On his return to the UK he was arrested and in 2016 convicted of preparing acts of terrorism.

Under acute (short-lived, high intensity) stress we focus on short-term rapid responses at decision making in many ways. Under acute stress, the psychological pressures can be as extreme as these are, physical hazards are not the hardest part of deployment, or perhaps undercover.

People who leave the relative comfort of developed countries to live in remote training camps or enter theatres of war often find themselves unable to act. In some cases, decision makers under stress experience ‘decision paralysis’ (doing nothing). At one point, he told an interview that he couldn’t tolerate conditions, which included hardships like cold deprivation, and monotony for days at a time can lead to mental confusion and slower decision making. Other circumstances in extreme environments can change quickly and unexpectedly. This makes it difficult to make an accurate connection and rapport.

In extremist messaging, false memories in fact recall the truth, and even that it then becomes much easier to lead others to believe the same misinformation. However, Stephan Lewandowsky, Sander van der Linden and John Cook’s article on page 10 looks at how we can inoculate against misinformation. ‘Their research has shown that ‘prebanking’ – by providing prior warming of disinformation strategies before they are delivered – helps increase resilience to them.

A recurring thread of concern about malign influence centres on the use of internet channels to spread extremist ideology. Sheryl Prentice’s research (page 18) has uncovered patterns in extremist messaging that can help with identifying and countering extremist content. Simon Henderson outlines how some of the techniques used by magicians could help deter malicious attackers and even influence them to waste their efforts on insignificant targets (page 18).

On page 32, Nelli Ferenczi and Gordon Henderson outlines how some of the techniques used by magicians could help deter malicious attackers and even influence them to waste their efforts on insignificant targets (page 18). They show how principles of magic can influence people’s understanding.

Can we inoculate against fake news? Combating misinformation by preventing it from sticking in the first place

What does alcohol-intoxication mean for the ability to tolerate insults and find themselves unable to act.
We all seek to influence the decisions and behaviours of others. Acquiring useful information from a target, convincing peers to share information, and spurring actions that promote desirable outcomes all require the ability to influence others through persuasion. So how is successful persuasion best achieved?

The increasingly complex form and ever-accelerating pace of modern life is depriving people of sufficient time and ability to make carefully examined decisions. As a result, they must often resort to a shortcut (or heuristic) approach in which a choice is made on the basis of a single, usually reliable piece of information. Through our work, we have identified six principles of influence that operate as such shortcuts in the realm of persuasion.

**SIX UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF PERSUASION**

1. **RECIPROCITY** People feel obligated to return favours performed for them. One memorable demonstration of this principle is the story of when CIA operatives received a ‘bonanza’ of information from an Afghan tribal elder, who had just been given a personalized gift: four Viagra pills (one for each of his wives).

2. **AUTHORITY** People look to experts to show them the way. When shown the opinion of a distinguished economist on an economic problem, individuals not only followed that opinion but also changed their submitted solutions to the problem; they did so without evaluating other relevant evidence.

3. **SCARCITY** People want more of what they can have less of. At one large grocery chain, brand promotions that had a purchase limit (‘Only X per customer’) or time limit (‘For today only’) resulted in significantly more sales versus promotions without a limit.

4. **LIKING** People want to say yes to those who they like. One route to liking someone is through finding similarities with them. Research shows that the odds of a failed negotiation are significantly lowered when the negotiators learn of similarities, like hobbies, that they share.

5. **CONSISTENCY** People want to act consistently with what they have publicly said or done. Having individuals sign an agreement led to significantly less lying on the form. People are more likely to believe in what they have publicly said or done.

6. **SOCIAL PROOF** People look to others’ behaviour to guide their own. UK tax officials collected hundreds of millions of additional pounds by including a message on tax recovery letters stating that most people do pay their taxes on time.

**THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRE-SUASION**

Researchers have learned a lot over the years about which elements to build into a message to achieve greatest impact. However, there is a crucial component of the process in addition to the content, which has often been overlooked. Effective persuasion is also achieved through effective pre-suasion. It’s the practice of arranging for people to agree with a message before they experience it.

On the face of it, pre-suasion seems illogical. After all, how can we arrange for people to agree with a message before they know what it’s about? However, it’s established science. It works by first putting the audience in a frame of mind that fits with the forthcoming message, thereby intensifying the impact of the message when encountered.

Let’s take as examples some frames of mind that CREST Security Review readers might want to install in others before sending a persuasive message.

**HELPFULNESS** In one study, when researchers approached individuals and asked for help on a survey task for which they would not be paid, only 38% agreed to participate. But, when the researchers approached a second sample of individuals and preceded that request with a simple, pre-suasive question to which most agreed: ‘Do you consider yourself a helpful person?’, 77.3% subsequently volunteered for the task. Why? For the second sample, volunteering fit with a recently installed helpfulness mindset.

**TRUST** Gaining another’s trust normally requires much time and effort. However, it is possible to acquire rapid trust by employing a clever pre-suasive strategy. For example, when presenting a proposal, it is better not to succumb to the tendency to discipline all of the most favourable features upfront, whilst leaving mentions of the drawbacks until the end of the presentation (or never). This is because a communicator who references a weakness early-on is immediately seen as more honest. The advantage of this sequence is that, with perceived trustworthiness already in place, when the major strengths of the case are advanced, the audience is more likely to believe them.

Elizabeth I of England employed this approach to optimise the impact of one of the most celebrated speeches of her reign. At Tilbury in 1588, while addressing her troops massed against an expected sea invasion from Spain, she dispelled the soldiers’ concern that, as a woman, she wasn’t up to the rigors of battle: ‘I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman. But, I have the heart of a king; and a king of England too!’ So long and loud were the cheers after this pronouncement that officers had to ride among the men ordering them to restrain themselves so the Queen could continue.

**COOPERATION** Suppose that you want to get a co-worker’s support for a new plan you have developed. Ask your colleague for advice concerning your idea, not for opinions or expectations regarding it. It turns out that evaluators who are asked to provide advice (versus opinions or expectations) on a plan are put in a cooperative state of mind before they even experience the plan, which makes them more favourable to it when they then do encounter it. There’s an old saying: ‘When we ask for advice, we are usually looking for an accomplice.’ We’d only add on the basis of scientific evidence that, if we get that advice, we usually get that accomplice.

**REPUTABILITY** During the 1970s, Henry Kissinger was considered America’s greatest international negotiator. When asked who he considered the best negotiator he had encountered, Kissinger nominated Egypt’s then-president Anwar Sadat because of a pre-suasive tactic: Sadat regularly employed to get more from a negotiation than was warranted by his political or military position at the time.

Before beginning negotiations, Sadat would assign an admirable trait to the opposing side (perhaps Israel’s ‘well-known’ tradition of fairness and sympathy for the underdog or support for those in need) that fitted with what he wanted. In other words, Kissinger said, ‘Sadat first gave his opponents a reputation to live up to’ – something they then did remarkably often.

**CONCLUSION**

Given that effective influence is optimised by both pre-suasion and persuasion, our recommended approach for practicioners is to adopt a ‘one-two’ strategy for maximum impact:

1) Identify the pre-suasive mind-set you would like an influence target to be in before receiving your related message, and then

2) Boost the persuasiveness of your request by incorporating into it one or more of the six universal principles honestly available to you in the situation.

In sum, we are confident that, by employing scientific evidence regarding pre-suasion, communicators will experience a notable increase in success.

For more visit www.influenceatwork.co.uk

Robert Cialdini is author of the bestselling book Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion and Pre-Suasion: A Revolutionary Way to Influence and Persuade. He is the Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Marketing at Arizona State University and President of INFLUENCE AT WORK.

**INFLUENCE AT WORK** provides training and advisory services on the effective and ethical use of persuasion. Their new Moment-Maker programme is based on the pre-suasion research described in this article.

Steve Martin is co-author (with Robert Cialdini & Noah Guilden) of the New York Times bestseller Yes! 50 Secrets from the Science of Persuasion. He is CEO of INFLUENCE AT WORK (UK).
SUBTLE INFLUENCE AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: HOW PRIMING WORKS IN INTELLIGENCE

In his book, *The Black Banners*, Ali Soufan, a former FBI intelligence interviewer, describes an interesting case when he used subtle influence tactics that ultimately led an al-Qaeda operative – Anas al-Mekki – to disclose sensitive information.

Based on the available intelligence, Soufan deduced that al-Mekki valued respect highly. Thus, to facilitate the likelihood that al-Mekki would disclose information, Soufan shrewdly increased al-Mekki’s perceptions that he was respected by altering the previously bare interview room to resemble a homely living room.

In addition, Soufan allowed al-Mekki to remain uncuffed during their interview sessions and, when attempting to elicit information, Soufan drew on al-Mekki’s need for respect by being firm but friendly and respectful.

**PRIMING TO PROMOTE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE**

Social psychologists refer to such tactics, where a particular perception or motivation is covertly increased to influence a target’s behaviour, as priming. An emerging body of psychological research suggests that priming motivations, which is likely to promote information disclosure, leads interviewees to share more information in intelligence interviews.

For example, in what interviewees believed was a concentration exercise, an American group of researchers, Dawson, Hartwig, and Brimbal, primed trust and feelings of security by instructing the interviewees to reflect on a personal relationship with a confidant. Some other interviewees were not primed. Subsequently, all the interviewees, who possessed information about a mock terror attack, were interviewed about the attack.

These researchers found that interviewees who were interviewed in a spacious room with open windows were more forthcoming with information compared to those interviewed in an enclosed windowless room.

The results of the experiment indicated that those interviewees who possessed information disclosed more information than their counterparts who were not primed.

**HOW DOES PRIMING WORK?**

Current theories of priming suggest that in the first instance priming increases the ease with which the primed motivation, for example the intention to offer beneficial assistance to another, comes to an individual’s mind. This initial step in the priming process is important because, due to their subtle nature, individuals typically misattribute the ease with which the primed motivation comes to their mind as self-rather than prime-generated.

Furthermore, classic psychological research indicates that individuals are likely to draw on motivations that they can easily remember when making decisions, instead of searching their memories exhaustively. Thus, priming influences behaviour because it increases the mental accessibility of the primed motivation, which in turn leads the primed individual to draw on the primed motivation (that they can now easily remember) to behave in a prime-consistent manner. Crucially, however, priming is most likely to influence behaviour in situations that encourage the performance of the prime-congruent behaviour.

