these communities, with Islamic organisations as well as the National Union of Seamen providing points of contact and support. An influential Yemeni Sufi shaykh, Abdullah Ali al-Hakimi, established Islamic centres in South Shields, Cardiff, Hull and Liverpool in the 1930s, and encouraged his fellow Muslims to retain their religious identity and practices (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 32-39). His transnational activism and involvement in the politics of his homeland led to vocal disputes with other community leaders.

1.1.2 POST-1945 ECONOMIC MIGRATION

The flow of Muslim settlers from other parts of the British Empire slowed between the first and second world wars, with the next major period of migration beginning in the late 1940s. This saw the settlement first of males and later whole families from India and Pakistan (including the territory which, in 1971, became Bangladesh) (Ballard 1994; Knott 2011).

In a process of ‘chain migration’, early pioneers were joined by relatives and friends from villages back in the Punjab, Gujarat, Mirpur (in Kashmir), and Sylhet (in Bengal). These South Asians were by no means all Muslims. Hindus, Sikhs and smaller numbers of Jains, Christians and Zoroastrians also migrated, though – like Muslims – they came chiefly for work in response to the demand for labour in British cities where industry was expanding (Ballard 1994; Knott 1997). They sought a better life, and did not migrate as a result of persecution.

From just a few thousand males in the late 1940s, the South Asian population grew to over 400,000 by 1971 (Knott & Toon 1982), with 170,000 of Pakistani and

1.1.3 FORCED MIGRATION AND SEEKING REFUGE

Those who had arrived direct from the Indian sub-continent in the post-war period were joined in the late-1960s and 1970s by Asian migrants from East Africa who no longer felt welcome in the newly-independent countries of Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda (from which they were expelled in 1972) (Knott 1997). These Hindu, Sikh and Muslim families were ‘twice-migrants’ (Bhachu 1985). They had moved to the British colonies in East Africa earlier in the twentieth century, and later found their opportunities were restricted or that they faced deportation as Africanisation policies were introduced (Anitha & Pearson 2013; Gilliat-Ray 2010). Many already had British citizenship and moved to the UK, with smaller numbers going to Canada and India.

Civil wars and political persecution in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Eastern Europe since the 1980s resulted in the arrival of asylum seekers and refugees, including Muslims from Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Kurdistan, Afghanistan and Bosnia (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 51; Change Institute 2009a). These migrant groups are sometimes referred to as ‘invisible’ as, unlike those from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, they are not distinguished in UK Census and other data based on ethnicity (Hussain: 2008a, 2008b). Migrants from these areas had different reasons for coming to the UK, as the two cases of Somali and Libyan Muslims show.

Like the Yemen, Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, Somalia had a colonial relationship with the UK, as part of the country had been a British protectorate until Somalia became a republic in 1960 (Change Institute 2009b: 23). Although Somalis first settled in Britain in the 19th century, in the late 1980s Somali asylum

Case study 1: A Pakistani migrant settles in Leeds in the 1940s

Chaudri Bostan Khan arrived in London in 1941 from Mirpur. His family had a strong tradition of army and navy service. He claimed to know of 120 family members across four generations who had served the British in this way. His uncle worked for the City Line in Bombay. In 1936, aged 25, Bostan Khan took his first voyage out from Bombay to England. His voyages took him to New York, Montreal, and Melbourne. When the Second World War began, he re-joined the navy and jumped ship in London. His intention was to discover a better life for himself: ‘English people go look in Pakistan, so I go look on England, to look for labour, for a good living.’

Chaudri Bostan Khan was a successful businessman proud of the fact that, since coming to Britain, he had worked only for himself. Before coming to Leeds in 1946, he had worked as a market trader in Huddersfield and Newcastle, selling hairgrips, babies’ dummies and plastic combs. He and a cousin opened two restaurants in East London, and then he moved to Leeds where he opened a fish and chip shop. Until 1971 he expanded his fish and chip business and then moved into the textiles’ industry, wholesaling cloth. In 1989 he had two large factories and several shops in Leeds. All his business concerns were managed by family members who migrated from Mirpur.

In 1948 Chaudri married an Englishwoman who eventually converted to Islam. They ran the businesses together. Mrs Khan was invaluable for her knowledge of English life and her skill in dealing with paperwork. Chaudri’s friends and relatives began to arrive, beginning with his brother in 1950. Mrs Khan liaised with the authorities and dealt with the formalities of immigration. Chaudri provided his countrymen with employment and housing. Like many who were to follow him, Chaudri Bostan Khan thought for many years that he would return to Pakistan but this never happened. Up to the time of his death in 1992, he was the President of the Leeds Islamic Centre.

An annotated account of an interview with Chaudri Bostan Khan by Ron Geaves in 1989. (Geaves 1995: 3-4)
seekers began arriving as a result of war and drought in the region (Change Institute 2009b: 23; Griffiths 2002; Liberatore 2017). Many came from refugee camps in neighbouring states, but some came via other European countries, eager to join compatriots in established Somali communities in the UK. By 2011, they numbered over 100,000, with most living in London, and many of them women and children (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 51).

In the case of Libya, it was political exiles, fleeing the Gaddafi regime in the 1980s, who first settled in Manchester, London and Sheffield (Wilson 2012). Many of them were professionals who went on to find work in the health service, in education and engineering. Unrest in Libya in 2011 led to further asylum applications (The Guardian 2011).

1.1.4 UNDERSTANDING MUSLIM ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

Minority ethnic communities in the UK, including those that are predominantly Muslim, are highly diverse. They differ from one another historically, socially, politically and demographically, and they are internally differentiated.

In 2009, the UK Government’s Department of Communities and Local Government commissioned a series of profiles of Muslim communities originating from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Turkey (Change Institute 2009a). The reports’ authors noted that the reasons for migration varied for different Muslim ethnic communities.

For example, Moroccans have been present in significant numbers in England from the 1960s while large numbers of their neighbours from Algeria arrived more recently as refugees and asylum seekers following civil disruption and widespread terrorism in Algeria. The Nigerian community arrived in numbers from the 1950s and then again during the 1990s to pursue economic opportunities following economic failures in their country, while Turkish Cypriot communities in the main migrated during the early post-war period to take up employment opportunities. Egyptians and Saudi Arabians have been present in small numbers for many decades while the Iranian, Iraqi and Afghan presence includes established exiles, students and, in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, more recent arrivals fleeing war and social breakdown. (Change Institute 2009a: 10; see also Pantucci 2015: 28-31).

Muslim migrant populations differ, depending on their country of origin, pre-migration status, migration and settlement histories and the particular issues they face in the UK, relating to accommodation, education, legal status and employment (Hussain 2008b). Being Muslim is no guarantee that people from different ethnic backgrounds will mix or get along. Language, history and family ties bind people together, and community associations and mosques are often organised on these lines.

However, it is important to be cautious about assuming that Iraqi Muslims, Turkish Muslims or other Muslim ethnic groups constitute meaningful ‘communities’ (Knott 2004). They may not be homogeneous, but may be internally divided on the basis of regional background, mother tongue, social status, and religious or political affiliation. Pakistani Muslims in Birmingham, for example, include Punjabis, Kashmiris, Pathans, Sindhis and Baluchis (Abbas 2008: 4).

Furthermore, the extent to which migrants from different backgrounds maintain connections with people in their places of origin differs (see section 5 below). How long they have been settled and whether they are first generation or second and third generation settlers born in the UK are likely to be influential factors.

1.1.5 CONVERSION TO ISLAM

Although migration, settlement, family life and the birth of children account for the vast majority of the UK’s Muslim population, a minority are converts (under 4 per cent) (Brice 2010). They were not born or socialised within Muslim families, but made the decision to adopt Islam as their religious identity, belief system and way of life (al-Qwidi 2002; Kose 1996; Suleiman 2013, 2015; Zebiri 2008).

There have been a small number of converts to Islam in Britain since the 16th century when the process
was referred to as ‘becoming a Turk’ (Zebiri 2008: 32). It was in the late 19th century that a number of British travellers, administrators and intellectuals were exposed to Islam and Muslim societies, and made the decision to convert. They included Henry Quilliam, who converted in Morocco in the 1880s and returned to the UK to found a mosque and Muslim Institute, Lord Headley, who was President of the British Muslim Society from 1914, Marmaduke Pickthall, a scholar of Islam who translated the Qur’an into English (1930), and Lady Evelyn Cobbold (Gilham 2014; Zebiri 2008: 33-36). Lady Evelyn, or Zainab, as she was known, a Scottish noblewoman who had spent much of her childhood in North Africa, was the first British-born woman to undertake the *hajj* or pilgrimage to Mecca (Woking Muslim Mission n.d.). She published an account of her experiences (Cobbold 2009 [1934]).

In the 1950s and 1960s, like Mrs Khan in the case study above, many converts to Islam were women who married South Asian migrants. They adopted some of the ethnic as well as cultural practices of their husbands, and were seen as responsible for bringing up the children as Muslims (Zebiri 2008). Although some people continue to adopt Islam when they marry into Muslim families, most now make an individual spiritual choice to convert (Suleiman 2013).

### 1.2 BRITISH MUSLIMS TODAY: THE STATISTICS

People were asked a question about their religious affiliation for the first time in the population census of 2001, and this was then repeated in 2011. Statistical analysis of the data by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) (2013), the Scottish Government (2014) and the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) (2015) provides a useful guide to the demography of Britain’s Muslims. Comparing data from 2001 and 2011 helps build a picture of religious trends.

The Muslim population of the UK increased between 2001 and 2011. England and Wales saw Muslims increase in number from 1.55 million to 2.71 million, rising from three to just under five percent of the population (Christians declined from 72 to 59 per cent, and those reporting no religion rose from 15 to 25 per cent in the same period) (ONS 2013; MCB 2015). In Scotland, the number of Muslims rose to approximately 77,000 (about 1.4 per cent of the population) (Scottish Government 2014); in Northern Ireland there were reported to be 3,800 Muslims in 2011 (Roberts 2015).

Nearly half of all Muslims were born in the UK, with most of the remainder born in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East (MCB 2015: 22). Muslims had the youngest age profile of all the religious groups: nearly half of them were under 25 in 2011 (MCB 2015: 27).

The Muslim population was ethnically diverse. More than two-thirds of Muslims were Asian, with the remainder from White, Arab and Black African backgrounds. Muslims with Pakistani heritage constituted the largest number (with over a million people).
made up 12.4 per cent of the population (MCB 2015: 25). The Yorkshire city of Bradford had the highest concentration, with just under a quarter of its population Muslim, but two London boroughs had still higher concentrations (Tower Hamlets, and Newham) (MCB 2015: 25-26; Jivraj 2013).

The White British population is the only group that lives in relative isolation from others, on average living in Districts with 85% of White British residents. All ethnic minority groups live in Districts where on average they make up fewer than 10% of the residents. (Simpson 2012: 1)

Research showed minorities, including Muslims, to be less segregated and more spread out in 2011 than they had been in 2001 (Jivraj 2013: 18). However, nearly half of all Muslims in England and Wales lived in the bottom 10 per cent of most deprived local authority areas (MCB 2015:18).

On education and employment issues, the 2011 population census showed an improving picture compared with ten years earlier, with a reduction in the percentage of Muslims with no qualifications, and a greater percentage of women participating in higher education and the labour market (MCB 2015). The percentage of Muslims in the ‘small employers and own account workers’ category was comparable to that in the wider population (both above 9 per cent), and only two percentage points lower in the ‘higher professional occupation category’, at 5.5 per cent compared to 7.6 per cent (MCB 2015: 19). However, only 20 per cent of the Muslim population was in full-time employment, compared to 35 per cent in the population as a whole, and unemployment was higher (at just over 7 per cent compared to 4 per cent) (MCB 2015: 58).

Despite recent gains, research has demonstrated ‘a strong ‘Muslim penalty’ for both women and men from different ethnic groups with respect to economic activity and unemployment’ (Heath & Martin 2012, cited in MCB 2015: 39; see also Khattab 2009; Khattab & Johnston 2015). In recognition of this ‘penalty’, one researcher asked why and how being a Muslim might affect educational attainment and employment prospects, concluding that ‘religion functions to reinforce disadvantage among groups that are culturally ‘alien’, regardless, or in spite, of whether their skin colour is white or not’ (Khattab 2009: 306, 319; see also Heath & Martin 2012). In a latter study, using data from the UK Labour Force Survey across a nine-year period, Khattab and Johnston (2015) found that both ‘colour’ and ‘culture’ impacted on people’s chances in the employment market, with the ‘penalty’ increasing as a person moved up the job ladder. British Muslims, particularly those of Bangladeshi and Pakistani heritage, were the most disadvantaged of UK ethno-religious groups, experiencing the double penalty of race and religion as a result of the ‘growing Islamophobia and hostility against them’ (Khattab & Johnston 2015: 501).

In November 2017, as part of its Global Futures Project, the US Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life sought to project the size of the European Muslim population, including that of the UK, to 2050. It offered three scenarios, depending on differing levels of migration, with the baseline being the 2016 figure of Muslims at 4.9 per cent of the total European population:

Even if all migration into Europe were to immediately and permanently stop – a ‘zero migration’ scenario – the Muslim population of Europe still would be expected to rise from the current level of 4.9% to 7.4% by the year 2050. This is because Muslims are younger […] and have higher fertility […] than other Europeans, mirroring a global pattern.

A second, ‘medium’ migration scenario assumes that all refugee flows will stop as of mid-2016 but that recent levels of ‘regular’ migration to Europe will continue […] Under these conditions, Muslims could reach 11.2% of Europe’s population in 2050.

Finally, a ‘high’ migration scenario projects the record flow of refugees into Europe between 2014 and 2016 to continue indefinitely into the future with the same religious composition (i.e., mostly made up of Muslims) in addition to the typical annual flow of regular migrants. In this scenario, Muslims could make up 14% of Europe’s population by 2050 – nearly triple the current share, but still considerably smaller than the populations of both Christians and people
with no religion in Europe. (Pew Research Centre on Religion and Public Life 2017)

Breaking these projections down by country, the Pew Research Centre estimated a UK Muslim population of 9.7 per cent (zero migration scenario), 16.7 per cent (medium migration scenario) and 17.2 per cent (high migration scenario). The countries projected to experience the greatest increase in the medium scenario, including the UK, were those that had been destinations for the highest numbers of regular Muslim migrants (e.g., from Pakistan and Bangladesh), rather than for those refugees who arrived between 2014 and 2016 (Pew Research Centre on Religion and Public Life 2017).

1.3 MUSLIM COMMUNITIES: INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS AND EXTERNAL PERCEPTIONS

Demography tells us how many people share certain characteristics, and where those people are clustered, but it doesn’t reveal whether or not that group of individuals actually constitutes a community. Neither does it identify the common ties and key factors that might bind them together or separate them from others.

The very concept of ‘community’ has been extensively debated and critiqued by scholars (see Knott (2004) for discussion). In popular usage, however, the term ‘community’ is used for a variety of collective types, some based on ethnicity and language, some on locality or on occupation, and others on religion or another shared interest or set of practices (Baumann 1996).

1.3.1 INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS

Many communities include people of different ages, genders and other social characteristics, but some draw their boundaries more narrowly, and contain only those of a single age group, gender, belief system or interest group.

It is appropriate to ask the question: ‘A community for whom?’ (Baumann 1996; Cohen 1985) In the case of ‘Muslim communities’, are their members involved in a meaningful relationship with one another and do they have things in common? Do they function as a community, or are they just a loosely connected group of individuals? (Hussain, 2014) External circumstances may play a part in how they see themselves, for example, whether they feel they are bound together as a result of external pressures. Muslims may also be treated as a community by others, by national or local government, by NGOs, scholars or other religious groups.

In both popular and scholarly discourse, British Muslim communities are identified first and foremost by their religion, but also by kinship, language and ethnicity. Yemeni, Pakistani, Somali, Bangladeshi and Turkish communities in Britain are held to connect together Muslims with a shared heritage and with family origins in another part of the world (in many cases, former British colonies) (Change Institute 2009a). Their members may be related by blood, marriage or wider social and transnational connections, and – depending on their length of settlement – they will be made up of multiple generations. They often share a mother tongue, though later generations prioritise English. Furthermore, they have their own community institutions, facilities and services. Everyday practices and special events, which are often gender-specific, draw on social and cultural traditions, but the local and national context also plays a part. These aspects of British Muslim life will be examined further below.

British Muslim communities are internally complex and dynamic. They change over time and from one location to another. They have their own internal struggles and differences, over family matters, between the generations, and over religious and political differences. However, something that marks them out from others has been the way they have been perceived by outsiders.

1.3.2 EXTERNAL PERCEPTIONS

The term ‘Islamophobia’ was first used in the 1990s to refer to dislike, distrust or prejudice directed at Islam or Muslims (Runnymede Trust 1997). But in England such hostility has been traced back to the work of the monk and scholar, Bede (673-735 CE), who expressed anti-‘Saracen’ views many centuries before Muslims began to settle in Britain (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 6-8). Over time, Islam was repeatedly described by clerics, travellers and other commentators as the enemy of Christianity and a threat to Europe.

Since 9/11, in addition to the stigmatisation of individual Muslims on the streets and online, their
communities have often been seen as suspect, as potential sites of radicalisation, and the target of counter-terrorist strategy and initiatives (Abbas 2005; Ali 2012; Hickman et al 2012; Lynch 2012; Mac an Ghaill & Haywood 2015). Fear of jihadist terrorism has hardened the boundary between British Muslims and other Britons, even though the number of those actively involved has been very small. The popular media in the UK, and increasingly social media, has repeatedly constructed Muslims as a monolithic group different from ‘westerners’ (Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2012; Knott et al 2013; Kundnani 2014; Moore et al 2008; Poole 2002; Poole & Richardson 2006). Muslims have routinely been associated with conflict, extremism and terrorism. The way they have been reported has generated anxiety about the Islamization of Britain (Knott et al 2013: 82-84).

This negative representation has not only had the effect of marginalising British Muslims but also of bringing their identity as Muslims to the fore in every sphere of life outside the home. They no longer feel like students, taxi drivers and doctors, but as Muslim students, Muslim taxi drivers and Muslim doctors, irrespective of their professional roles or other identities (Lynch 2013: 249). Bigotry is not the sole reserve of strangers who are unfamiliar with Muslims as work mates, friends or neighbours, however. Converts to Islam report that intimate family members, who are exposed to the same Islamophobic representations as distant strangers, often make no effort to understand them or to break through the stereotypes (Ramahi & Suleiman 2017).

There is another academic tradition which defines communities according to geography or location. People within a bounded area, such as a neighbourhood or even a city, are held to be interconnected and to have needs, concerns and interests in common. Demographic information and analysis about local Muslim communities, such as Muslims in Leicester, Blackburn or Luton, is used by MPs, journalists, local councils and other public bodies to better understand those they represent and serve, to deliver effective community relations and law and order, to identify and target service provision, and improve future planning for housing, education, healthcare and policing (e.g., Abbas 2008; Valentine 2008b). Particular localities — whether neighbourhoods or whole cities — are constructed as ‘British Asian’, ‘Bengali’ or ‘Muslim’, whether to attract resources, for tourism or for cultural reasons (Hussain 2014; McLoughlin et al 2014).

An academic focus on sectarian communities or groups reflects the fact that, for quite a number of Muslims, religion is considered to be more important for self-identity than nationality, ethnic background or locality. For these Muslims, their ‘community’ is made up of those with whom they share a particular religious identity as well as beliefs, values and practices, such as prayer and fasting. They spend time together, build close relationships and support the group financially. Religious communities often link Muslims across ethnic or geographical boundaries. Some operate nationally, such as Young Muslims UK and JIMAS (Jamiyat Ihya’ Minhaj al-Sunnah); others transnationally, including networks like the Naqshbandi Haqqani Sufi Order and Tablighi Jama’at (Bowen, 2014; Gilliat-Ray 2010; Hamid 2016; Lewis 1994; Peter & Ortega 2014). A major example in the UK is the Ismaili Muslim community, which first gained a presence in the 1950s and now numbers about 15,000 (Daftary 2011). The Shi’a Ismaili diaspora, of which it is a part, is spread over some 25 different countries, and is globally interconnected. [British Muslim sectarian movements and networks are discussed in detail in section 6 below.]
There is an extensive academic literature on British Muslims and Muslim communities in the UK, which cannot be done justice here. What follows below are examples of some of the different studies that have been undertaken.

Some research studies have reported on the history or contemporary profile of Muslims in Britain (e.g., Abbas 2005; Ansari 2004; Gilliat-Ray 2010) or on a single Muslim ethnic minority, such as Iraqi Muslims (e.g., Change Institute 2009c) or Iranian networks (Spellman 2004). The Change Institute’s (2009) reports, on Muslim communities originating from Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Turkey, provide useful summaries of their migration history, population centres, socio-economic status, community dynamics, transnational connections and civil society development. Information on studies of new and less visible Muslim minorities in the UK is provided in an annotated bibliography by Hussain (2008a).

The majority of detailed case studies, however, have focused on specific Muslim ethnic groups settled in high density locations, including Yemeni Muslims in Cardiff, Tyneside, Liverpool and Manchester (Gilliat-Ray 2010; Halliday 2010; Lawless 1995; Seddon 2014), Pakistani Muslims in Bradford (Akhtar 2012; Barton 1986; Lewis 1994; McLoughlin 2005a), Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets (DeHanas 2016; Eade 1989; Gardner 2002; Zeitlyn 2015), London’s Turkish Muslims (Kucukcan 1999), Pakistani and Khoja Muslims in Peterborough (Smalley 2002), and Somali and Kurdish Muslim refugees in London (Griffiths 2002; Liberatore 2017).

Examples of research that examines communities based on religious identity rather than ethnicity or locality include studies of Britain’s Sufis (Geaves 2000; Hamid 2016), Salafi Muslim women (Inge 2017) and Muslim jihadis (Pantucci 2015). Increasingly researchers are considering Muslim identities that cut across or transgress the traditional communal boundaries of religion, ethnicity or locality (e.g., Alexander et al 2013; Billaud 2016; Hussain 2014; McLoughlin et al 2014).

Families and mosques have been important institutions for the development, organisation and regulation of Muslim communities (Bowen 2016; Grillo 2015; Scourfield et al 2013), but increasingly gender and generational issues have come to the fore. UK Muslim communities are internally complex, and they have changed over time, with the move from a first generation of migrants to second and third generations of settlers (Akhtar 2012; Gilliat-Ray 2010). The depth of their roots in the UK – through length of stay, education, exposure to British culture, norms and values – has impacted on gender issues, generational change and political participation (Akhtar 2012, 2014). Young Muslim men and women have become an important subject for research, especially since 9/11 (Hamid 2017; Jacobson 1998; Kabir 2010; Lewis 2007), with a focus on their religious, national and gendered identities, educational, political and civic engagement, plus their attitudes to Government policy, radicalisation, extremism and transnational activism (e.g., Archer 2001; Brown & Saeed 2015; Cottee 2015; DeHanas 2016; Dwyer 1999; Dwyer et al 2008; Franceschelli & O’Brien 2015; Hamid 2011; Hopkins 2009; McGlynn & McDaid 2016; Saeed & Johnson 2016; Song 2012). How they are seen by others has also influenced the way in which young Muslims, in particular, have shaped their identities (Ahmed 2003; Lynch 2013; Mac an Ghaill & Haywood 2015).

