From the Diasporisation to the Transnationalisation of Exile Politics - The Case of Sri Lanka, 1983-2016 | Thematic Report Three

Asylum, Security and Extremism

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About CREST

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 4

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................. 5

1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND SECURITY: LESSONS FROM THE DIASPORA STUDIES LITERATURE ................................................................. 7

2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND SECURITY: LESSONS FROM THE SECURITY STUDIES LITERATURE ................................................................................. 9
   2.1 Traditional Security Approaches to Migration and Asylum ...................................................................................... 10
   2.2 Critical Security Studies, Migration and Asylum ................................................................................................. 12
   2.3 Securitisation: Speech Acts and Practices ............................................................................................................. 13
   2.4 Terrorism and the Securitisation of Migration and Asylum ................................................................................ 15
   2.5 The Asylum-Security Nexus, the ‘Displacement Cycle’ and Human Insecurity ................................................ 17

3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND SECURITY: LESSONS FROM THE RADICALISATION LITERATURE ............................................................................. 20
   3.1 Drivers of Radicalisation ........................................................................................................................................... 21
   3.2 The ‘Taxonomy’ of Terrorists .............................................................................................................................. 24
   3.3 Areas for Further Research .................................................................................................................................... 24

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................................................ 27

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................................................... 28

ANNEX A .................................................................................................................................................................................. 37
This is the final of three Thematic Reports published as part of a CREST-funded project carried out by a team of researchers at City, University of London, and Cranfield University at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. With the objective of better understanding Tamil diaspora communities’ attitudes and engagement in the Sri Lankan civil conflict (1983-2009) and its aftermath, the project explores diaspora and refugee communities’ relationship with the changing socio-political environment in the homeland, exploring what shapes and influences processes of radicalisation or moderation among these communities. It recognises that the socio-political circumstances in which these processes develop are often crucial to understanding why a community or individuals within that community abroad act in a certain way; this includes analysis of different scales and levels of engagement, both in home and host countries, as well as different ‘areas’ of engagement, which can include social, economic and political interactions.

The three thematic reports produced as part of this project cumulatively build a comprehensive picture of the state of knowledge on political action among diaspora, refugee and asylum populations. The theoretically-informed, literature- and evidence-grounded conclusions arising from these three thematic reports are therefore of relevance beyond the case of Sri Lanka.

Thematic Report One discussed how four analytical concepts, diaspora, transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and translocalism, have come to frame the academic discussion on overseas politics and the potential of these concepts to shed light on the relationship between mobility and political action. Thematic Report Two complements the previous report’s broad conceptual discussion by specifically focusing on an analysis of the context and drivers of political action among diaspora and refugee populations, and engaging with the term ‘refugee politics’. The current paper – the final Thematic Report – analyses the growing ‘securitisation’ of refugees and other forcibly displaced populations and calls for greater consideration of structural vulnerabilities in the forced migration and displacement cycle that increase the risk of radicalisation, extremism and related political behaviours.
INTRODUCTION

The forced displacement and cross-border onward migration of people as a result of conflict and generalised instability inevitably raises security concerns for states. The loss of control of borders in mass influxes is seen as a potential threat to national security, and the protracted presence of refugees on another’s sovereign territory can undermine relations with neighbouring states and negatively affect regional stability. Indeed, the decision of states to push refugees across their borders has the implicit intent of generating such insecurity, as does the deliberate destabilisation of camps and the militarisation of a camp’s population as a means to further conflict. The economic costs of hosting refugee populations, in the absence of adequate international financial support, challenges national development plans with host populations concerned about the diversion of limited resources and competition for land, jobs, healthcare and education opportunities. Large scale refugee flows are also seen by some states as a threat to national identity where it is argued that cultural and religious differences cannot easily be reconciled in a context where a government loses control over the scale and pace of entry or the means to return unrecognised refugees to their country of origin.

At the same time, and specifically in response to refugee and migration flows from the Middle East over the past two years, some states, both in Europe and the region, while conscious of security issues, have opened their borders to people fleeing conflict, and others have for the first time participated in global protection initiatives such as Third Country Resettlement. Beyond their international legal obligations and a stated humanitarian commitment to contribute to ‘burden sharing’ in refugee responses (both European and global), countries see benefits and opportunities in accepting refugees as long term citizens playing an important economic and social role in the development of the nation and its projection as a responsible global partner.

Over the past decade, however, and coinciding with the rise of transnational jihadism, territorial and societal security concerns about refugee flows and asylum-migration have been joined by more direct and immediate fears about the relationship between displacement, onward migration, the entry and settlement of refugees, and terrorism. Parts of the United Nations, civil society and human rights organisations reject the notion that migration can be associated with an increased terrorism threat, arguing that refugees and other migrants are victims of violence rather than perpetrators (Koser and Cunningham 2017: 209 – see also Neumann 2017), and that the global failure to address the exploitation of migrants and root causes of migration should instead be the main concern and priority of states. The UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights concluded in a 2016 report that ‘there is no evidence that migration leads to increased terrorist activity’ (cited in Crone 2017: 14), a message further reinforced in recent research undertaken by the Special Representative on Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism during Austria’s 2017 OSCE Chairmanship (Neumann 2017: 25).

However, the principal concerns expressed by security organisations such as Europol (2016 – cited in Crisp 2017; Crone 2017) and the German Federal Ministry for the Interior (2016), and drawing on Syrian migration in 2015 and 2016, are that agents of international jihadist groups have shown a capacity to recruit among displaced Syrians in the region, in transit and settlement, and that terrorists (including children as ‘sleepers’) were concealed among refugees and prepared to take part in terrorist attacks at some later date. President Trump has been exceptional among Western leaders in arguing that a link, albeit of undefined causality, exists between migration and terrorism on US soil (US Department of Homeland Security 2018), and the policy response has included a scaling back of the US refugee resettlement programme (as other countries in Europe and Canada have expanded their programmes), a temporary ban on entry into the US from certain Muslim majority states (a policy that has not been replicated elsewhere), and a further review of the humanitarian visa programme.

Media reporting of terrorist attacks and legal proceedings (see Annex A) now routinely report the migration or refugee profile of those implicated in or charged over attacks and such reporting will inevitably influence public perceptions of refugees, asylum-seekers and any threats they are seen to pose. A Pew poll in 2016 reported that across ten EU countries included in the study, 59 percent of respondents voiced concern about the prospect of increased terrorism in relation to the influx of refugees in 2015-2016 while a further 50 percent worried about the economic burden of hosting refugees, fearing the loss of jobs and social benefits (Wike, Stokes and Simmons 2016).
This Thematic Report critically reviews the current academic state of knowledge on refugee movements and the security threat nexus. Drawing on the two previous Thematic Reports in this series it seeks to better understand why forced displacement, onward migration and refugee settlement in countries of asylum is increasingly linked to the threat of political extremism and terrorism. It builds on the discussion in Thematic Report Two on the nature of refugee politics and what shapes individual’s political commitments to conflict at ‘home’ and what factors shape forms of political engagement internationally. It extends this discussion by considering the pathways through which engagement in diaspora politics could take an extreme form, including support for the use of violence.

Through an examination of the literature on critical security studies, and in particular ‘securitisation’, the Thematic Report traces the process by which ‘the refugee’ is constructed as a threat, how that threat is understood by the state and by society more broadly, and how the evolution, dissemination and consumption of the ‘threat’ comes to inform policy-makers and the policy-making process. And, finally, the Report reviews the radicalisation literature in relation to the known experiences of refugees throughout the forced displacement cycle as they seek to move from a place of danger to a place of safety. It is shown that at various points on the cycle individuals confront situations that open doors to those who would seek to recruit and radicalise them, who may be drawn to extremist narratives, or who become dependent upon those who have the resources to provide routes out of danger.