**PRIMING HELPFULNESS**

Recent research has examined two theoretical assumptions:

(a) Priming influences disclosure by increasing interviewees’ mental accessibility to the primed motivation, hence, predisposing the interviewee to behave in a prime-consistent manner;

(b) Such predisposition is most likely to increase disclosure when the interviewee uses an interview style that draws on the primed motivation and encourages the interviewee to behave in a prime-consistent manner.

**PRIMING WORKS IN INTELLIGENCE**

Previously, research has demonstrated that activating individuals’ helpfulness motivations increases their cooperativeness in various domains. Such increased interviewee cooperation fits neatly with the interviewer’s task of soliciting information, since a cooperative interviewee is likely to share reliable information.

In my research, participants assumed the role of an informant in my research, participants assumed the role of an informant and were instructed to reflect on and write about helping another, comes to an individual's mind. This initial step in the priming process is important because, due to their subtle nature, individuals typically misattribute the ease with which the primed motivation comes to their mind as self-rather than prime-generated.

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**WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PRIMING?**

Primers are individuals who employ priming techniques to elicit information. It is crucial for primers to understand the extent to which priming encourages the primed individual to behave in a prime-consistent manner. Primers must choose priming techniques that are likely to lead to a response congruent with the primed motivation.

**ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE**

The analysis of information disclosure is crucial for primers. It is important for primers to understand the role of priming in increasing interviewees’ cooperative behaviour. Primers must choose priming techniques that are likely to lead to a response congruent with the primed motivation.

**CONCLUSION**

Primers must choose priming techniques that are likely to lead to a response congruent with the primed motivation. The analysis of information disclosure is crucial for primers. It is important for primers to understand the role of priming in increasing interviewees’ cooperative behaviour. Primers must choose priming techniques that are likely to lead to a response congruent with the primed motivation.

**REFERENCES**


David Neequaye is a final-year doctoral candidate in Psychology at the University of Gothenburg. His research focuses on subtle influence tactics in investigative interviewing.
Perhaps the most frequent question psychologists get asked after, ‘are you analysing me?’ is ‘can you make other people do things for you?’

Seminal psychology papers on influence are often referred to in advertising, and techniques derived from these classic works are often used in corporate contexts and elsewhere to persuade others. Just occasionally these techniques are used to persuade people to do things that they might not otherwise consider. Some of the techniques are covert, for example mere frequency of exposure to an idea makes it more palatable, whilst other techniques are more overt, such as using authority and perceived credibility to persuade someone.

However, in law enforcement and security contexts we must consider the legal acceptability of a technique as well as whether it actually generates the truth. We must be mindful of any technique in which the influencer, rather than the ‘target’, has either deliberately or unwittingly generated the account. We must also be wary of generating an account from a vulnerable target. Consider, for example, the seemingly benign theory of recency in which in offering the target something I can expect that the person then feels obliged to give me something in return. This technique may generate a false account designed to please rather than something which is either useful or true.

Are there, then, alternatives that ensure we don’t cross the legal line whilst remaining powerful means to extract information from an individual doing something that we want without any force, influence or persuasion? Happily, there are and they come from an area of research and practice that might not be immediately obvious.

Our research is based on the examination of thousands of hours of real police interrogations with high value targets. What seemed to work best was quite different from some techniques such as pre-susitation (see Robert Galdini and Steve Martin on page 4 in this issue) and had far more in common with psychologists such as Carl Rogers, William Miller and Stephen Rollnick, who take a humanistic approach, which emphasises empathy and the good in human behaviour. This approach is client-centered and requires that the client takes an active role in their own treatment. This approach also requires that the interviewer in the interactions shows ‘unconditional positive regard’, which entails accepting others without judgment or evaluation.

These therapeutic approaches have long been established as particularly effective means by which to encourage behavioural change, such as violence reduction, more healthy lifestyles and a reduction or abstinence from alcohol or drugs. However, when we observed similar approaches used by interviewers, even though not trained in any of these methods, the outcomes included: (i) a reduction in aggressive and resistant detainee behaviours; (ii) an increase in detainee engagement and willingness to talk and; (iii) the production of more information, intelligence and evidence.

Critically, because these approaches do not rely on any aspect of covert or overt persuasion or influence, they should protect the innocent and put only internal pressure on the detainee when there genuinely is (i) some guilty knowledge and (ii) a degree of conscience or at least ambivalence about what they have done or intend to do.

There are some basic tenets about this approach that we found especially relevant to investigative interviews.

**FOCUS ON VALUES AND BELIEFS**

Those interviewers that didn’t simply rattled off questions or seek facts throughout, but instead showed an interest in the thoughts, feelings and beliefs of the detainee fared better in the long run at establishing what they wanted to know. We have argued that individuals are not simply fact-giving machines that ask will simply respond. Instead, interviewers that genuinely showed an interest in an individual’s unique perspective were far more successful.

**NON-JUDGEMENTAL QUESTIONING**

Interviewers that asked any judgement either about the individual in front of them, or in any way insinuated they already knew the facts were far less successful. Instead those that demonstrated an open mind, curiosity and seeking all sides of the narrative were more successful.

In contrast, a lack of empathy, distance or indifference towards the individual generated less information and could lead to no comment or silence. Importantly, lacking empathy or simplistic displays, or trick empathy was readily seen through and backfired. As such, it is not enough to ‘try’ empathy, one has to make a genuine effort to show positive regard.

**EMPATHY AND REGARD**

We found that showing empathy and positive regard resulted in both more engagement from the detainee and more information. Although rare, it also was also more likely to generate admissions of guilt. In contrast, a lack of empathy, distance or indifference towards the individual generated less information and could lead to no comment or silence. Importantly, lacking empathy or simplistic displays, or trick empathy was readily seen through and backfired. As such, it is not enough to ‘try’ empathy, one has to make a genuine effort to show positive regard.

**AUTONOMY AND PERSONAL CHOICE**

Most importantly those interviewers who reinforced the detainee’s choice to talk or not were more likely to develop a dialogue with the detainee. This may seem counter intuitive but at the very heart of client centered therapeutic interventions is the notion that it is not the therapist’s wishes that matter. As much as the therapist may desire the client to abstain from alcohol, stop being violent, eat more healthily etc, humanistic approaches recognise that these are the personal choice of the individual. In the same way, although an interviewer may want an interviewee to talk, it is the interviewee’s choice. In some cases we saw that the individual’s legal advisor appeared to suggest that the most important thing for the individual to do was stay silent. It seemed to be more important that the interviewee conforms to the legal advisor’s desire for the client to stay silent that mattered most. However, right at the heart of humanistic approaches is the notion that it is up to the individual.

Intriguingly this tells us that in many cases individuals do want to talk. It is their right to say nothing and the legal duty of their solicitor to advise them to if they feel it is in the client’s interest. However, it is also their right to talk, and neither the police nor the lawyer should seek to influence them either way – the ethical and more productive approach is to help the individual decide for themselves. Our research is directed at engaging in an authentic and genuine rapport based relationship. This doesn’t necessarily mean friendship or warmth – it means a genuine effort to connect, to understand – not to corner, manipulate or persuade. In our view interviews should endeavour to help and understand not trick, influence or manipulate the truth out of interviewees.

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Benjamin Franklin is said to have coined the phrase that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. This principle applies to many things, from vaccinations to physical exercise, and it even applies to combating ‘fake news’ and other forms of misinformation.

Misinformation sticks. Erasing ‘fake news’ from your memory is as difficult as getting jam off your fingers after a Devonshire tea.

Once you hammer into people that there are Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Iraq, it doesn’t matter that none were found after the country was thoroughly scourd by the invading forces. The constant drumbeat of ‘WMD, WMD, WMD’ in the lead-up to the invasion, followed by innumerable media reports of ‘preliminary tests’ that tested positive for chemical weapons during the early stages of the conflict – but ultimately were never confirmed by more thorough follow-up tests – created a powerful impression that those weapons had been discovered. An impression so powerful that a year after the absence of WMDs became the official US position, 60% of Republicans and 20% of Democrats believed either that the US had found WMDs or that Iraq had them, but had hidden the weapons so well that they escaped detection.

Misinformation can stick even when people acknowledge a correction, and know that a piece of information is false. This principle applies to many things, from vaccinations to physical exercise, and it even applies to combating ‘fake news’ and other forms of misinformation.

In a study conducted during the initial stages of the invasion, colleagues and ourselves presented participants with ‘preliminary tests’ that tested positive for chemical weapons during the early stages of the conflict – but ultimately were never confirmed by more thorough follow-up tests – created a powerful impression that those weapons had been discovered. An impression so powerful that a year after the absence of WMDs became the official US position, 60% of Republicans and 20% of Democrats believed either that the US had found WMDs or that Iraq had them, but had hidden the weapons so well that they escaped detection.

We found that US participants who were certain that the information had been retracted, continued to believe it to be true. This ‘I know it’s false but I think it’s true’ behaviour is the signature of the stickiness of misinformation. Misinformation sticks even in situations in which people have no ideological or motivational incentive to stick to their erroneous beliefs. In the laboratory, the original misinformation shines through in people’s responses to inference questions when they are presented with entirely fictional but plausible scripts about various events. For example, people will act as though a fictitious warehouse fire was due to negligence even if, later in the script, they are told the evidence pointing to negligence turned out to be false.

Misinformation sticks. Erasing ‘fake news’ from your memory is as difficult as getting jam off your fingers after a Devonshire tea.

There is broad agreement in the literature that combating misinformation requires that the correction be accompanied by a causal alternative. Telling people that negligence was not a factor in a warehouse fire is insufficient – but telling them that arson was to blame instead will successfully prevent any future reliance on the negligence idea.

Another way to combat misinformation is to prevent it from sticking in the first place. An ounce of inoculation turns out to be worth a pound of corrections and causal alternatives. If people are made aware that they might be misled before the misinformation is presented, there is evidence that people become resilient to the misinformation.

This process is variously known as ‘inoculation’ or ‘prebunking’ and it comes in a number of different forms. At the most general level, an up-front warning may be sufficient to reduce – but not eliminate – subsequent reliance on misinformation. In one of our studies, led by Ulrich Ecker, we found that telling participants at the outset that ‘the media sometimes does not check facts before publishing information that turns out to be inaccurate’ reduced reliance modestly (but significantly) in comparison to a retraction-only condition. A more specific warning that explained that research has shown that people continue to rely on outdated information even when it has been retracted or corrected, by contrast, reduced subsequent reliance on misinformation to the same level as was observed with a causal alternative.