These issues will be discussed in more detail in the sections below.
2. MOSQUES AND LEADERSHIP

2.1 STATISTICS AND TYPES

According to Mehmood Naqshbandi, who has collected data on Islam and Muslims in Britain since 2006, by September 2017 there were 1,825 mosques (masjid) in the UK, an increase from 1,640 in 2015 (Naqshbandi 2017: 2-3). Around 600 of these were registered with the Charity Commission (Naqshbandi 2017: 3). In addition, there were a number of hired halls, chaplaincy rooms, temporary premises and mosques under construction.

Reflecting global trends, some 85 per cent of British Muslims are Sunni, with the remainder Shi’a (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 61). In 2017, around six per cent of the UK’s mosques were run by and for Shi’as (three per cent by Twelver Shi’as, and a further three per cent by Ismailis and Bohras). In terms of mosque affiliation and attendance, Sunni Muslims have organised principally around sectarian groupings which have their roots in 19th and early 20th century reform movements from South Asia and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East. The former include the Deobandi and Barelwi movements, Jama’at-i Islami and Tablighi Jamaat; the latter, Salafi groups and those with links to the Muslim Brotherhood (see section 6 below, and Glossary).

The importance of these traditions can be witnessed in the UK’s mosque profile. In 2017, in addition to Shi’a mosques, 41 per cent of mosques were Deobandi, 24 per cent were Barelwi, with a further four per cent representing other Sufi traditions, and nearly three per cent linked to Jama’at-i Islami and its later manifestations. Drawing on Middle Eastern reform traditions, over nine per cent of mosques were Salafi, with three per cent representing mainstream Arab or African Sunni Islam. Most of the remainder were non-denominational Muslim prayer rooms, in universities, hospitals, airports and other public places.

In Bradford, the first mosque (founded in 1959) served all Muslims in the city (Barton 1986; Lewis 1994). Like many mosques, even today, it was established in a converted house. However, as the Muslim community grew, separate mosques were opened for Deobandi followers from West Pakistan, Bangladesh and Gujarat in India, for Barelwis, members of Ahl-i Hadith, Ahmadiyyas, Shi’a, and Muslim university students of all backgrounds (Lewis 1994; McLoughlin 2005a). By 1989, there were 31 mosques of different persuasions in the city (Lewis 1994); today there are over 90 (Naqshbandi 2017). Bradford is home to the Al-Jamia Suffa-Tul-Islam Grand Mosque which can accommodate up to 8,000 for prayers, the largest in the country (Naqshbandi 2017: 13). Founded in 1983 by Shaykh Muhammad Habib-ur-Rehman Mahboobi, a Sufi Master of one of the Qadri and Naqshbandi Sufi Orders (Bradford Grand Mosque 2017), it was housed in what had once been a large textile mill. In 2012, a new purpose-built mosque was opened.

Birmingham’s 162 mosques include two of the largest in the country, each accommodating over 6,000 individuals for prayer, Birmingham Central Mosque (Deobandi tradition) and Central Jamia Mosque Ghamkol Sharif (Barelwi). These large mosques are not typical, however, as about half of all the UK’s mosques have a capacity of under 300 (Naqshbandi 2017: 15).

Yemeni Arab Muslims, the community with the longest history in the UK, still cluster in areas where their forebears settled more than a century ago, in ports and major industrial cities. Sheffield, Liverpool and Cardiff, for example, have mosques and cultural centres managed by and for Yemeni Muslims (Gilliat-Ray 2010; Halliday 2010). More recent arrivals, including many Somali Muslims, generally attend the mosques of longer-standing Muslim minorities, though there are now Somali-managed mosques in London, Manchester and Leicester (Liberatore 2017; Muslims in Britain n.d.).

Seventy-two per cent of mosques provide facilities for women, although these may vary. However, only 49 per cent of the largest group (Deobandi) do so (Naqshbandi 2017: 5-6). All Shi’a and 96 per cent of Salafi mosques have women’s facilities. Even where women are given access, gender separation often results in them being allocated inferior space and resources to men.
(Naqshbandi 2017: 5). Women’s attendance, however, is optional, whereas men’s is obligatory.

## 2.2 Activities

Mosques provide space for the five daily prayers (salah), the weekly communal prayer or jum’a and for other prayer gatherings, such as at times of Ramadan and Eid (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 183; Naqshbandi 2006: 4.1, 4.2). The only formal requirement is that a mosque be ritually clean. Calligraphy and book shelves for copies of the Qur’an may be present, but there is an absence of pictures and images. A series of clocks will show the prayer times. Provision is made for worshippers to wash (wudu).

In the main mosque space, there is no seating, just an open hall for prayers to be performed. There is a mihrab or alcove the traditional purpose of which was to amplify the imam’s voice during prayers (Naqshbandi 2006). This also fulfils the important function of indicating the direction of prayer, towards Mecca. Those attending salah or jum’a set out their prayer mats facing it. Adjacent to the mihrab is a mimbar or pulpit, from which the Friday khutbah or sermon is delivered. For ceremonial reasons, the khutbah is given in Arabic, although a talk in the local language is a longstanding tradition from the earliest days of Islam (Gilliat-Ray 2010; Naqshbandi 2006: 4.1). Although it is obligatory for a call to prayer (adhan) to be made before salah, this can be done simply and without amplification.

The majority of mosques offer Qur’anic classes (maktab or madrasah) where Qur’anic Arabic recitation and Islamic studies are taught, and where young Muslims imbibe the community’s religious norms and values (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 152-155; Naqshbandi 2006: 4.13) (see 4.1 below). These classes are generally held after school and at weekends. Questions have been raised by Muslims and non-Muslims alike about the pressure of having to attend additional classes at the end of the school day, about rote learning, the use of punishment, and the lack of teacher qualifications (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 154). An Association of Muslim Supplementary Schools (n.d.) was set up in 2008 to support and represent these schools and to raise standards.

Many of the larger mosques also host Shari’ah Councils (Bowen 2016; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 193-194; Grillo 2015). With their origins in the formation of Islamic legal spaces in British India, which prioritised ‘living in accord with Islamic social norms and spirituality’ rather than conformity with the state, they were first introduced in Britain in 1982, following a meeting to form a national Shari’ah Council (Bowen 2016: 28, 47). They offer a range of legal services, including the reconciliation of family disputes, divorce certification, and the production of expert opinions for cases in civil courts. More often than not, however, it is women’s divorce that preoccupies them (Bowen 2016).

In addition to their religious purposes, mosques in the UK have always had community and political functions (Akhtar 2012; Lewis 1994; McLoughlin 2005b), with imams having a role as local and sometimes regional and national brokers and representatives. This was particularly important prior to the formation of national representative bodies such as the Muslim Council of Britain (McLoughlin 2005b; see section 7 below).

Most mosques welcome visitors, for example during Islam Awareness Week or as part of educational or interfaith programmes. A useful guide to etiquette when visiting a mosque is provided by Naqshbandi (2006: 4.12). ‘Visiting My Mosque’ day is an annual occasion when mosques all over the UK are open to visitors, providing opportunities for them to learn more about the religion of Islam and the everyday lives of their Muslim neighbours, as well as to see Muslims from a different perspective to that normally presented in the media.

Although the use of mosques for local meetings and student visits has a long history in Britain, a significant increase in public scrutiny and intervention has been witnessed in the 21st century, following 9/11 and 7/7. This has had a variety of consequences, such as a greater openness to a wider public, more active local policing, the development of leadership training and other initiatives (see section 2.4 below), and more targeted mosque hate crime.
Hate crimes have become an increasing problem for mosques in the UK in recent years, as a report from the Press Association revealed (Roberts 2017):

**Hate crimes** targeting mosques across the UK more than doubled between 2016 and 2017, new figures have revealed. Police forces recorded 110 hate crimes directed at Muslim places of worship between March and July this year, up from 47 over the same six month period in 2016… [R]acist abuse, acts of vandalism at mosques and bomb threats feature heavily among the reported hate crimes. Smashed windows at mosques, damage to cars parked outside and graffiti were all recorded along with physical assaults on Muslims on their way in or out of the buildings, two cases of arson and two complaints of bacon being left on mosque doors. (Roberts 2017)

Historical research has shown that, in addition to complaints from non-Muslims about mosque planning, parking and prayer times (Cesari 2005; Gale 2004; McLoughlin 2005a; Peach & Gale 2005), disputes between rival factions in local areas were not uncommon. For example, Oxford and Leicester witnessed rivalries between Barelwis and Deobandis over control of mosques (Shaw 1988; Bowen 2016). Other cities have seen protests by Sunni Muslims about Ahmadiyya centres (Barzani 2015). Shi’a mosques have been defaced with Sunni-inspired graffiti (Hanif & O'Neill 2015). Mosque protests and intimidation by far-right groups also have a history in urban Britain (Bushar 2015).

In addition to internecine conflicts between mosques, internal disputes have sometimes occurred over election and management issues, raising questions about political interests, representation and mosque leadership (McLoughlin 2005a; Naqshbandi 2006: 4.4). These have often been linked to political factions back in South Asia or the Middle East, and there is evidence that the politics of these regions has been imported to mosques and ethnic associations, and has also influenced British party politics at the local level (Akhtar 2012).

More recently, the impact of global jihadist networks on mosque leadership has become a cause for concern.

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**Case study 2: A local mosque in Leeds**

The Al-Madina Masjid was founded in the early 1970s by local Pakistani and Indian Muslims. Originally situated in two small houses, as the Muslim population grew it became necessary to extend, and then to build a new mosque. The Makkah Masjid, as it is now known, was opened in Burley, Leeds 6, in 2003. Like many other mosques in the UK, it was made possible through the generous donations of Muslims, and was built only after a series of planning applications, rejections and negotiations with the local council.

On land that once belonged to the Christadelphian Church, Makkah Masjid is a purpose-built mosque on three floors which can accommodate over 2,700 people, both men and women. In addition to daily prayers, the weekly jum’a and prayer gatherings during Ramadan and Eid, it co-ordinates funerals, marriages and conversions (the repetition of the Shahadah by new Muslims). Prayer times are displayed on its website.

Serving an area inhabited by Muslims and Hindus of South Asian descent, and a large number of university students, the mosque is outward-looking, hosting interfaith events, and school and university visits. It won a national award for its outreach work, and engagement with young people, women and community organisations. Run by a management committee, and part of Leeds Muslim Council, it is led by Imam Qari Asim, a solicitor by profession, and prayer leader at the mosque.

The mosque’s website is regularly updated with posts and tweets about Muslims in the UK, their history, problems, achievements and initiatives, particularly those of young people and women. Issues of mosque security and hate crime are taken seriously, with the mosque working with the police and other faith bodies to provide guidance. Other resources include a step-by-step guide to the Islamic pilgrimage, the hajj, responses to questions about grooming and sex abuse, information on Visit My Mosque day, a radio discussion on LBC about what Muslims are doing to combat extremism, and videos of talks by Qari Asim and others.

Makkah Masjid, [https://makkahmosque.co.uk](https://makkahmosque.co.uk)
MOSQUES AND LEADERSHIP
Muslims and Islam in the UK


2.4 LEADERSHIP ISSUES

There has been a long-standing tradition in British Muslim communities for mosque leaders (imams) to be imported from the regions from which migrants first came (Gilliat-Ray 2010; Lewis 1994, 2007). This has meant that the majority were far more familiar with the culture of their homeland than with the challenges of leading a mosque in the UK. Few of these men were well qualified or spoke English, and their role was limited to leading prayers, teaching Qur’anic recitation and giving the Friday sermon (which rarely related to the issues faced by British Muslims, especially young people or women). They had little contact with the world beyond the mosque.

From the 1990s, the number of British-trained imams increased, although research from 2007 revealed that only eight per cent had been born and educated in the UK, with a further eight per cent from the Middle East, and the vast majority – some 84 per cent – from South Asia (Geaves 2008; Gilliat-Ray 2010). The research revealed ‘a deeply conservative body of individuals maintaining traditional languages, certain types of qualifications and still largely recruited from the place of origin’ (Geaves 2008: 105).

Since that time, there has been greater professionalization of the training and standards of imams, and more recognition of their changing role and the demands placed upon them (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 169-71; Lewis 2007: 276-79). This has come about through the work of Islamic seminaries (dar al-‘ulum) in the UK, and a greater number of imams are now younger, speak English, and are more able to connect to British Muslim communities (see 4.3.2). As a result of concerns about the risk of radicalisation, there has been increasing intervention by Government (Lewis in Peter & Ortega 2015). In 2006, the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board was established with a remit of overseeing mosque governance and supporting the training of imams (Bowen 2014: 110). A Muslim Faith Leaders Review was announced in 2007 (and reported in 2010), and initiatives were introduced to improve training provision and to link Islamic seminaries to the higher education sector (Cheruvallil-Contractor & Scott-Baumann 2015; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 175-78; Mukadam et al 2010).

Case study 3: The Finsbury Park Mosque

Originally known as the North London Central Mosque, it first opened in 1988 to serve a growing North London Muslim population, both North African and South Asian in ethnic origin. In 1997 it came under the control of Abu Hamza al-Masri, an Egyptian-born mosque leader (imam) who had fought in Afghanistan from 1991-93 and had visited Bosnia during the war there. He founded ‘Supporters of Shariah’, an organisation which provided support for refugees and Muslim fighters (mujahideen) from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir and Palestine (O’Neill & McGrory 2006; Pantucci 2015). It drew in young men from the UK and Europe, introducing them to the ideology of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

From 1997 to 2003 – when it was raided by police in connection with the Wood Green Ricin plot, and Abu Hamza was dismissed from his post by the Charity Commission – the mosque was the focus of an extremist network. In addition to the ricin plotters, an Algerian-Briton terrorist involved in the Russian Beslan massacre was a frequent attender. Three of the 7/7 bombers, Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, and Jermaine Lindsay, had attended the mosque and listened to Abu Hamza’s preaching. Five of those involved in the failed 21 July plot later in 2005 had been trained by Muhammed Hamid, the radical leader thought to have taken over from Abu Hamza after the latter’s arrest in 2004 (Pantucci 2010, 2015).

A significant proportion of those who later went on to plan or commit terrorist offences at home and abroad have been linked to the Finsbury Park Mosque in some capacity or another, but it is also the case that many of those who worshipped there over the years showed no signs of having been radicalised. In 2005, control of the mosque was handed over to the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). Since then its aims have been both to provide a space for local Muslims to worship, and to focus on community and interfaith initiatives. (Finsbury Park Mosque n.d.)

The events that occurred at Finsbury Park Mosque have fed into a broader debate among Muslims and in Government about mosque leadership.

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The events that occurred at Finsbury Park Mosque have fed into a broader debate among Muslims and in Government about mosque leadership.
3. FAMILY, GENDER AND GENERATIONS

3.1 FAMILY

The family is an important unit within British Muslim communities. Indeed, ‘Islamic law reflects the mutual obligations that rest within family relationships that are intended to ensure the security, well-being and moral nurturing of the next generation, care and respect for the elderly, and protection of the weak and vulnerable’ (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 132). Whether extended or nuclear in type, the family is the primary location for children’s socialisation both as Muslims and as second or third generation members of heritage communities (Gilliat-Ray 2010; Lee & Knott 2016; Scourfield et al 2013). It is the place where religious and social norms and values are shared and practised, but also where they are adapted and challenged, including by wider society (Grillo 2015; Naqshbandi 2006).

Although ‘most ethnic communities among the Muslim population have very close family structures’ (Naqshbandi 2006: 6.2.6), migration and the minority context have added new pressures (not that such pressures would have been entirely absent in places of origin).

But since the 1970s, the Muslim family presence in Europe (immigrants, refugees and their descendants) has become progressively wider and deeper, as well as more diverse in terms of origin. Hence, matters routinely affecting family life and relations of gender and generation have grown in importance with immigration and settlement catalysts for changing perceptions of self and others, forcing all parties (incomers and members of receiving societies) to reassess and perhaps reassert cherished values, and bring individuals and families within the purview of the law. (Grillo 2015:3)

Some of the important issues affecting British Muslim families and family life are dealt with in other sections: gender and the generations in 3.2; children’s socialisation in 4.1; and transnational connections in section 5. In this section, kinship structure and relationships, marriage and related issues, and everyday life will be discussed, albeit briefly.

3.1.1 KINSHIP LOYALTIES

Kinship structures and relationships, and the terminology used to describe them, differ from one Muslim community to another, and on them rest the traditional affiliations and factions that lead both to family practices and to internal community hierarchies, differences and rifts. After religious and national markers, ethnic and tribal divisions are the key levels of differentiation. Among Afghan migrants, for example, this might include Pashtuns, Baluchis and Turkmen; among Nigerian, Yoruba and Hausa; among Somalis, Darod, Isaaq and Hawiye among others (Change Institute 2009a: 37). For Muslims with South Asian heritage (Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Indian), the general term used for the extended kinship group is biradari (literally ‘brotherhood’). Other terms apply for the extended family in Muslim communities originating elsewhere.

In many British Muslim communities, kinship relationships affected the migration process (e.g., providing financial support and enabling chain migration). It had an impact on where families settled, and often where men worked, as well as with whom they socialised. Extended families were bound together by a ‘gift economy’, through the exchange of marriage partners as well as material goods and favours in the UK and ‘back home’ (from Werbner (1990) on Pakistanis in Manchester). In addition to supporting the migration process, kinship networks also had an impact on political and religious organisation within communities, especially among the first generation of migrants (Akhtar 2012; Pantucci 2015; Werbner 1990). In Bradford, for example, these networks caught the eye of mainstream political parties eager to capitalise on the potential for a bloc vote.

Here, the kinship network was a mobilising resource: if kinship or biraderi elders could be brought ‘on side’, they would be helpful in ensuring that, not only their vote, but also the votes of their wives and voting-age
children could be secured. There developed a system of patronage, whereby local leaders of all political parties, but especially the Labour party, developed links with Pakistani community leaders – often biraderi elders – and forged a gateway to the Pakistani vote. (Akhtar 2012: 763; see also Pantucci 2015)

These arrangements have since been disrupted, however, as the next generation of local Muslims has made its own claims about the things that matter to younger people, and as affiliations and friendships have become less kin-based and more reliant on work or university relationships and those forged through Islamic organisations (Akhtar 2012).

Although some adults participate in groups or go to mosques which serve all Muslims irrespective of their ethnic background, many have continued to frequent organisations in which their heritage language and traditions are maintained. This was particularly the case for first generation male Muslims. Members of the younger generation often criticised their elders for focusing on ethnic culture and affairs back home at the expense of their Islamic identity and practice, and this change of orientation contributed to the formation from the 1990s of a number of new Islamic groups and media outlets (see 6.1 and 5.2 below).

3.1.2 MARRIAGE ISSUES

Conduct, and the roles and responsibilities pertaining to marriage (nikah) and family life are discussed extensively in the Qur’an and Hadith, often with reference to the household of the Prophet Muhammad (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 132-134; Naqshbandi 2006: Chapter 6). According to Gilliat-Ray (2010: 134), ‘Although marriage is a social and religious contract in Islam rather than a sacrament, it nevertheless has profoundly spiritual dimensions’, particularly relating to the procreation and raising of children. Marriage in Islam is a ‘solemn civil contract between a man and a woman’ (Pearl & Menski 1998: 39). For most couples marrying in the UK, both a civil and an Islamic marriage is undertaken, the former being a state requirement and the latter a religious and social custom.

The manner in which marriages are enacted depends on the cultural traditions of the family as well as the legal process, but the majority of British Muslims marry within their own ethnic group, and many of those of South Asian heritage marry a blood relative (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 140-141). Tradition, security and property issues explain the persistence of this arrangement. An increasing number of young Muslim women, however, express a preference to marry a Muslim from the UK on the grounds that the partners are more likely to be compatible and to understand one another’s culture and attitudes. Fewer marriages are arranged solely by the parents than was once the case, though parental approval is generally sought (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 142). Furthermore, British Muslims are getting married older than previously, often after graduating and moving into work (Ahmed 2012: 198). Some are choosing ‘Islamic marriages’ rather than arranged ones, with the focus being on the couple’s shared religious values and identity, and a pre-nuptial process that is chaperoned and halal (permitted) (Ahmed 2012: 203-205).

There are some common assumptions made about Muslim marriages by outsiders (e.g., that all marriages are arranged and/or forced; that it is easy for a Muslim man to divorce his wife; and that polygamy is widely approved) (Ahmed 2012: 193-194; Grillo 2015: Chapter 3). Equally, there are examples of pious rhetoric about marriage and the family as Islamic ideals. Neither of these actually matches the diverse practices and attitudes of British Muslims (Grillo 2015; Naqshbandi 2006: 6.2). What is more, as Grillo (2015: 40-41) has noted, these are changing, ‘with minority families displaying a range of attitudes towards marriage, cohabitation, parenthood, gender, domestic responsibilities and intergenerational relations’, and with evidence of greater marital instability and more single-parent households. As he goes on to say, all forms and aspects of Muslim marriage in the UK have come under increasing public scrutiny, with forced marriage and sham marriage criminalised, and under age marriage and polygamy given media attention (Grillo: 2015: Chapters 3&4). The role of Shari’ah councils in the negotiation of divorce proceedings has also been important, both within Muslim communities and as a matter of wider public interest (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 143; Grillo 2015: 98-102).

3.1.3 EVERYDAY FAMILY LIFE

The Islamic and often ethnic character of the home as a family space is made manifest in its material and sensory culture (Metcalf 1996):
Internal decorations, such as pictures and wall hangings inspired by Islamic art, text and architecture, reinforce self-conscious Muslim identity and a sense of God-consciousness (taqwa). The Islamization of space through sound may be achieved by the playing of religious CDs, such as nasheeds (devotional songs), and recitation of the Qur’an. (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 137)

Some Muslim homes have separate spaces for men and women. In general, self-segregation is only practised when visitors who are not close family relatives are present. The home is often referred to as the domain of women and children, as opposed to public space which is gendered male. However, this general rule is repeatedly transgressed, with women of all ages occupying an array of public fora, in universities and colleges, work places, shopping malls, forms of public transport and, increasingly, mosques (in which they are segregated from men). Some women cover all or parts of the body (with a hijab, niqab or burqa) in public; others do not. It remains the case, though, that, with fewer Muslim women working than men (see section 3.2), the home is the place where they spend most of their time, with children, and often with relatives and female friends.

Homes are also prayer spaces, with families laying down mats and performing the prayer (salah) together. Home may also be the place where children learn to recite the Qur’an (though many do so in mosque schools, see 4.1 below) (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 138). During Ramadan, it is where family members desist from food and drink; it is where they break the fast at sundown. During festivals, it becomes a place of celebration, where gifts are exchanged and food shared. British Muslims relax at home. They cook and eat, do chores, play video games, do their homework, watch TV, contact family and friends elsewhere, gossip and joke together.

3.2 GENDER AND GENERATIONS

3.2.1 MUSLIM WOMEN: FAMILY, WORK, AGENCY AND ACTIVISM

From the perspective of religious teachings, Islam emphasises the spiritual equality of men and women, though it differentiates their roles and responsibilities (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 207): ‘Islam prescribes quite precise rules for conduct between the sexes, requiring that men and women do not mix together in ways that compromise their integrity.’ (Naqshbandi 2006: 6.3.1) Although it stresses the importance of motherhood, it does not bar women from participating in education and work outside the home, or in choosing a partner or inheriting property (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 208). However, first generation migrants from different countries imported their own cultural ideas about gender roles and women’s family lives which were often at odds with both Qur’anic teaching and with the liberal notions generally espoused in the UK. Patriarchal traditions about family honour, marriage practices and the seclusion of women (purdah) had an impact on Muslims’ participation in wider society, but women often found ways of combining forces, gaining a degree of independence and having an influence in family and community affairs (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 210-213; Werbner 1990: Part II).