The three thematic reports in this series are:

1. Understanding Transnational Diaspora Politics: A Conceptual Discussion
2. The Engagement of Refugees in Transnational Politics: Lessons from the Migration, Diaspora and Refugee Studies Literature
3. Asylum, Security and Extremism

These reports are available to download from the CREST website: www.crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/extremism-to-moderate-politics/
1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND SECURITY: LESSONS FROM THE DIASPORA STUDIES LITERATURE

While Thematic Reports One and Two provided a detailed analysis of the rationales and *modus operandi* of diasporic communities, they also concluded – among other things – that Diaspora Studies has predominantly focused on the ways in which diaspora politics negatively affect conflicts in the homeland. Authors have argued that diasporas are in effect ‘peace-wrecking’ actors – to use the terminology employed by Smith and Stares (2007) – sustaining conflicts from afar by providing economic and human capital to advance a particular and typically nationalistic cause. This image of ‘diaspora as insecurity’ can be found in influential econometric research by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler that seeks to understand how civil wars are initiated and renewed. The authors argue that while the size of the diaspora is not directly related to the start of conflict, ‘a large diaspora considerably increases the risk of repeat conflict’ (2004: 575). This necessarily implies that ‘diasporas’ are inherently connected to security concerns; an implication that has been problematised by Nathan (2008: 266) who argues that such a view is based on ‘a positive correlation … [in Collier and Hoeffler’s study] … between renewed civil war and the proportion of a country’s population living as emigrants in the US’, which might be an exceptional case.

McGregor and Pasura’s research on African diasporas’ engagement with episodes of crisis and instability in the homeland points to the influence that global security concerns are playing in framing debates over ‘conflict-generated diasporas’, leading to at best ‘simplistic’ and at worst ‘dangerously misleading narratives about Islamic violence in Africa’ (Dowd and Raleigh 2013, cited in McGregor and Pasura 2014: 4). Although the literature on the potential ‘peace-making’ role of diasporas allows us to move beyond the limiting account of these groups as violent-prone entities, McGregor and Pasura (2014: 4) do caution against ‘the risk of replacing one oversimplified framing with another’. Referring specifically to the often-celebratory tone of much writing about diasporas and development, these authors point out that ‘transnational connections and engagements, even if philanthropic or developmental in intent, are much more multi-faceted, fraught and conflictual than the development literature conveys’ (McGregor and Pasura 2014: 5). While Lyons (2007: 529) argues that conflict-generated diasporas are less likely ‘to be willing to compromise and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protractedness of homeland conflicts’, Al-Ali, Black and Koser (2001: 626) suggest that if an individual opposes the government in the home country, which one could argue might have contributed to his/her displaced status, ‘he or she may choose not to contribute [to national reconstruction] despite being able to afford to’. This inconclusive picture resonates with Brubaker’s (2005) criticism of the tendency to understand diasporas as homogeneous entities with similar goals and methods of action.

More recent research is focusing on how ‘conflict-generated diasporas’ evolve over time and through the ‘life-cycle’ of migration (Betts and Jones 2016; Koinova 2016; Sökefeld 2006). While this research contributes to our understanding of the ways in which diaspora groups mobilise (also in conflictual ways), there is insufficient critical and theoretical reflection on when and how the actions of such groups might constitute a security problem. Moreover, despite the focus on identity-formation and group organisation, there is limited thought on how displacement and the experience of conflict and asylum affects behaviour and what are likely to be the resulting security implications, if any. An exception is provided by Koinova (2016),

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1 Thematic Reports One and Two provide a more detailed analysis of this literature.
who, by focusing on the specific experience of Bosnian refugees in the Netherlands, observes that both displacement and the host country response to such phenomenon were crucial in defining diasporic political activism. Elsewhere, Demmers (2007) studies changes in the nature of war and the emergence of identity-based security issues as drivers for diasporic activism, effectively providing a bridge between the Diaspora Studies and the Security Studies literatures. Her study considers the impact that the ‘War on Terror paradigm’ has had on framing diaspora politics; ‘a large share of diasporic politics today is dedicated to fighting a discursive battle over image, the justification of violence, and political legitimacy, passionately countering and contesting terrorist labelling’ (Demmers 2007: 24).

The post-Cold War expansion in the meaning of the concept of security is central to the discussion on the so called ‘securitisation’ of forced displacement and asylum. The following section maps out the contribution the Security Studies literature makes to our understanding of how discursively, and in policy terms migration, asylum and displacement have increasingly come to be seen as a threat.
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND SECURITY: LESSONS FROM THE SECURITY STUDIES LITERATURE

The literature on the relationship between displacement and security can broadly be organised in two ways: first, there is the traditional perspective of migration as a threat to the security of the state, and second, analysis that is centred on a ‘critical’ observation of the figure of the migrant and threats to economic, societal and cultural forms of security. Huysmans and Squire (2009: 170 – emphasis added) argue that ‘both Migration Studies and Security Studies tend to approach issues related to the migration-security nexus in traditional terms by conceptualising security as a value to be achieved’, generally taking the state as the main unit of analysis towards which external threats, largely of a military nature, are directed. However, scholars within the realm of critical security studies have sought to bypass these conceptions, both by understanding security as a social construction (Bigo 2002, 2014; Buzan and Wæver 1997; Huysmans 2006), and by focusing instead on the figure of the migrant (Gerard and Pickering 2014; Innes 2014; Millner 2011).

Before this review addresses these schools of thought, some preliminary reflections can be made. First, focusing only on a state-level analysis could simplify how forced migration is understood, treating it as a static concept as instances of insecurity are generally analysed at the border, and as such tend to miss out on experiences of prior displacement, asylum-seeking, integration and potential return. Equally, when focusing on the figure of the migrant we should not diminish the role that the state plays as a security actor through a number of tools, including through the use of migration (Betts 2009; Weiner 1992; Loescher and Milner 2005, 2011).

Second, despite neo-realist opposition to the expansion of the concept of security to include non-military threats, Betts (2009: 62) considers that ‘much of the literature on the relationship between forced migration and security (and much policy-making on immigration and asylum) implicitly adopts elements of a TSS [traditional security studies] approach’. In fact, objections have been raised to the extent to which early critical security scholars such as Buzan or Wæver effectively challenged the nature of security as entailing a tangible, achievable status (McSweeny 1996). Without engaging in a detailed theoretical discussion, what is important here is that there are question marks over the capacity of at least some elements of critical security studies to break completely from traditional approaches to security.

Finally, the Security Studies literature has been shaped both by ‘changes in the nature of migration and in the nature of thinking about migration’ (Huysmans and Squire 2009: 169). Traditionally the literature has referred to the ‘migration-security nexus’, where irregular migrants, asylum-seekers, labour migrants and refugees are often merged under the same label. An emerging literature is however focusing specifically on irregular migration, asylum-seeking and refugees in relation to security through the term ‘asylum-security nexus’ (see for example Avdan 2014; Bigo 2014; Feller 2005, 2006; Gibney 2004; Hammerstadt 2014). Although the latter term better reflects the interests of this CREST-funded project, the thematic report will use both terms when analysing the literature.

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2 This report is going to focus largely on the contribution of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, through theorists such as Buzan, de Wilde, and Wæver.
2.1 TRADITIONAL SECURITY APPROACHES TO MIGRATION AND ASYLUM

Weiner advocates the use of a ‘security/stability framework’ for the study of international migration that ‘consider[s] political changes within states as a major determinant of international population flows, and migration, including refugee flows, both as a cause and a consequence of international conflict’ (1992: 95). Specifically, in relation to three distinct types of ‘forced and induced emigration’ which states use to pursue strategic objectives, forced emigration is presented as a way for states to achieve cultural homogeneity or as way to assert dominance over a minority; to deal with political dissidents and class enemies; and to achieve foreign policy objectives (Weiner 1992: 100). Weiner comments:

To view refugee flows as simply the unintended consequence of internal upheavals or economic crises is to ignore the eagerness of some governments to reduce or eliminate from within their own borders selected social classes and ethnic groups, and to affect the politics and policies of their neighbours (1992: 103).