A more involved variant of inoculation not only provides an explicit warning of the impending threat of misinformation, but it additionally refutes an anticipated argument that exposes the imminent fallacy. In the same way that a vaccination stimulates the body into generating antibodies by instigating an infection, which can then fight the real disease when an actual infection occurs, psychological inoculation stimulates the generation of counter-arguments that prevent subsequent misinformation from sticking.

The inoculation idea can be illustrated with an example from climate change. Although there is a persuasive scientific consensus – reliant on 150-year-old basic physics and 15,000 modern scientific articles – that the Earth is warming from the burning of fossil fuels, political operatives often seek to undermine that consensus to introduce doubt about those scientific facts in the public’s mind.

Ulrich Ecker and ourselves showed that people can be inoculated against those disinformation efforts by presenting them with (1) a warning that attempts are made to cast doubt on the scientific consensus for political reasons, and (2) an explanation that one disinformation technique involves appeals to dissenting ‘fake experts’ to feign a lack of consensus. We illustrated the ‘fake-expert’ approach by revealing the attempts of the tobacco industry to undermine the medical consensus about the health risks from smoking with advertising claims such as ‘20,679 Physicians say “Luckies are less irritating”.

By exposing the fake-expert disinformation strategy at the outset, the subsequent misinformation (in this case, the feigned lack of consensus on climate change) was defanged and people’s responses did not differ from a control condition that received no misinformation about the consensus. (Whereas in the absence of inoculation, that misinformation had a detrimental effect.)

Misinformation sticks and is hard to dislodge.

But we can prevent it from sticking in the first place by alerting people to how they might be misled.

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But we can prevent it from sticking in the first place by alerting people to how they might be misled.
THE PARTISAN BRAIN: WHY PEOPLE ARE ATTRACTIONS TO FAKE NEWS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

‘THE PARTY TOLD YOU TO REJECT THE EVIDENCE OF YOUR EYES AND EARS. IT WAS THEIR FINAL, MOST ESSENTIAL COMMAND.’ GEORGE ORWELL, 1984

Orwell’s famous novel, 1984, describes a totalitarian government in which the party in power manipulates the minds of its citizens through perpetual war, government surveillance, propaganda, and aggressive police, and demands that they abandon their own perceptions, memories and beliefs in favour of party propaganda. In this dystopian nightmare, people are forced against their will to adopt the beliefs of the ruling party. However, modern research in political science, psychology and neuroscience suggests that people are often quite willing to adopt the (mis)beliefs of political parties and spread manipulation misinformation when it aligns with their political affiliations.

While it is widely accepted that identification with a political party – or partisanship – shapes political judgments similarly to other forms of group affiliations that have nothing to do with politics. As such, identification with a political party is likely to activate mental processes related to group identities in general. Social groups fulfill numerous basic social needs such as belonging, distinctiveness, epistemic closure, access to power and resources, and they provide a framework for the endorsement of moral values (cf. Fig. 1). Political parties fulfill these needs through different means. For example, political rallies and events satisfy belonging needs; party elites and think tanks provide policy information; party members model norms for action; electoral success confers status and power; and party policy provides guidance on values. Because partisan identities can fulfill these goals, they generate a powerful incentive to distort beliefs in a manner that contradicts the truth, similar to a tug of war, when these identity goals are stronger than our accuracy goals they lead us to believe in fake news, propaganda, and other misinformation. In turn, these beliefs shape political attitudes, judgements, and behaviours.

The importance of each goal varies across individuals and contexts. When our accuracy goals are more important than the other goals, we will be more likely to arrive at accurate conclusions (insofar as we have access to factual information). Conversely, when one or more identity goals outweigh our accuracy goals, we will be more likely to distort our beliefs to align with the beliefs of our favourite political party or leader. When party beliefs are factually correct, our identity goals will generate accurate beliefs; but when party beliefs are incorrect, our identity goals will lead us to false beliefs. This process is likely intensified when competing political parties threaten moral values and access to resources, since these factors increase group conflict. Political systems dominated by two competing groups, like the Labour and Conservative parties in the UK, may heighten partisan motives because they are particularly effective at creating a sense of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’.

AN IDENTITY-BASED MODEL OF POLITICAL BELIEF

We recently developed a model to understand how partisanship can lead people to value party dogma over truth. Because identification with a political party is a voluntary and self-selected process, people are usually attracted to parties that align with their personal ideology. Political parties are also social groups that generate a feeling of belonging and identity – similar to fans of a sports club. Indeed, neuroimaging research has found that the human brain represents political affiliations similarly to other forms of group identities that have nothing to do with politics. As such, identification with a political party is likely to activate mental processes related to group identities in general. Social groups fulfill numerous basic social needs such as belonging, distinctiveness, epistemic closure, access to power and resources, and they provide a framework for the endorsement of moral values (cf. Fig. 1). Political parties fulfill these needs through different means. For example, political rallies and events satisfy belonging needs; party elites and think tanks provide policy information; party members model norms for action; electoral success confers status and power; and party policy provides guidance on values. Because partisan identities can fulfill these goals, they generate a powerful incentive to distort beliefs in a manner that contradicts the truth, similar to a tug of war, when these identity goals are stronger than our accuracy goals they lead us to believe in fake news, propaganda, and other misinformation. In turn, these beliefs shape political attitudes, judgements, and behaviours.

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HOW CAN WE REDUCE BIASES RELATED TO PARTISANSHIP?

To reduce partisan bias, our model suggests that interventions should either fulfill social needs that drive partisanship or increase the strength of accuracy goals. To make this effective in a political context, policymakers need to first determine which goals are valued by an individual and then aim to fulfill those goals. For example, when people are hungry for belonging, interventions should either affirm a feeling of belonging or make other social groups available or salient to each individual. When trying to correct a false belief, one risk threatening the target’s identity or revealing a gap in their knowledge, creating a feeling of uncertainty that is highly aversive. For instance, one study found that simply denying a false accusation did not change beliefs. However, denying the accusation while also providing an alternative explanation for the event did. Thus, an effective way of correcting people’s beliefs about fake news might be to enrich the corrective information in order to provide a broader account of the news.

Another strategy is to enhance accuracy goals. This can be done by activating identities associated with this goal, such as scientists, investigative journalists, or simply the identity of someone who cares about the truth. Another possibility is to incentivise accuracy or accountability. For instance, incentives and education that foster curiosity towards science, accuracy and accountability, can reduce partisan bias. Interacting with counter-partisan sources or being made aware of one’s ignorance about policy details also reduces political polarisation.

Another factor to keep in mind while building interventions is the impact of the source of the message. We know that people resist influence from out-groups. Therefore, interventions should aim at appealing to a superordinate identity that includes all targets of the message – like all British people – or use a trusted source within the targets’ political party to deliver the message.

CONCLUSION

Partisanship represents a threat to democracy. For example, there is evidence that foreign propaganda leverages existing social and moral divisions to drive a wedge between citizens. Social media might exacerbate expressions of moral outrage. Indeed, our research has found that moral emotional language is more likely to be shared on social media, but only within one’s political group – which can lead to disconnected political echo chambers and political polarisation. It is crucial to tackle these issues to ensure a healthy and robust democracy.
People’s sincere beliefs about past public events do not always tally with the facts. In one survey of 712 American voters, for example, 25% agreed that the ‘Bowling Green Massacre’ – a fictional incident referenced by Kellyanne Conway, one of President Trump’s key advisers – justified the need for banning immigration from seven predominantly Muslim countries. As this example illustrates, the easy spread of misinformation often means that false beliefs about past events can become widely accepted.

In light of growing concerns about the abundance of misinformation in our physical and online worlds, and about manipulative disinformation campaigns being run by political extremists and powerful foreign governments, misinformation is increasingly viewed as a serious threat to the stability and security of our communities, and of our nations. As yet, there is no failsafe inoculation against misinformation, but psychological science is well positioned to play a central role in this endeavour. Indeed, many hundreds of psychological studies have documented how and when misinformation changes people’s beliefs about past events, and even people’s memories of those events.

In a typical study, participants view some kind of event – a video, perhaps, or a staged ‘crime’ – and later receive written or verbal misinformation about what happened. After a delay, they are then tested on what they remember about the event, with these tests commonly revealing that the misinformation finds its way into people’s honest accounts.

Participants in one recent study, for instance, watched footage from a police officer’s body-worn camera, which depicted the officer striking an unarmed civilian with his baton. Participants also read the officer’s report of the incident, which contained many factual errors. When subsequently asked about the incident, participants frequently gave answers that fitted with the officer’s account despite conflicting with the objective facts they had seen in the footage. Modern misinformation isn’t always verbal, of course. In recent years, doctored photos have become a prevalent medium of misinformation about what happened. After a delay, they are perhaps, or a staged ‘crime’ – and later receive written or verbal corrective warnings, than to abandon worldview-consistent misinformation. Involving many injuries and even deaths. Misinformation is usually most effective when the source seems highly reliable, and so the potency of images like these may lie in their apparent credibility.

However, one recent series of experiments found that even highly unconvinving doctored photos subtly influenced people’s beliefs about major public events. Mirroring many other studies, this finding shows us that people often change their beliefs about the past based not on reasoned argument, but on a momentary feeling that a suggested event seems familiar. Illusory familiarity of this kind might arise for any number of reasons, such as when misinformation is easy to imagine, or when it has been repeated several times. And one consequence is that even when we can initially resist fake news from untrustworthy sources, it may nevertheless still permeate our memories at a later time, when it still feels familiar but we have forgotten where we learned it.

Once one person has accepted verbal or visual misinformation, it can be surprisingly easy to lead others to have the same false beliefs or memories. Numerous studies show, for instance, that when two friends discuss a shared experience, which one of them remembers the misinformation as true.

With these demonstrations in mind, it is clear why distorted accounts of past events can spread so easily within social groups. For this reason, we must be mindful that having two witnesses who agree on what they remember should not always be twice as compelling as one witness. So what can we do about the misinformation problem? In terms of social influence, perhaps the most intuitive solution would be simply to challenge misinformation; that is, to correct people’s misconceptions with facts. Unsurprisingly, that this solution would actually be feasible, it might just work. There is growing evidence that – contrary to several demonstrations of ‘backfire effects’ – correcting people’s misconceptions with facts can be rather effective in reversing false beliefs, and in research on memories for past events, telling people they have been exposed to misinformation has often proven sufficient to reduce, albeit not fully reverse, its influence.

In one study, Italian participants who briefly saw a photo of a peace protest in Rome – which was doctored to appear far less than peaceful – recalled the event as having been violent, involving many injuries and even deaths. Misinformation is usually most effective when the source seems highly reliable, and so the potency of images like these may lie in their apparent credibility.