Muslim women in the UK continue to be less economically active than men, although their participation in the labour market is increasing. According to the 2011 population census, when compared with all women in England and Wales, fewer Muslim women of all ages were in employment (Muslim Council of Britain 2015: 62). Of those aged 16-24 or 50 and over, around 30 per cent were employed, whereas of those aged 25-59, 57 per cent were in work (compared to 80 per cent of all women). Far more Muslim women of all ages were ‘looking after home or family’ (18 per cent compared to 6 per cent of women in the general population) (Muslim Council of Britain 2015: 63). In most cases, whether they work or not, Muslim women are charged with maintaining the home and the family’s cultural and religious traditions. As a growing number of women go out to work, however, older relatives often step in to assist with childcare and nurture.

Across Muslim communities, in addition to mosques, there are a plethora of local groups – religious, political, cultural and social – which meet in other spaces, including homes and community or leisure centres. Given the male dominance of mosques (Shannahan 2014), Muslim women have organised separately, often in one another’s homes, to pray, read or celebrate together, or to do charitable work (Akhtar 2014; Werbner 1990). Female members of the first
generation, for example, prayed at home or in the homes of relatives or friends: such gatherings ‘provided friendship and support and alleviated the loneliness that some women felt and reinforced the importance of kinship in the UK context’ (Akhtar 2014: 234; Gardner 2002). Since then, women have become more proactive, gathering together for Qur’an recitations, to sing songs of praise (nasheed), and to celebrate Milad, the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Akhtar 2014).

Research has shown how this has not only empowered them personally, but has also led them at times to become ritual leaders and teachers of other women, active civil society organisers, charity fundraisers, and critical readers and commentators (Akhtar 2014; Bokhari 2013; Contractor 2012). They have also researched women’s needs and campaigned for more inclusive mosques and better facilities for women (Inclusive Mosque Initiative 2018; Lewicki & O’Toole 2017; Shannahan 2014). An increasing number of mosques now have facilities for women and, in some, women have organised full programmes of prayer, study and even pilgrimage (Akhtar 2014; Inge 2017; Naqshbandi 2017).

With women in 2011 constituting 43 per cent of Muslim university students, it is evident that many are now choosing to enter the public arena for education as well as for work (Muslim Council of Britain 2015: 62). Simultaneously, they are becoming more involved in decision-making about when and whom to marry, how to engage publicly and on what issues, and how to express their religious and social identities outside the home (Billaud 2016; Lewicki & O’Toole 2017).

Muslim women vary by ethnic background, country of birth, length of stay in the UK, sectarian identity, education and age, but they have all been subjected to a process of labelling and stigmatisation which masks their differences. This has often been focused around the hijab (headscarf) and niqab (face veil). These forms of covering have acquired multiple meanings in recent decades, from being seen as a sign of religious and cultural oppression at one end of the spectrum (by outsiders), to being a proud mark of personal identity at the other (by many Muslim women themselves) (Dwyer 1999; Franks 2001; Tarlo 2007).

The hijab acquired new meanings for Muslim women in the UK after 9/11, with some deciding to wear it as an act of solidarity or defiance, and others as an outward expression of their religiosity, at times against the judgement of more cautious or less religious family members. Although often described as a form of protection for women and a sign of self-respect and modesty, increasingly the wearing of hijab has become important as a statement of personal autonomy, choice and self-expression (Billaud 2014; Dwyer 1999; Franceschelli & O’Brien 2015; Franks 2001; Tarlo 2007). ‘Modern and modest’ is how it is described by some young women (Franceschelli & O’Brien 2015: 704). This is no less true for the niqab which, when worn by religiously conservative young women, is no longer simply part of a prescribed dress code, but a garment of choice for engaging in public, and sometimes a sartorial statement: ‘[Aisha, Mitra, and Sonia] use their bodies as blackboards to convey political, religious, moral, and biographical messages whose multiple meanings remain fundamentally ambivalent.’ (Billaud 2014: 518) What is clear is that the hijab and niqab mean different things to different people: to outsiders who observe and judge these forms of dress, but also to those who wear them.

British Muslim women’s civil society activism has to be understood within the context of public discourse about Muslim women’s oppression as well as Government policy on counter-extremism, both of which contribute to shaping Muslim women’s agenda, attitudes and willingness to engage publicly (Lewicki & O’Toole 2017). The work they choose to do, however, is not confined to mainstream politics or public protest (2017: 167).

Rather, campaigners against FGM and in favour of more inclusive mosques made use of art-, drama- and film-based forms of expression, mobilization via networks, social media and online petitioning, offered day to day advice to statutory agencies and health care providers, organized pop-up prayer venues, used consultation forums to advance their claims, and turned to research and blogging as tools of activism. (Lewicki and O’Toole 2017: 167)
3.2.2 MUSLIM MEN AND MASCULINITIES

By comparison with British Muslim women, the issue of British Muslim men and masculinity is under-researched. Given the presence in the UK of Muslim men from many different countries of origin over several generations, the general but unexplored landscape is one of a plurality of different masculinities, relating to length of stay, heritage and religious traditions, age, class and education.

In one sense, a great deal is already known about the activities and achievements of Muslim men in the UK, their migration history, and involvement in community organisation and religious practice. However, until recently, their roles, experiences and identities were rarely presented or understood as gendered (but see Gardner (2002) who looks at both male and female Bangladeshi elders). Muslim women and children were marked out in the literature, but men were not. For example, although it has been recognised that ‘UK Mosque management committees privilege male involvement, decision-making and leadership roles, with figures of as few as 15% women in management positions’ (Shannahan 2014: 1), more is known about the gendered aspects of women’s participation and experience than men’s, even though men are in the majority. Furthermore, discussion of the patriarchal and traditional nature of South Asian and Arab cultures and their impact on how Islam is understood and practised in the UK has tended to focus more on how they affect the activities, roles and experiences of women than men.

With greater academic awareness of gender issues, this has begun to change. However, it has resulted in an uneven picture emerging in which young Muslim men and masculinities have received some attention, but older men have not (Archer 2001; Dwyer et al 2008; Hopkins 2009; Macey 1999; Mac an Ghaill & Haywood 2015).

In the case of younger men, public perceptions have often been in tension with the diverse ways in which they see themselves and act as young Muslim males (Dwyer et al 2008; Hopkins 2009). A common stereotype has depicted young Muslim men as members of gangs: ‘these are youths wielding weapons, alienated from their families, their communities and the wider society, 

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Case study 4: Young Muslim women, Integrate UK, and civil society activism

Integrate UK is a charity ‘that works towards equality and integration by supporting young people with their learning’ (Integrate UK 2018). It began life in 2009 when a group of girls at a secondary school in Bristol decided to work together to help young people arriving from outside the UK to settle. It is now a UK-wide initiative whose projects have gained international recognition. Through projects, videos, music, and educational resources, Integrate raises awareness about gender-based issues, including female genital mutilation (FGM), grooming for radicalisation and right wing extremism, honour crimes, gang and drug culture and child sexual exploitation. Young people serve as trustees, and are involved in all aspects of the charity’s work including campaign selection, video and film-making, public speaking and training. Integrate UK’s productions, many of which have won awards, include ‘The Silent Scream’ (film), the FGM Radio Project and ‘My Clitoris’ (a music video), all of which campaign against FGM, ‘Islam Ain’t that Scary Thriller’, made for the tenth anniversary of 9/11, and ‘Twin Track’, a teen drama about being drawn into radicalisation and gang culture. Use of social media and online petitions have also formed part of the charity’s campaigning strategy.

The impact of Integrate-UK was identified in research by Lewicki and O’Toole (2017). They noted that it had been instrumental in informing Government about FGM, in the subsequent decision to send out a letter to all schools in the UK to remind them of FGM safeguarding issues, and in bringing about the mandatory reporting of FGM cases by teachers, doctors and health and social care professionals (Lewicki and O’Toole 2017: 161-162). Support for the campaign had also been expressed by Malala Yousafzai, the international education campaigner, and by Ban Ki Moon, the United Nations General Secretary.

Integrate UK 2018. ‘What We Do.’ http://integrateuk.org/what-we-do

Lewicki & O’Toole, Acts and Practices of Citizenship: Muslim Women’s Activism in the UK (2017)
locked into a cycle of inevitable but meaningless violence, low self-esteem and self-destruction’ (Alexander 2000: 126, cited in Hopkins 2009; Mason 2013); alternatively, according to Archer (2001), they have been seen as ‘effeminate and academic’ (Hopkins 2009: 301). Since 9/11, public discourse has cast young Muslim males in other ways too, as extremists and terrorists. One young South Asian man astutely recognised another key shift, from racial to religious stigmatisation: ‘In the past the word ‘Paki’ was the stereotype. Now people say Muslims are called terrorists but the real stereotype now is to be called a Muslim.’ (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood 2015: 102)

Despite this being part of their own self-description, young Muslims are aware that this is a stereotype which takes no account of the differences between them, and incorporates other negative identities: Muslim extremist, Muslim gangster, Muslim drug dealer. Another young man noted that, ‘we’re both using the same word. But they use Muslim and they don’t even know us, or they mean something bad. For us it’s a definite good thing or just a normal thing’ (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood 2015: 104).

Whilst these young men are routinely represented as ‘Muslim’ rather than with reference to other forms of identity, they are nevertheless acutely aware of class-related issues – such as poverty, unemployment, criminality and local deprivation – which connect them to those of other religious and ethnic backgrounds (Mac an Ghaill & Haywood 2015: 108-109; Mason 2013).

As in all social groups, there are some individuals who are drawn into gangs and other criminal networks, who commit offences, hold extremist views, act violently or even participate in terrorism. A number are arrested and convicted; some serve jail terms. However, in light of the commonly-held stereotypes of young Muslim men, it is important to get this into proportion. Taking the prison context as an example, at the end of 2015, half of the inmates in England and Wales identified themselves as ‘Christian’, 30 per cent as ‘no religion’, just under 15 per cent as ‘Muslim’, and the remainder as ‘other religion’ (Grimwood 2016: 23). Whilst the proportion of Muslim prisoners is increasing, and is high compared to the percentage of Muslims in the population as a whole (under 5 per cent), about one-third of Muslim prisoners are not British nationals (Shaw 2015), and the total includes a number who convert to Islam during their time in prison (Marranci 2009; Spalek and El-Hassan 2007). Furthermore, only a very small minority of Muslim prisoners have been convicted of offences relating to terrorism (Grimwood 2016; Marranci 2009; Shaw 2015).

The changing nature of young Muslims’ needs and interests – for example, their use of English over and above community languages, and their turn from ethnocentric to Islamic identities – has also influenced their patterns of association and identity formation, whether these relate to street culture, new Islamic reform movements and charities, alternative arts spaces

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**Case study 5: Diverse Muslim masculinities**

Social research with young British-born Muslim men has begun to get behind the stereotypical labels to find out more about how they see themselves, relate to one another and to others, and negotiate their Muslim masculinity.

After interviewing young Pakistani-heritage Muslim men from Bradford and Slough, one team of researchers (Dwyer et al 2008) found that some of them focused primarily on fulfilling family expectations and being good Muslims, some on educational attainment and personal progress, and others on territorial loyalty, being hard, and working your own way up. A final group exploited social networks in pursuit of alternative futures in which they could contribute to the community or help others. All these young men had different priorities, referred to by the team as ‘religious’, ‘middle-class’, ‘rebellious’ and ‘ambivalent’ masculinities (Dwyer et al 2008: 121-130). What this showed was how these young Muslim men, from varied social classes and educational backgrounds, expressed differing norms, values and goals, and how even for those ‘most disengaged with the wider social order, religion and family expectations continue[d] to have significant influence in shaping their gender identities’ (Dwyer et al 2008: 130).

Dwyer, Shah, & Sanghera, *From Cricket Lover to Terror Suspect: Challenging Representations of Young British Muslim Men (2008)*
or university societies (Barylo 2018; Hamid 2011, 2017; Hussain 2014; Janmohamed 2016; Kabir 2010; Lewis 2007; Song 2012). Their approach to Islam differs to that of their parents. The individual quest to find an authentic and culturally unadulterated form of Islam and Islamic identity has come to the fore (6.1 below). And the transmission of religious knowledge between peers, and university as a context for discussing Islam have increased in importance (4.3 below).
4. EDUCATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION: ISLAM, SOCIALISATION AND EDUCATION

As they get older, there will be an expectation that children will identify first and foremost as Muslim, before any national or ethnic identification (Scourfield 2017: 7).

Scourfield’s observation about young British Muslims raises an issue that will be discussed further in Chapter 6, the importance of being ‘Muslim first’. But how is this identity imbibed and reinforced in childhood? And how does this accord with Islamic ideas about socialisation and education?

In his examination of the Islamic conception of education, Halstead (2004: 522, see Scourfield et al 2013: 22) stated that ‘no aspect of a Muslim’s life can remain untouched by religion’. This arises from the rich tradition in Islam of educational thought and practice. Drawing on Halstead’s work, Scourfield et al (2013: 22) noted that, within Islam, education is held to cover ‘individual development and God-consciousness, the transmission of knowledge, and the development of an understanding of society and its social and moral rules’. The Arabic term tarbiya refers to ‘the development of individual potential, and … the process of nurturing and guiding young people to maturity’, and talim, to ‘the imparting and receiving of knowledge, usually through training, instruction, or another form of teaching’ (2013: 22). These overlap with western understandings of socialisation, education, and informal and formal nurture (see Lee & Knott 2016, for discussion of these terms).

British Muslims’ participation in and approaches to external educational contexts will be discussed in 4.2 and 4.3 below, but prior to that it is important to consider how they view the primary stage of socialisation, in which the young acquire and internalise cognitive and embodied knowledge, practices, skills and traditions, especially in the family and at home (Lee & Knott 2016: 13). In short, there is a need to understand how children learn to be Muslims (Scourfield 2017: 6-7).

A child will usually be marked as a Muslim from the first moments of life, by having the adhan (call to prayer) spoken into her ear. She will also be given a name which marks her as Muslim. When she is growing up, the faith will very likely be made material in the fabric of the home. This often starts at the front door with Arabic text on the lintel. Inside, framed verses from the Qur’an may be displayed, as well as pictures of famous mosques, usually in preference to family photographs. (Scourfield 2017: 6)

In their research on British Muslim childhood in Cardiff, Scourfield et al (2013: 14-18), whilst recognising that there are multiple ways to be Muslim and many different family arrangements and contexts, identified the key factors in this learning process. (They prefer the concept of ‘nurture’ to ‘transmission’ or ‘education’, in so far as it turns attention away from teaching and instruction towards learning, and acknowledges the agency of children as well as adults [Scourfield et al 2013: 20-21; see also Nesbitt 2000; Singh 2012].) The factors they noted were cognitive transmission, embodiment and habitus, minority defence, and the role of religious organisations. The first refers to the way in which universal cognitive processes impact upon social and cultural transmission. Here, Scourfield et al (2013: 14) rely on Whitehouse’s account of how divergent ritual modes promote the transmission of religious beliefs and practices by drawing on basic memory processes: Whitehouse’s ‘doctrinal mode’ involves frequent repetition of ideas, texts and behaviours which exploit semantic and procedural memories, whereas the ‘imagistic mode’, involving intense, emotional and irregular events, generates episodic memories (Whitehouse 2004). As Scourfield et al (2013: 14) suggest, ‘mainstream Sunni Islam, with its five daily prayers and repeated recitation of the Qur’an, falls squarely into the doctrinal mode’.

The second factor they identified was embodiment and habitus, referring to the ways in which children unconsciously acquire the dispositions, habits and moral behaviours associated with being a Muslim (Scourfield et al 2013: 15, 92-93). This is achieved through observation and participation, imitation and repetition. It is practical and moral learning as well as mental and doctrinal. Through this everyday process, a particular Muslim habitus – which is ethnically,
linguistically and culturally inflected – is absorbed, embodied, displayed and remembered (in implicit memory). How to pray, how and when to serve food and eat, how to recite the Qur’an, and how to show respect are all learned, as is how to behave according to gender norms and expectations.

Scourfield et al (2013: 16, 88, 96) also identified ‘minority defence’ as an important factor in learning.

Being part of a visible minority in the UK, especially one that is socially and economically disadvantaged, and is subject to discrimination and stigmatisation, is important in the process of children’s identity formation and their sense of community and belonging (Scourfield et al 2013: 16). It has been argued that religion may play a more significant role in such a learning context than it might for children being brought up in a cultural majority, or in a minority that is not visibly different or
the subject of discrimination. Further, being socialised as part of a minority will involve mixing with others from a similar background and with shared characteristics, thus ‘reinforc[ing] children’s identification with Islam’ (Scourfield et al 2013: 17).

Turning from informal to formal religious nurture, the final factor identified by Scourfield et al (2013: 17-18) was the role of religious organisations in the learning process. Most Muslim children in the UK learn to read and recite the Qur’an in Arabic, whether they do this is a daily mosque school, at the home of an independent teacher, in their own homes or even on Skype. Often termed ‘supplementary schools’ in the educational literature (in so far as they supplement the learning that children receive at primary and then secondary schools), they focus chiefly on the reading of the Qur’an in Arabic and on providing children with sufficient Arabic language to help them do so. Schools of this kind have existed since the 7th century in the Middle East and Africa (Boyle: 2004: 1). In the UK, they have played an important part in Muslim children’s Islamic education and the development of their identity as Muslims (Barton 1986: 150-175). In addition to the Qur’an and Arabic, many Muslim supplementary schools have offered other aspects of Islamic Studies, and some have provided formal instruction in an ethnic language and culture (Cherti & Bradley 2011: 18; for examples, see Safar Academy 2015; An Nasihah Publications 2017). A key feature of children’s learning in such a context is that it is social and helps incorporate them into an Islamic ‘community of practice’ (Boyle 2004: 25; Scourfield et al 2013: 110).

All of the factors identified and discussed by Scourfield et al (2013) contribute to explaining how and why Muslims have been more successful than others in the UK at passing on their religious beliefs and practices from one generation to the next. Drawing on data from the Home Office Citizenship Survey (of adults in England and Wales) and its accompanying Young People’s Survey, Scourfield et al (2012) examined and compared patterns of religiosity across the generations in four groups: Christians, Muslims, those from other religions and those with no religion. Significantly higher rates of intergenerational transmission were found among Muslims than among the other groups. Muslims, especially those in lower social classes, were found to be the most successful transmitters of the four groups. They ‘remained almost twice as likely as Christians to report practising the same religion they were raised in’ (Scourfield et al 2012: 106). The authors suggested that this endorsed the importance of religion for migrant minorities as they establish themselves in a new location over a period of several generations (Scourfield et al 2012: 105).

4.2 EDUCATION AND SCHOOLS

If the evidence on intergenerational transmission has presented a picture of effective Muslim socialisation, the data on Muslim educational attainment over the decades has been less positive, with researchers noting a ‘Muslim penalty’ in operation (see section 1.2) in both education and employment. Assessing the results of the 2011 population census, the Muslim Council of Britain reported an improving picture, but with ‘Muslims lag[ging] behind Hindus and Sikhs, both in terms of a greater proportion with no qualifications, and a lower proportion with higher level qualifications’ (MCB 2015: 61). Researchers have suggested that increasing anti-Muslim rhetoric and sentiment have contributed to the traditional racial and cultural disadvantages experienced by minority ethnic communities in relation to education and employment (Khattab & Johnston 2015).

British Muslims have been engaged since the early years of their settlement in the UK in debating and campaigning on issues related to education and schools. From the 1970s onwards, British Muslim parents have actively campaigned for mainstream schools to take account of the religious needs and identities of their children in relation to issues such as uniforms, school meals and the curriculum […] Meanwhile, they have also sought to establish their own voluntary aided faith schools. (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 131)

In 1983, the introduction of halal meat in school meals in Bradford in state schools with more than ten Muslim pupils generated the first of many debates about halal, religious freedom and animal rights (most recently discussed in relation to Lancashire schools in autumn 2017) (Valentine 2008b: 6; Lewis 1994: 148-149). The ‘Honeyford affair’ in the mid-1980s, which followed the publication of an inflammatory letter in the Salisbury
Review by a Bradford headteacher, Ray Honeyford, exposed significant differences of view about the extent to which mainstream schools should accommodate the needs and requests of minorities (Valentine 2008b: 5; Lewis 1994: 149-151).

Despite calls for a variety of accommodations to be made over matters including modesty issues, holidays and timetabling, food, curriculum issues (e.g., related to sport and music), and the provision of single-sex education, as Gilliat-Ray (2010: 149) noted, ‘the reaction of local education authorities to these calls from Muslim parents were regionally variable, confused and often ad hoc’.

These calls have raised an underlying issue about integration. Miah (2015) has referred to this as an assumption about the desire for ‘self-segregation’, the idea that British Muslims do not want to integrate but prefer to live in parallel but separate communities, according to their own norms and values, isolated from wider society. On the basis of ethnographic research in the north of England, Miah argued against this premise, suggesting that the focus on faith schooling, for example, is best understood as a desire to ‘integrate through faith’ not cultural separatism. In addition, his research concluded that parents view integration as a ‘natural and gradual process’ (Miah 2015: 137), and that pupils, whilst they value group solidarity (especially in the context of anti-Muslim prejudice), held that a mixed school experience ‘provided the opportunity to mix and to get to know each other’ (2015: 139).

The desire of many Muslim parents to bring up their children as practising Muslims with a knowledge of Islam, its teachings, practices and values led some to invest in and lobby for faith-based schools (Gardner et al 2005; Parker-Jenkins et al 2005). Until 1997, Islamic schools in the UK were all independent and private. The Labour Government in that year extended the opportunity of applying for state funding to all faith groups. The Islamia Primary School in Brent, London, originally founded independently in 1983, was one of two state-funded, voluntary-aided Islamic ‘faith school’ established in 1998, the other being the Al-Furqan School in Birmingham (Dwyer & Parutis 2013: 270). Since then there has been a steady growth in the number of Islamic state schools.

By 2015, there were approximately 150 Muslim schools, the majority of which were independent. In terms of state-maintained schools, there were, in England, ten primary schools and eleven secondary schools, some of which were combined (British Religion in Numbers 2015). Muslim schools were represented nationally by the Association of Muslim Schools UK, an organisation which promotes Islamic education, supports teacher training and professional development, and aims to improve educational standards in Muslim schools (AMS-UK 2012).

A minority of parents have opted for Islamic schools, whether controlled and funded independently or by the state. Such schools not only offer a degree of continuity with the beliefs and practices and practices of home and mosque, but additional support in Arabic and Islamic studies (as well as national curriculum subjects) (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 151-152; Osler & Hussain 2005: 132-133). As they are generally single-sex schools, many families feel comfortable that their views about modesty and gender will be upheld, as well as their traditions of duty and respect, but they are also keen for their girls to aim high and perform well (Osler & Hussain 2005: 140-141). The majority of parents, however, have been content to send their children to local state schools, although they have often favoured those with a religious foundation (Church of England or Catholic) and, in the case of secondary schools, those that are single-sex.