Weiner’s approach is useful not only because of its influence in subsequent research, but also because it questions traditional frameworks of analysis that understand migration as the direct consequence of economic imbalances, instead establishing a relational link between forced migration and security.

Building on Weiner’s work, Loescher and Milner (2005: 24) observe how during the Cold War, ‘forced migration constituted one of the central concerns of US and Western foreign policies [as] refugees were seen as part of the struggle between East and West’. Watson (2009: 17) adds support to this argument when interpreting displacement movements during the Cold War era as ‘part of a larger security agenda associated with the victory of the capitalist “West” [...] these cases demonstrate that migration has and can be constructed in various ways, indeed as a source of security rather than insecurity’.

In the early 1990s, the migration-‘high politics’ nexus was also the dominant framework not only to understand some of the early post-Cold War academic writings on migration and security, as Loescher and Milner (2005: Chapter 2) describe, but also to explain political developments in security for a such as the UN and NATO, and in foreign policy debates around issues of regional economic and political integration (Martin 2001). Having said that Newland (1995) argues that the Cold War geographical and ideological grounds for granting refugee status were not at the forefront of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Rather the emphasis was on the use of foreign policy to prevent, respond, control or stop refugee flows into the US or into regional areas of interest to US foreign policy, with examples including the refugee crises in Northern Iraq in 1991, Rwanda in 1994 as well as US policies towards Cuba and Haiti.

In their analysis, Loescher and Milner acknowledge that, while forced migration was a ‘central concern of US and Western foreign policies’ (2005: 24), with the exception of specific refugee groups that were perceived as assets or liabilities in specific crises, ‘the logic of the Cold War was bound by a highly constrained notion of security which did not see migration as a central issue’ (2005: 24). This understanding of security was based on two premises: that most state threats came from outside its borders, and that while they were ‘primarily but not exclusively’ of a military nature, they required a political response (2005: 24). Loescher and Milner also argue that after the end of the Cold War ‘it became clear that refugee movements were not only a consequence of insecurity, but could also be a cause of instability, for host states, for countries of origin, in conflict and even a threat to wider international peace and security’ (Loescher and Milner 2005: 24-25). Other scholars, however, have taken a different approach, as illustrated by Watson’s (2006: 66) analysis of the writings of Waever (1995). The latter author has argued that the role that migration played in national security agendas during the Cold War was contextual, varying in importance between East and West based on the different levels of internal cohesion and legitimacy of the two political and ideological regimes.

Weiner is critical of the migration and security literature from the early 1990s arguing that ‘little systematic comparative attention has been given to the ways in which international population movements create conflicts within and between states’ (1992: 94). Newland (1995) and Salehyan (2007) address this weakness by considering the role that military action, such as the US in Haiti in 1994 or NATO in Kosovo in 1999, as well as ground interventions in Africa or Asia, played in an attempt by more powerful countries to limit further displacement and onward movement.
According to Salehyan, ‘refugee flows between states may significantly increase the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) […] Refugee-receiving states are more likely to initiate MIDs as they intervene to prevent further externalities, and refugee-sending states initiate MIDs as they violate borders in pursuit of dissidents’ (2007: 1). The large-N quantitative analysis carried out by this author covering the period between 1955-2000 proposes therefore that refugees are a key variable in triggering conflicts, in which both sending and receiving states are involved. Milner (2009) addresses these issues from a political theory perspective, suggesting that mass arrivals and protracted refugee situations might be perceived by those countries within the region of origin of forced displacement – which often suffer from fragile and weak political structures – as a threat to their sovereignty, as they limit the ability of the country to control its own borders and achieve its international and domestic political objectives, therefore connecting to Salehyan’s argument that this could lead to inter-state disputes.

More recent work by Salehyan together with Choi (2013) shifts the focus from military action and conflict to the consequences of hosting refugees for international and domestic terrorism. On the basis of a cross-national, time-series data analysis of 154 countries between 1970–2007, the authors suggest that the ‘greed’ literature has not taken into account the effect that the influx of humanitarian aid and the presence of humanitarian workers that accompany refugee crises can have in providing incentives for terrorist attacks. As Choi and Salehyan (2013: 57) explain:

> aid resources, particularly in violent contexts, are often another prime target for theft and provide an easy opportunity for militants to acquire resources […] and the abduction of aid workers for ransom […] humanitarian workers may also become a target because of their ethnicity, nationality, or religion. Rather than travelling abroad to conduct attacks in their selected country, extremists can choose to target expatriates in their midst.

Choi and Salehyan (2007) complement Stedman and Tanner (2003)’s arguments around the manipulation of refugee flows and refugee camps by warrying factions to attract and use humanitarian aid to support the continuation of warfare. At the same time, in common with the rest of the literature presented in this section, Choi and Salehyan treat refugees as a tool used by security actors, whereby they are a means to an end rather than actors in themselves.

In a different context, Loescher and Milner (2004, 2005, 2011) analyse how inter-state dynamics can generate ‘protracted refugee situations’, whereby various peace and security actors fail to engage with the causes of forced displacement. The reasons for such a lack of engagement should be sought also in relation to security, as both sending and receiving states make their political action contingent on socio-political decisions that could affect their security both directly and indirectly. Examples of these are Macedonia’s reluctance to accept Kosovar Albanian refugees in 1999, as they were seen as a potential threat to Macedonia’s ethnic balance, or Iraqi Kurds in Turkey (Loescher and Milner 2005: 33). While the significance of protracted refugee situations from a security point of view has been addressed in the literature, Loescher and Milner (2004) underline the existing emphasis on the security needs of Western states at the expense of refugee-hosting states within the region of origin, where scarcity of resources, political fragility, lack of governance and sovereignty concerns exacerbate the security spill-overs from the militarisation of camps and refugee competition with the host population.

The preoccupation of traditional approaches with external, military threats reinvigorates an important dimension in the study of the relationship between forced displacement and security that tends to be sidelined vis-à-vis other migration-related matters, which at the time of writing, generate more political and public debate, at least in Western societies, such as identity, belonging and integration. A limitation of traditional approaches, however, is that migration flows, and especially forced displacement, are treated as an instrumental tool in the hands of states, thereby neglecting the agency of the displaced in influencing security ‘calculations’. In addition, focusing on the state level means important migration-related dynamics within states are not considered. As Weiner (1992: 103) observes when discussing migration as a security problem, ‘the threat can be an attack by armed refugees; migrants can be a threat to either country’s political stability; or migrants can be perceived as a threat to the major societal values of the receiving country’. Focusing on the migration/asylum-security nexus necessarily requires going beyond the state-level of analysis and understanding implications at the societal level, which allows us to take into consideration non-military conceptualisations of security.
2.2 CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES, MIGRATION AND ASYLUM

Dating from the mid-1990s, critical security studies is best described as an ‘orientation towards the discipline [of security studies] than a precise theoretical label’ (Krause and Williams 1997: xii) that has the aim of expanding the study of security by moving it away from ‘the state-centric militarism of the traditional orthodoxy’ (Vaughan-Williams and Peoples 2010: 5). Scholars within critical security studies have sought to ‘deepen’ the security agenda by going beyond the state as the only referent object; ‘broaden’ security thinking by incorporating various areas that were previously neglected, such as the environment, migration or the economy; and challenge the nature of security as something that exists as an objective reality, rather arguing that security is something that is constructed (Krause and Williams 1996; Buzan 1991; Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998; Waever 1995).

The Copenhagen School, a school of thought within critical security studies, has added to debates on what the referent object of security is and the implications this may have for non-traditional security issues, but also to discussions on how something becomes a security issue. These two main contributions will be explored by focusing on the notions of ‘societal security’ and ‘securitisation’, both relevant to this review of the literature on migration and security.

In the second edition of the book People, States and Fear, Buzan argues that, although the understanding of security as state-level and preoccupied with the military and political sectors remains ‘particularly central’ (1991: 1), it cannot be fully comprehended without taking into account other levels of analysis – individual, regional, system/international – and sector areas – economic, environmental, societal – that are intrinsic to the field of International Studies. In his own words, ‘a full understanding of each can only be gained if it is related to the others. Attempts to treat security as if it was confined to any single level or any single sector invite serious distortions of understanding’ (Buzan 1991: 363).