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Sheryl Prentice

INFLUENCE IN EXTREMIST MESSAGING

Roshonara Choudhry, a London-based student arrested for her attack on a Labour politician in 2010, is said to have drawn inspiration from a series of YouTube-hosted sermons by the Islamist preacher Anwar al-Awlaki.

The Boston bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev, far-right Norwegian extremist Anders Breivik, and Adil Uka, who carried out the shooting of a serviceman in Frankfurt, Germany, are all thought to have been influenced to some degree by online extremist material. What is it about the content of such communications that makes them so appealing to particular individuals? How do authors convince people of the efficacy of their cause?

MESSAGING STRATEGIES AND TACTICS

My research has sought to establish patterns in the language of extremist groups in order to ascertain a common set of strategies used by authors in their attempts to persuade others. These strategies include argument-focused strategies, such as applying pressure directly to the audience in the form of commands; group-focused strategies such as the use of moral comparisons between in-groups and out-groups or a heavy reliance on social norms; and author-focused strategies that include attempts to establish likability with the audience or inspire them.

Influence tactics vary from group to group and from individual to individual. For example, Osama Bin Laden’s messages were primarily characterised by moral arguments, whereby authors justify the use of violence as a means of redressing perceived immoral actions against their people (this includes, for example, any Western government actions that can be perceived as evidencing double standards or ill-treatment). The messages of Ayman al-Zawahiri, on the other hand, were characterised by employing a wide range of persuasive levers, such as direct propositions and demands combined with morality and authority-based arguments.

Other tactics can include images, for example, those posted by Islamic State affiliates on Twitter. Images such as those by Islamic State of Ayman al-Zawahiri, on the other hand, were characterised by moral arguments, whereby authors justify the use of violence as a means of redressing perceived immoral actions against their people (this includes, for example, any Western government actions that can be perceived as evidencing double standards or ill-treatment). The messages of Ayman al-Zawahiri, on the other hand, were characterised by employing a wide range of persuasive levers, such as direct propositions and demands combined with morality and authority-based arguments.

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Engagement with extremist messages

More recently, research in this area has moved beyond message content to investigate individuals’ engagement with extremist messages. A recent study by Vergani and Blue (see Read More on page 41) highlighted the link between the psychological traits of message recipients and the appeal of particular forms of persuasive rhetoric.

In the study, the language of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s Inspire magazine was compared using a computerised text analysis programme. Dabiq content was rated higher on religious and authoritarian values. The researchers then presented participants with extracts of extremist messages from Dabiq and Inspire, disguised as science fiction narratives.

The participants were asked to express their attitude toward these extracts. Those with higher scores on the character traits of religiosity and authoritarianism were more likely to express positive attitudes towards the extracts from Dabiq, thus potentially explaining the group’s comparative popularity with certain kinds of followers.

Whilst research has shown how communications may elicit positive attitudes amongst audiences, do extremist messages persuade individuals to carry out acts of extremism, or do they merely reinforce previously held world views? Vergani and Blue’s study actually found that consumption of extremist material increased pro-social behaviour in individuals with low or medium trait aggression.

The identification of influence tactics featured in extremist messages may also be useful in the creation of counter messages as an alternative strategy to takedowns. However, a key consideration raised here is the extent to which one can utilise the influence tactics derived from extremist messages to create an effective set of counter-persuasion strategies. Here the focus should shift towards a more enhanced understanding of how consumers respond to particular influence tactics and from whom, with consideration given to individual differences, and favourably received influence tactics informing counter-terrorism responses.

Establishing reliable patterns of influence in extremist content allows for the development of automated tools to assist investigators in locating and assessing potentially problematic content. Certain tactics might be found to unite a particular type of extremist message, such as the activating of audience members’ commitments in Islamic extremist messages, or the othering tactics frequently used in far-right messaging. However, we should be mindful that each group is driven by its own motivations and causes. Therefore, any attempt to establish reliable patterns in influence tactics must consider within, as well as across group perspectives.

The benefits of establishing patterns of extremist messaging

Of course, not all target-audience members have low aggressive tendencies, and the divisive nature of extremist messages does pose a threat to societal stability. While the influence tactics employed may not be successful in convincing all of their target audience, those messages do convince some to threaten the security and safety of others. Therefore, an understanding of how such messages influence particular individuals remains of great importance.

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### The Trade of the Tricks: How Principles of Magic Can Contribute to National Security

The goal of magic is to engage and entertain an audience through the creation of a false, apparently impossible reality. Accordingly, magicians employ a rich repertoire of strategies to influence and fool an audience’s understanding about the state of the world.

This includes methods for manipulating their attention – including where the audience is looking and what they are listening to; perception – including what the audience thinks will happen next; and emotion – how the audience feels about what they are experiencing. Importantly, magicians use these strategies to influence and deceive their audiences without the need to lie.

Magic is sometimes referred to as ‘mind hacking’, and its underlying principles and methods have the potential to support both offensive and defensive security applications. The capability to influence a subject of interest’s understanding about the world and their resultant behaviour can contribute to a wide variety of security applications, including the deterrence of state-based threats, disruption of terrorist activity and enhancement of cyber security.

**MISDIRECTION**

For example, the likelihood of the public noticing, attending to and correctly making sense of safety and security notices could be increased by exploiting principles of conspicuity amplification used in magic. Many magic effects rely upon an audience actively noticing and paying attention to certain features; indeed, the fundamental principle of misdirection actually involves influencing the direction of spectators’ attention.

Magicians exploit conspicuity to attract or seduce their spectators’ attention through the amplification of properties including intensity, size, movement, contrast, position, novelty, repetition, and absence. A glamorous assistant wearing a brightly coloured outfit who walks on-stage from the wings carrying a golden envelope is likely to attract the attention of the audience, as they will be moving, wearing a colour that contrasts with the background of the stage, and holding a novel item. As the audience cannot direct its attention to two locations simultaneously, this event misdirects the spectator’s attention away from the magician, and creates the perfect moment – referred to by magicians as an ‘off-beat’ – for the magician to switch the deck of cards they are holding for another (stacked) deck in their pocket.

In a security context, principles of conspicuity and misdirection could be employed to disrupt hostile surveillance of sensitive logistics and deployment activities, seducing an attacker’s attention away from the real transportation of sensitive equipments and materials, onto more conspicuous, yet simulated, transportation activities.

**HAVERSACK RUSES**

The probability of hostile actors detecting covertly deployed surveillance assets could also be reduced, both by ameliorating their conspicuity and their resultant behaviour; that is, to support the detection and management of adversarial threats, disruption of terrorist activity and enhancement of cyber security. In a security context, principles of conspicuity and misdirection could be employed to disrupt hostile surveillance of sensitive logistics and deployment activities, seducing an attacker’s attention away from the real transportation of sensitive equipments and materials, onto more conspicuous, yet simulated, transportation activities.

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The strategies used by magicians for manipulating spectators’ perception include masking – putting something in-between the spectator and the object to be hidden; blending – making the thing to be hidden look like its background; repackaging – wrapping the object in other insignier cues that change its appearance to resemble a different object; and dazzling – breaking up the object’s pattern of cues that are used for identification.

Attacks could be lured away from real assets towards false, low value decoys, and high-value assets could be hidden amongst a sea of indistinguishable low-cost simulations. The perceived footprint, conspicuity and potency of protective measures could be amplified, and cyber attackers, for example, could be lured into spending time and resources attacking the wrong targets, erroneously believing that they have been successful, and unintentionally disclosing their capabilities and strategies.

Some magic effects allow a spectator to think that they have surreptitiously acquired useful information when they have not. This is a stratagem known as the ‘Haversack Ruse’, named after an apocryphal event that supposedly occurred during the 1917 Sinai-Palestine Campaign, where Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen let a haversack containing false British battle plans fall into Ottoman military hands, thereby bringing about British victory in the Battle of Beersheba and Gaza.

In magic, use of the Haversack Ruse might involve the spectator ‘accidently’ catching a glimpse of the face of a card as it is placed by the magician onto the table. During the act of placing the card, the magician will execute a one-handed change that exchanges the glimpsed card for another.

In the cyber security domain, honey encryption similarly allows a cyber attacker to believe that they have surreptitiously acquired useful information when they have not. A honey-encrypted file (containing, for example, credit card details) will resist brute-force password generation attacks by appearing to resolve into plaintext during decryption, when in fact the critical data remains encrypted as ciphertext.

**COUNTER-INFLUENCE**

The strategies used by magicians to influence people are scalable from individuals to collectives, and work by exploiting fundamental tendencies in human psychology and physiology. This means that they can be employed to influence large multi-cultural and heterogeneous audiences without any requirement to first collect and analyse intelligence about them.

Many of the strategies that enable magic to be applied readily within the cyber domain, where hostile actors (and their software proxies) remain just as susceptible, to being influenced and deceived as they are in other venues of human activity, and where many of the inherent risks also create new opportunities.

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The potential to enhance influence and deception gives rise to a reciprocal and critical need for counter-influence and counter-deception. Influence approaches from magic can be inverted, that is, to support the detection and management of adversarial influence and deception.

Analysis using an understanding of magic can inform the detection, identification and unpicking of the methods by which hostile capabilities and threats are obfuscated, false intent revealed and conveyed, misattribution traps set, false-flags raised, and causes divorced from effects. The value of magicians in a ‘pouch turned gamekeeper’ role also has precedence, wherein such practitioners of influence and deception are often well placed to detect and explain it when it is used by others.

**LIMITATIONS**

Despite the potential for the principles of magic to contribute to national security, it is important that stakeholders and researchers remain aware of magic’s limitations. The goal of performance magic is ultimately to influence an audience’s sensemaking, and not its behaviour; and magic always necessitates a reveal, thereby signalling to the audience that they have been deceived. In many security applications, influence and deception is only effective if it is never suspected, let alone detected by an attacker.

Magic is intended to fool a largely passive audience that is ignorant of the methods employed, and magicians rarely need to account for risks to life, property, relationships and ethics in the design of their effects. Professional magicians also benefit by exaggerating their influence and deception skills when the tools of their trade may in fact be far more prosaic. Finally, publicity is the lifeblood of professional magicians, a disposition incapable of which is security.

**EXPLOITING MAGIC TO ENHANCE NATIONAL SECURITY**

The field of magic possesses a rich heard of esoteric, utilitarian, and, to-date, largely untapped knowledge about influence and deception that could make a positive contribution across multiple security domains. Three ways in which this might be achieved are outlined.