Debates have continued about whether or not faith schools in general are socially divisive and segregationist and, in the case of minority faith schools, whether they mitigate against or contribute to community cohesion (Dwyer & Parutis 2013; Flint 2007). Do they offer a sufficiently broad-based education, and do they do enough to enable children to discuss and even challenge their religious identity and the beliefs and practices associated with it? (Davies 2009; Gardner et al 2005). Parker-Jenkins et al (2005: 4-5), however, argued that it was racism and Islamophobia that had brought questions about faith schools to the fore (given that Anglican and Catholic state-maintained schools had been in existence for decades). The emergence of new, state-funded, minority faith schools was, they suggested, simply ‘an extension of the tradition afforded other schools established on a religious ethos’ (2005: 6).
Case study 7: The Birmingham Trojan horse affair

The ‘Trojan horse affair’ was the name given to an alleged plot in 2014 by extremist Muslims to infiltrate Birmingham schools. It generated extensive media coverage and Government activity. It was focused in particular on Park View Academy, the educational trust with which the academy was associated, and two further schools under its remit. Although Park View had been a failing school in the mid-1990s, by 2006 it had been turned around and was seen as one of the most improved in the country. In 2012, Ofsted described it as ‘a truly inclusive school’ with no evidence of discrimination (Holmwood & O’Toole 2018; Mogra 2016).

With the publication of a leaked letter in March 2014 – the authenticity of which was disputed – an alleged Islamist plot to influence the governance and curriculum of the schools was revealed. As well as intense media reporting, this led to a series of Government inquiries to examine evidence of extremist infiltration or ‘entryism’ (Miah 2017: 3). Published in July 2014, an initial report, by Peter Clarke, did not identify extremism at the level of school governance, but did find evidence of an organised campaign and that there were ‘a number of people in a position of influence who either espouse, or sympathise with or fail to challenge extremist views’ (Clarke 2014). These non-faith schools were deemed to operate with a narrowly politicised form of Islam, intolerance, anti-Western rhetoric and segregationist views (Clarke 2014). Following an inspection by Ofsted, the Office for Standards in Education, all the schools were then rated inadequate and were placed in special measures. Disciplinary proceedings were begun into the professional conduct of the teachers (Mogra 2016).

However, in the years that followed, other public inquiries and academic research have challenged the initial findings, the nature of the evidence on which they were based, and the associated Government and media narratives of an organised campaign of Islamist extremism. In March 2015, the Education Select Committee, in its review of the affair, Extremism in Schools: The Trojan House Affair, noted that ‘no evidence of extremism or radicalisation, apart from a single isolated incident, was found and that there is no evidence of a sustained plot nor of a similar situation pertaining elsewhere in the country’ (Holmwood & O’Toole 2018; Long 2017). Then, following a flawed disciplinary process, all cases against the Academy and Trust’s senior teachers were dropped in May 2017. The process to investigate those allegedly involved in the plot and in extremism has subsequently been described as ‘a serious miscarriage of justice’ (Holmwood & O’Toole 2018; see also Mogra 2016).

This affair not only generated discussion about the events themselves and the allegations of Islamist infiltration and extremism, but about how both public discourse and Government policy position British Muslims as a security problem (Miah 2017; see also Holmwood & O’Toole).

Countering the critics of faith schools, a further argument was made by Ameen and Hassan (2013: 16), that ‘secular Eurocentric schooling in the UK can no longer masquerade as an ideologically neutral space’, and that secular schools are no less indoctrinating than those which are faith-based. They concluded that the social goods – of inclusion, anti-racism and tolerance – could be fostered equally successfully in faith schools as in non-denominational ones.

At various times, with or without justification, Muslim schools have been cited as a problem for community cohesion, a bastion of extremist ideology, a threat to British values and a radicalisation risk. The Trojan horse affair, in 2014, was the most high profile of cases exposing such concerns, though the Birmingham schools in question were not actually Islamic schools but community-based state schools with a majority of Muslim pupils (Holmwood & O’Toole 2018; Long 2017; Miah 2017; Mogra 2016).

This affair not only generated discussion about the events themselves and the allegations of Islamist infiltration and extremism, but about how both public discourse and Government policy position British
Muslims as a security problem (Miah 2017; see also Holmwood & O’Toole).

The question about schools and their role in radicalisation was also addressed in Spotting the Signs of Radicalisation, a report for the Henry Jackson Society (Webb 2017). The report contained the profiles of 29 young people from the UK ‘who travelled, or attempted to travel, to work with extremist groups or fight for armed Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2016’ (Webb 2017: 9). On the evidence of these profiles, Webb (2017: 66) judged ‘real-world relationships’ with family and friends involved in extremism to be critical, with some of these relationships being formed in educational institutions, particularly in high schools (77-79). Along with religious institutions, Webb (2017: 77) suggested that ‘educational institutions can provide forums in which extremists can socialise, even if the schools themselves play no role in the radicalisation of the students’. She found that several schools had seen two or more students convicted of terrorism offences or leave/attempt to leave the UK to join an extremist movement. However, she also noted that recognition of extremist activity or intentions in a school provided an opportunity for intervention and safeguarding (Webb 2017: 79).

4.3 HIGHER EDUCATION, STUDENT SOCIETIES AND ISLAMIC SEMINARIES

4.3.1 UNIVERSITIES AND STUDENT SOCIETIES

Despite factors such as low family income and the ‘Muslim penalty’ (see section 1.2; Khattab 2009), the 2011 population census showed educational progress since 2001, with a reduction in the percentage of Muslims with no qualifications, and a greater percentage of women participating in higher education (MCB 2015). Furthermore, the number of Muslims with a degree-level qualification more than doubled between 2001 and 2011 (Morris 2018).

University or college offers the opportunity for young Muslims to experiment away from family, community and mosque, and to forge their own identities. This stage of emerging adulthood – from 18-30 years – sees a lessening of bonds, more independent decision-making, increased receptivity to new ideas and worldviews, and ‘intense identity exploration’ (Smith et al 2011: 16). Significant arenas for such exploration, as Singh (2012) has shown in his study of young British Sikh adults, include religious youth organisations and camps, online networks and student societies. Whilst the latter are undoubtedly important, universities and colleges more broadly, through their academic as well as social provision provide an opportunity for personal reflection and discussion with peers on issues relating to religious identity and religious and political issues (Lee & Knott 2017; McGlynn & McDaid 2016).

The fact that a number of those who became involved in terrorism had been educated at UK universities generated fear amongst those in Government that higher education institutions and student societies were failing to protect young people from radicalisation and extremism. The Government’s Prevent Review in 2011 stated that nearly a third of those convicted in the UK of al-Qaeda related offences had been university or college educated, and that Islamist organisations had targeted those with large numbers of Muslim students and their student societies (Home Office 2011: 72-73). Similar fears were expressed elsewhere: ‘Islamic extremism on campus is troubling higher education systems around the world, including many Muslim nations.’ (Welch 2015)

In 2010, several think tanks reported on the influence of radical Islam, extremist speakers and networks on university campuses and in student societies (Centre for Social Cohesion 2010; Quilliam 2010). For example, in an analysis of Islamic Society (ISoc) sermons given at one London campus, the Quilliam Foundation found conservative statements on shari’ah law and the position of women, as well as hate speech directed to Shi’a Muslims, Jews and homosexuals (Quilliam 2010: 6-10). Offensive jihad and the ideologies of extremist preachers were shown to have been endorsed (Quilliam 2010: 11-13). Following the publication of these reports, doubts were raised by the National Union of Studies and Federation of Student Islamic Societies about their ideological and political stance, one-sidedness and (lack of) methodological rigour (Brown & Saeed 2015: 1960). Subsequently, academic research has endorsed some of their claims, but situated them in a wider context of student opinion. Interviews by Song (2012) and Inge (2017) with Muslim students, for instance, showed that at times they had felt intimidated...
by ISoc leaders and members with hard-line extremist views (reported in Quilliam 2010: 14, 17). Overall, however, Muslim students had much to say that was positive about their student societies (Song 2012). Song (2012: 158) concluded that ‘to characterize ISocs and Muslim student mobilizations as the breeding grounds of Islamic extremism is to overlook all the other aspects of ISOC membership within universities, and all the students who join ISocs for entirely innocuous, and indeed, laudable, reasons’.

Muslim students have not restricted their criticisms to ISocs, however. Other studies have shown that they also felt targeted by Government (as a result of the Prevent duty and the suspicion placed on Muslim communities) and by the negative reporting of media and think tanks (Brown and Saeed 2016: 1960; Saeed & Johnson 2016: 45). They have expressed the view that all the socially-cohesive work done by ISocs and Muslim charities seems to have been ignored at the expense of the focus on Islamist extremism (Brown and Saeed 2016: 1962; Song 2012: 156). As Muslim students, they have felt implicated in the activities of a small extremist minority (Saeed & Johnson 2016: 43; Song 2012: 150) and afraid to speak out on political issues (Lynch 2013: 250; Saeed & Johnson 2016: 44).

Others have also challenged the negative view of ISocs and assumptions about Islamist extremism on campus. Critics, including the UK Federation of Student Islamic Societies and the National Union of Students, have pointed out that, just because a terrorist may have studied at a particular university is no indication that they were radicalised there, that they were part of a university network of extremists, or that they influenced others (Allen 2015; Brown & Saeed 2015; McGlynn & McDaid 2016; Saeed & Johnson 2016; Song 2012). Focusing on a hard-line minority, critics have argued, has taken attention away from the vast majority of Muslim students not drawn to extremism, who may in fact have resisted the influence of extremist leaders or speakers (Brown and Saeed 2015; Saeed & Johnson 2016; Song 2012). Furthermore, according to Brown and Saeed (2015), such an approach endangers the very spaces – student societies – in which young people are able to engage with peers in critical debate and activism.

Although the young women in Inge’s (2017) study and some of those interviewed by other researchers (Quilliam 2010; Song 2012) encountered extreme opinions, statements and behaviours in university ISocs, they dealt with them pragmatically, with resilience and critical judgement. Irrespective of the challenges, both those who joined ISocs and those who did not (Song 2012) saw a value in Muslim students having the opportunity to gather together for prayer and socialising, to explore their Islamic identity, and to be involved in student activism and charity work.

New research on ‘Re/presenting Islam on Campus’, funded by the UK Arts and Humanities Research Council and directed by Alison Scott-Baumann, is in progress. It aims to analyse how Islam is understood on university campuses and to enable an open, informed discussion about Islam as an aspect of British life. Further information about the project, its methodology and publications is available (Re/presenting Islam on Campus 2018).

4.3.2 ISLAMIC SEMINARIES

Young Muslims’ opportunities for formal education beyond the age of 16 have not been limited to the university and college sector, but have included studying at an Islamic seminary or dar al-‘ulum, abroad or in the UK. The earliest seminaries in the UK were those established by the Deobandis in Bury (1975) and by Tablighi Jama’at in Dewsbury (1981) (Gilliat-Ray 2006; Lewis 1994). Like other Islamic seminaries they were modelled on institutions developed for other times and other social and political locations. There are now more than 25 registered seminaries, the majority being Deobandi, but others Bareilwi, Shi’i and Muslim Brotherhood (Gilliat-Ray 2006: 57; Lewis in Peter & Ortega 2015: 238). Most cater for male students, though several are female-only. In addition, the co-educational Muslim College was set up in London in 1987, and two other mixed seminaries followed, in Leicester and Oxford (Gilliat-Ray 2006: 59-60). Cambridge Muslim College, also co-educational, was founded in 2009 (see below).

Dar al-`ulum recruitment and curricula have been described by Lewis (1994) and Gilliat-Ray (2006), with both authors recognising the conservative approach of seminaries and their reticence to change. A divergence was noted between most ‘hermetically-sealed’ South-
Case study 8: The making of a Salafi Muslim woman – university experiences

In her ethnographic study, Anabel Inge (2017) examined the formative experiences, decision-making, commitments and identity practices of a group of young women in the UK who turned to Salafism (in this case, a non-violent form of ultra-conservative Islam).

The young women she interviewed saw university as ‘a fresh start, a chance to reinvent oneself and re-evaluate goals’ (2017: 80), but one that could also be culturally alienating (especially its drinking culture and free mixing between the sexes). Furthermore, the content of university courses – whether involving secular western philosophy and law or evolutionary theory – could be challenging, even haram (forbidden) (Inge 2017: 167).

One young Muslim described a period of experimentation and informed decision-making undertaken with new friends at university:

Along with a group of Muslim girlfriends, she went from talk to talk – all of them, she said, were ‘trying to find themselves’ and to resolve their Islamic identities. Confused by the “melting pot of ideologies” they encountered on campus, they tried to make sense of it by researching Islam together […] The friends would transfer allegiances when “it didn’t sound right”. This eventually led them to a Salafi ISoc splinter group.’ (Inge 2017: 81-82)

This young woman and others interviewed by Inge expressed a range of feelings and experiences from their early months at college. For one, this was a period of exposure to Muslim diversity: ‘It was only when I got to college I realized there was different types of Muslims, you know – I’m being serious! ... It was something that I was not taught.’ (Inge 2017: 77). This diversity was witnessed in the ideological rivalry between preachers, through the emergence of splinter groups, and in the range of views on offer from moderate to extreme (2017: 80-81). In their search for a form of pure Islam, the young women were repeatedly frustrated by the focus, not on Islamic knowledge, but on current affairs and global grievances (2017: 81).

Speaking about Al-Muhajiroun (an extremist movement influential within some London ISocs in the period prior to Inge’s study), one young woman noted the initial welcome given to young seekers like herself: ‘They welcome you, they take you and they take your number, they become friends with you, and it’s just it was a lot more open [than some other Salafi groups].’ (Inge 2017: 85) But she also exposed the underlying power relations when she said of one leader: ‘He had the big beard, trousers were above the ankles, he was much older than us, he seemed like he was much more knowledgeable than we could ever be, and we were just these two little girls.’ (Inge 2017: 79)

Despite the claims to gender equality within student societies, the young women could see the hierarchies and power relations at work. They countered this by offering one another practical, ideological and emotional support and friendship in their mutual quest for Islamic knowledge and faithful practice.


Asian inspired seminaries and a small number of others (e.g., the Muslim College and Hawza Illmiya) eager to be more open and to obtain external validation (Gilliat-Ray 2006: 73-74).

A further issue raised by Gilliat-Ray (2006) was affordability. Studying at a dar al-'ulum was and continues to be far cheaper than the alternatives in further and higher education. Furthermore, there is as yet no Islamically acceptable loan system for those Muslim students and their families who eschew interest-based loan arrangements for the repayment of tuition fees (Inge 2017: 166; Timol 2018). This acts as a form of discrimination against Muslim young people and compounds the problem of educational underachievement associated with low income families (MCB 2015).

As a result of concerns about the risk of radicalisation post-7/7, the UK Government began to intervene in seminary education and imam training (Lewis in Peter & Ortega 2015). A review on Muslim faith leaders reported in 2010, and various initiatives were introduced to improve training provision and to link Islamic
An example of such an institution is the Cambridge Muslim College (Sinclair 2016), founded with a mission ‘to develop Muslim faith leadership through world-class education, training and research based on a dialogue between the Islamic intellectual tradition and the ideas and circumstances of the modern world (Cambridge Muslim College 2018). It is co-educational, non-denominational, and independent (not funded by the UK Government or other states).

Fully embracing the need to engage faith and modernity and to set high academic and pastoral standards, it developed a Diploma in Contextual Islamic Studies & Leadership (accredited by the British Accreditation Council for Independent Further and Higher Education). The Diploma was designed to build on knowledge and qualifications in Islam obtained elsewhere, and to help those with a background in traditional Islamic studies to go on ‘to join the mainstream of British further education’ (Diploma Prospectus 2017-18). In a similar spirit, in 2017 the College launched a BA (Hons) in Islamic Studies, drawing on the curricula of two renowned Middle Eastern institutions, the al-Fath Academy (Ma‘had al-Fath) in Damascus and al-Azhar University in Cairo, adding modules on contextual knowledge and skills, and validated in the UK by the Open University.

The programmes have attracted Muslim students from all over the UK, including those from traditional seminaries seeking to broaden their education and skills in preparation for employment (e.g., as imams, chaplains, counsellors etc). According to Morris (2018), it has trained ‘a new generation of scholars who are critically engaged, trained in Islamic pedagogy and knowledge, but to British higher education standards and norms’.
5. TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS: DIASPORAS, CHARITIES AND ACTIVISM

5.1 TRANSNATIONAL AND DIASPORIC CONNECTIONS

There are a variety of ways in which British Muslims connect to Muslims elsewhere, and multiple motivations for doing so. They may understand it to be part of their Islamic duty and practice; they may wish to stay connected to family members or to significant places; they may interpret it as being part of the global ummah or Islamic community; they may want to help Muslims elsewhere who are suffering or in need. In general, there is a divide between the perspectives of different generations of British Muslims, with members of the first generation retaining the deepest connections with their place of origin (where possible through homeland visits and a strong homeland consciousness), and many second and third generation Muslims espousing a universalising Islam which they believe transcends culture and ethnicity, one which accords with their more ‘cosmopolitan consciousness’ (McLoughlin 2010: 228; see also Janmohamed 2016).

One important means of transnational interconnection for British Muslims is religious travel. Every Muslim is enjoined to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca – the Hajj – at least once in his or her lifetime (it being one of Islam’s ‘five pillars’), and some 25,000 British Muslims make the journey annually (Knott 2016: 5-6; McLoughlin 2015, 2016). In support of this process is an industry of community organisations, travel agents, tour operators, welfare providers, and local and international carriers (McLoughlin 2015, 2016). The Hajj is not the only religious travel undertaken, however (Akhtar 2014). Depending on which branch of Islam and Muslim group they belong to, British Muslims may visit Sufi shrines, Shi’a mosques or sites associated with the Prophet Muhammad, in the Middle East or South Asia. These examples of ritual circulation illustrate the importance for British Muslims of religious travel, as both an individual spiritual commitment and a communal practice (Eickelman & Piscatori 1990). McLoughlin (2010: 223; see also Mandaville 2001: Chapter 4) refers to Islam as ‘a travelling faith’.

Further, of continuing significance are those connections which British Muslims retain with their extended families, in the homeland and beyond. Some

Case Study 9: British Bangladeshi children’s visits to Bangladesh

In his study of British Bangladeshi children’s transnational lives, Benjamin Zeitlyn examined the role of family visits to Sylhet in Bangladesh in their socialisation and identity formation.

They involve careful preparation, planning and imagining beforehand, and reminiscences long afterwards […] Families save up for many months to raise the considerable amounts of money necessary to pay for air fares, gifts for relatives and expenses. Thousands of pounds may have to be borrowed from friends or on credit cards and be paid off for many months afterwards. (2012: 953)

These visits expose them to the place where their parents were born and to the people and places of importance to their extended family. They see how others live and learn how to behave in this other part of their world. They often find this environment ‘disorientating and unsettling’, but at other times it leads to ‘feelings of companionship, privilege, fun and freedom’ (2012: 966). Some feel very much at home, whilst others are just reminded that London is their home.

The visit is a key experience in the socialisation of British Bangladeshi children. It is an emotional and sensory rollercoaster for children which challenges and confirms their sense of who they are. (2012: 953)

Benjamin Zeitlyn, Maintaining Transnational Social Fields: The Role of Visits to Bangladesh for British Bangladeshi Children. (2012; see also Zeitlyn 2015)
Muslim communities, particularly those from Pakistan and Bangladesh, continue to have active transnational links with their countries of origin, involving regular family visits, the sending of remittances, marriages, and religious and political ties (Glick Schiller et al 1992; Zeitlyn 2012, 2014). Some lead ‘multi-local’ lives, with material and emotional investment and time spent in both the UK and their other home (McLoughlin 2014).

Other Muslims – especially refugees – retain strong memories, emotions and cultural ties, but fewer practical and social ones with their place of origin. These connections may have been severed by war or conflict, and by the displacement and dispersal of families, sometimes over many centuries. Their active ties may now be with family members in other parts of the world, in the US, Canada or Germany, rather than in Iraq, Iran or Yemen. They share a diasporic consciousness despite their lack of effective ties with a homeland (Knott 2011a; Knott & McLoughlin 2010). Although, second and third generations may feel less physically connected than their parents or grandparents, they nevertheless retain a distinct sense of ethnic identity, and may well seek to explore their roots later in life (see Case Study 10 in 5.3 below).

5.2 STAYING IN TOUCH: TECHNOLOGY AND THE MEDIA

The ability of migrants to stay connected has changed as technology and travel have become more sophisticated and affordable (Mandaville 2001). From airmail and telephones, through early online forums and email, to mobile telephony, Skype and social media, communications platforms have developed to support cheap and regular contact between dispersed family and friends. The increasing speed and decreasing cost of travel and international financial transactions have made visiting and remitting money easier.

Changes to information technology have also helped people stay in touch with homeland politics and religion. For British Muslims, this was especially important for the first generation whose family members kept them in touch with events. This was supplemented by access to ethnic media, including newspapers, radio and satellite TV, in Urdu, Punjabi, Bengali, Turkish and other community languages. Later generations are less familiar with these languages and less directly involved in homeland politics, and more at ease with both an English language minority media directed at their needs and interests and the global Islamic media.

In her study of the British Muslim press in the 2000s, Ahmed (2005: 110) noted the need, post-Rushdie affair, for English language media addressing the needs and interests of second generation British Muslims. The nature of the topics covered had changed, with a move from ethnic politics to issues concerning the lives of young people in Britain. A variety of publications were launched or given a face-lift. They had different audiences and reflected different perspectives on Islam (Ahmed 2005: 113), and included Q News, The Muslim News, Crescent International, Khilafah, and The Invitation. Muslim current affairs and religious knowledge were among the top reasons that British Muslims gave for reading such publications, and readers said they felt more confident and a greater sense of belonging to an active community with common interests as a result (Ahmed 2005: 118-121).

Although several of these publications can still be found online – only one continues to be published in print form – three are no longer produced at all. British Muslim news and discussion continues to be publicly available but is now mostly online, on websites and Facebook groups. Despite the move to digital, in one study of Arab diasporas, Georgiou (2013) found that the assumed boundary between ‘old’ and ‘new’ media did not apply. Television, for example, had retained its special place, alongside and in connection with social media.

Transnational television especially is popular among participants and illustrates a powerful case of an old medium being adapted, reinvented and reinforced in its appeal in the digital era, linking generations as well as media experiences. The space around television becomes more than merely a space of consumption. It becomes a space of emotional proximity, regular exchanges and of ordinary interaction, in similar ways as it has been for decades [...]. Only, in this case, the familial and the domestic are not rooted in a single place. As an Iraqi participant in London said in a focus group, different members of her transnational family...
Different forms of media have become interconnected as family members socialise across time zones and national boundaries.

Islamic radio stations, many with local licenses, have broadcast in the UK since the 1990s, particularly at the time of Ramadan. Satellite TV channels have aired for more than a decade now, in Urdu, English, and, in some cases, in other community languages. The Islam Channel is UK-based but broadcasts globally. Founded in 2004, it fulfilled the need for alternative broadcasting among Muslims in the UK and abroad (Islam Channel 2016). A more recent example is British Muslim TV, which was launched in 2014 by Sky Digital (see also 5.4 below). It aims to provide educational and entertaining content that the channel’s website says is ‘confidently Muslim and comfortably British’ (British Muslim TV 2018).

This array of communication channels is a reminder that British Muslims have diverse identities – national, ethnic, political and religious – which they draw on and express at different times, for different reasons and using different media. British Bangladeshi Muslims, for example, have a number of both local and transnational allegiances (Begum & Eade 2005; Knott 2011b; Redclift 2013; Zeitlyn 2015). These include various political organisations in Bangladesh and Tower Hamlets, Islamic transnational networks (Sufi, Islamist and Salafi), and UK-based religious institutions like the East London Mosque or the Brick Lane Jamme Masjid (Begum & Eade 2005; DeHanas 2016), all of which have their own ways of communicating.