Notwithstanding the holistic approach that Buzan’s ideas invite us to take, when analysing the migration/ asylum-security nexus the concept of ‘societal security’ or ‘societal threats’ has become particularly influential. Society is understood here as entailing ‘identity, the self-conception of communities, and those individuals who identify themselves as members of a particular community’ (Waever 1995: 66-67 - emphasis in original; Waever 1993). Waever argues that while security is necessarily associated to the state as a referent object, security should be reconceptualised ‘in terms of a duality of state security and societal security. State security has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and societal security has identity’ (1995: 67 - emphasis in original). Societal security therefore has to be understood as when ‘significant groups within a society feel threatened, feel their identity is endangered by immigration, integration or cultural imperialism, and try to defend themselves’ (Waever 1995: 67). It reflects the ‘ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions’ (Waever 1993: 23 - emphasis in original).

McSweeney is critical of the Copenhagen School approach in the way that it reifies ‘identity’ and ‘security’ by understanding them as something existing a priori and reducing ‘our conception of society to its most ephemeral and empirically contentious component’ when in fact societal groups face a ‘multi-dimensionality of threats’ (1996: 85). Such criticism has not stopped the proliferation of studies on concepts of identity, belonging, and the extent to which ‘foreigners’ constitute a potential threat to the ‘way of being’ of a society (Diez and Squire 2008; Huysmans 2000, 2006; Kaya 2012). This literature is often connected with the radicalisation literature (Abdi 2015; Rahimi and Graumans 2015), but even more increasingly to the extent to which such a broadening of what counts as security has influenced control and border management policies, especially within Western, liberal democracies (Boswell 2007; Den Boer and Monar 2002; Geddes 2005; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Huysmans and Buonfino 2008; Leonard 2010; Slominski and Trauner 2017).

Sociological literature on group-threat theories, while not necessarily embedded on security studies frameworks of analysis, attempt to deconstruct how ‘foreigners’ present a societal threat by focusing on the effect the actual versus the perceived size of that population as well as temporal dynamics (i.e., the duration of stay of those populations) have on determining the level of (perceived) danger by receiving societies (DeWaard 2015; Hjerm 2007; Pettigrew, Wagner and Christ 2010; Zorlu 2016). While empirical research on security-related issues implicitly shed light on the perceived fears of the hosting population towards foreigners, they also often fail to distinguish
Different displacement phenomena which might enrich the discussion.

A cornerstone of this relatively recent approach to understanding ‘security among the people’ is the notion of ‘securitisation’, originally coined by Waever (1995). It refers to the process by which an issue is moved from the realm of politics (in the public domain) to the realm of security by framing it as an ‘existential threat’, thus justifying the implementation of ‘extraordinary’ policies to address that threat, which may not otherwise have been acceptable to the general population. In other words, ‘security is not just a value or a condition but a specific way of dealing with an issue’ (Trombetta 2014: 132). This concept is based on the premise that security is a social construct through which the state and its elites define ‘existential threats’ in order to prioritise specific policy actions (Buzan, Waever and Wilde 1998). Waever explains clearly how securitisation works:

With the help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Waever 1995: 55).

Doty (1998: 73) suggests that the Copenhagen School’s focus on the speech act and the discursive process ‘limit[s] our understanding of securitisation to an instrumental process that is controlled by elites and power holders’ when in fact it can also be a bottom-up driven approach, i.e., originating ‘from the masses’. Other scholars, mostly influenced by the Foucauldian approach to biopolitics (Huysmans 2006; Bigo 2002; Leonard 2010), have also questioned the approach arguing that ‘the practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse’ (Bigo 2000: 194). This strongly resonates with Weiner, who contends that the understanding of migration and asylum as a threat lies not only in the perceptive and discursive dimension, but also in the practical political domain:

The highly conflictual nature of population movements has affected which institutions make exit and entry rules...[engaging] the foreign and defence ministries, the security and intelligence agencies, and [the] heads of government...the very form and intensity of response to unwanted migrations is itself an indication that such population flows are regarded as threats to security or stability (Weiner 1992: 125)

Trombetta (2014: 133) seeks a bridge between the discourse versus practice divide in arguing that ‘to some extent, they can be seen as complementary: security is not only about exceptional measures but also about the perpetration of practices...that makes security measures operational and normal’.

 Debates on the multifaceted nature of securitisation have been further extended by the research of authors such as Hammerstadt (2014) who suggests that there is a third ‘securitisation school’ focusing on an ‘inclusive approach’ that refers to human or common security and that it is sharply in contrast with solely discursive or practice-oriented approaches. In the same vein, Doty (1998) analyses three ‘modes’ of securitisation of migration which shed light on different processes and potential dimensions to the asylum-security nexus: the national security mode, the societal security mode and the human security mode. The latter concept refers to ‘people-centred’ approaches to security (MacFarlane 2004) and has been used to explore the impact of securitising discourses and practices on the well-being of migrants and asylum-seekers (Feller 2006; Gerard and Pickering 2014; Innes 2014; Seidman-Zager 2010; Truong and Gasper 2011).

In the following sections the theoretical concepts already introduced will be applied to migration and asylum debates in order to provide answers to the questions of why and how forced displacement is increasingly considered in security terms, and the implications for forcibly displaced populations.

## 2.3 SECURITISATION: SPEECH ACTS AND PRACTICES

The migration/asylum-security nexus captures concerns that ‘large scale arrivals are seen as a threat to political, economic or social stability and tend increasingly to provoke hostility and violence’ (Feller 2006: 513-514). As Guiraudon and Joppke (2001: 15) suggest, ‘there is a simple reason for linking migration and security: to the
degree that immigration is unwanted, and immigration policy becomes “control” policy, immigration is likely to be addressed in negative terms, as a “threat” to the receiving society’. The authors provide an analysis that focuses on the ‘constructedness’ of migration as a political and security process taking place at European (Kosolwski 2001), national (Bigo 2001) and local levels (Quassoli 2001). While Guiraudon and Joppke focus largely on how migration policy is developed, they also briefly engage with ‘how much of a security threat immigrants actually are’, arguing that because migration policies have become more restrictive, there has been a shift from demand to supply-driven immigration, higher levels of irregular immigration and more risk-taking and law-violating behaviours among those that still consider migration despite increased state restrictions. These authors therefore conclude, ‘the proportion of irregular immigrants – asylum-seekers, tourists, illegals, and transitory migrants – among criminal immigrants is exceedingly high everywhere’ (2001: 17).

Having said that, Guiraudon and Joppke caution against conflating the category of ‘criminal transients’ with the majority of ‘law-abiding resident foreigners’, a practice that they describe as ‘politically convenient, but at best a half-truth’ (2001: 17). While these authors identify that second-generation migrants are more prone to conflict and crime, allegedly because of failing integration policies, their analysis nonetheless falls short of identifying how different displacement phenomena are considered within such securitised frameworks, therefore contributing to the conflation of migration and asylum-security nexus within academic debates. This is important when considering that, for example, the radicalisation literature sees restrictive integration or refugee policies as drivers of radicalisation (Abdi 2015), although the securitisation literature is much more limited in understanding how security-influenced policies have affected the political behaviour of refugees and other forcibly displaced populations.

The securitisation process is understood to contribute to ‘creat[ing] or reinforce[ing] divisions between “us” and “them”, using the enemy “other” on the outside as a tool for strengthening the community bonds between insiders’ (Hammerstadt 2014: 267-268), particularly within Western liberal democracies (Bigo 2001; Diez and Squire 2008; Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017; Stokes-Dupass 2017). Studies have shown how political debate, media and the rise of right-wing parties in the West have contributed to the wide acceptance of the notion of the ‘outside threat’, which has found its way into international policy statements such UN and NATO declarations (Bigo 2001; Feller 2006), parliamentary discussions (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008). Such arguments have also been used to justify policies that advocate more restrictive and controlling migration regimes (Bigo 2001, 2014; Geddes 2005; Huysmans and Buonfino 2008; Watson 2009, among others). As Huysmans observes, ‘the political process of connecting migration to criminal and terrorist abuses…does not take place in isolation [but it] is related to a wider politicisation in which immigrants and asylum-seekers are portrayed as a challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare provisions’ (2000: 751).