First, knowledge from the field of performance magic should be better incorporated into ongoing research about how individuals and organisations make sense of the world, and how this activity can be manipulated by others. Second, principles of magic should be exploited to enhance operational training for those security, intelligence and counter-terrorism staffs that would benefit from enhanced ‘sneaky thinking’ and counter-deception skills. Third, design methods used by magicians to construct magic effects should be exploited in the development of enhanced protective and cyber security capabilities.

Simon Henderson is a director at Artifice Ltd, a small research and training company that helps select government communities, elite sports and specialist military units to become better at tricky thinking, enabling them to realise new forms of competitive advantage in adversarial settings. Simon is a lifelong student of magic and has created and published a number of original effects.
Heather Flowe looks at what alcohol-intoxication can mean for the reliability of evidence.

Half of perpetrators and one-fifth of victims were reportedly ‘under the influence’. The high percentage (ranging from 71-97%) of those who were under the influence of alcohol when they witnessed the crime is an important factor as criminal investigations and prosecutions often rely on testimony by witnesses and victims who were intoxicated during the crime.

Recent research on eyewitness memory studies on alcohol show that witnesses and suspects provide accurate accounts of what they think it is likely to be incorrect. This decreases the overall quantity, but not the accuracy, of the information reported by intoxicated compared to sober people.

Researchers have also investigated the effect of alcohol in relation to a number of other factors, such as interview delay and suggestibility. A key question for investigators is whether it is better to wait until an intoxicated witness has sobered up before interviewing them, or whether it is better to interview them as soon as possible, before forgetting occurs.

Studies have found that the information provided by people who are interviewed immediately after witnessing a mock crime, while they are still drunk, is not more prone to error compared to that of sober people. Further, compared to a delayed interview, a relatively early interview results in greater memory accuracy over time, regardless of whether participants were intoxicated during the crime.

Recent research has also found that witnesses who were intoxicated compared to sober during encoding are no more likely to incorporate misleading information into their testimony. However, there is some evidence that when witnesses are pressed for information and asked leading questions, those who were intoxicated compared to sober during encoding are more likely to be influenced and report erroneous information. Such findings underscore the necessity of using proper investigative interviewing with intoxicated informants, witnesses, and suspects.

Further studies are underway to better understand the effects of alcohol on how memories are encoded and recalled, and more research is warranted with higher doses of alcohol. However, provided that non-leading questions are asked, research to date indicates that informants who were under the influence of alcohol when they witnessed a critical incident will report less information overall than those who were sober, but they will not recall more erroneous information.

Dr Heather D. Flowe is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Birmingham. She researches applied cognition, in particular the effects of alcohol on memory for traumatic events.
Police investigators are sometimes faced with instances in serious criminal investigations where they have a suspect, but lack sufficient evidence to support bringing charges against them.

The Mr Big technique is an undercover operation aimed at obtaining a confession in such cases.

While it is indisputable that the procedure can help secure confessions, the tactics are psychologically invasive and manipulative, and as a consequence my jeopardise the reliability of those admissions.

FOUR STAGES OF THE MR BIG TECHNIQUE

INTELLIGENCE PROBE
The suspect is placed under surveillance so that the investigators can learn about their lifestyle (e.g., friends and family). This information is used to tailor undercover operatives (UCO) behaviours to complement the predilections of the target.

INTRODUCTION
A UCO befriends the suspect and inveigles them into a powerful, albeit fictitious, criminal organisation. Methods of introductions vary, such as approaching the target while in police custody or at a rehabilitation facility.

SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
The UCO involves the suspect in activities that demonstrate the extreme wealth, power, and reach of the criminal organisation. The suspect is first tasked with completing small jobs, such as delivering parcels, for which they are paid generously – over £60 per hour in some cases.

The jobs escalate in terms of difficulty, responsibility, remuneration, and pressure to participate. Suspects are also involved in lavish social events like all-expenses paid international trips.

EVIDENTIARY SCENARIO
The operation culminates with the suspect meeting the organisation's boss – Mr Big. The suspect is informed that his imminent arrest poses a threat to the organisation's security. By confessing and providing the details of the crime, the suspect can assist Mr Big in foiling the efforts of the police. A failure to cooperate with Mr Big will jeopardise the suspect's tenure in the organisation, he will forfeit their assistance in thwarting the police, and he may also fear retaliation from Mr Big.
MANIPULATING TARGETS VIA SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Researchers have explored the effectiveness of social influence tactics in gaining compliance – when an individual changes their behaviour and yields to real or imagined pressure. In particular, tactics such as reciprocity, consistency, liking, social proof, authority, and scarcity have proven to be successful in gaining compliance by exploiting social and behavioural norms.

These tactics are requisite components of Mr Big operations, which raise serious concerns about the extent to which any confession obtained through this technique is voluntary.

#1 Reciprocity
Ingrained in us from an early age is the expectation that one should repay a favour. Reciprocity is a powerful social norm that exists across cultures and is demonstrably effective in obtaining compliance. Mr Big operations are rife with reciprocity. UCOs provide the targets with large favours and gifts throughout the operation (e.g., money, work, meals), which consciously keep targets under constant pressure to return favours. In order to satisfy the organisation and Mr Big, the target is put in the position of repaying favours by engaging in a range of criminal activities.

#2 Consistency
There is a tendency for people to want to maintain uniformity between current and past behaviours. Hundreds of studies have revealed that, in order to gain compliance, the foot-in-the-door (FITD) technique exploits our need to remain consistent.

The FITD technique involves asking a small favour of someone (with a high likelihood of compliance), followed by a later request for a larger favour. Within Mr Big operations, the FITD technique is instantiated by the target being asked to first complete very small jobs (e.g., delivering parcels) and then asked to engage in more complex and violent activities.

#3 Liking
Social relationships are an integral part of people’s lives and are therefore a powerful means of gaining compliance. We tend to do more for and say yes more often to requests from those we know and like compared to strangers. Research has shown that our fondness grows for people who like us and are similar to us; we are therefore more likely to comply with their requests. Many individuals who are engulfed in Mr Big operations tend to lack meaningful social ties. Targets are unlikely to jeopardise their position of repaying favours by engaging in other criminal activities.

#4 Social proof
When individuals are faced with a novel situation and are uncertain of how to behave, they will examine the behaviour of similar others and act accordingly. A strong indicator of similarity is the need to maintain this relationship.

#5 Authority
Authority is a powerful tactic for gaining compliance. Research has shown that people were willing to inflict (what they thought was real) pain to others simply because they were instructed to do so by an authority figure. Authority is omnipresent within Mr Big operations. The UCO exhibits their power by providing the target with generous rewards, such as money and trips, for complying with their requests. Staged retaliations against fictitious wrongdoers illustrate to the target that his own physical well-being may be in jeopardy should his loyalty to the gang falter. The UCO is also higher in the criminal organisation’s hierarchy than the target and is sanctioned to demand the target’s acquiescence. Overall, the UCO is setting the stage for the ultimate request to confess to Mr Big.

#6 Scarcity
Scarce commodities are considered much more valuable and desirable than those in abundance. Scarcity is systematically exploited during Mr Big operations. Permanent membership in the criminal organisation is held out to be within reach. Much effort is put into increasing the target’s demand for greater involvement in the criminal organisation by providing the target with social rewards, like friendships, and intermittent financial incentives. If the target does not confess their prior criminal activities to Mr Big, they will not be granted full membership and will lose all the social and material benefits to which they had become accustomed.

WHY THE MR BIG TECHNIQUE IS PROBLEMATIC AND DANGEROUS

All of the aforementioned influence techniques have been employed to some extent throughout the history of Mr Big operations. In light of how self-incriminating statements are elicited via multiple influence techniques that are demonstrably effective in gaining compliance, the procurement of a confession from a vulnerable individual in a pressure-filled situation is an unremarkable accomplishment.

A recent Supreme Court of Canada ruling put some limits on the use of the Mr Big technique due to concerns surrounding confession reliability, undue prejudice, and abuse of process. The court ruled that a Mr Big-induced confession is now presumptively inadmissible but may be salvaged if it can be shown that its reliability has been corroborated by confirmatory evidence – for example, the target provides information that only the police and actual perpetrator would know. The problem remains that knowledge of the confession obtained from the undercover operation can make the putative confirmatory evidence appear to be more probative than it really is.

Further, the confession and so-called corroborative evidence can make the tactics that elicited the confession look less coercive than they really were.

In short, the Mr Big technique poses a risk of eliciting unreliable confessions and attendant wrongful convictions, in part because of the use of compliance-gaining tactics on vulnerable individuals who are ensnared in an orchestrated web of deceit.

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POSITIVELY INFLUENCING INDIVIDUALS DURING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

INFLUENCE REQUIRES UNDERSTANDING AND COMMUNICATION

Employees who undermine or sell out their organisation don’t necessarily start out as malicious threats. They can also be long-standing and loyal employees who, because of large organisational change like a restructuring or alterations to their pensions, have become disillusioned or angry with their employer. Recent research on individual employee responses to organisational change identified seven different emotional and behavioural types. Based on our research, we have built on these seven categories to suggest ways to positively influence individuals in order to prevent or mitigate the likelihood of insider threat during large scale organisational change.

TRUSTERS

These employees are receptive to the need for change. There is a fit between their personal goals and those of the organisation. Employees are proactive in identifying what might be improved and done differently to support change and are likely to cooperate with leaders and managers to make the transitions required. They are therefore engaged and active participants in change processes, offering their ideas and suggestions on how to adapt and meet the organisation’s new needs.

These individuals are unlikely to be either active insider threats, like those leaking data or undertaking other malicious behaviour, or passive insider threats, such as those employees withdrawing effort or not reporting others’ negative behaviour.

Communication and engagement strategy

Managers should continue dialogue with employees at all levels to allow these individuals to feel involved in the changes and updated on further developments. They should talk to employees to check they are not just going through the motions and are anticipating issues that might cause subsequent conflict or challenge. These employees could be appointed change champions where they lead employee forums on change and feedback concerns to management from across the other six groups of individuals outlined below.

WATCHFUL FOLLOWERS

This type of team member is alert to and wary about change. In the past there is likely to have been a close synergy between their personal and the organisation’s goals, but now they sense things might be starting to diverge. Failure by leaders to acknowledge that a transition has started may sow the seeds of reduced trust and create more entrenched vigilance among this group.

This group is not likely to form an active threat, but could be a passive threat in terms of withdrawing further effort and investment in their role during a time of uncertainty. This might be the first stage in a progression towards insider threat and so active steps are required to re-engage with these previously engaged employees.