As a result of the close and regular transnational ties of the large British Bangladeshi community, the effects of political conflict and violence in Bangladesh are felt deeply in the UK (Redclift 2013; Zeitlyn 2014). In 2013, for example, the impact of sentencing by the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) of those tried for offences during Bangladesh’s liberation war of 1971 generated significant political debate and online activism in the UK, and this continued with subsequent terrorist attacks on ‘atheist bloggers’ and journalists in Bangladesh (Zeitlyn 2014).

The move to digital platforms and, increasingly, to social media, whilst empowering for British Muslims, has nevertheless raised some security concerns, especially in relation to potential online radicalisation and the recruitment of young people to international jihadi activism (Gill et al 2015; Conway 2017). Many of the parents of young British Muslims who travelled to Syria, for instance, said they believed their offspring had been radicalised or recruited online (Webb 2017). The ability of extremist movements to draw on social and other media for their strategic aims has equally become a matter of concern. Islamic State’s ‘propaganda machine’ (Winter 2015), for example, was shown to be flexible, adaptive to a variety of audiences, and technically sophisticated; whilst its media strategy deployed a diverse array of platforms to appeal to the hearts and minds of potential sympathisers, but also, through the depiction of its military prowess and atrocities, to the worst fears of critics (Farwell 2014; Winter 2015).

According to Gill et al (2015: 35), anxieties and assumptions about the role of the Internet in terrorism have not been borne out by the evidence: ‘The Internet has not led to a rise in terrorism. It is largely a facilitative tool; radicalisation is enabled by the Internet rather than being dependent upon it.’ (Gill et al 2015: 35) Furthermore, Brinkerhoff (2009) has argued that ‘digital diasporas’ have the potential to ease rather than exacerbate security concerns, whilst also ‘improv[ing] diaspora members’ quality of life in the host society, and contrib[uting] to socio-economic development in the homeland’.

5.3 DIASPORAS, DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY

The connections that migrants maintain, to families, diasporic communities and transnational networks, raise development as well as security issues for governments and international organisations. On the development side, they lead to investment back home: in house and mosque building, education and training, businesses and charities, but also in the circulation of skills, technology and knowledge (Page & Mercer 2010). Diasporas account for significant percentages of GDP in developing countries (see Brinkerhoff (2009), for examples). It is not unusual for governments to mobilise their diaspora communities,
as the Government of Bangladesh has sought to do by providing tax breaks on investment and selling special bonds to attract foreign currency (ILO Country Office for Bangladesh 2014). Much of the support from individuals within the diaspora, however, goes directly into households rather than into community organisations or charities, suggesting that policy makers and development practitioners have not yet fully understood or capitalised upon the motivations and processes involved in what Page and Mercer refer to as ‘social remittances’ (Page & Mercer 2012: 4).

When it comes to matters of security, diaspora communities have been cast as both peace-breakers and peacemakers (Knott & McLoughlin 2010: 12; Turner 2010). At times they have been known to stoke a civil conflict back home, but equally they have supported peace-building initiatives.

Diaspora communities are able to mobilise quickly in support of a cause, raise funds, exploit social media, lobby political leaders, and use their networks to transfer information and resources. Among the western Somali diaspora, for example, some young men travelled to Somalia to fight the Islamist cause – against the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, and later with al-Shabaab – whilst other diaspora Somalis chose instead to contribute through consciousness-raising activities and funding to support post-conflict reconstruction and development (Elmi 2010: 101; see also Joosse et al 2015).

There are multiple reasons for choosing the path of the transnational activist, whether as fighter or fundraiser. Some are motivated by the idea of the ummah or global Muslim community to provide support for fellow Muslims and to defend Islam against outsiders (Akhtar 2005; Gale & O’Toole 2009; Hegghammer 2010: 73). The concept of the ummah is powerful because it conveys the idea that Muslims are connected across time and place, irrespective of their various differences (Hamid 2016; Jammohamed 2016; Mandaville 2001; McLoughlin 2010). As a theological ideal, it transcends the barriers of national or ethnic identity (though in practice, like other religious groups, Muslims are divided by cultural and sectarian preferences). Only a small minority of those inspired by the call to respond to the suffering of Muslims in other countries have taken up arms, however; most have organised or joined public protests, run charity fundraising events or distributed

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**Case Study 10: The Kurdish Muslim diaspora and transnational politics**

British Kurdish refugees hail from different Middle Eastern states (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey) but remain connected to one another by a shared political consciousness of their transnational Kurdish identity, culture and ‘statelessness’ (though governments in their countries of origin dispute this). Turkish Kurds began arriving in Britain in the 1980s, following a period of repression at home (Sentas 2016: 902). Kurdish refugees have arrived from Iraq, Iran and more recently Syria, since that time (Griffiths 2002; Wikipedia: Kurds in the United Kingdom 2017). Approximately 50,000 people self-identified as ‘Kurdish’ in the 2011 population census (Wikipedia: Kurds in the United Kingdom 2017).

Unlike other diasporas, in which the ethnic politics of the first generation may be of minor interest to their children, many second and third generation British Kurds share the aspirations of their parents for a ‘homeland’, and join the struggle for identity, language and rights (Kurdish Cultural Centre 2010; The Kurdish Project 2015; Sentas 2016). The UK’s Kurdish Muslim community includes those with ties to homeland organisations, some of which are outlawed at home and abroad. Turkish Kurds in the UK, for example, have been subject to policing and security operations as a result of their links to the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, an organisation proscribed in the UK since 2002 for its links with terrorism (Sentas 2016: 903). Turkish Kurds have been warned not to collect or send funds back to the PKK (Sentas 2016: 903).

Britain’s Kurdish community has also been the subject of scrutiny concerning violence against women, particularly with reference to a number of ‘honour killings’ carried out in the 2000s (Begikhani et al 2010; Hague et al 2013). Research with relevant agencies and individuals in both the UK and Iraqi Kurdistan identified the roots of the issue in Kurdish traditions of male-dominance within the family and in gender-based customs and values, and not in the teachings of Islam.
5.4 MUSLIM CHARITIES

One means of supporting Islamic causes in and beyond the UK has been through Muslim charities, of which there are some 3,000 (Barylo 2016: 392). As well as accepting donations in support of appeals to help refugees, victims of environmental disasters and those in conflict zones, these charities have assisted Muslims to fulfil their annual obligation to give of a portion of their surplus wealth to the poor (zakat) (Knott 2016). They range from large international ventures to small grassroots concerns. As well as being an expression of zakat, they are a demonstration of active Muslim citizenship, locally and globally (Barylo 2018).

Islamic Relief was the first large UK-based Muslim charity. Founded in 1984 by postgraduate students to support disaster and emergency relief, it now has field offices in more than forty countries and undertakes development programmes for food, water, education and health, as well as relief (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 257; Islamic Relief 2017). It joined the UK Disasters Emergency Committee in 2005, and has now become one of the world’s largest Islamic NGOs (Islamic Relief 2017).

Islamic Relief was followed in 1985 by Muslim Aid, founded in response to the famine in Africa, and in 1993 by Muslim Hands, which focused initially on providing humanitarian support during the war in Bosnia (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 257; Muslim Aid 2017; Muslim Hands 2018). They all belong to the Muslim Charities Forum, an umbrella organisation for international NGOs (INGOs) run by Muslims and based in the UK (Muslim Charities Forum 2017). These and other large charities operate like businesses, often using a corporate model (Barylo 2016: 392).

A different model has been adopted by Penny Appeal. Founded in 2009 by the entrepreneur, Adeem Younis (founder of SingleMuslim.com), its principle is ‘We take small change and make a big difference with it’ (Penny Appeal 2018).

Penny Appeal’s way of doing charity is simple, and has a massive impact. We make charitable giving affordable and rewarding, ensuring everyone can help the poor and needy by donating just a few pennies each day. (Penny Appeal 2018)

The charity supports many of the same causes as Islamic Relief and the other big charities (as well as helping UK groups in need), but uses different methods. It has its own YouTube channel showcasing its work, and ‘is responsible for a new wave of events around the country – from Muslim pantomimes and comedy shows, to Islamic conferences and training programmes’ (Morris 2018). Through advertising, it supports the work of British Muslim TV.

Smaller charities have attracted the attention of young Muslims as a form of engaged activism. As Barylo (2016: 384) noted: ‘Volunteers are attracted by grassroots charities because of their flexibility, and their ability to deliver concrete results quickly. They are seen as a more attractive form of politics than slow bureaucratic NGOs, or the government.’ Not all young Muslims have the same motivations, however. Although some see their charitable work as an expression of their Islamic identity and moral code (Dehanas 2016: 192), others are less concerned by the boundary between the religious and the secular and more motivated by the desire to live and work ethically (Barylo 2018: 7).

Proven cases of abuse by registered Muslim charities are rare in the UK; indeed, the regulation and oversight of such organisations make the financing of crime or terrorism difficult, even if this were their goal. Other funding routes and mechanisms may be easier to exploit and more profitable. In the case of IS, for example, financing strategies included the acquisition of ‘profits from criminal activities, the control of oil and gas reserves, extorting agriculture, the sale of antiquities, and illegal taxation’ (Ryder 2016: 84).

5.5 TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: FOREIGN FIGHTERS

Researchers have debated the definition of a ‘foreign fighter’ (see Malet 2015), and have offered a variety of explanations – social, psychological, political, economic and cultural – for why people support conflicts abroad...
Case study 11: Muslim charities and terrorist support

Muslim charities in the UK, US and elsewhere have faced allegations that they provide material support to terrorists or have links with terrorist organisations, though the charities themselves counter this by saying they are part of the solution not the problem.

There have been a number of investigations of Muslim NGOs, and several have been banned from operating in particular countries. For example, Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) was banned from Israel and the United Arab Emirates in 2014 for alleged support for Hamas. An independent audit found no evidence of links (Price 2014). The bank, HSBC, severed its ties with IRW in 2015 because of its work in high-risk jurisdictions (Gadher 2016). Muslim Aid was investigated by the Charity Commission for England and Wales in 2010 for funding terrorist-related groups, an allegation that was not substantiated (Holt 2010).

In 2015, a report published by the Overseas Development Institute examined the issues faced by INGOs seeking to provide humanitarian aid in the context of counter-terrorism (Metcalfe-Hough et al 2015). It recommended that Muslim organisations become more engaged, open and transparent, and that they ‘should be more proactive in raising public awareness of the important work they do in some of the world’s most dangerous places, as well as the values and standards that they adhere to and their part in the wider British aid effort’ (Metcalfe-Hough et al 2015: 26). A key concern was how such organisations could be fortified against the threats of reputational damage in the media or physical attacks, both of which damage their ability to conduct their charitable activities.

Religiously active young people also join Islamic groups to escape the stifling inward-looking politics of the older generation or to find a vehicle for opposition to discrimination and exclusion in wider British society as well as seeking strong friendship networks and wanting to feel part of something bigger than themselves […] A sense of moral outrage about Muslim suffering is used by activists for recruitment. The first generation of young Islamic activists in the 1990s witnessed the first Gulf War, the US invasion of Somalia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and persecution of Muslims in Chechnya and Kosovo. The current generation are likely to be motivated by concerns of the second Palestinian Intifada, the ‘War on Terror’, in particular the western military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, the human rights violations in Guantanamo and the rise of Islamophobic sentiment across Europe. Other factors include anti-terrorist legislation and policing tactics, religious discrimination experienced on the street or at the workplace and the way Islam is portrayed in the media. (Hamid 2011: 257-258; see also Pantucci 2015)

Here, Hamid succinctly summarises some of the principal factors driving young British Muslim activists in the 1990s and 2000s. Maher (2013) adds that ‘many of those travelling to Syria as foreign fighters are male; in their twenties, of South-Asian ethnic origin, with recent connections to higher education, and with links to individuals or groups who have international connections’ (see also Silverman 2017).

Those fighters at the heart of a struggle often explain things differently from their critical peers back home, or from those ex-members who have chosen to desist from extremism or violence. Fighters may be serious about their beliefs and commitments, but their peers may think they have been duped by ideologues (Webb 2017; Joosse et al 2015). Speaking of young people drawn into joining and fighting with al-Shabaab, one Canadian-Somali asserted that,

I think it’s a cult really I don’t know what minds you’re at to be brainwashed but it comes down to anything, like if you are
easily, if you meet the wrong person or the people and they easily motivate you, because, I mean, there are people that are very charming in a sense and like they, whatever they’re saying you actually believe because they’re so passionate about it, and like so driven about it, like you just want to believe. (Joosse et al 2015: 821)

Furthermore, those who have participated and then stepped away from violent extremism acknowledge that, whilst they once shared these beliefs, they now see them as erroneous or misguided (e.g., Husain 2010). One young Salafi woman, who had attended meetings held by al-Muhajiroun, said, ‘I knew anything to do with Anjem [Choudary] was bad news, and these were definitely not the people I wanted to associate with, and they were definitely not following Qur’an or sunna. So I left and never looked back – except at how naïve I was’ (Inge 2017: 87). An ex-member of al-Muhajiroun, Adam Deen, stated that ‘the narrative I absorbed was a skewed interpretation of Islam that taught me to de-humanise non-Muslims. They taught me that to question their ideology would be to question God’ (Deen 2016). Such views were not only expressed by critical Muslims but also by non-Muslims asked to reflect on the motivations of British Muslim foreign fighters (Silva & Crilley 2017). Although some people stated very negative opinions, others were more empathetic, and alluded to brainwashing, adventure-seeking, humanitarian motives, and the impact of grievances about the treatment of Muslims in the UK and beyond (Silva & Crilley 2017: 9-15).

In a first wave, from the 1980s to 2000s, small numbers of British Muslim men travelled abroad to fight, either with their compatriots in homeland conflicts (e.g., in Kashmir or Somalia), or alongside Muslim brothers in national or civil struggles (e.g., in Bosnia, Afghanistan) (Bowen 2014; Elmi 2010; Hegghammer 2010; Kohlmann 2007; Nesser 2015; Pantucci 2015). According to one of its leaders, the Salafi organisation, JIMAS (see 6.4.2 below), sent some 50 people to fight in Bosnia in the 1990s (Bowen 2014: 61), and some members travelled to Kashmir and trained with the jihadi group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Bowen 2014: 62).

In interviews with Kohlmann (2007), British Muslim fighters who had participated in the Bosnian conflict expressed their sense of fulfilment in having done their collective duty to help Muslims in need, and of personal merit in following the way of the Prophet and his companions (Kohlmann 2007). One, for example, said,

I watch the TV and tears roll down my face when I see the Muslims in Bosnia, Muslims in Palestine, Muslims in Kashmir. And then I come [to Bosnia] and you feel a sense of satisfaction. You feel that you are fulfilling your duty. You feel that you are doing what the Prophet and his companions done [sic] 1400 years ago. (Kohlmann 2007: 5)

This was mirrored in testimonies by Swedish Muslim fighters who had returned from conflicts in Afghanistan and Bosnia: ‘You see injustices in a Muslim land and want to set things right’: ‘we were fighting to help Muslims in Bosnia. We wanted to build a state that forbids what is haram [i.e., forbidden] and upholds what is halal [i.e., allowed].’ (Nilsson 2015: 348)

From 2012, in a further wave, British and other European Muslims – including a minority of women and children – travelled either independently or as part of a network to join those fighting in Syria or Iraq, under the banner of the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra or for other jihadi groups (Dawson & Amarasingam 2017; Maher 2014; Nesser 2015; Webb 2017). Those from the UK (approximately 850 of them) hailed from diverse ethnic heritage communities, and included those of British Algerian, Bangladeshi, Eritrean, Pakistani, Palestinian, Somali, Sudanese and Yemeni backgrounds, as well as White converts (BBC News 2017). They travelled from various parts of the UK, including London, Luton, Manchester, Bradford, Cardiff, Portsmouth, and the Midlands (BBC News 2017; Silverman 2017; Webb 2017). They came from different social classes and had different levels of education (Webb 2017).

Key players in this network were seasoned foreign fighters, but many were new to the idea of international jihad. Although the influences on them varied, they shared some of the commitments of those who had travelled earlier to Bosnia and Afghanistan: the obligation to undertake jihad, serve others and attain paradise.

There are those who are principally motivated by the region’s human suffering, whom we
call missionary jihadis; there are martyrdom seekers, who regard the conflict as a shortcut to paradise; there are those simply seeking adventure, for whom the supposed masculinity of it all has great appeal; and, finally, there are long-standing radicals for whom the conflict represents a chance to have the fight they had been waiting for. (Maher 2014)

But to these were added motivations specific to the cause: the desire to build an Islamic state or Caliphate, and to live under shari’ah law (Dawson & Amarasingam 2017; Nesser 2015; Vidino 2014). One foreign fighter described his actions as follows:

*We emigrated because we don’t want to live in the system anymore. And the system is the western governments. Their democracy [...] But we have our own way of life, which is called Islam. It is a complete way of life. It is a religion but also a governance. It has laws and ways in which you do everything from how you go to the toilet, drink water, and brush your teeth to how you worship Allah and how you run a business.* (Dawson & Amarasingam 2017: 201-202)

Whilst many young British Muslims have become ‘confidently Muslim and comfortably British’ (British Muslim TV 2018), a zealous minority have sought to fulfil their spiritual identity and antipathy to the west by joining the quest to build an Islamic state by violent means. By October 2017, of those identified in the BBC British jihadist database (279 in total), about 150 fighters and their associates had either died or remained in Syria or Iraq; more than 100 had been convicted of terrorism offences; and about half of those to have made the journey had returned to the UK (BBC News 2017). This was broadly supported by data gathered by ICCT a year earlier, when the number of foreign fighters from the UK was estimated at between 700 and 760, with about half having returned, the majority of others remaining, and about 70 deaths reported (ICCT 2016: 40).

Such figures have generated fears that those returning from conflicts abroad may carry out acts of terrorism at home. Analysis has suggested however that this might be less of an issue than the need to support reintegration:

**Thomas Hegghammer’s analyses of foreign fighter-related attacks, for instance, assert that merely one in nine returnees perpetrated attacks in the West between 1990–2010, with that number decreasing vastly for the Syrian conflict, to one in 360. Thus, for the majority of returning foreign fighters, assistance in returning to normal life and dealing with mental illness such as post-traumatic stress disorder is a more necessary policy response. (Reed & Pohl 2017: 3; Hegghammer & Nesser 2015)**

How to handle British Muslim foreign fighters returning to the UK has become an important matter for Government, security practitioners (the police and the intelligence, probation and prison services), legal teams, social services, policy makers, and for Muslim communities. Issues of disengagement and desistance from terrorism, political violence and extremism, and of reintegration, have been debated, and a range of Government and community programmes put in place (Marsden 2017). At the same time, considerable investment has been made in the drive to prevent radicalisation and build resilience in order to avoid others being drawn into violent extremism.
6. BRITISH ISLAM: SECTARIAN MOVEMENTS AND NETWORKS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Three quarters of Muslims in the UK consider British to be their only national identity (Muslim Council of Britain 2015: 34). But for some, they are ‘Muslim first’, with their religious rather than ethnic or national identity being of most importance to them (DeHanas 2016; Franceschelli & O’Brien 2015). This is especially true for young Muslims. Islam is their principal orienting identity, not only for reasons of piety, but also because it overrides cultural and national differences.

[I chose] Muslim first because it is my most strong identity and I think it breaks down all barriers of every other identity. As a Muslim, I don’t have a colour, I don’t have a language, I don’t have a nationality. It kind of bonds me to billions of people without those barriers. (Young British Bangladeshi woman, in DeHanas 2016: 69)

Being a Muslim is my religious belief. Being British is the society in which I’ve grown up and helped me form into the person I am now. Being a Muslim is more important to me than anything, whether that’s family, ethnicity, or nationality. (British Muslim student, male, in Song 2012: 153)

This is in contrast to their parents’ generation. In an article on Pakistani women in the UK across the generations, Akhtar (2014: 232) quotes one pioneer migrant as saying: ‘We were Muslims but we didn’t know Islam.’ The rise in importance of public religious identification is generally held to date from the late 1980s and The Satanic Verses controversy, when the defence of the Prophet Muhammad and of Muslim identity and values challenged the liberal priority of freedom of expression (Akhtar 1989; Modood 1990; Pantucci 2015). This was a time when it became clear that British Muslims – particularly those whose heritage lay in South Asia – saw themselves primarily in terms of Islam and religious discrimination rather than race and racism (Modood 1990a: 131; 1990b). A new and more assertive Islamic identity began to develop among British Muslims (Knott & Khokher 1993; Lewis 1994, 2007; Hamid 2011, 2016).

In the 1960s, in the initial stages of community development, Muslims in Britain had made little reference to different schools of thought or Islamic traditions.

What happened is that when we came to Britain, the people who were praying in the mosque, I remember, we were praying together. There were no Deobandis, no Barelwis, no Ahl-i Hadith, nobody. We were glad to have a mosque and to be able to pray. Whoever established it usually was going to do it his own way, in his own tradition... We didn’t mind what it was as long as Islam was practised. (Sher Azam, ex-President, Bradford Council of Mosques, in Geaves 1996: 159)

Once communities were able to finance and support more than one mosque, however, traditional divisions began to have an influence (Lewis 1994; Pantucci 2015). This was initially most noticeable in areas of South Asian Muslim settlement in which Deobandis and Barelwis began to establish separate community organisations and mosques (see below). In the 1970s and 1980s the first generation of British Muslims in many ways sought to recreate the Islamic institutions of their homelands.

More recent Muslim migrants, from different ethnic and national backgrounds, have generally started out by attending existing mosques near to their homes. However, as they have become more settled and organised, they too have opened their own mosques and community centres.

In the UK today, a large number of Islamic movements and networks are represented, most with their origins in either South Asia or the Middle East (Gilliat-Ray 2010:...
This not only reflects the historical presence of Muslim migrants from different parts of the world, but – in the case of Middle Eastern reform movements particularly – of young Muslims’ search for Islamic purity and authenticity.

Some young people, through the intersection of alienation from parental values, religious institutions and marginalisation from mainstream society [...] have identified with international Muslim political causes and have become receptive to the work of active revivalist organisations. (Hamid 2011: 252)

It is important here to distinguish between Islam and Islamism, the former referring to the global religion as a whole in all its unity and diversity, and the latter to what is often referred to as ‘political Islam’. Since its popular inception in 1970s Algeria to refer to political ideology and activity inspired by Islam (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 99; Hamid 2007: 146), ‘Islamisme’ has been used of a wide-range of very different groups, often pejoratively. In the UK, ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist’ have been used generally of groups and individuals informed by the revivalist Islamic movements, Jama’at-i Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood (see below; Hamid 2016), but care needs to be taken in the use of this terminology to avoid inaccuracy or over-simplification (Peter & Ortega 2014: xv). As Maher & Frampton (2009: 18) noted, ‘there is no single “mode” of Islamist expression’. Islamist groups range from non-violent to violent extremist movements as well as those closer to mainstream Sunni Islam.