Huysmans was among the first that sought to provide a comprehensive analysis of why and how ‘directly or indirectly, supporting strategies of securitisation makes the inclusion of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in European societies more difficult’ (2000: 753). By providing various steps in the ‘The Europeanisation’ (and hence, securitisation) of migration policy aimed at creating a borderless internal Europe, Huysmans demonstrates that migration has become a ‘meta-issue’ in the political sphere which encompasses and relates to various economic, societal, and cultural dynamics, in his own words:

Construction of the internal security field, the restrictive migration policy, the privileging of nationals of Member States in the internal market, and the policies supporting, often indirectly, expressions of welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilising factor feed into the negative politicisation of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees as an illegitimate presence and scapegoat (Huysmans 2000: 770).

3 It is especially in relation to this point that one is reminded of Bigo (2002)’s argument that ‘international’ and ‘internal’ security are converging. If we include the notion of societal security, and therefore of ‘identity’, in the realm of internal security, we can understand how the protection of democratic and Western principles becomes a matter of ‘national security’ against external threats.
These political dynamics are not restricted to the European experience as the global migration challenge confronts fundamental political ideas underpinning Western states (Huysmans 2000). Huysmans (1995, 2006) observes that the process by which ‘us and them’ is defined contributes to a generalisation of migration movements as equally undermining the ‘survival of the political community’, therefore also questioning the traditional notions of memberships identified by the ‘politics of belonging’:

So, the image seems to be not only one of insecure individuals threatened by ‘foreigners’ but also one of an insecure collective identity which unites the insecure individuals. Slogans such as ‘we Austrians’, ‘we Flemish’, ‘own people first’, etc. express this collective dimension (Huysmans 1995: 53).

This in turn resonates with discussions on radicalisation which will be analysed later in this review, and in particular the extent to which the political behaviour of migrants, refugees and especially second-generation individuals may be determined by the uncertainties of ‘non-belonging’.

Influenced by the approach of the Copenhagen School, Bigo agrees that securitisation processes are not ‘spontaneous’ (2002: 72), however, he argues that ‘it is possible to securitise certain problems without speech or discourse’ (2000: 194). Rather than implementing ‘exceptional measures’, through day-to-day practices and routines such as visa controls, profiling and border checking, security agencies are seen to reinforce the understanding that immigrants are threats. For Bigo (2002: 66) the securitisation of migration is ‘a transversal political technology, used as a mode of governmentality by diverse institutions to play with the unease […] so as to affirm their role as providers of protection and security’.

Waever’s conceptualisation of the ‘speech act’ and Bigo’s focus on practices of securitisation have led others (Leonard 2010; Geddes 2015; Watson 2006, 2009; to name a few) to analyse how migration and asylum policy has been influenced by such processes, and how migration and forced displacement is increasingly governed from a distance. An example of this is the debate in the literature on whether the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX)⁴, established in 2004, can be considered an example of extraordinary measures as part of the securitisation of migration and asylum in EU discourses and policy (see Leonard 2010; Mass and Truong 2011; Neal 2009).

Both ‘speech acts’ and practices of security agencies and other political actors offer useful insights in to the active role that state-level authorities, institutions and other elites play in the generation and reproduction of securitising dynamics. However, there are also limitations, they neglect the agency of immigrants, asylum-seekers or refugees in dealing with securitised policies, such as focusing on how networks or groups (including diasporas) might facilitate mobility. In addition, while ‘the border’ is a dominant theme, containment practices to prevent migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees from reaching the territory of a state have also been studied. The logic of ‘blaming migrants’, inherent in many of these practices, is problematic because it ‘misrecognises structural issues such as refugee flows, urban riots, crime, unemployment and welfare dependency as the attributes of migrants that need to be policed and regulated’ (Humphrey 2013: 179).

How such structural elements fit within securitising processes – and the role that the forced migration and displacement cycle plays – requires further attention. In line with these observations, the next section will look more closely at the literature that considers containment strategies or the so-called ‘externalisation’ of asylum/migration controls. However, before moving to that discussion, we will complete our analysis of securitisation discourses and practices by exploring the role that terrorism and radicalisation play in their generation and sustaining.

2.4 TERRORISM AND THE SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION AND ASYLUM

The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001 is frequently associated
Lessons from the Security Studies Literature

With the securitisation of migration and asylum in Western democracies and the links to terrorism and radicalisation (Humphrey 2013; den Boer and Monar 2002), with problematic consequences in terms of how policy planning and implementation takes place. In the words of Koser and Cunningham (2017: 209),

> Without [...] denying the potential of migrants (or refugees) to turn to extreme violence, the risk is that isolated contemporary incidents, or distant historical examples, are taken out of context and then projected into the future and used as the basis for sweeping generalisations about the threat that large-scale migration and asylum flows may pose to national and regional security.

Avdan’s (2014) quantitative analysis of origin-specific asylum recognition rates in 17 Western European countries from 1980 to 2008 comes to the conclusion that transnational terrorism has not eroded humanitarianism in asylum admissions. The rate of acceptance of asylum applications is influenced by direct experience with terrorist attacks, not by the general occurrence of terrorist attacks worldwide (2014: 465). Avdan also finds that ‘Muslim states encounter significantly lower rates of recognition’ (2014: 459), and that ‘policy tightening in Europe does not discriminate against origin countries that export terrorism even when such attacks involve victims of recipient states’ (2014: 465). We will return to these two specific findings later in the section but for now what this research shows is that the relationship between terrorism and asylum is more complex than what popular discourses on 9/11 and subsequent attacks would imply.5

Huysmans and Buonfino (2008)’s empirical analysis of discursive action in the British Parliament (both Houses) between 11 September 2001 and early June 2004 also provides a note of caution against over-emphasising the role that 9/11 has since played on securitising debates on migration. While parliamentary debates gave support to the view that immigration and asylum might be vehicles for terrorist and security breaches, this ‘fluctuated quite significantly within the political field’ (2008: 767). Such fluctuation can be explained by the general reluctance in the British Parliament to explicitly maintain a connection between terrorism and migration, principally to avoid excessive politicisation of the issues or exacerbating the risk of demonisation of migrants and the undermining of social cohesion.

Importantly, ‘this does not mean that migration and asylum are not securitised; but the way they are embedded within security framings, at least among the political elite, is more multifaceted than simply suggesting that terrorism plays a major role in structuring these framings’ (Huysmans and Buonfino 2008: 767). For these authors focusing exclusively on the connections between migration, asylum and (counter-)terrorism risks downplaying other important securitisations resulting from the ‘politics of unease’ that addresses policy areas that contribute to a ‘general context of societal insecurities and unease’ (2008: 781), such as welfare provision, identity and irregular migration, and specifically justifies the introduction of identification technology for surveillance and control. Huysmans and Buonfino therefore argue a two-level analysis of securitisation which not only reflects the realist/critical security studies divide but also presents the depth of the migration/asylum-security nexus beyond the fear of terrorist attacks. As Seidman-Zager (2010: 4) states, ‘the implication of links between asylum-seekers and terrorism is […] only one facet of a broader discourse on immigration- and asylum-related securitisation’.

In the European context there is no unanimous agreement on the impact that 9/11 had on the migration/asylum-security nexus. Some reject the causality arguing, as Baker-Beall does (2009: 194 - emphasis in original), that even ‘before the events of 11 September 2001, the construction of the immigrant “other” as a potential threat to European society and therefore European identity, was a central theme within the EU’s internal security policy’ (see also Boswell 2007; Gibney 2002; Karyotis 2007). Others have suggested that although not new to Europe, the relation between asylum and migration policy and security concerns strengthened, accelerated and/or became more prominent after 9/11 (Den Boer and Monar 2002; Crisp 2003; Buonfino 2004).