Communication and engagement strategy

Enhance the resilience of those in this category by letting them process their emotions about change through actively listening to their concerns. They need time to talk through their issues and support to manage their emotions, which are likely to include surprise and shock, and therefore also watchfulness. They need support to help them regain their sense of control. Build on their previous positive experiences of transition(s), and provide clear explanations as to the underlying reasons why change is now necessary. This interaction needs to be genuine to avoid trust declining any further towards the organisation and its leaders. Ensure such exchanges are positive and keep open the communication channels with them. Ensure those in this group are kept aware of new developments and actively involved if things progress in ways that are different from expectations.

CHANGE THE TOPS

This type of team member perceives that the source of change is due to unwelcome transition at the top, with newcomers imposing a change that appears, to them, to be unnecessary in the organisation. Those in this category are concerned with a discrepancy between the past and any new organisational direction. The emergent divergence between their own goals and those of the organisation is becoming apparent. This unexpected loss of synergy creates a perceived loss of control that they attribute to the new leader’s lack of knowledge and insight about the organisation. Insider threat can arise within this group through active retaliation against new ‘problem’ leaders, and involve rebellion that is perceived as morally justified against leaders who are seen to either lack integrity or competence.

Passive threat activity could also emerge with those in this group feeling their concerns are unheeded by top management, and so they will choose to remain silent and not speak up about other things, such as other co-workers’ counterproductive work behaviour.

Communication and engagement strategy

Emphasis needs to be directed towards communicating the case for the change, but also to try and make a link with what endures from the past. New top and local leaders should ensure that they are available to meet staff and hear their concerns. From this interaction, it is helpful to try and discern what it is about the new direction that is seen as threatening. Attention must be devoted to trying to break down any emergence of a ‘them’ (new leaders) and ‘us’ (those remaining in the organisation) dichotomy. Further, in building their credibility, new leaders need to ensure that their words and actions are credible and engender the trust of staff. These individuals could be included as critical friends on management committees for the organisational change; this would increase the transparency around the change process and the new leaders, adding insight and potentially gaining their subsequent buy-in and participation for the new direction.
IDENTITY SHIFTERS

This category arises from a disconnect between an individual’s past work, identity, and goals and the new organisational requirements and objectives. This difference may have been occurring over a long period of time and be related to generational differences, such as from different training given to a particular profession which has now been superseded by something else. This is unlikely to be a single individual, rather a view shared amongst similar others either within or across departments. These individuals can create a heightened risk of insider threat, either through their withdrawal and passive resistance to the new direction, or from efforts to actively sabotage the change. This risk can arise through their moral disengagement, characterised by cynicism, frustration, fear or anger towards the required change. If these individuals are morally disengaged they may fail to see their retaliatory actions as harming the organisation and its stakeholders; they need support to help them to recognise the unintended consequences of their actions.

Communication and engagement strategy

Attention needs to be paid to identifying and emphasising the overarching elements of the job/profession that are enduring, to underscore what is being changed and why these new requirements are necessary. Importantly these should be communicated in terms of how changes enhance the role, rather than detract from it. It is in this group’s contributions and the value they bring to the organisation that are recognised. This can be done through personal and specific feedback from leaders. Given the level of experience of this group, it is likely to be important to listen to the concerns about what is being endangered for them. Negative reactions may be related to a perceived loss of status or resources that make their roles more difficult to do. Identify the focus effects on influencers in this sub-group who can be pivotal in gaining support for the change. Such a strategy would send an important signal of respect and appreciation for their skills and insights and help to motivate the ongoing development of these individuals’ skills.

ANGRY DISTRUSTER

This category arises from a change that thwarts an important personal goal. This is likely to have arisen over time and may be related to identify-shift issues. It may also stem from unrealistic expectations that have not been well-managed by earlier line managers which has now reached a tipping point. As a result they are likely to feel morally justified in undertaking actions that recover what they perceive is ‘owed’ to them. This group presents the highest risk of active insider threat, and such individuals are also vulnerable to being exploited by malicious external/internal actors. Further, the long-term stress implications of this state can result in them becoming more of a risk than even they intended. Critically, they are already likely to be isolated from their work group, which can seriously impede efforts to discern the real level of threat they pose. They distrust those in authority whom they are likely to regard as responsible for squashing or sabotaging their cherished plans.

Communication and engagement strategy

Communication and engagement strategy is important to sensitively identify the underlying source and history of the angry distruster’s issues. This state is a demanding and depleting place for anyone to be in for any length of time; it takes effort to stay angry. Once leaders have ascertained the problem they can discern whether it is possible to achieve some or all of their goals, or whether a better route is to apologise for past or future (perceived) injustices. Be aware that any leader, due to their position as an authority figure, is likely to be in a difficult position to help and instead could exacerbate issues. Care and sensitivity is required to avoid creating a wider angry distruster group through the perceived unfair treatment of colleagues. New leaders may not be created in the same way as those with a long history. Avoid creating any kind of scapegoat or martyr but equally ensure that those who pose a risk are not allowed to remain unchallenged. If this situation has been going on for some time co-workers may have been alienated and also feel resentful of the time such individuals absorb from leaders. Identify those who still have a constructive dialogue with the individual. It is important to try to recognise what adjustments could be made to support this group, but also the limitations if their expectations are unreasonable. This may make their retention difficult and it might be better for all of them to exit the team or the organisation. Key here is that this group’s treatment can send important signals to others about how the organisation cares for and respects its staff.

APATHETIC

This category of employee is likely to contain long-serving and previously loyal individuals. They now see no sympathy between their personal goals and those of the organisation. They may have been angry distrusters in the past. They may perceive there is simply no point in changing, but still want to try and remain in the organisation in order to access their pension, for example. It is important to distinguish between those who represent an insider threat through their passive withdrawal activity, from those who are actually still angry and so pose a more active risk as outlined in the angry distruster category. This group is likely to use withdrawal and avoidance coping rather than engaging with the changes occurring around them. Their disengagement will be noted by others and can spread and become the norm if left unchallenged.

Communication and engagement strategy

Communication and engagement strategy is important, as with other types, to ascertain the underlying source and history of this group’s issues. It is crucial to recognise those who used to be engaged and discern whether work or other external matters are core to their disengagement; they may have personal issues that are causing them to have to disconnect. Identify any new organisational goals that incorporate things that have in the past been important to them. They may have significant organisational knowledge and experience that will be important for the organisation to retain and to transfer on to others in the team. Ensure any effort at change is recognised and praised to help these individuals re-engage, but also monitor their behaviour to ensure they are not undertaking counterproductive or harmful behaviour. Emphasise the risk to everyone from those who are not following the correct procedures or rules. The tarnishing of an otherwise impeccable legacy is a fear that might be important in personally re-engaging this group. It might be productive to encourage these individuals to form part of small team-level taskforces on organisational change.
A terrorist plotting a mass casualty attack as part of an extremist group. A disgruntled employee on the verge of taking action that will cause significant financial and reputational harm. A lone actor in the recesses of the dark web hacking, stealing, misinforming or circulating material that may well ruin lives.

These scenarios, although appearing different on the surface, have a similarity at their core. Specifically, these scenarios involve human beings who have decided to take radical action that will have dire consequences. Once identified, they are the individuals that interviewers must engage with to prevent those consequences in the immediate and longer term.

Thankfully such individuals are rare. However, the prospect of failing to make the best use of an opportunity to speak to them places significant pressure on law enforcement and intelligence personnel. In addition to the short term aims of securing a conviction or preventing an immediate tragedy, there may be a longer term aim of learning about the motivations, autobiographical history and key transitions that have led them to this point. As such, there is the immediate objective of gaining cooperation in the interview as well as a need to gain a detailed understanding of someone else’s world view. Building up a knowledge base of this kind may prove valuable in guiding future attempts at pre-emptive interventions.

**PERSPECTIVE-TAKING AND ACHIEVING COOPERATION**

Research suggests that we are overly pessimistic about our ability to get others to cooperate with us. In reality, it can be difficult for someone to avoid cooperating with a reasonable request because of the social factors involved.

In some cultures, to refuse a reasonable request can often result in a loss of face and sizeable social discomfort. However, by working to see things their way, we give ourselves a better chance of success. However, by working to see things their way, we give ourselves a better chance of success.

How then can an interviewer overcome these barriers and make a request for cooperation a reasonable one? The answer may be a question of perspective. Importantly, it is not for the interviewee to decide what is reasonable, but rather whether the interviewee considers it so. Therefore, the interviewer needs to consider the interaction and wider context from the perspective of the interviewee.

The task of forming an accurate model of another person’s perspective is a difficult one, involving a cognitively demanding and time-consuming process of anchoring and adjustment. This begins with anchoring our assumptions in our own understanding and then adjusting these through a series of cognitive leaps, forming and testing hypotheses until we reach what we consider to be a plausible approximation of the other person’s perspective.

Unfortunately, this process is subject to an egocentric bias. Furthermore, and precisely because it is cognitively demanding and time consuming, we may cut the process of assessing another’s perspective short. Specifically, and consistent with the notion of ‘satisficing’ - making a decision that satisfies the minimum possible requirements – we may stop at the first reasonable solution, rather than the most accurate one.

In such cases, resistance by the interviewee might be attributed to their personal characteristics, such as deliberate avoidance, unwillingness to face reality, or even a lack of intelligence. Interviewers might even reach a (premature) conclusion that it is a process they need to engage with. How will they react when they realise who they are talking to? Do the answers to these questions provide hooks that will get them to engage or triggers that will cause them to switch off? Understanding the interviewee’s perspective could help not only in planning what to say, but also when to say it.

It may be that rather than trying to change the person in front of us, we can take the easier route and adjust our half of the interaction. Following an unsuccessful attempt, rather than putting down to ‘it’s just them’, we need to explore it as an indication that our model of their perspective is incomplete.

The terrorist, employee and hacker are all likely to have different reactions to attempts to engage with them. However, by working to see things their way, we give ourselves a better chance of success.

Wayne Thomas has 20 years of operational experience in serious crime and terrorism investigations and the teaching of operational skills. He is a doctoral student at Portsmouth University, researching the application of cognitive memory models to improve elicitation techniques. Lorraine Hope is Professor of Applied Cognitive Psychology at the University of Portsmouth and a CREST-funded researcher. Lorraine’s work focuses on the performance of human cognition in applied contexts, including memory and decision-making under challenging conditions.
Cultural Differences in Influence

Cultures can vary in how much they value individualism or collectivism. Collectivist cultures are characterised by a focus on the collective relative to the individual. For example, in communications the use of ‘we’ as a pronoun is favoured over ‘I’. Identity is embedded within one’s relationships and social context, and individuals are socialised into enduring, cohesive groups. Personal goals are group-oriented, in exchange for the benefits of group membership. Conversely, individualist cultures emphasise the independent, unique, and stable traits of an individual. Individuals are socialised to see themselves as separate and distinct to others and the social context.