Almost always, Islamists project their view of Islam as the ‘true Islam’ and pass off disputed theology as uncontested truth. They presume to constitute the whole of the faith, rather than just a faction within it. Yet, it is of paramount importance to distinguish between the two – Islam and Islamism – particularly when far-right political parties such as the BNP [British National Party] seek to deny this distinction and conflate all Muslims with Islamists, stoking the fears of an apprehensive population. (Maher & Frampton 2009: 19)

One thing all Islamic sects or movements – including those referred to here as Islamist – have in common is their claim to authenticity, and to ‘what constitutes correct, genuine Islamic practice and interpretation’ (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 59). In general, Muslims prefer the term ‘school of thought’ (maslak) to ‘sect’ (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 55). Different groups or schools of thought have emerged for social, political and theological reasons, including differing attitudes to the law or society, divergent views on Islamic or secular governance, and differences of opinion about Qur’anic interpretation, authority, what constitutes authentic Islam and how to be a good Muslim.

Academic studies of Islamic movements and networks in the UK are wide-ranging, with some scholars describing multiple groups (Bowen 2014; Geaves 1996; Gilliat-Ray 2010; Hamid 2011, 2016; Lewis 1994), and others focusing on a single group or, in some cases, a family of related organisations (e.g., Geaves (2000) and Geaves & Gabriel (2013) on Sufism in Britain; Inge (2017: 24-43) on Salafis). Examples of studies of single groups include those on Tablighi Jamaat (King 1997; Pieri 2015; Sikand 1998; Timol 2015), and on extremist groups such as Hizb-ut Tahrir (Hamid 2007) and al-Muhajiroun (Bailey 2017; Kenney 2017; Kenney et al 2017; Wiktorowicz 2005). Although not accepted by other Muslims as Islamic, the Ahmadiyya have been the focus of several studies (Barzani 2011; Geaves 2017; cf. Valentine 2008a).

6.2 SUNNI AND SHI’A ISLAM IN THE UK

The most basic distinction within Islam – in the UK and beyond – is between Sunni and Shi’a. Sunni and Shi’a differences have their origin in an early dispute about who should lead after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. His followers disagreed over issues of succession and authority, with some favouring the Prophet’s closest male companion, Abu Bakr, and others, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali. As followers of the Prophet’s example (sunnah), those who supported Abu Bakr, and later the Umayyads, became known as Sunni, whereas those who followed Ali and his sons were referred to as Shi’a, the Party of ‘Ali.

The majority of British Muslims, 85 per cent, are Sunni (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 61). The many Sunni movements and networks will be discussed in 6.3 and 6.4 below. The remainder are Shi’a. The majority of
British Shi’a Muslims are of Pakistani heritage, with others originating from Iran or Iraq (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 61; Spellman 2004; Change Institute 2009c). In 2017, around six per cent of the UK’s 1,825 mosques were run by and for Shi’as (by Twelver Shi’as (including Khojas), Ismailis and Bohras) (Naqshbandi 2017). Key organisations include the Al-Khoei Foundation which represents Shi’a interests and runs several schools, the Institute for Ismaili Studies, the Khoja al-Mahdi Institute and the Hawza Illmiya, a further and higher education college (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 63). The renowned Iranian marja or religious authority, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is influential in the UK from his base at Najaf in Iraq (Bowen 2014). His European headquarters is at the Imam Ali Foundation in north-west London.

A traditional marker in Sunni Islam has been the principal Islamic law school (madhhab) with which a group identifies. These schools emerged from the work of four Islamic scholars, and are known by their names: the Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Shafi'i schools. Some Sunni groups associated with Salafism, however, favour direct reference to the sources of Islam (the Qur’an and sunnah), thus by-passing the schools of law and their leaders (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 72-73; Hamid 2016; Inge 2017: 15-16).

There are various ways to categorise Sunni movements. I will begin with those associated with South Asian Islam, as they were the earliest to be established in the UK, and will then turn to those Middle Eastern movements which have become more widespread in the last 25 years. In the discussion that follows, reference will be made in each case to the type of movement, its origins, theological and political ideas, attitudes to wider society, presence and location in the UK, factions and divisions, and, where relevant, any history of violent extremism.

6.3 SOUTH ASIAN REFORM MOVEMENTS IN THE UK

Among the contemporary expressions of Islam in South Asia that are a product of this colonial encounter [with Britain], five traditions are of particular importance… the reformist Deobandis, the quietist and revivalist Tablighi Jama’at, the conservative and populist Barelwis, the Islamist Jama’at-i Islami and the modernists. (Lewis 1994: 36)

6.3.1 THE DEOBANDI MOVEMENT

The Deobandi movement is a reformist but conservative Islamic movement which was founded in 19th century India as a response to British colonialism. It emphasises scholarship and education, and accepts the authority of the ulama (Islamic scholars), and their scholarly and legal traditions. It originated within the tradition of South Asian Sufism. Although it is opposed to the theology and practices of the Sufi Barelwi movement (see 6.3.3 below), it continues to perpetuate a shari’ah-centric Sufism that is often conflated with the anti-Sufi doctrine of the Salafis (Timol 2018; see also Geaves 2015).

The Deobandis are one of two major South Asian Islamic movements in Britain (the other being the Barelwis). They control the largest number of mosques (Naqshbandi 2017), and have more than twenty seminaries (darul’ulum) for male students, two female-only boarding seminaries, and a number of schools, including some for girls (Cheruvallil-Contractor & Scott-Baumann 2015; Gilliat-Ray 2006). Their major centre is the darul’ulum in Bury (founded in 1979), but their presence is also significant in other northern towns and in the city of Leicester (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 87, 2006; see also Geaves 1996). Although Deobandis in Britain come from Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Indian heritage communities, the leadership tends to be Gujarati. They are highly conservative in terms of their attitudes to women and dress, yet committed to engaging with the broad base of Muslims in the UK through well-educated leaders with a command of English.

The Deobandis remain influential, not least of all through key figures such as Muhammad ibn Adam al-Kawthari of the Institute of Islamic Jurisprudence. Based in Leicester, through the daruliitaa.com website, he provides answers in English to followers’ questions on matters ranging from belief to practice, gender issues to marriage and divorce, and business and trade.

Deobandis in the UK are largely apolitical at the national level, though there is some involvement in local affairs (Bowen 2014). In Pakistan, there are historical links with the Taliban and with Kashmiri jihadi organisations, but Deobandi leaders condemned al-Qaeda. There is no evidence of any association with violent extremism in the UK (Bowen 2014: 34).
6.3.2 TABLIGHI JAMA’AT

Tablaighi Jama’at is a pietistic revivalist movement known for its missionary work among cultural and lapsed Muslims. Founded by Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi in the 1920s in India, it was an historical offshoot of the Deobandi tradition, but is now a global network operating in more than one hundred countries (Gilliat-Ray 2010; King 1997; Pieri 2015; Sikand 1998). Its annual international gathering in Bangladesh attracts some five million followers (Bowen 2014: 39).

With its UK headquarters at its markaz or centre in Dewsbury, it has a fairly close relationship with the Deobandi movement, making use of its many mosques as retreats and bases for Tablighi missionary activity (Bowen 2014; Geaves 1996; Lewis 1994; Pew Forum 2010). The Jama’at’s followers offer their services as door-to-door preachers, for periods of up to 120 days, to spread the six-point programme: ‘profession of the faith (shahadah), prayer (salat), remembrance of God (dhikr), respect for all Muslims, sincere intentions and the giving of time, especially in missionary activity.’ (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 89; Mogra in Peter & Ortega 2015; Vasquez & Knott 2014). Their target group is other Muslims not those of other faiths or none, and its approach is spiritual. It has no interest in politics, or engagement with government or wider civil society (Bowen 2014; Vasquez & Knott 2014).

This naivety about local and national politics came to the fore during Tablighi Jama’at’s campaign to build a new mosque adjacent to the Olympic stadium in east London (Dehanas & Pieri 2011; Pieri 2015). Dubbed the ‘mega mosque’, it attracted a great deal of negative media attention, and the plans for its construction eventually fell through in 2010.

Tablighis have also been reluctant to engage with public bodies and the media in relation to accusations that they have been used as a cover by extremists, including Jermaine Lindsay, Mohammed Siddique and others involved in terrorist plots in the 2000s (Pantucci 2015: 39). The Jama’at’s reputation as a pietistic and apolitical movement has allowed some to travel internationally under its banner, and indeed an al-Qaeda training camp manual suggested recruits first make contact with a Tablighi group (Pantucci 2015: 39-40). The concern, according to Bowen (2014: 43), has not been that it promotes violent extremism, but that it has been ‘susceptible to infiltration by extremists seeking to use it as a hunting ground for new recruits’.

In the case of both the Deobandi and Tablighi movements, the focus on isolationism and, at times, ‘the subtle demonization’ of western society (Bowen 2014: 28) have set them at odds with the government agenda of community cohesion.

6.3.3 THE BARELWI MOVEMENT

The Barelwi movement, sometimes known as Ahl al-Sunnat wa-al-Jama’at, is a reform movement which arose in India in the 19th century. It can usually be distinguished from the Deobandi movement by its teachings about Muhammad, the role it ascribes to Sufi teachers and the devotional practices it endorses (Geaves 2015).

Taking as his focus the person and example of Muhammad, the founder, Ahmed Riza Khan, aimed to cultivate devotion and love for the Prophetic path or sunnah: ‘The Barelwi worldview is shaped by distinctive ideas about the qualities and characteristics of the Prophet Muhammad, who is widely believed to be blessed with superhuman qualities and characteristics.’ (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 92) He also stressed the role of Sufi teachers (pir), who intercede with Muhammad on behalf of followers, and the importance of commemorating their births and deaths, and visiting their tombs and shrines (Gilliat Ray 2010: 93; see also Bowen 2014; Geaves 1996).

Throughout the history of South Asian migration to Britain, Barelwis have almost certainly been numerically dominant, though less centrally organised and vocal than many other Islamic movements (Geaves 2000; Lewis 1994): ‘Barelwi Sufism is the main tradition in the rural Mirpur district of Pakistan, the ancestral homeland of most of Britain’s Pakistani Muslims.’ (Bowen 2014: 116) Although they are responsible for fewer mosques than the Deobandis, Barelwis – who prefer to be known as Ahl al-Sunnat – control the majority of ‘Sufi’ mosques (459 out of 538): 24 per cent of all the mosques in the UK (Naqshbandhi 2017). They have a strong local focus, as well as transnational connections determined by which pir they revere or which order they belong to (Geaves 2000; Geaves & Gabriel 2013). Key examples of locally-based Sufi leadership can be seen in the early

In addition to organising around esteemed spiritual leaders, the Ahl al-Sunnat has developed several organisations globally that operate in the UK, including Minhaj ul-Qur’an, a network of mosques and Islamic centres, and Dawat-e Islami, a Pakistan-based missionary organisation with its UK centre in Dewsbury (Bowen 2014: 117; Geaves & Gabriel 2013). Although it imitated many of the strategies and practices of Tablighi Jama’at (Timol 2018; Gugler 2013), Dawat-e Islami exploited information technology, and developed its own television channel, Madani TV (Bowen 2014: 117).

There are also two UK-based organisations in which British-born Barelwis have played a part, the British Muslim Forum (BMF), which was formed in 2005, and the Sufi Muslim Council (SMC), in 2006. The BMF was established to give a voice to Barelwis who felt unrepresented by the Muslim Council of Britain (see 6.5.1 below). The SMC had some initial success in pitching itself as a representative organisation for the silent majority of Muslims in the UK (Stjernholm 2010), but is now defunct (Hamid 2016: 13).

6.3.4 OTHER SUFI INITIATIVES

In addition to the Barelwis, who are predominant among Sufis in the UK, a number of transnational Sufi Orders are represented, including Naqshbandiya, Qadiriya, Chishtiya, Alawiya and Tijaniya, most of which transcend ethnic boundaries. For example, one Naqshbandi shaykh in the UK, Nazim al-Haqqani, until his death in 2013, had a diverse UK following of Turks, South Asians, and white and Afro-Caribbean converts (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2010: 40-41); whereas the Tijaniya Order, with its roots in West Africa, had the support of Nigerian Muslim migrants (Bowen 2014). On the whole these orders have repackaged traditional teachings and practices rather than offering something new (Geaves & Gabriel 2013). Like those in Ahl al-Sunnat, their leaders were slow to appeal to young Muslims and to offer an alternative to those Islamist and Salafist youth movements that were growing in popularity in the 1990s and 2000s (Hamid 2016).

According to Hamid (2011: 256; Hamid 2016: 129-31), it was with the arrival of ‘a “Muscular Sufism” popularised by charismatic American convert scholars such as Hamza Yusuf, Nuh Keller and Zaid Shakir and the British Abdal Hakim Murad’ that a modern sophisticated alternative was provided. It is largely through its online presence that these leaders and the trends they have initiated have been publicised and a network generated. One such intervention has been the Radical Middle Way (formed in 2005), which aims to connect young British Muslims with authentic Muslim scholarship ‘utilising a dynamic web-based platform, social media and SMS messaging’ (Radical Middle Way 2017). Another has been masud.co.uk. Started in 1996 by Masud Khan, it foregrounds the work of Abdal Hakim Murad (now Dean of Cambridge Muslim College), and claims to be one of the leading resources of traditional Islam on the world wide web. It includes material on British Muslim heritage as well as articles of contemporary relevance (masud.co.uk 2017; Hamid 2016: 130-131).

The phrase ‘traditional Islam’, used increasingly by Sufi leaders, has been adopted to raise the profile of global Sufism, to challenge the dominance of Salafi and Islamist groups and preachers, and to bring together the wide range of Sufi and new Sunni perspectives into a more coherent and effective movement (Hamid 2016: 68-87; Geaves & Gabriel 2013).

One organisation with its roots in Turkish Sufism but now with a global reach is the Gülen Movement. Established by Fethullah Gülen in the 1960s and influenced by the teachings of Said Nursi, it developed into a large and powerful Sufi cemaat (jama’at or community) during a period of Turkish state secularism. With its first school opened in 1982, through its educational wing, its influence extended beyond Turkey to Central Asia and, through the Turkish diaspora, to the United States, Germany and elsewhere (now with over 1,000 schools
worldwide) (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2010: 14). Fethullah Gülen migrated to the US in 1999, and from there he has overseen a global movement combining both secular and spiritual objectives, and incorporating schools, universities, businesses (including an international news agency, TV stations and Zaman, a daily newspaper), interfaith and intercultural initiatives (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2010: 16). Referred to by the ruling political party in Turkey (the AKP) as a ‘parallel structure’, one which seeks to establish its own institutions and ultimately to take over the instruments of state, it is now considered a terrorist movement and is held responsible for the coup attempt in July 2016.

Less influential in the UK than in Germany and the Netherlands, the movement’s following has been almost exclusively among those from Turkish heritage communities, especially via the Turkish-medium supplementary schools run by the Axis Educational Trust (Tedik 2007). Its impact has extended to others, however, through the Dialogue Society (Dialogue Society 2016; Tedik 2007; Weller 2015), a charity founded in 1999 whose aim is to advance ‘social cohesion by connecting communities, empowering people to engage and contributing to the development of ideas on dialogue and community building’ (Dialogue Society 2016). It seeks to achieve this by bringing people together through a variety of discussion events and outreach activities. These and other initiatives are discussed by Weller (2015).

6.3.5 JAMA‘AT-I ISLAMI

Jama‘at-i Islami (JI) was a South Asian Islamist political party, founded in 1941 by Maulana Mawdudi (1903-79) who called for an Islamic theocratic state based on Shari‘ah law which could defeat British colonialism and western ideology. It developed separate branches in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (Hartung in Peter & Ortega 2015).

Despite having no official presence in the UK (Geaves 1996), this Islamist movement has been particularly influential through its various ideological offshoots: the UK Islamic Mission, the Islamic Foundation, the Markfield Institute of Higher Education, the Islamic Society of Britain, Young Muslims UK, and Dawatul Islam (Bowen 2014: 83-100; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 98-103; Hamid 2016: 6; Maher & Frampton 2009: 22-23; Pantucci 2015: 32). It also influenced the Muslim Council of Britain. The presence of Jama‘at-i Islami in the UK has been social and ideological – through networking and publications – rather than institutional.

Jama‘at-i Islami-inspired organisations are revivalist in orientation, outward-looking and socially engaged. Unlike other South Asian origin movements, their leaders have been professionals with a secular education who have been inspired by the ideas of Mawdudi, rather than religious scholars trained in Islamic jurisprudence.

The UK Islamic Mission (UKIM) was founded in 1962 by a small group based at the East London Mosque (Bowen 2014: 83), and has since been the principal face of JI in the UK, overseen about 50 mosques (Naqshbandi 2017) and Islamic schools. With a focus on education, information, interfaith and charitable work, it has developed an external focus whilst also seeking to serve those Muslims who share its values (UK Islamic Mission 2015). A key initiative of UKIM was the establishment in 1984 of Young Muslims UK (YM), the aim of which was ‘to create an elite of second-generation British Muslims influenced by JI ideology who would provide Islamic leadership to Muslim young people’ (Hamid 2011: 254; Hamid 2016: 15-32).

The Islamic Foundation was established in 1973 by Jama‘at-i Islami members who had previously studied in Britain and saw a need for western-style, English-medium Islamic education, publications and training to build on the community-based work already underway (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 102; McLoughlin in Peter & Ortega 2015: 212-215). In 2000, the Foundation launched the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE) with the aim of providing reputable academic and professional education in Islamic studies, Muslim chaplaincy, and Islamic banking, finance and management in an Islamic environment but validated by established local universities (Markfield Institute of Higher Education 2017; McLoughlin in Peter & Ortega 2015).

The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB), a cluster of assorted Islamist activist organisations brought together in 1990 by JI activists, pursued a wider vision – of working across different schools of Islamic thought in Britain, and seeking to engage them with non-Muslims (Bowen 2014; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 103). As well as
introducing campus Islamic workshops, and Islamic scouts group and various charitable activities, in the mid-1990s ISB developed ‘Islam Awareness Week’ and took over the oversight of Young Muslims UK (Islamic Society of Britain 2012). Hamid suggests that

[...] since the bombings of July 2005 YM has moved towards a post-Islamist position where it has publicly jettisoned its previous Islamist movement rhetoric. A number of members of YM have gone on to create non-ideological organisations that address the grassroots issues affecting young people. (Hamid 2011: 254; Hamid 2016)

Dawatul Islam (DI) was founded in 1978 as a JI-inspired, British Bangladeshi parallel to UKIM. Its principal impact has been in east London where its members came into conflict and went to court over the running of the East London Mosque (since 1988 run by the breakaway movement, the Islamic Forum of Europe [IFE]) (Bowen 2014: 88). As well as running the mosque, the Forum oversees an all-male youth wing, the Young Muslim Organisation (YMO), and Muslimaat UK, for young women (Hamid 2011: 255; Hamid 2016: 6-7).

The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), an organisation first founded in 1997 with encouragement from Government in order to provide national representation for British Muslims across a broad spectrum of Sunni groups (Seddon in Peter & Ortega 2015), included trustees and other leaders with backgrounds in JI and the Deobandi movement. The subject of several media exposés, including an investigative article in The Observer in 2005 linking it with JI and its commitment ‘to the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan ruled by sharia law’, MCB’s public role – and JI’s influence within it – was challenged (Bowen 2014: 91; Seddon in Peter & Ortega 2015). For further discussion of MCB, see 7.1 below.

Despite its political origins in the Indian sub-continent and migrant links, Jama’at-i Islami has never operated as a political party in the UK. Nevertheless, since the 1960s, its religious and political thought has inspired a number of groups and movements. What is less clear is the extent to which these groups and movements continue to reflect the theology and political ideology of Jama’at-i Islami or its founder, Mawdudi. They share a commitment to Islamic activism and wider social engagement, but differ in other ways. Various, they have been criticised for being too liberal (e.g., YM, and the MIHE), too conservative (e.g., DI) or too extreme (e.g., IFE and the East London Mosque). Even where movements have diversified or moved away from their earlier political links, the historical connection to JI and Mawdudi’s call for an Islamic theocracy based on Shari’ah law continue to haunt them (Bowen 2014).

Prolonged media criticism of JI-inspired Islamist organisations (including the IFE, YMO, East London Mosque and MCB) has been counter-balanced by scholars writing on their grassroots counter-terrorism initiatives and community activism (for media criticism, see Bowen 2014: 91-93; and Wikipedia: Islamic Forum of Europe; for academic accounts, see Lambert 2008; DeHanas 2016). DeHanas’s (2016) ethnographic account of young Muslim activists based at the East London Mosque provides important detail for understanding the Islamic motivations and practices of non-violent, politically-active Muslims. By ‘“vot[ing] with their feet” in public demonstrations of politics and piety’, they risk being stigmatised as ‘Islamist extremists’ as they endeavour to be active and engaged citizens (DeHanas 2016: 186).

6.3.6 AHL-I-HADITH

Formally launched in north India in the 1850s, this movement drew its inspiration from a variety of earlier sources, the 16th century Indian Shah Wali and Yemeni Muhammad al-Shawkani, as well as Ibn Taymiyyah (14th century) and Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (18th century) (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 104; Hamid 2016). The founders of Ahl-i-Hadith held the view that Indian Muslims no longer followed the pure beliefs and practices of early Islam, and stressed the importance of going directly to the Qur’an and Hadith rather than through one of the established legal schools (madhhab). This approach appealed primarily to a scholarly and elite audience (Gilliat-Ray 201: 104). In many respects Ahl-e-Hadith was a South Asian form of Salafi Islam whose impact and presence in the UK was later eclipsed by Middle Eastern Salafism (Timol 2018).

The movement was first established in Britain in 1975 by Moulana Fazal Karim Asim, who worked initially through the UK Islamic Mission (see above) and later set up the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 105;
Lewis 1994). The Green Lane Mosque in Small Heath, Birmingham became the official headquarters. The mosque, one of a number of increasingly important centres of Salafism in the UK, became an independent charity in 2008 (Hamid 2011: 256; Inge 2017: 243; Markazi Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith UK, n.d.). Followers share with other Salafis the commitment to live according to the early traditions of Islam and to discard what they see as later ‘cultural accretions’ (Bowen 2014: 59).

6.4 MIDDLE EASTERN REFORM MOVEMENTS IN THE UK

6.4.1 INTRODUCTION

The primary Middle Eastern influences on Islam in Britain, particularly from the 1990s onwards, have been the Salafi beliefs and practices associated with the 18th century scholar, Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab (exported by the Islamic regime in Saudi Arabia and by various Wahhabi institutions and scholars), and the global impact of the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in 1920s Egypt). According to Wiktorowicz (2006: 208), there are three broad categories within Salafism: pietistic, political and jihadi.

Pietistic Salafis who believe that salvation will come through faith, religious ritual and strict adherence to the principles laid down in the Qur’an and hadiths; political Salafis who believe that Muslims should also strive to establish Islamic states in Muslim-majority countries; and jihadi Salafis who advocate the taking up of arms to overthrow un-Islamic regimes in Muslim lands. (Bowen 2014: 59)

These three impulses have been important in the development of Salafism in the UK, and in its internal debates and schisms, as will be seen below.

In general, Middle Eastern Islamic reform movements have taken root more recently in the UK than those with their origins in South Asia, owing both to migration patterns, and to second generation Muslims’ feelings of marginalisation and search for authenticity (Lewis 2007).

As with some of the more recent Jama’at-i Islami inspired Islamist organisations described above, since the 1990s a number of Salafi groups with their roots in the Middle East have appealed to young British Muslims. Some have been influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, and others by charismatic Salafi preachers and activists (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 71-74; Hamid 2011, 2016). Although they share a commitment to reviving ‘authentic’ Islam, their views have differed on issues such as khilafah (an Islamic state or society based on shari’ah), jihad, and engagement with Government and wider society (Wiktorowicz 2006: 208). Their rejection of Sufism as reprehensible innovation (bid’ah) has often been vociferously expressed (Hamid 2016). Despite being considered extreme in their personal piety and desire to pursue a pure form of Islam, the minority have been non-violent. The promotion of violence is predominantly associated with nomadic jihadists, such as Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Muhammad, Abdullah al-Faisal and Anjem Choudary, some of whom had served in conflicts abroad and all of whom used extremist takfiri rhetoric sanctioning violence against those they considered to be apostates (Bowen 2014: 67; Hamid 2011: 257; Pantucci 2010).