For Schlentz (2010) this variety of opinion reflects the need for more systematic and rigorous analysis of the European case, which she sought to address through a comprehensive study of policies, laws, technological

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5 It is also interesting to notice how the title of Avdan’s paper mentions both ‘asylum recognition rates’ and ‘the migration-security nexus revised’, suggesting again the conflation of different terminology.
solutions, and administrative and operational practices in the European Union (EU). Her conclusion is that 9/11 ‘did matter because it escalated the securitisation of asylum and immigration in the EU [which] manifested both quantitative and qualitative change’ in the different areas explored (Schlentz 2010: 31). Baele and Sterck also seek to address the issue through a quantitative analysis, suggesting that while security language is strongly used at the EU level, there is ‘uneven intensity of this framing’ depending on which ‘subfields of immigration are being analysed’ (2015: 1133). Their results also suggest that while ‘asylum’ is less heavily securitised than ‘illegal migration’, ‘very different situations are conglomeration within this label of “illegal”’ (Baele and Sterck 2015: 1132), which allegedly refers to the conflation of the migration- and asylum security nexus.

A parallel debate that has developed in relation to the events of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks is what contribution they have made to the securitisation of ‘the figure of the Muslim’ (Diez and Squire 2008: 577) compared to other ethnic or religious groups. Kaya (2012: 405) reflects on contemporary events, including terrorist attacks, but also popular debates about Muslim traditions (e.g., the use of the hijab or the burqa), to argue that ‘prejudiced perceptions about Islam’ have contributed to the image of Muslims as the ‘enemy within’ threatening Western civilisation, leading to the rise of ‘Islamophobia’ as a political ideology and form of governance.

Fekete (2004: 3-4) describes the promotion of ‘monocultural homogeneity through assimilation’ in Europe and that applies both to Muslim citizens and immigrants ‘as an adjunct to anti-terrorist law’ but also a means to combat the broader fear that ‘adherence to Islamic norms and values threatens the notion of Europeanness’. For this author these developments cannot be explained by ‘Islamophobia’ alone, they are ‘structured anti-Muslim racism’ (Fekete 2004: 3). Humphrey (2013)’s study of Muslim immigration in to Australia shows that 9/11 effectively transformed the consideration of Muslims from an ‘ethnic/religious minority in a multicultural society’ to a ‘transnational risk’ (2013: 182). However, he also recognises that prior to 9/11 Muslims in Australia were already ‘stigmatised as a culturally problematic and socially marginalised immigrant community’ (2013: 182).

These studies show that 9/11 and subsequent terrorist attacks may have provided a legitimising platform for the securitisation of Muslim populations, both citizens and immigrants, but also draw our attention to the literature that considers the role that race and racism play in the construction of these securitisation discourses and practices (see, for example, Ibrahim 2005; Moffette and Vadasaria 2016; Schuster 2003). However, the tendency of the literature to group ‘Muslims’ under one entity makes it very difficult to analyse in more depth the impact that securitisation has had on different groups within this larger category, including those who have been settled over many generations, recent arrivals, or refugees and asylum-seekers.

2.5 THE ASYLUM-SECURITY NEXUS, THE ‘DISPLACEMENT CYCLE’ AND HUMAN INSECURITY

The narrative of ‘the border’, as previously discussed, is a dominant theme in the literature on migration, asylum and security. The ‘externalisation’ of migration/asylum controls and the securitisation of host country entry and settlement policies for migrants, including refugees, complements the preference for ‘tightening’ borders. While these themes invite reflection on the forced migration and displacement cycle (displacement/flight, encampment, onward movement, settlement/integration), the focus is restricted to the impact securitisation has had on certain stages of this cycle. The possibility that structural vulnerabilities in the cycle could contribute to finding alternative explanations to the migration/asylum-security nexus, or to moving the onus of attention away from the refugee and the asylum-seeker as the threat, is thus far largely absent from the debate.

The ‘externalisation’ of migration/asylum control refers to those measures aimed at preventing the arrival in a state’s territory of what Humphrey’s (2013: 185) has described as ‘illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and unwanted cultural and political influences from diasporas’. This ‘containment of the risk’ relies on outsourcing mechanisms and agreements with other states, security professionals, corporations, international organisations and NGOs. Measures normally associated with containment practices – that Humphrey (2013: 180) terms ‘hypergovernance’ or transnational management of populations – include at the very far end conflict management, state building, and other human security and development-oriented policies in countries generating ‘unwanted migrants’.
Other measures incorporate interception and detention en route and the extra-territorial processing of asylum claims. Examples of the latter comprise the ‘welcome and departure centres’ in major transit countries in North Africa proposed in November 2014 by German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière, or the designation of Turkey as ‘safe’ transit country in the EU ‘migration crisis’ that began in 2015 (Leonard and Kaunert 2016; Slominski and Trauner 2017 – see also Schuster 2003: 234). Additional examples would include the temporary holding centres in Guantanamo Bay and the ‘offshore processing centres’ in Jamaica and the Turks and Caicos Islands that the US instigated in the 1990s to prevent asylum-seekers from Haiti reaching its shores, or the equivalent arrangements that Australia developed in the 2000s with Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea to manage asylum-seekers intercepted in unauthorised vessels at sea (Leonard and Kaunert 2016: 49).

As Leonard and Kaunert explain (2016: 50), the extra-territorial processing of asylum claims has been portrayed by some as a positive measure to reduce the life-threatening risks that asylum seekers take in their journeys to reach their preferred destination, to provide them protection closer to their country or region of origin, while at the same weakening the profit-making organised crime groups that run the smuggling routes. Moreno-Lax finds this set of explanations paradoxical when applied to search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean given that they amount to the ‘invocation of human rights [...] to curtail (migrants’) human rights, justifying interdiction (‘to save lives’), and impending access to safety in Europe’ (2018: 119 – see also Hyndman and Mountz 2008). Moreover, rather than ‘solving’ the problem, these measures may accentuate it, as Morrison and Crosland’s (2001) findings would suggest. These authors conclude that by the late 1990s the effect that EU’s increasingly restrictive legal entry options could be having was to indirectly encourage a higher number of asylum-seekers to resort to the services of traffickers and smugglers.6

Extra-territorial practices – and many other under the ‘externalisation’ umbrella – have generated criticism for their tendency to confine migrants and asylum-seekers in ‘excluded’ spaces, making their experience ‘invisible’ and raising legal and moral concerns over the protection of their human rights, as clearly illustrated by the many questions raised over of the EU-Turkey Agreement particularly in relation to the handling of asylum-seekers by the Turkish authorities (Mountz 2015: 190; Niemann and Zaun 2018: 8-9 – see also Leonard and Kaunert 2016; Geddes 2015; Humphrey 2013; Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017; Gibney 2004; Watson 2009; Feller 2006).7 There is increasingly published analysis of loss of rights experienced by refugees and asylum-seekers (Crépeau, Nakache and Atak 2007; Pocora 2016; Truong and Gasper 2011; Seidman-Zager 2010). Feller (2005, 2006), for example, observes that ‘refugees are not migrants’ and therefore need specific policies of protection which are being hindered by securitising policies, even at the expense of other mobility policies. Researchers have called for the desecuritisation of forced migration by returning it to the realm of humanitarian and human rights politics (Harada and Kimura 2011; Feller 2005; Crépeau, Nakache and Atak 2007).8

6 Seidman-Zager also challenges the idea that securitisation necessarily brings benefits but develops this argument in relation to a different aspect of the debate. He focuses on the impact of increased security measures on the human security of the hosting community, drawing attention, among other things, to the ‘psychological distress [that] may stem from living with a heightened state of alertness and harbouring a fear of the unknown due to the presence of an unpredictable threat that could strike indiscriminately’ (Hassett and Sigal 2002: 1809, cited in Seidman-Zager 2010: 19).