These differences are reflected in the role that others play in influence and persuasion processes. Because the self in collectivist cultures is rooted in social roles and context, the salience of in-group members and group identity is an important component of influence. For example, others’ opinions exert heightened influence on collectivists relative to individualists, along with appeals to family integrity and harmony with others.

In terms of influence, there is a greater reliance on nominated experts, which may include community or religious leaders. In terms of influence, there is a greater reliance on nominated experts, which may include community or religious leaders. In high uncertainty avoidance cultures, echoing the cultural belief that citizens are less competent than authorities. The expertise of sources is more persuasive for cultures high in uncertainty avoidance and power distance, as opposed to the persuasiveness of argument strength for cultures that are low in both uncertainty avoidance and power distance.

Uncertainty

Uncertainty avoidance describes the degree to which members of a culture experience the future as ambiguous and threatening. Members of high uncertainty avoidance cultures search for absolute, ultimate truths to reduce the discomfort of uncertainty. In terms of influence, there is a greater reliance on nominated experts, which may include community or religious leaders. In terms of influence, there is a greater reliance on nominated experts, which may include community or religious leaders.

Adapting Strategies for Culture

One final cross-cultural dimension to consider is that of ‘honour’, an important concept in some Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African cultures. Honour reflects an individual’s honesty, loyalty, and positive social reputation. It is a commodity that can be gained or lost, and thus must be considered carefully in persuasion strategies. Preferences for types of negotiating strategies, such as rational persuasion, coalition-building, and appeals to honour can be linked to culture. For example, rational persuasion – typical in non-honour, Western cultures – minimises relational concerns and removes the individual from the task at hand, whereas honour models of negotiation focus on the importance of maintaining and gaining honour.

Avoidance

Cultures can vary in how much they value individualism or collectivism. Collectivist cultures are characterised by a focus on the collective relative to the individual. For example, in communications the use of ‘we’ as a pronoun is favoured over ‘I’. Identity is embedded within one’s relationships and social context, and individuals are socialised into enduring, cohesive groups. Personal goals are group-oriented, in exchange for the benefits of group membership. Conversely, individualist cultures emphasise the independent, unique, and stable traits of an individual. Individuals are socialised to see themselves as separate and distinct to others and the social context.
SUSAN BRANDON

USING STEREOTYPES TO PREPARE FOR INTERVIEWS

Stereotypes are often seen as contributing to barriers to rapport between people. But Susan Brandon, former Director of Research of the US’s High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, highlights research that shows us how stereotypes can be used to help build rapport and influence interviewees to disclose more information.

Planning for an interview requires preparation for impression management. This includes being strategic about how the interviewer will manage the interviewee’s impressions of them and also vice versa: how the interviewee might manage the impression the interviewer forms of them. These first impressions are formed quickly, are hard to change, and will be influenced by stereotypes – that is, by what we expect an individual to be like depending on their social or cultural group. An expert interviewer will find strategies to ensure that first impressions work to his or her favour. Anticipating stereotypes might be part of that effort.

The Stereotype Content Model (SCM) describes how individuals within a culture characterise social groups in their own culture in terms of warmth and competence. Warmth (are they friendly or not?) and competence (can they harm me or help me?) are two characteristics about which we judge people quickly.

An SCM for Lebanon (from 2013) is shown in Figure 1, the scale for both measures goes from low to high for each axis. The groups within each SCM are identified by members of that country. Individuals are asked, “What various types of people do you think today’s society categorises into groups (i.e., based on ethnicity, race, gender, occupation, ability, etc.)? Please list between eight and sixteen such groups.” Then they are instructed, with respect to each group, ‘As viewed by society, how warm are members of this group?’ And, ‘As viewed by society, how competent are members of this group?’

As can be seen, Lebanese are likely to view ‘professionals’ with warmth and to assume that they are generally competent; alternatively, they are likely to view ‘domestic workers’ and ‘refugees’ as cold and incompetent. Rich people and bureaucrats are seen as competent but cold; urban people and environmentalists are seen as warm but relatively incompetent.

Groups falling in the upper right-hand quadrant are reference groups within that culture; that is, groups that serve as normative standards for social comparison and often, social aspiration: these are the groups we want to belong to and often self-identify with. SCMs can serve as tools for predicting group stereotypes within a culture and for comparing these stereotypes across cultures. An interviewer thus might use an SCM to aid in predicting a subject’s view of themselves and of the interviewer.

Using the Lebanese SCM, for example, someone interviewing a Lebanese subject might want to emphasise their role as a professional and downplay that they are any kind of bureaucrat or part of an elite group such as the rich.

The interviewer might also encourage the Lebanese subject’s view of themselves as a ‘true Lebanese’, that is, as part of a Lebanese reference group. This is because emotions directed towards groups that fall in the upper right-hand quadrant of SCMs are admiration and pride. In contrast, the emotions directed towards groups falling in the lower left-hand quadrant are contempt and disgust; pity is directed towards groups in the upper left-hand quadrant, and envy towards those groups in the lower right-hand quadrant.

Encouraging self-efficacy and a sense of autonomy – that is, a sense of self-pride in the interviewee – is important to the development and maintenance of rapport between the interviewer and interviewee, and has been shown to increase the likelihood of the interviewee providing useful information.

SCMs for a number of other countries can be found at www.fiskelab.org/cross-cultural-wc-maps

Thus, making the interviewee feel good about themselves should be useful to information elicitation.

In addition, research has shown that the four quadrants of SCMs not only elicit different emotions, but that these emotions are associated with four discrete patterns of behaviour: helping (upper right-hand quadrant), harm (lower right-hand quadrant), passive cooperation and protection (upper left-hand quadrant) and harassment and exclusion (lower left-hand quadrant). Obviously, helping is the behaviour an interviewer wants to encourage from their subject.

SCMs for a number of other countries can be found at www.fiskelab.org/cross-cultural-wc-maps

What should an interviewer do when the subject comes from a country for which there is no readily available SCM? One clue is in the fact that reference groups are what individuals aspire to be and identify with. Across many countries, reference groups sit in the upper right-hand quadrant, and are viewed as both warm and competent. Therefore, the interviewer should engage in behaviours that display both warmth and competence: showing empathy and genuine regard (warmth), as well as an understanding of the interview process and the situation in which the subject finds themselves (competence). Doing so should increase the likelihood that the interviewer will be viewed as warm and competent, which will in turn encourage the subject to be helpful.

As many practitioners may recognise, this model is based on how we are seen by other parties, not necessarily who we actually are. Thus what you say, how you say it, what you wear and items you carry can influence the person to see you as warm and competent – someone they will help, by opening up and disclosing information.

Dr Susan E. Brandon is Research Psychologist at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). For eight years Susan was the Research Program Manager for the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG). Prior to this she was Chief for Research of the Behavioral Science Research Program at DIA, having spent 25 years as a faculty member in the Behavioral Neuroscience Division of the Department of Psychology at Yale University.
Could fragmentation within the Far-Right contribute to increasingly extreme responses to Islamist terrorism? There is increasing evidence of instrumental responses from some of the most extreme groups, which seek to encourage the strategic use of violence.

Reciprocal radicalisation, or cumulative extremism, is a concept that suggests extremist groups become more extreme in response to each other’s activity. This means a group may frame violence as justified or necessary because they perceive an opposing group as extreme. Identifying how to respond to such a dynamic has become increasingly important, as terrorist threats from both Far-Right and Islamist groups increase, alongside increased hate crime and group membership.

More research is needed to establish the extent to which extremist groups genuinely escalate in response to each other. Small groups such as the British Far-Right National Action, and their subsequent incarnations, can be particularly challenging due to the way they thrive on conflict with other groups. My own work examines individual groups at a more granular level, through which it may be possible to establish how, when and why risks increase.

Whilst they maintained secrecy, a review of their promotional, recruitment and incitement materials reveals that they, and their offshoots, (NS131, Scottish Dawn, and now System Resistance) weaved prejudice about Muslims into a broader narrative about ‘inevitable race war’, presenting Islamist attacks as orchestrated by Jewish interests. Violent responses by the far-right were presented as inevitable and to be celebrated. Consequently, whilst their internal rhetoric was primarily anti-Semitic, they primarily targeted Muslims and immigrants at demonstrations and harassment stunts. They made frequent visits to areas such as Rotherham and Leeds, seeking to create fears of ‘Muslim grooming gangs’ following the Rotherham arrests.

This implies a conscious and deliberate targeting strategy by the leadership. As the group became more active online and on the streets during 2015 and 2016, instances of violence and criminality also increased. These included a small number of serious offences, including a racially-motivated attempted beheading by Zac Davies in 2015, and the glorification of right-wing terrorist Thomas Mair, who murdered the British MP Jo Cox in 2016.

Around a third of these incidents arose within a week or two of Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe or the United States, although there were other significant attacks where no such response followed. The other notable way in which National Action’s extremism intensified in response to Islamist terrorism was in their stated intention to ‘learn from (their) enemies’. They expressed admiration for Islamist terrorists, and on several occasions sought to motivate their members by commending Islamist terrorists for their ‘commitment’ and ‘organisation’.

This was followed by a recruitment campaign centred on ‘white jihad’, as well as training camps using an Islamist terrorist video. This indicates a tactical and instrumental response, often prompting an expressively violent response from members.

The group’s propaganda reflects that these escalations had complex roots, which related not only to perceptions of opposing groups, but also competition within the Far-Right. Their behaviour alludes to a long-wave response to Islamist terrorism. Reciprocal radicalisation could consequently be viewed as a phenomenon which operates across movements, as well as between groups. The fluidity within the Far-Right creates conditions where more extreme and knowledgeable individuals can move between groups, increasing the risk of a ripple effect in support for violent extremism.

Responding to and preventing instrumental activity from groups can be particularly challenging, due to the way they may obfuscate and delay plans, as well as the unpredictable way in which individual members may respond to disruption. Responses also need to take account of the way reactions to designated enemies can occur some time after conflict is assumed to have subsided, as well as anticipating potential responses to Islamist attacks, and other significant events which may increase group competition, as reflected by National Action’s increased activity during the EU referendum.