Hamid (2011, 2016) has described a number of these movements and examined the relationships between them. As he noted, ‘Some young people, through the intersection of alienation from parental values, religious institutions and marginalisation from mainstream society […], have identified with international Muslim political causes and have become receptive to the work of active revivalist organisations’ (Hamid 2011: 252; Lewis 2007). These factors are further elaborated by one ex-member of Hizb-ut Tahrir who listed some of them as follows:

A heightened perception of Muslims and Muslim countries being unjustly attacked […] Double standards exhibited by the UN and USA with respect to Israel. Political Islam, being touted as a panacea for the Muslims’ problems. A lack of alternative scholarly voices advocating more traditional responses to state oppression, and increased media awareness due to proliferation of Islamic literature on the internet. (Hamid 2007: 151)
The principal movements and trends in the UK include JIMAS, a range of Salafi mosques and initiatives, Muslim Brotherhood-inspired organisations such as the Muslim Association of Britain, and radical Islamist groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun. The number of Salafi mosques has been increasing in the last decade, from around 30 in 2009 (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 72) to 180 in 2017 (Naqshbandi 2017: 5). This rise is predicted to continue as younger leaders take over from their elders in more traditional Barelwi and Deobandi mosques (Naqshbandi in Inge 2017: 29).

6.4.2 JIMAS (JAM‘IYAT IHYA‘ MINHAJ AL-SUNNAH)

Unlike most of Britain’s Islamic organisations at the time, it was not the UK offshoot of a larger foreign network. It operated in English and its membership was mainly British-born. (Bowen 2014: 60)

JIMAS was founded in 1984 by a group of British Muslim university students (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 81), led by Manwar Ali (also known as Abu Muntasir), and was responsible for popularising Salafism among young people. Like many other Western-educated Muslims at the time, the founders were eager to distinguish religion from the culture of their parents’ generation (Inge 2017: 27), and were ready to adopt a purer form of Islam based on the Qur’an and sunnah (Hamid 2016: 50-67). Some went to study at the University of Madinah in Saudi Arabia, returning with skills in preaching Islam as well as in Arabic (Inge 2017: 29).

Salafi scholars from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt and the US, and veterans from the conflict in Afghanistan sought to gain their allegiance (Bowen 2014: 60; Hamid 2016; Inge 2017: 28-29; Khan 2016), plying their distinct theological interpretations of authentic Islam and ideological commitments to military jihad and the caliphate. For a time, JIMAS sent fighters to Afghanistan (Bowen 2014: 60-61), but in 1995 disagreements on the issue of jihad were exposed. Pietistic Salafi members took one side, following the guidance of Sheikh al-Albani, and those who endorsed jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kashmir as an obligation took the other, encouraged by representatives from the Kashmiri jihadi group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (Bowen 2014: 61).

This was one occasion in a growing division – between those pursuing a pietistic path and others favouring a political vision – which eventually led to a schism (Hamid 2016: 61; see Wiktorowicz 2006 for discussion of Middle Eastern Salafi rifts). Several figures, including Abu Khadeejah and Dawud Burbank, left in 1995 to form the website, Salafi Publications. A group based at Brixton Mosque, and led by the convert Abdul Haqq Baker, also broke away (Bowen 2014: 65; Inge 2017: 30). The more politically radical group, including Manwar Ali and Usama Hasan, remained in JIMAS.

Over the next decade JIMAS retreated from its earlier radical stance, and from Salafism too, eventually ‘reinvent[ing] itself as a non-sectarian Muslim educational charity that runs community projects for those of all faiths and none’ (Inge 2017: 30-31) through a focus on education, engagement and service (JIMAS 2015).

6.4.3 OTHER SALAFI INITIATIVES: SALAFI PUBLICATIONS AND BRIXTON MOSQUE

With those favouring a pietistic Salafi approach leaving JIMAS in the mid-1990s, the driving force of Salafism in the UK was replaced by a number of distinctive initiatives. Salafi Publications, based in Birmingham, became a hub of activity, whilst the Brixton Mosque was fast becoming a major London centre for Salafi study and practice, attracting African-Caribbean converts, as well as an increasing number of Somali Muslims (Bowen 2014; Hamid 2016; Inge 2017).

Salafi Publications was originally a publishing outlet for the dissemination of translations by Dawud Burbank and others of Arabic texts and lectures by prominent Salafi scholars and preachers (Bowen 2014: 64). By 2016, in addition to a publishing house, it included a bookshop, primary and secondary schools, two mosques, and a network of thirteen associated bodies across the country, and around 11,500 affiliates (Inge 2017: 30, 39; see also Abu Khadeejah 2016; Salafi Publications 2017; The Salafi Masjid 2017). Loyal to Saudi Salafism, it has remained committed to ‘purifying Islam from additions, distortions and extremism, and cultivating the Muslims upon Islam as it was understood by the first three generations of Muslims’ (Salafi Publications 2017).
The ‘Brixton Mosque community’ has had a presence in south London from 1975 (Inge 2017: 33). A group of Black Muslims, including converts and those from West Africa, began congregating and preaching to others. They opened a mosque on Gresham Road in 1990, which at that time accommodated Muslims of different traditions and backgrounds (Inge 2017: 33). Then, in 1993, the mosque formally acquired a Salafi identity with the election of a new leadership. Over the next decade or so, Brixton Mosque ‘became known for its uncompromising adherence to a socially conservative version of Islam – Salafism – as well as its equally uncompromising opposition to Jihadi groups’ (Inge 2017: 35; Hamid 2011, 2016). Several extremist preachers were banned or challenged, including Abdullah El Faisal, Abu Hamza Al-Masri and Anjem Choudary (Hamid 2016: 64, 123; Inge 2017: 36). After a period of informal counter-extremist activity, mosque leaders began a partnership with the Metropolitan Police’s Muslim Contact Unit, including working together on the STREET youth project (Inge 2017: 31-32, 36; Lambert 2010: 81, 87). And the doctrinal ‘war between the Salafis and ISIS’ continued (Abu Khadeejah, quoted in Inge 2017: 235), as a result of differing perspectives on jihad, takfir and suicide bombing, among other things.

Between 1,800 and 2,000 Muslims now worship at Brixton Mosque (Inge 2017: 39). As is the case in general for Salafis in the UK, most are under 30, close to a half are female, a significant number are converts, and some are European Salafis who have emigrated because of restrictions on Islamic dress in their home countries (Inge 2017: 40). Ninety-six per cent of all Salafi mosques in the UK have facilities for women (Naqshbandi 2017: 6), and Brixton is no exception.

Another change has been in the ethnic background of Salafis, with the largest number now coming from London’s Somali community. Unlike those from South Asian backgrounds, ‘Somalis tend to regard mosques as spaces for women as much as men; places where women may spend hours relaxing with their families and exchanging news with friends, rather than just popping in for a quick prayer’ (Inge 2017: 43).

Birmingham and London remain the major centres of Salafi activity. In addition to mosques, there are many small worship and study groups meeting in community centres, as well as Facebook groups, student societies and websites providing Salafi resources. The broad Salafi movement in the UK, despite incorporating diverse groups and serving a young constituency, remains strict on issues of personal piety, conservative on gender segregation, dress, education and family matters, and unswervingly literal on matters of doctrine, with the Qur’an and sunnah as the basis of decision making and lifestyle. In the context of Western liberal society, and even when compared to other Islamic groups, their beliefs and practices appear extreme. But there is nothing to suggest that pietistic Salafis in the UK support, condone or practice violence. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that they have sought to counter it, by preaching and organising against violent jihadi speakers and those who seek to radicalise young Muslims. (Bowen 2014; Inge 2017; Lambert 2010).

Nevertheless, the assumption is often made, particularly in the media, that Salafism in the UK is a cause for alarm. For Muslims hostile to these trends, such as Khan (2016), a ‘new conglomerate’ of Salafis and Islamists (influenced by Jama’at-i Islami, the Muslim Brotherhood or Hizb-ut-Tahrir) is considered a potential threat in terms of the radicalisation of young Muslims and their adoption of an extreme ideology.

6.4.4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (IKHWAN AL-MUSLIMUN)

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is an Islamist movement. Founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna as an apolitical Islamic reform movement (Bowen 2014: 102; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 74; Maher & Frampton 2009: 19-20; Peter & Ortega 2015: 7-13), it advocated a return to the Qur’an and sunnah, and shari’ah as the basis for the development of an Islamic society that would challenge Western colonial domination in the region. As a result of persecution, it became increasingly revolutionary and ideological, taking its inspiration from the work of Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) (who was himself influenced by Maulana Mawdudi, the founder of Jama’at-i Islami) (Kepel 2005: 46-57).

From the 1930s, the MB began to establish itself in neighbouring countries. Its mix of Islamist political theology, anti-Western discourse, civil society activism and charitable work have had an appeal far beyond its original homeland, to the extent that it is now a fully transnational movement with branches in many
countries (some operating as political parties) and with organisational connections in others. It is not formally constituted in the UK, but its influence has been substantial, with several organisations inspired by it or led by its members. Chief among these are the Muslim Association of Britain, the Islamic Society of Britain and the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (see below).

6.4.5 HIZB-UT-TAHRIR

Although it was in the 1990s that Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) really took off in the UK, it was founded in Palestine in the 1950s and became a transnational movement focused on working towards ‘restoring the political unity of the Muslim world by re-establishment of a pan-Islamic state or caliphate (khilafah)’ (Hamid 2007: 146). Originally a political party (Farouki in Peter & Ortega 2015), it was unable to register or gain legitimacy in Palestine or beyond, and by 2007 was banned in most countries of the Middle East and Central Asia. Despite this, it was able to get an informal foothold.

Following their expulsion from other countries, some HT activists arrived in Britain in the 1980s, gaining a following among international students and professionals (Hamid 2007: 148; Hamid 2016: 33-49). This was extended as HT successfully spread its revolutionary message of an Islamic caliphate as ‘the ideological alternative to capitalism, socialism, secularism’ via university student societies (ISocs) (Hamid 2007: 149; Lewis 2007: 120). As Hamid (2016: 35) has noted, however, the ‘caliphate’ in HT ideology was largely ‘an emotional category that [had] nothing to do with geography, states or borders’.

Led for a decade by Omar Bakri Muhammad, HT came to widespread public attention in 1994 after Channel 4 broadcast the documentary, The Tottenham Ayatollah (Pantucci 2010), though by then it was already known in universities and mosques for its inflammatory magazines and leaflets (not only calling for the caliphate but stigmatising Jews, Hindus and gay students) (Hamid 2007: 148; Gilliat-Ray 2010: 78-79). Moderate and non-violent compared to al-Muhajiroun (Bowen 2014: 67) – the movement that Omar Bakri Muhammad went on to lead from 1996 – HT was not formally proscribed in the UK although it was threatened with a ban after the 7/7 bombings and, from 2004, was listed under the National Union of Students’ ‘No Platform’ Policy, for inciting hatred and supporting terrorism. Its response to the latter was to operate under other names, including the Millennium Society and 1924 Society (Hamid 2007: 149; Khan 2016).

Nevertheless, by 2007 its rhetoric had been ‘toned down’ (Lewis 2007: 121) and it had adopted a more gradualist approach. Its basic message has remained the same, however (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 80): ‘Muslims should present Islam as the solution [...] Muslims should interact with the wider society and explain Islam – its beliefs and values – and its alternative political vision for the Muslim world.’ (Hizb-ut Tahrir Britain 2017; see also Akhtar 2005: 174-175) In Hamid’s (2011: 158) view, HT ‘represents an intellectual halfway house of sorts between moderate Islamism and violent jihadism’.

In 2017, Hizb-ut-Tahrir Britain maintains a website on which regular news and comment are provided about Islam and Muslims in the Middle East and the UK, the failings of secularism, liberalism and British Government policy (e.g., on Prevent, Ofsted), and the positive ideas and values of Islamic governance, culture and gender equality. The website offers leaflets, white papers, press releases and other publicity materials, but no information on its activities or organisation in the UK.

6.4.6 AL-MUHAJIROUN (THE ‘EMIGRANTS’)

Al-Muhajiroun (AM) was formed in the UK in 1996 by Omar Bakri Muhammad following his resignation from Hizb-ut-Tahrir (he had initially established AM in the 1980s in Saudi Arabia) (Pantucci 2010: 230-231; Pantucci 2015). It became ‘the most structured movement on the British radical Islamic scene’, and targeted young people nationwide through ‘touring activities, university societies and summer camps’ (Thomas in Peter & Ortega 2015: 177). It adopted an extreme jihadi position at the violent end of the Salafi spectrum (but was not accepted as Salafi by others). It expressed antagonistic views towards non-Muslims and those it saw as apostates, and encouraged followers to travel abroad to train and fight in conflicts (Bowen 2014: 67; Inge 2017: 87). Omar Bakri was the movement’s most important ideologue and many of AM’s teachings were derived from his thought; it borrowed from the Islamist ideology of Hizb-ut-Tahrir combined with a
Salafi-inspired religious theology (Kenney 2017: 4). It differed from HT in advocating for the imposition of shari’ah in Western countries as well as Muslim-majority ones.

Wiktorowicz (2005: 91), who interviewed members of AM in the early 2000s, identified identity crisis as AM’s dominant mode of recruitment, particularly among university students and recent graduates of South Asian descent. The role of external communication in AM, he stated, was to induce a sense of ‘crisis and urgency’ (Wiktorowicz 2005: 85), with activists conveying a sense of a Muslim community under threat and requiring immediate action from supporters. This was communicated externally through street activism, and followed up in more intimate study circles (Kenney 2017: 7-8). Rather than being clandestine, AM were actively confrontational (Hamid 2016: 13); they sought publicity and provoked outrage (Bailey 2017). The group voluntarily disbanded in 2004 to pre-empt an expected ban, and was eventually proscribed in 2010, under several different names: The Saved Sect, Al Muhajiroun, Islam4UK, Call to Submission, Islamic Path, London School of Sharia, Muslims Against Crusades, Al Ghurabaa, Need4Khilafah, the Shariah Project, and the Islamic Dawah Association (Home Office 2017; Pantucci 2010).

Omar Bakri Muhammad left the UK for Lebanon in 2005 and was barred from returning. Despite his absence and increased pressure from the authorities, followers showed considerable adaptability, both in reconfiguring themselves to get around legal constraints, and in maintaining connections to Bakri online (Kenney et al 2013: 746). Furthermore, veteran members took on a greater role, including Anjem Choudary (now imprisoned for supporting IS) who stepped up after Bakri left (Wood 2017: 180-196). In an interview with Raymond (2010), for the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, Choudary professed that:

> AM’s stated aim is to overthrow the British government, without using violence, and to establish an Islamic state in the UK based on Shari‘ah law. According to Choudary, after this Islamic state is established, ‘we would continue to conquer other countries, removing the obstacles in the way of establishing the Shari‘ah until we have the domination of Islam globally’. (Raymond 2010: 8)

It is now illegal in the UK to belong, invite support, organise meetings, or wear clothing or display articles indicating support for AM or any of the other named groups (Home Office 2017).

6.4.7 OTHER JIHADI INFLUENCES IN THE UK: AL-QAEDA AND ISLAMIC STATE

Birt and Hamid (2015: 171-173) identified a ‘seven-piece jigsaw’ which constituted the ideology of jihadi networks in the UK, and over which ‘sectarian splinters among violent and non-violent racial groups were defined’ (Birt & Hamid 2015: 171). The seven components were: religious communication (takfir) of Muslim leaders for not fully ruling according to shari’ah; jihadism as ‘a permanent and […] individual obligation that may be […] called for by non-state actors’; the world as the abode of war, or Dar al-Harb; attacking the far enemy; the acceptance of no discrimination between civilian and military targets; suicide bombing; and killing Muslims (Birt & Hamid 2015: 171-172). Arguments between violent jihadi factions revolved around these points, and formed the basis of the al-Qaeda critique of IS and the justification for a change of military targets and the killing of Muslims by the latter (Wood 2017).

In addition to the impact of al-Muhajiroun and the key extremist preachers discussed earlier – Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada, Omar Bakri Muhammad, and Anjem Choudary (Nesser 2015: 39-47) – the influence of a wider range of jihadi movements and clerics has been felt in the UK since the 1990s. In addition to the relative ease with which radical preachers were able to enter the country and reach audiences, access was available online to the writings and speeches of internationally known jihadi ideologues, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki.

Neither al-Qaeda nor IS were formally constituted in the UK. They did not need to be because the ideologies of both were circulated in person by extremist preachers and foreign fighters, and online via websites, forums and social media. Furthermore, some social spaces, particularly Finsbury Park Mosque, did for a time...
become identified with the transmission of their ideas. As Birt and Hamid noted (2015: 172), ‘Omar Bakri described himself as the spokesman for Osama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders’. Abu Hamza aligned himself with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and with armed jihad fought in their names (Thomas in Peter & Ortega 2015: 175).

Abu Qatada appears to have been a point of contact for extremists linked to al-Qaeda, as was Djamel Beghal, also a regular at Finsbury Park Mosque (Pantucci 2015: 34, 132). Beghal had links to al-Qaeda training camps and helped young recruits secure a passage to Afghanistan (Pantucci 2015: 132). Furthermore, with such recruits coming into contact with members of al-Qaeda abroad, the message was repeatedly reiterated, that they should return home and carry out attacks there (Pantucci 2015). The foiled 2004 truck bomb attack by the ‘Crawley group’ and the 7/7 attacks were among the results, both of which revealed evidence of al-Qaeda communications, manuals, training camps and use of al-Qaeda tactics and methods in the UK (Nesser 2015: 171-190).

The most vociferous protagonist for IS in the UK was Anjem Choudary. The now-banned movements associated with him (see 6.4.6 above) were a key means by which the ideology of the Islamic State (IS) was articulated, as well as being an influence on many of those who chose to travel to Iraq and Syria for jihad. In an interview with Graeme Wood (2017: 180-196), Choudary explained how the coming of the caliphate had changed the terms of the debate, requiring him and others to support ‘offensive jihad’ in countries ruled by non-Muslims and the killing of Muslims: “‘Hitherto, we were just defending ourselves,’ Choudary said. But the waging of war to expand the caliphate is a duty of the caliph.’ (Wood 2017: 184)

Like al-Qaeda, the manifestation of IS in the UK has not been dependent on institutional formation or a physical location. It has resided in its network of support and its online presence. Maher (2014) has argued, however, that social media changed the process of communication and therefore of recruitment.

‘There’s nothing special about me,’ they might say. I just decided to come. If I can do it, you can do it.’

The effect of social media is to normalise the experience, while also motivating and inspiring potential recruits. Perhaps most significant is that the conversation runs two ways. In the past, al-Qaeda would issue unidirectional edicts and vague instructions to followers to ‘do something’ at home. Today, you can talk to fighters directly and have a proper conversation. (Maher 2014)

As Maher suggested, such exchanges allowed prospective recruits to deal with any emotional and practical barriers, and to prepare to make the journey.

In her report of young people who travelled (or attempted to do so) from the UK to Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2016, Webb (2017) found that real-world, face-to-face relationships with family and friends were also crucial for involvement in extremism. Educational institutions, particularly high schools (Webb 2017: 77-79), provided forums in which they could socialise, with several schools seeing two or more students convicted of terrorism offences or of attempting to leave the UK to join an extremist movement.

What these online and offline cases show is that contemporary extremist movements do not need to be formally institutionalised or to have a physical base in order to share an ideology, or recruit and mobilise potential supporters. The presence of IS in the UK resided in these online and personal encounters, many of which will have taken place on mobile phones and PCs in young people’s bedrooms, and between peers in public spaces.

6.5 ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN THE UK: CONCLUSION

Writing in 2011, Hamid stressed that the UK’s various Islamic movements and trends exhibited ‘an internal logic and set of truth claims’;

They essentially agree on the notion that Islam is a divinely revealed religion which provides meaning and guidance for life.
They start to differ on the analysis of the causes of Muslim civilizational decline and interpretation of scriptural sources to correct this situation in the modern era. (Hamid 2011; 258)

Increasingly, Islamic movements have become concerned with teaching what they see as the correct principles and practices in ways that make sense for Muslims in Britain, and with finding ways to cope with the challenges of living in a non-Muslim society. Their analyses and methods differ according to their history, Islamic tradition, the nature of their membership and wider appeal, and their approach to society, politics and the West.
7. BRITISH ISLAM: REPRESENTATIVE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND CAMPAIGNING GROUPS

7.1 REPRESENTATIVE BODIES

After the controversy following the 1988 publication of Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses*, Muslims in Britain increasingly recognised the need to organise and represent themselves at national level. The UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) was founded in 1988, and the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997, both with the intention of public representation for Muslims and active engagement with Government (Birt 2005: 99-101). After criticisms were levelled at the latter for its Islamist origins, it was followed by the Barelwi-inspired British Muslim Forum (BMF) and Sufi Muslim Council (SMC) in the mid-2000s (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 109-12; Stjernholm 2010). The BMF claimed to represent a broad range of Muslims bodies; the SMC said it could tap into the grassroots Islam practised by the silent majority. All these organisations sought to represent British Muslims to Government and the wider public, with each facing criticisms at various points for being insufficiently representative, too compliant, too political, too controversial or too critical.

The largest of these umbrella bodies today is the MCB, which has more than 440 affiliated mosques and Islamic organisations (Muslim Council of Britain 2017). Despite facing a series of challenges to its public position over the years, in part because of its earlier connections to *Jama’at-i Islami* (see 6.3.5 above), but also because it struggled for credibility with British Muslims, it has managed to remain in operation and to some extent to salvage its reputation (Birt 2005: 104; Bowen 2014).

Despite issues surrounding its links to the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately to Hamas, through a change of leadership MAB was able to continue in its public role working closely with Government (whilst others left to form the British Muslim Initiative). In 2006, it participated in the establishment of another umbrella organisation, the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) established to oversee mosque governance and to support the training of imams (Bowen 2014: 110). Now organised into eleven regional branches, MAB’s principal activities are focused on the organisation of national and local events for Muslims, whilst it aims to reflect ‘the diversity of the Muslim community and [lead] the way in promoting and defending Islam’ through ‘a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the wider non-Muslim community’ (Muslim Association of Britain 2016).

Several other apparently representative bodies have also reflected sectarian perspectives. The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB, founded in 1990) took its early inspiration from two Islamist sources, *Jama’at-i Islami* and the Muslim Brotherhood (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 103). It focused on promoting Islamic values and engagement with non-Muslims, especially through its Islamic Scouts movement and the initiation of ‘Islam Awareness Week’. Supporters closer to the Muslim Brotherhood split from ISB and founded the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) in 1997 (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 75-77; Hamid in Peter & Ortega 2015: 112-114; Maher & Frampton 2009: 20-21). Although MAB shared many of the Brotherhood’s principles, its focus was on the active participation and citizenship of British Muslims, and to this end it sought to work closely with the Government and other public and civil society bodies. MAB came to public prominence in 2003 during the ‘Stop the War’ campaign when it played a role in bringing British Muslims into a coalition with peace groups, unions, political parties and campaigning organisations (Bowen 2014: 108; Hamid in Peter & Ortega 2015: 113). MAB was called on in 2005 to take over the management of Finsbury Park Mosque following the removal of Abu Hamza (Gilliat-Ray 2010: 76-77; Muslim Association of Britain 2016).

The Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) was first established in 1963 by Arab, South Asian and Malaysian students from the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i Islami studying in the UK (Bowen 2014: 103). Since then, it has sought to represent the interests of Muslim students at universities and colleges in the
FOSIS has attracted criticism at times, for its association with Islamist groups, and its apparent support for extremist organisations and speakers, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (e.g., Home Office 2011; Khan 2016).

Islamic Societies or ISocs are student-run organisations situated in higher education institutions, many of which are affiliated to FOSIS. In her study of three ISocs in the south-east of England, Song (2012) sought British Muslim students’ views and experiences of ISocs at their universities, and considered potential differences between those who join ISocs and those who do not.

There does appear to be a divide between British Muslim students who join ISOCs and those who do not, but this distinction does not turn, neatly, upon the degree to which one is religiously devout and practising. Generally speaking, it appears that some of the student population who do not join ISOCs profess a looser affiliation or attachment to Islam than those who do. A key motivation for those who join or participate in ISOCs is the importance of meeting and socially networking with other Muslim students; underlying this desire to network with Muslims is the view that they will share certain values/beliefs/practices in common with each other. Those who do not participate in ISOCs are less likely to mobilize around their Muslim identity than those who do. (Song 2012: 156; see also Inge 2017).

FOSIS’s own estimate is that, in 2017, there were approximately 130,000 Muslim students in universities and colleges in the UK and Ireland, served by 120 ISocs organised into seven regions (FOSIS 2017). For more information on ISocs, see 4.2 above.
iv) To channel talent into strategic projects which practically help to put back into wider British society.

Described by Hamid (2011: 259) as a ‘civil society project’, from its inception it was seen as ‘a space where Muslims could openly talk about Islam alongside politics and other critical social issues’ (Malik 2009). It has broadly avoided negative public criticism by other groups, and retains its registered charitable status.

CAGE

Formerly CagePrisoners, CAGE was established in 2003 as an independent advocacy NGO ‘with the purpose of raising awareness of the plight of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and other detainees held as part of the War on Terror’ (CAGE 2017a). Although it aims to work with both Muslims and non-Muslims, according to the Director, it is the will of Allah that makes possible CAGE’s work. According to its website, it seeks to,

- work closely with survivors of abuse and mistreatment across the globe, supporting them to access due process for their case
- carry out cutting edge research, regularly documenting the abuse of due process and the erosion of the rule of law in the context of the War on Terror
- provide a voice for survivors of the war on terror, challenging the dominant narrative of suspect communities and the perceived threat of terrorism, and
- empower communities through workshop, events and seminars highlighting and campaigning against state policies. (CAGE 2017a)

CAGE has come under significant public scrutiny over the years because of its contact with and campaigning on behalf of those arrested or imprisoned for terrorism offences, including Moazzem Begg (who joined CAGE after his release from Guantanamo in 2005), Michael Adebolajo, Shaker Aamer and Mohammed Emwazi (Khan 2016; McMicking 2015). It has been fiercely critical of the UK Government’s PREVENT programme (Qureshi 2015), and of what it refers to as the ‘science of pre-crime’ that underpins it (CAGE 2016). This stance of holding Government to account, along with its reputation for working with those accused of terrorism offences, has raised the question of whether CAGE is an important human rights group or an apologist for terror (McMicking 2015).

Support for CAGE’s work was compromised after 2015 when Amnesty International declined to share a platform with it, and the UK Charity Commission asked charities to cease funding it because of its controversial links with Emwazi (Rawlinson 2015). It is now funded by donations.

Liberal and neo-conservative commentators and think tanks such as Sara Khan, Quilliam, and the Henry Jackson Society have sought to expose it (Khan 2016, 2017; Moore 2017; Stuart 2015); equally, they stand accused by CAGE of Government collusion (CAGE 2017b, 2017c).

Quilliam

The Quilliam Foundation (now Quilliam) was established in 2007 by three former members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Ed Husain, Maajid Nawaz and Rashad Zaman Ali, who had moved away from Islamism. Today it describes itself as the ‘world’s first counter-extremism organisation’, and as

advising others on counter-extremism strategy and policy, developing and communicating research to shape a public conversation about extremism and terrorism, and building counter-extremism programmes to build the capacity of others to get involved. We are not a ‘representative’ body, we are not a mass movement actively seeking mass support, nor are we a religious organisation seeking to preach. (Quilliam 2017)

Originally founded to raise awareness of Islamism as a political ideology, the Foundation sought to expose its dangers in its various guises. In 2010, in a confidential but leaked report to the UK Government (Preventing Terrorism: Where Next for Britain?), Quilliam named a number of other Muslim individuals and organisations as pro-Islamist, including the Muslim Council of Britain, the Muslim Association of Britain, FOSIS and the Islam Channel, linking them to Jama’at-i Islami
and the Muslim Brotherhood. This and other activities provoked criticism from various prominent Muslims who accused Quilliam of McCarthyism, spying on British Muslims and acting as ‘arbiters of who is and is not an acceptable Muslim’ (Inayat Bunglawala, in Gardham 2010). Quilliam countered some of the views of its opponents in ‘Setting the Record Straight’ (Quilliam n.d.). As well as repelling accusations of spying and McCarthyism, it stressed that it was no longer in receipt of Government funding (after 2010), and that it had not given the ex-leader of the English Defence League respectability by ‘facilitat[ing] his defection’ (Quilliam n.d: 3). This last point referred to Quilliam’s work with Tommy Robinson before and after his imprisonment in 2013 (in 2015, Robinson told The Huffington Post UK that the organisation had paid him over a period of six months in association with his departure from EDL and, as he put it, for being their ‘poster boy’) (Hopkins 2015).

**iEngage/MEND**

iEngage was formed in 2008 with the declared purpose of being ‘dedicated to promoting greater media awareness, political participation and civic participation amongst British Muslims’ (Wilson 2017: 11). It played a significant role in highlighting Islamophobic content in the UK news media. It engaged with academic researchers working on Islam and its representation, developed a travelling Islamophobia awareness exhibition, and lobbied Government and other public bodies on related issues, including serving for a time as Secretariat for the All Party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia. This ceased after accusations of extremism were made and support for the organisation became compromised (Gilligan 2011; Wilson 2017: 12).

iEngage relaunched as **MEND: Muslim Engagement and Development** in 2014. It describes itself as ‘a not-for-profit company that helps to empower and encourage British Muslims within local communities to be more actively involved in British media and politics’ (MEND 2017), and has the following objectives.

MEND aims to equip Muslims with the skills, resources and materials necessary for them to play a more active role in society. MEND believes that all citizens have a responsibility to contribute to the positive and sustained development of a Britain in which all members of society are valued and respected whatever their religious, racial or ethnic background, gender or sexual orientation.

- MEND endeavours to enable active citizenship and participation by British Muslims in furtherance of its aims to create a more inclusive and tolerant Britain.
- MEND aims to provide commentary and analysis on the high volumes of news content and coverage that maligns Islam and Muslims and foments Islamophobia in the UK and across Europe.
- MEND aims to work with Muslim and non-Muslim organisations to ensure that anti-Muslim prejudice is regarded just as socially unacceptable as anti-Semitism and other forms of racism and xenophobia.
- MEND will provide free training seminars to British Muslims in the UK offering support and advice on why mainstream participation is important and how to go about getting involved.
- MEND works to deepen democratic and civic engagement at the local level by encouraging greater participation by British Muslims in voluntary bodies and institutions. (MEND 2017)

MEND runs an Islamophobia Response Unit, which enables incidents to be reported online; it also provides a media toolkit and resources for teachers.

Despite its positive pro-social agenda, MEND continues to generate controversy in relation to the ideological standpoint and history of its leaders, its critical stance towards UK media and Government, and the anti-Semitic and homophobic views of some of its speakers. MEND stands accused by its ideological opponents of being ‘Islamists masquerading as civil libertarians’ (Tom Wilson 2017, for the Henry Jackson Society; see also Khan 2016).

**Inspire**

Inspire was established in 2008, and describes itself as ‘an independent non-governmental counter-extremism
and women’s rights organisation’ founded to respond to the inertia of male Muslim leaders on key matters relating to extremism and women’s issues (Inspire 2017). Since its formation, it has campaigned against violence, Islamist extremism and IS in particular, provided training and teacher resources on human rights and gender equality, and produced online counter-narrative videos for young people (Inspire 2017). Its 2014 ‘Making a Stand’ initiative, supported with funding from the Home Office, encouraged British Muslim women to tell their stories about extremism and radicalisation and to work against them in their families, mosques and communities (Inspire 2017). This initiative was one of several critiqued by CAGE and others on the grounds of its close ties to Government (2017c; 2017d; for a rebuttal, see Khan 2017).

Sara Khan, one of Inspire’s co-founders, entered the debate about Islam in the UK in 2016 with her book, *The Battle for British Islam: Reclaiming Muslim Identity from Extremism*, in which she identified many of the key protagonists in what she described as the ‘new spirit of cooperation between Islamists and Salafists’ in Britain (Khan 2016). This new ‘conglomerate’, she wrote, ‘increasingly advanced a claim to speak for all British Muslims’ (Khan 2016). Objecting strongly to this, she discussed the importance of women taking a stand against extremism and its appeal for young Muslims, as well as the need for greater understanding and better communication by Government to Muslim communities. The failure to achieve this, she suggested, only invites more extreme Muslim voices to intervene: ‘Salafi-Islamists have seized on the Government’s poor communication in furthering their anti-Western and victimhood narrative’ (Khan 2016).

In January 2018, Sara Khan was appointed by the government to be Lead Commissioner for the Home Office’s Commission for Countering Extremism – a decision that received widespread criticism from within Muslim communities (BBC News 2018).

**Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks)**

Tell MAMA was initiated in 2012 by Fiyaz Mughal as a project within Faith Matters (established in 2006, to enable faith communities to reduce conflict). It was set up as an independent human rights NGO, with Government backing and funding (in 2012-13), for the reporting, recording and analysis of anti-Muslim hate crime and the support of victims (Tell MAMA 2017). It has worked locally and regionally with the Police, and reports annually on the nature, extent and geography of anti-Muslims attacks.

Taking a stance on all forms of bigotry and discrimination, in 2014 Tell MAMA invited the LGBT activist, Peter Tatchell, and former chief executive of the Community Security Trust (a charity that protects British Jews from anti-Semitism and related threats), Richard Benson, to become Patrons. This led to accusations by Islamist groups of it being pro-Zionist and anti-Islamic (Cohen 2014; Khan 2016).

The work of these and other related organisations illustrates the range of issues around which British Muslims are organising. In diverse ways, these bodies and their representatives express the desire and intention to assert Muslim interests, to intervene in public debates, to contribute to civil society, and to highlight areas in which their communities are disadvantaged, treated as suspect, vilified or the victims of Islamophobia. It is clear, however, that these organisations are not aligned in their interests or wider relationships; in some cases, they are in competition or in dispute with one another. Claims by some that others work too closely with Government are common, whilst others target those they hold to be extremist or Islamist (CAGE 2017b, 2017c; Cohen 2015; Husain 2007; Khan 2016; Maher & Frampton 2009; Qureshi 2015; Stuart 2015; Wilson 2017).

It is notable that a number of the protagonists in these bodies previously belonged to other Islamic organisations, such as Young Muslims UK, *Hizb-ut-Tahrir*, Muslims4UK, and the Muslim Council of Britain, and it is possible that some of the animosity between them hails from longstanding disagreements or results from changes in their ideological allegiance and standpoint over time.

At the level of political ideas, however, arguments between them revolve around the place of Islam in the West, the ‘battle for British Islam’, views about the secular state, and the UK Government and its policies. On such issues, the groups differ considerably, with CAGE and MEND adopting a critical stance towards
the UK Government's counter-terrorism and extremism policies and practice, whilst Quilliam, Inspire and Tell MAMA are more open to working with Government or taking Government funding to counter extremism and Islamophobia. Both MEND and Tell MAMA focus on holding the media to account for anti-Muslim prejudice and encouraging the reporting of hate crimes against Muslims, but they take different approaches, with MEND working independently and Tell MAMA using official measures and co-operating with the Police and Government. Quilliam and Sara Khan of Inspire share a liberal perspective and a commitment to critiquing the views of Islamist ideologues and working to counter what they consider to be the dangers of Islamism in the UK; along with Tell MAMA, they are accused of political collaboration by CAGE and others. The City Circle remains aloof of inter-group conflict.
8. CULTURAL MUSLIMS, SECULAR MUSLIMS AND EX-MUSLIMS

Although many young people from Muslim families think of themselves as ‘Muslim first’, not all Muslims are overtly religious. There are many who see themselves as ‘cultural Muslims’, ‘secular Muslims’ or ‘ex-Muslims’.

The term ‘cultural Muslim’ refers to members of the Muslim community who are non-practising but may retain a degree of attachment to Islamic culture and family traditions (Milani 2014). According to Hamid (2011: 250), cultural Muslims are in the majority, accounting for 75-80 per cent of all Muslims. Some within this category may identify specifically with secularism (‘secular Muslims’) or atheism (in which case they may think of themselves as ‘ex-Muslims’).

Secular Muslims include those whose primary allegiance is to secularism though they may retain an ethnic and even nominal religious identity (Orenstein & Weismann 2016). One group that represents their interests is British Muslims for Secular Democracy, founded in 2006 by Nasreen Rehman and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (bmsd 2017).

A minority see themselves as ‘ex-Muslims’. Some are non-believers or atheists; other have converted to another religion.

At 20, I actually thought I was the only Muslim atheist in the world. You just don’t know about it. I didn’t know you could leave. There’s not a concept of it. It’s hard to explain. It’s like knowing the world is round but you can’t see it. (Imtiaz Shams in Anthony 2017)

The Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain (CEMB), founded in 2007, offers them support through self-help (Cottee 2015: 179-85; Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain 2017). Its online forum provides a space for doubters to hear from others, reflect on their position, and share thoughts and feelings.

I joined the forum after I saw a YouTube video of one of the members. He chronicled his process of becoming an ex-Muslim. And it was one of the most powerful moments in my life because this was the first time I’d actually heard another ex-Muslim’s voice. (Cottee 2015: 183)

Those who choose to leave Islam (technically referred to as ‘apostates’) are frequently judged harshly by more conservative Muslims and even by family members, leading some to keep their new identity and views hidden (Anthony 2017; Cottee 2015). Those who make the decision to come out as apostates experience a range of emotions: relief, excitement, guilt, anger, anxiety and confusion (Cottee 2015: 66-71). The impact of disclosing this to others may generate in them an equally strong emotional reaction (Cottee 2015: 79-116), of shock, hurt, anger, shame and vilification. Some friends and family choose the path of repudiation, whilst others try to understand and protect the leaver. The reaction of others only adds to the pain and grief associated with apostasy.

The identities touched on here, of ‘cultural’, ‘secular’ and ‘ex-Muslim’, have also at times been politicised. Lambert (2008), writing on Salafi and Islamist Muslims in London after 7/7, noted the tendency among many liberal commentators and political actors to favour ‘secular’ Muslims, as well as Sufis, as an antidote to Islamic fundamentalism. They were, he said, ‘courted by politicians and political lobbyists as role models and bulwarks against the influence of violent extremism and “radicalisation”’ (Lambert 2008: 75).
CONCLUSION: DIVERSITY, CHANGE AND NEW DIRECTIONS

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9. CONCLUSION: DIVERSITY, CHANGE AND NEW DIRECTIONS

In much public discourse, especially in the media, Muslims are presented as a homogeneous group and Islam as a uniform religion. As this research synthesis makes clear, this is not the case.

The UK’s Muslim population is highly diverse. It includes people from multiple ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, some first-generation migrants and refugees, but most second or third generation settlers for whom the UK is home and British is their main national identity. It is diverse in terms of race, class, education and sexual orientation. It includes those who are ‘Muslim first’ and others for whom different aspects of their identity take priority. The majority are ‘cultural Muslims’, but even that term hides an array of different ways of being Muslim.

Furthermore, Islam in the UK is far from monolithic. The Islamic landscape contains a multiplicity of mosques, seminaries, schools of thought, organisations, charities, transnational movements and online networks associated with different traditions of Islam, many with their roots in South Asia and others in the Middle East.

British colonial relationships with India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, with Africa and the Middle East contributed to the formation of many of the Islamic reform movements now represented in Britain, and also influenced issues of migration and citizenship. First generation migrants, where circumstances allowed, retained strong relationships with family members in their countries of origin. Second and third generation young people have had more complex relationships with these places, some with active family connections, others with emotional and symbolic ties. For some young Muslims, a sense of being part of a wider global Islamic community is more important than the ethnic and familial roots of their parents.

Local geographies have also contributed to the different experiences and life-chances of British Muslims, with some living in densely populated Muslim areas, some in super-diverse neighbourhoods, and others in locations with few Muslims and an absence of facilities to support their culture or religion. Many live in areas classified as deprived, with Muslims in general experiencing a ‘Muslim penalty’ when it comes to educational and employment opportunities and attainment. Nevertheless, as the 2011 population census showed, the picture is changing for the better in terms of participation in the workplace and educational results.

As there have been Muslim communities and neighbourhoods in the UK for more than a century, change is to be expected. Many changes have come about as a result of the way in which Muslims of different generations have engaged with wider society, whether in schools, universities, workplaces, civic spaces or the political arena. Government policies have had an impact, especially those relating to national security and equality and diversity, but also to education, training and the law. Furthermore, global events (such as the Rushdie affair, conflicts in Bosnia and Iraq, 9/11 and 7/7) have led to change – in how Muslims have been seen by others, whether they feel they belong, and in their willingness to engage or participate in public life in the UK.

Muslims have in common their exposure to anti-Muslim sentiment, Islamophobia in the media and hate crime, although those who are outwardly Islamic in speech or dress may have been targeted to a greater extent than others. In terms of public discourse and identity politics, since the 1990s, race and ethnicity have given way to religion, especially Muslims. Many people, particularly second or third generation, have embraced this. In doing so, they have also sought to distinguish themselves from the ethnic and cultural practices and homeland ties of their parents, preferring what they see as an unadulterated and purer form of Islam.

In all of these areas, change has been informed by the need to engage existing and older traditions, relationships and practices with the demands of a new context. Among other things, this context is outwardly secular and liberal; it has ‘British values’;
it applauds integration and cohesive communities. But it too is dynamic. The contemporary political, social and economic environment is very different to the one experienced by South Asian migrants in the 1950s and 1960s. Adapting and finding satisfying ways to be a Muslim citizen in the UK has not been without its challenges in any period.

Despite the brakes on progress arising from Islamophobia, discrimination and disadvantage, as well as from conservatism and criticism within minority communities themselves, Muslims have found new means of expression, fulfilling identities, and opportunities for civic engagement and activism. They are now part of mainstream British consciousness, with prominent figures such as Mo Farah, Nadiya Hussain, Amir Khan, Yusuf Islam, Baroness Warsi and Sadiq Khan in the public eye (Timol 2018).

There is also a sense of generational change, as British Muslims ‘transition from a patchwork of ethnic communities to a self-conscious and creative religious public […], a trend that is affecting everything, from political activism and religious scholarship to institution building, culture, lifestyle, and business’ (Morris 2018). This is especially the case for young people.

_Beneath the dark shadow of 11 September, our young Muslims have grown up under intense global scrutiny. But instead of hiding, the generation that have resulted are passionate about their faith and proudly self-identify as Muslims. They are ardent about defending themselves against what they believe are the misconceptions about Muslims, at the same time as seeing their faith as something that empowers them. They see it as their role to be ambassadors for their faith. They do not see the world in terms of clashes of civilisations. Instead, they see multiple cultures, domains and experiences co-existing inside themselves. For Generation M, faith and modernity together make perfect sense._ (Shelina Zahra Janmohamed, Generation M: Young Muslims Changing the World, 2016)
GLOSSARY

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Ahl-i Hadith: a Salafi reform movement founded in 1850s India which drew on Middle Eastern as well as South Asian influences; established in UK with small following

adhan: call to prayer

Ahmadiyya: an religious movement established in India at the end of the 19th century; the founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, claimed to be the long-awaited Mahdi and renewer of Islam; for this reason, Ahmadis are not accepted by other Muslims

Al-Muhajiroun: a violent Salafi jihadi movement initially established in the 1980s in Saudi Arabia, but revived in the UK in 1996 by Omar Bakri Muhammad; disbanded in 2004 but later operated under other names

Barelwi: a Sufi reform movement founded in 19th India during colonial rule, and well established in the UK as Ahl al-Sunnat wa-al-Jama’at

biradari: Urdu term from Persian work meaning ‘brotherhood’; locally based clan or family network among South Asian Muslims

daru’l-‘ulum: seminary

Deobandi: a conservative Sunni reform movement founded in 19th India during colonial rule, and well established in the UK, with its seminary in Bury.

burqa: full body covering worn by women

hajj: annual pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca

hijab: head and hair covering worn by women

imam: prayer leader

hadith: narratives reporting the sayings of the Prophet

Hizb-ut-Tahrir: founded in Palestine in the 1950s, it became a transnational movement working towards the re-establishment of a pan-Islamic state or caliphate; established in the UK in the 1980s and led by Omar Bakri Muhammad until 1996

Jama‘at-i Islami: a reform movement established in India in 1941 by Maulana Mawdudi; its influence is wide-reaching in the UK through a range of organisations including the UK Islamic Mission, Markfield Institute of Higher Education, the Islamic Society of Britain, Young Muslims UK, and Dawatul Islam

Jam’iyat Ihya’ Minhaj al-Sunnah (JIMAS): founded in 1984 by British Muslim university students, led by Manwar Ali (Abu Muntasir); popularised Salafism among young British-born Muslims and converts

jum’a: Friday congregational prayers

khutba: sermon

madhhab: school of law

madrasah; maktab: supplementary classes for Qur’anic Arabic recitation and Islamic studies

marja: source of authority in Shi’ism; ayatollah

masjid: mosque

maslak: school of thought; sect

mihrab: niche in mosque interior

minbar: pulpit

mujahideen: Muslims who fight for the cause of Islam; those who engage is jihad

nikah: marriage

niqab: women’s full face covering (apart from the eyes)

Salafi: Islamic reform movement established in the Middle East at the beginning of the 20th century; one who draws on the Qur’an and Sunnah for guidance

salah: five daily prayers

shari‘ah: Islamic laws
**shahadah**: declaration of faith

Shi’a: ‘party of ‘Ali’; Shi’as are divided into Twelvers, who accept a lineage of twelve *imams*, and those who accept seven *imams* (Ismailis and Bohras)

**sunnah**: the example of the Prophet; traditions surrounding his life and times

**Tablighi Jama’at**: a pietistic revivalist movement founded in India in the 1920s; close connections with the Deobandi movement, but now a global missionary network operating in more than one hundred countries

**Takfir**: (call for) the excommunication of unbelievers

**ulama**: body of Islamic scholars

**Wahhabi/Wahhabism**: a reformist branch of Sunni Islam, named after the 18th century scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, associated with the purification of Islamic practice, the purging of Sufi elements, and the principle of the unity of Allah; allied to the political elite in Saudi Arabia.

**wudu**: ablution before prayer

**zakat**: obligatory Islamic tax; one of the five pillars of Islam


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