7 Kaunert and Leonard (2011) have argued against the claim that at least some Member States have been willing to cooperate at the EU-level on asylum and migration matters as a means to avoid liberal domestic pressures on the introduction of more restrictive measures in their own countries. They find that cooperation at the EU-level has led to more protection standards for refugees and asylum-seekers due to institutional changes that have provided more of a role to ‘refugee-friendly’ EU institutions and the increasing ‘judicialisation’ of asylum matters. Although they were writing before the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, and even if there is still room for improvement in the EU approach, their analysis remains pertinent to understand the divisions and tensions that developed between EU institutions and certain Member States over the best response to the mass influx of refugees from the Mediterranean.

8 The Copenhagen School’s agenda is to have less, rather than more, security by showing how an issue can be moved in to the security realm and the consequences of doing so (see, for example, Waever 1995). Calls to move migration away from the security domain therefore fall well in line with this agenda.
For Hammerstand (2014), among others, the securitisation of ‘vulnerable people’ (including refugees) has brought something positive; it has allowed researchers and practitioners alike to increase awareness of the different stages of the displacement cycle – which are often neglected – in order to develop better tailored policies and institutions (see also Doty 1998; Innes 2014; Gerard and Pickering 2014). However, while some academic literature uses the migration/asylum-security nexus to reiterate the need to develop a system based on the logic of ‘human rights’ (Crépeau, Nakache and Atak 2007; Pocora 2016), Hammerstadt argues that, ‘the aim of securitising forced migration as a human security or common security issues was […] less an academic endeavour than an activist one’ (2014: 274).

Stokes-Dupass (2017) addresses the issue of the acceptance of asylum-seekers by host states and societies by focusing on Danish, Norwegian and Swedish responses to the Syrian refugee crisis, and the implications for citizenship trajectories and integration. The author argues that the ‘recent legislative changes and restrictive social policies created by [the Scandinavian] nation-states have greatly restricted movement of Syrian refugees into Scandinavia’ (Stokes-Dupass 2017: 58), affecting their ability to obtain naturalisation, and leaving them effectively ‘stateless’ with little or no guaranteed protection and limited opportunities for integration.

Diez and Squire (2008) have studied developments in Germany and the United Kingdom, two EU countries with high immigration over the past decades, have developed and they argue that ‘traditions of citizenship’ such as the ius sanguinis (Germany) and ius soli (United Kingdom) – though undergoing a gradual process of convergence - have nevertheless different consequences in shaping the securitisation debate, with the former being more ‘racialised’ and consequently arguably more directly linked to the articulation of migrants as potential terrorist and ‘foreign others’ (Diez and Squire 2008: 577-578). This, however, could have important implications, for example, in the analysis of second-generation refugees, and the extent to which more liberal integration policies affect the radicalisation of these groups.

The findings of Stewart and Muley (2014) agree with Diez and Squire that the UK has experienced less of a securitisation of migration directly related to terrorism, and instead has been more affected by the ‘politics of unease’ described by Huysmans and Buonfino (2008 – see previous section). On the basis of interviews with refugees granted status before and after 2005, Stewart and Muley challenge ‘the notion that providing physical refuge and temporary refugee status will necessarily lead to long-term integration’ and instead argue that such temporary status (five years in length) generates ‘fear and uncertainty [among refugees] over their futures’ (2014: 1033) and may have prevented them from entering the workforce, leading many to seek naturalisation for the ‘wrong reasons’ (2014: 1036). The overall argument of the authors is that asylum legislation in the UK has resulted in an erosion of the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees, who are left increasingly marginalised and insecure.9

The conclusions reached by Stewart and Muley on the importance of the economic inclusion of refugees for their long-term integration is reinforced by Barslund et al’s (2016) analysis of Bosnian refugees in several European countries. They argue that granting the right to work is a key factor to favour the insertion of refugees in societies, although ‘failing to do so can still lead to good long-term labour market outcomes’ (2016: 1). While providing access to the economic market is clearly important, the authors partially admit that taking a macro-economic approach misses out both on micro-level data and non-economic factors that might have favoured integration processes, including the (absence of) security-related issues that could impact on how refugees, especially from certain nationalities or religious/ethnic groups, relate to their hosting societies. This could affect how migrants and refugees consider their membership within a community, which in turn might influence their security profile.

9 The Ethnic and Racial Studies’ Special Issue on Migration and Citizenship published in 2005 (Lewis and Neal 2005; Sales 2005; Flynn 2005) provides a good framework to contextualise the tensions surrounding asylum, labour needs and multicultural citizenship that Stewart and Muley’s (2014) research addresses.
Over the last decade radicalisation has become an overriding concern in policy, practice and academic research (Dzhekova 2016; Rahimi and Graumans 2015; Silke 2008). Between 2005 and 2006 the use of the term in English-language press more than doubled (Sedgwick 2010), and a greater number of books on radicalisation and terrorism were published in the five years following 9/11 that in the previous fifty years combined (Silke 2008).

There is consensus across the literature that ‘radicalisation’ refers to a ‘readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society’ (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010: 798) but beyond the broad definition there is no agreement on the causes and methods of radicalisation or ideal approaches to intervention, and generalising ‘theories of radicalisation’ have therefore not been developed (Dawson 2017). Instead, many scholars have focused on understanding motivations and drivers of radicalised behaviours with a strong focus on Muslims, Islam and Jihadi terrorism (Abdi 2015; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Klausen et al 2016), including attempts at defining a ‘taxonomy’ of the Jihadi terrorist (Bryson 2017; Bakker 2011; Hegghammer 2011; Sageman 2004 among others). A much smaller literature examines radicalisation among non-Islamic diasporas including Sri Lankan Tamils (Thompson and Bucerius 2017) and Albanians (Koinova, 2011).

In attempting to understand the processes of radicalisation much of the literature focuses on sociological factors including: immigration and integration (Rahimi and Graumans 2015); the youth (Abdi 2015; Bakker and Grol 2015; Dawson and Amarasingham 2017; Thompson and Bucerius 2017); the space of the camp or the border (Cruickshank 2010; Rabil 2016); homegrown terrorism, including in Europe (Crisp 2017; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Hegghammer 2013; Klausen 2016); the role of the internet in facilitating radicalisation (Dawson and Amarasingham 2017; Pearson 2016; Von Behr 2013); gendered terrorism (Pearson 2016) and refugees (Abdi 2015; Sude, Stebbins, and Weilant 2015). While these topics should move the literature beyond Jihadism, Dzhekova find that ‘the application of analytical models developed within radicalisation research remains underdeveloped beyond studies of Islamic terrorism’ (2016: 8), leading Roy (2017) to observe that we are seeing the ‘Islamisation of radicalisation’ rather than the ‘radicalisation of Islam’.

For a number of authors violence is critical to understanding the radicalisation process. Schmid, for example, considers radicalisation as ‘the process through which individuals become socialised into political violence’ (Schmid 2011: 217, cited in Dzhekova 2016: 9), thus asserting a causality between radical or extremist views and attitudes on the one hand, and political violence on the other. For Dzhekova (2016: 7) such an assumption is misleading because it is possible for groups or individuals to seek ‘far-reaching changes in society’ that ‘may not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat of or use of violence’ (Veldhuis and Staun 2009, cited in Borum 2011: 12). The holding of radical views and the pursuit of radical aims may therefore be a peaceful endeavour, however, research tends to overlook such engagement particularly when the agents of change are relatively ‘invisible’ (e.g., asylum-seekers, rejected and returned asylum-seekers, or even refugees).

Similarly, Bartlett, Birdwell and King (2010: 10 - emphasis added) suggest that ‘non-violent radicalisation’ refers to ‘the process by which individuals come to hold radical views in relation to the status quo but do not undertake, or directly aid or abet terrorist activity’. This definition is useful because it highlights the possibility of peaceful-like situations of change, but also, simultaneously expands the remit of what is considered as violent forms of radicalisation.
by including long-distance financial support to radical or terrorist groups, even if those individuals are not present during the perpetration of violent actions (as, for example, in conflict or war zones).