Increased competition within the Far-Right appears to exacerbate these problems. Whilst proscription has restricted National Action’s former members, the way in which they have quickly and repeatedly re-mobilised reflects that threats are likely to remain more diffuse, including from those on the periphery, and lone actors.

With this in mind, a long-term approach aimed at reducing community polarisation and hate crime is needed, alongside direct interception. The behaviour of National Action also suggests risks may intensify for some time before a group or its members use violence, meaning that a reduction in immediate warning signs may be misleading. As such, approaching reciprocal radicalisation as a gradual and longer-term phenomenon may be necessary.
Mental Disorder in Terrorism, Mass Murder and Violence: Moving Away from Pathologising Grievance.

On the night of October 1st 2017, Stephen Paddock opened fire from the 32nd floor of the Mandalay Bay hotel in Las Vegas onto a crowd of concert goers below. His actions led to the deaths of 58 and injuries to over 800. It was the deadliest mass shooting conducted by a single individual in United States history.

Despite the flurry of activity on social media to categorise Paddock’s actions as either terrorism or mass murder, Paddock’s motives continued to elude law enforcement. Within a week of the attack, investigators published a statement that they had not yet uncovered any insights into Paddock’s motivations from his personal life, political affiliations, social behaviours, or economic situation. As the investigation continued, one recurring assumption began to dilute the media; that the violence was caused by an undiscovered mental disorder.

This assumption snowballed when evidence emerged of Paddock’s father’s history of psychopathy, suicidal tendencies, and criminal behaviour. The assumption of mental disorder causing violent behaviour has instinctive appeal. It offers a clear-cut and simple explanation of why people choose violence. By attributing Paddock’s record of violence to mental disorder (as understood by the general public), as opposed to a political aim, it fits with the popular image of a crazed killer.

The case of Paddock is not isolated. Media coverage of many recent mass killings has shown the desire to attribute motivation to mental illness. The cases of Dylan Roof, Isachenko Santiago Ruiz, Michel Zehaf-Bibeau, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, and Omar Mateen have all attracted wide media coverage, mainly because of the discussion surrounding how their actions should be labelled. It is due to their suspected mental disorder.

Nowhere was this debate more evident than at the inquest following the Sydney Siege, an attack carried out by Man Haron Monis. Following the siege, the Islamic State praised his actions in its propaganda. Monis also had an extensive history of mental disorder. Monis’ history of mental disorder best corresponds to the Islamic State, and following the siege, the Islamic State praised his actions in its propaganda. Monis also had an extensive history of mental disorder.

LONE ACTORS AND MENTAL HEALTH

Research continually shows that prevalence of mental disorders in terrorist groups is lower than what would be expected in a general population. This is thought to be due to rigorous selection techniques during terrorist recruitment. Which helps to screen out unsuitable individuals, particularly those with a mental health problem. Given this and evidence showing the higher than expected prevalence of mental disorders in the lone actor population it is readily assumed that individuals acting alone who do profess ideological motivation but not being able to join a terrorist group because of a mental health problem. This then feeds into the belief that individuals who act alone, whose motivation is not readily identified, must have a mental health problem.

However, on interviewing and examining the writings of terrorist recruiters, these assumptions have proven to not hold weight. Terrorist recruitment is highly fluid. Terrorist recruiters do sometimes look for specific qualities in recruits, but this is highly dependent on the group’s aims and needs of the group, the area that they are recruited from, and the political situation.

No recruiter mentioned, or could recall, a situation where they were interested in an individual with a mental health problem, or held that an individual with a mental health problem would be unsuitable. Interviewed recruiters also questioned whether it would always be possible to tell if a potential recruit had a mental health problem if it was not disclosed.

THE TERRORIST

Related to the assumption that terrorist groups screen out individuals with mental health problems is the assumption that the ‘terrorist’ is a single entity. The above identifies low prevalence rates of diagnosed mental disorders within terrorist groups, but not outright misconception. It is now readily assumed that terrorists within a group will not have a mental health problem.

However, terrorists are in fact highly diverse, with different beliefs, roles, functions, and experiences. These experiences, occurring before becoming involved in terrorism, during involvement, and following disengagement can have a psychological impact.

Terrorist writings and interviews have highlighted that undiagnosed mental health problems in those involved in terrorist groups are higher than currently expected. Psychological distress before engagement is 33.3%, during engagement is 45.9%, and following disengagement is 41.9%. The writings and interviews have shown that negative experiences, and the way individuals cope with such events during engagement may have longstanding psychological effects.

TERRORIST OR MASS MURDERER?

Solely focusing on those who engage in violence on behalf of a political or religious cause unduly narrows our understanding of the relationship between mental health and extreme violence. Answers may also be found in the scientific study of mass murderers. Much like lone actors, mass murderers carry out large scale acts of violence alone and their mental state has been continually discussed. However, to date, the difference lies in the motivation behind their violence. Mass murderers are not seen to have a political motivation.

Mass murderers are keen to intentionally act on impulse, primarily because of psychiatric conditions. The evidence, however, is that most conduct predatory, rather than impulsive, violence – even when there is evidence of a mental disorder. In fact, much like lone actors, evidence shows there to be very little difference in ‘rational’ planning and attack behaviours between mentally ill and non-mentally ill mass murderers.

VIOLENCE IN THE MENTALLY ILL

Media portrayals of large scale acts of violence consistently implicate mental disorder (as a single entity) as a cause of violence. This is an unfortunate view that is broadly consistent with how mental health problems are portrayed within public opinion.

The use of general terms such as ‘mentally ill’ neglect to consider the range of different disorders, each with a different combination of symptoms, that interact differently with different environments. In search for the role of mental disorder in acts of mass violence, the answer is likely to differ widely from case to case depending upon the individual’s diagnosis and symptoms, prior life experiences, co-existence of other stressors and vulnerabilities, and lack of protective factors.

Importantly, improvements in this area can only be made with empirically sound research. Researchers must have a mature response which will then feed into practice and public discussion. Just because a factor (such as mental disorder) is present in a case of mass violence, does not make it causal. Nor is it always facilitative. It may be completely irrelevant. We must be comfortable with this complexity; understand that where mental health problems are present, they are usually one of several vulnerabilities, and lack of protective factors.

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A-Z OF INFLUENCE TACTICS AND TOPICS

A - AUTHORITY - people are more likely to be persuaded by an authority they perceive to have expertise (based on knowledge, power or status).

B - BEHAVIOURAL MIMICRY - can increase compliance to subsequent requests (even third-party requests) and it increases spontaneous helping behaviour.

C - CONSISTENCY - people prefer to act in ways that are consistent with their previous values and action, particularly when these are known publically.

D - DOOR IN THE FACE - is a technique that involves preceeding a desired request with a larger request that the respondent will most likely turn down. Compliance to the second request is increased as the respondent compromises.

E - EMPATHY - genuine empathy and positive regard result in greater engagement and more information elicitation. Be careful though faked or trick empathy is likely to backfire!

F - FOOT IN THE DOOR - is a technique where an initial small request is followed by a related larger request. Once the 'door' is open respondents are more likely to comply with the larger request.

G - GROUP EFFECTS - people look to the behaviour of others to inform their responses particularly under conditions of uncertainty i.e., they seek social proof.

H - HOLONISTIC - considers such as environmental and situational factors should be taken into account as well as interpersonal ones. Is this the right time and place to make your persuasion attempt? Do the surroundings lend themselves to communication or are there too many distractions? Does the person you are trying to influence have time to listen?

I - INTENTIONS - is the person you are trying to influence motivated by the same arguments that you find so convincing? Think about their goals and aspirations rather than your own and shape your arguments accordingly.

J - JOINING - successfully persuading a person to act in a way that is inconsistent with a group they’re a member of can depend on when they joined. New members are likely to be enthusiastic and keen to show their allegiance, whereas disillusionment with the group could offer opportunities to exert influence.

K - KINESICS - forms of (potentially) persuasive nonverbal communication such as use of eye contact, gestures, head nodding, posture and facial expression to convey, for example, emotion, encouragement, rapport and attention.

L - LISTENING - successful influence requires understanding the motivations and goals of the respondent, active and careful listening to what they say and how they say it is critical.

M - MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING - an effective, goal directed, non-confrontational, non-judgmental and non-adversarial therapeutic technique designed to elicit behaviour change or increase motivation to change problematic or unwanted behaviours through the examination and resolution of ambivalence.

N - NUDGE - proposes positive reinforcement and indirect persuasion (e.g., altering the choices available) as a means to influence individual or group behaviour in a predictable way, without forbidding or tactically manipulating incentives.

O - OBJECTIONS - acknowledge and refute potential objections (to a request or course of action) before the target of the persuasion has had a chance to raise such them.

P - PROXEMICS - how space and distance can be used to influence communication through either compliance or breach of norms, such as being aware of public, social, personal and intimate space.

Q - QUESTIONS - questions can be structured and formulated to direct attention, imply certain answers, or facilitate inferences. As a result, questions can be used to deliberately mislead and contaminate individual memory and understanding, and, as a consequence, will favour choices that avoid losses.

R - RECIPROCITY - people often feel obliged to reciprocate someone's welfare issues before attempting to influence them not only introduces an element of reciprocity, it allows them to concentrate on what you are saying.

S - SLEEPER EFFECT - messages from low-credibility sources can gain in persuasiveness over time as the (low-credibility) source of the information is dissociated (or forgotten) while the message is retained.

T - TRUSTWORTHINESS - a component of source credibility trusted sources are viewed as objective and reliable.

U - UNDERSTANDING - perspective-taking involves modelling an interviewee’s perspective and generating alternate hypotheses about their possible reactions to different approaches in order to optimise the impact of influence attempts.

V - VALENCE FRAMING - presenting critical information pertaining to a decision in a positive (gain) or negative (loss) way, draws on the principle that people are usually loss averse and, as a consequence, will favour choices that avoid losses.

W - WORRIES - a person is unlikely to consider your point of view if they have more pressing concerns. Addressing someone’s welfare issues before attempting to influence them not only introduces an element of reciprocity, it allows them to concentrate on what you are saying.

X - X-FACTOR - although charisma has only recently been validated as an empirical construct, comprising the ability to both influence and put people at ease, this ‘x-factor’ has long been associated with persuasion skills.

Y - YOU - first impressions count, so make sure you make the right one. Everything you do and say is likely to be judged through the lens of the first few seconds of interaction.

Z - ZEITGEIST - an awareness of contemporary and/or cultural influences likely to be informative about a person’s beliefs or activities.
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