The following two sections analyse the rapidly growing literature on radicalisation by focusing on two main themes that are more relevant to refugee politics and political extremism: drivers of radicalisation, and identified characteristics of terrorists.

### 3.1 DRIVERS OF RADICALISATION

Several academic and policy-related studies have sought to develop ‘models’ to explain the radicalisation processes, including: the four-stage model of the terrorist mindset reported in an FBI Bulletin (Borum 2003); the ‘Staircase to Terrorism’ (Moghaddam 2005); or the NYPD’s four stage model of Islamic radicalisation (Silber and Bhatt 2007), which inspired subsequent research (Klausen et al 2016). These models are designed to have a predictive capacity providing early warnings of future radicalisation, a diagnostic function to explain the process of radicalisation, a research function to guide others working in the field, and to a lesser extent, a problem resolution function pointing to potential intervention to avoid radicalisation.

The models identify ‘triggers’ or precipitating factors for individuals becoming radicalised including social alienation, discrimination or social exclusion, racism, and poverty. Yusoufzai and Emmerling (2017), for example, argue that Western Muslims radicalise because of four factors: identity crisis; relative deprivation; personal characteristics such as narcissism; and lack of empathy. The Guardian (2017) reports, ‘ongoing research into causes of Islamic militancy has underlined the complexity of motives of recruits and volunteers, as well as differences between different conflict zones’, with ‘religious beliefs, poverty, a lack of education and work and the opportunities offered through radicalisation being among the main drivers in Nigeria to join Boko Haram. However, research by Mercy Corps (2016) notes that Boko Haram recruited young entrepreneurs in Nigeria with promises of protection and investment to boost their businesses a situation that resonates with the idea that ‘individual experiences are actually more significant than legal status in explaining why some people may become radicalised’ (Koser and Cunningham 2017: 210). The research also points to the need to treat the relationship between poverty and/or educational levels and radicalisation with great care. World Bank research, for example, has shown that Islamic State/Daesh recruits from Africa, south and east Asia and the Middle East were ‘significantly more educated than individuals from their cohort in their region of origin’ (cited in The Guardian 2017). Research conducted in 2016 by the French think-tank Centre de Prévention contre le Dérives Sectaires Liées à l’Islam (Bouzar and Rollie Flynn 2017) on, among other things, patterns of radicalisation among French teenagers found that among the 809 individuals that had been stopped when trying to leave France to join the Islamic State/Daesh there was substantial diversity in terms of socio-economic class, religious background, recent immigrant history and gender. What these examples illustrate is the need to further research non-marginalisation-related radicalisation, or a rethink of the meaning of marginalisation.

Dzhekova et al (2016: 7)’s conceptualise radicalisation as ‘a dynamic, multi-staged and multifaceted phenomenon’, demanding that research needs to address a wide range of contingent factors that might influence its development, and here the research of Rahimi and Graumans (2015), Dawson (2017), Lemon and Heathershaw (2017) and Klausen et al (2016) is particularly useful. However, Rahimi and Graumans (2015: 28) also caution that ‘regardless of the diversity of causes, academic literature as well as governmental strategies have shown a consistent interest in the basic formula that a lack of cultural integration equals an increased threat of radicalisation’. While integration shows the relevance of radicalisation to migration and asylum, it is important not to assume that integration is limited to ‘foreigners’. On the contrary, several studies have emphasised the risks of so called homegrown terrorism, both of foreign and non-foreign origins (Klausen et al 2016; Lia and Nesser 2016; Silber and Bhatt 2007; Yusoufzai and Emmerling 2017). Dawson (2017: 6) suggests that because data of Jihadis in their region of origin’ (cited in The Guardian 2017). Research conducted in 2016 by the French think-tank Centre de Prévention contre le Dérives Sectaires Liées à l’Islam (Bouzar and Rollie Flynn 2017) on, among other things, patterns of radicalisation among French teenagers found that among the 809 individuals that had been stopped when trying to leave France to join the Islamic State/Daesh there was substantial diversity in terms of socio-economic class, religious background, recent immigrant history and gender. What these examples illustrate is the need to further research non-marginalisation-related radicalisation, or a rethink of the meaning of marginalisation.

The inclination to equate lack of cultural integration with an increased threat of radicalisation has led, Rahimi and Graumans (2015) argue, to ineffective or damaging interventions that may actually increase rather than reduce the incidence of radicalisation.
Gould and Klor, for example, find that the backlash against Muslims groups in the US following 9/11 – measured by reported incidents of hate crime - slowed down their assimilation, as revealed in statistics suggesting higher rates of intra-marriages and fertility, lower rates of female labour force participation and English proficiency. The authors conclude that ‘terror attacks against Western targets may have a long-term political and socio-economic impact, by creating a more ethnically cohesive Muslim community in this generation and also the next’ (Gould and Klor 2016: 2066). In the UK a number of academics have similarly argued that the government’s PREVENT Strategy and its implementation has maintained a sole focus on British Muslims, undermining community cohesion and building resentment towards the government with accusations both of surveillance and of engineering ‘value changes’ within Muslim communities (Awan 2012; Thomas 2010).

Gould and Klor further suggest that ‘terror groups may also intentionally induce a backlash on persons of a similar ethnic origin in the targeted country, in order to decrease their rate of assimilation’ (2016: 2066). The authors claim this is an important contribution to the literature which has so far concentrated on the backlash against the country or territory where terror groups reside following an act of violence. For the authors of this CREST project what is interesting about Gould and Klor’s finding is that it signals the importance of diaspora groups in processes of radicalisation.

Groups and networks are considered vital in processes towards or away from radicalisation, both in everyday interactions as on the internet (Abdi 2015; Dawson 2017; Silke 2008; Von Behr et al 2013). Bakker (2006), for example, found in an analysis of 242 Jihadis that individuals tended to become radicalised through networks of friends or relatives, and Van Engeland (2016) studies the active mediating role that Muslim communities can play in diffusing tensions and violence. Thompson and Bucerius (2017) present key insights on the role of diasporas in perpetrating or halting radicalisation. On the basis of 168 in-depth interviews with youth and young adults in Toronto belonging to the Tamil and Somali diasporas, the research suggests that the two groups provide very different case studies to ‘examine the varying ways that existing sentiment pools can operate to mobilise broad levels of support for, or vilification of, the framing strategies of terrorist entities and their supporters’ (Thompson and Bucerius 2017: 12 - emphasis added). Rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach, Thompson and Bucerius argue that ‘framing’ and ‘group sentiments’ play a key role in influencing whether young people may be vulnerable to radicalisation. For example, the positive portrayal of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the diaspora as ‘the organisation that takes the plight of the Tamil people’ (2017: 8) strongly influenced the perceptions of the group and the political cause of separatism held by Tamil-Canadians. The fact that Canada labelled the LTTE as a terrorist organisation negatively affected the perception that these interviewees had of their (host) country.

In opposition, the negative portrayal of Al Shabaab by the Somali diaspora was found to be a significant factor in steering young Somali Canadians away from extremist narratives and reduced their vulnerability to recruitment. This research shows that while ‘hypermarginalisation’ certainly plays an important role in rendering certain communities more vulnerable to radicalisation, those same communities can also play an active and key role in triggering action, both in positive and negative terms. The relationship between diasporas and processes of radicalisation is a theme that could provide new insights into the ‘peace-wrecking/peace-building’ debate on diasporas but that by and large has so far not been looked at by the Diaspora Studies literature.

Abdi (2015)’s research into Somali groups in the United States finds that race, (lack of) income and religion have played key roles both in processes of ‘othering’ and in contributing to the radicalisation of Somali refugees, particularly the youth. Abdi’s findings were similar to those of Thompson and Bucerius (2017) noting that there has been a concerted effort by the Somali diaspora to fight back ‘hyperbolisations’ on the (potential) scale of Somali youth radicalised in Minnesota. However, at the same time, he states that many young men in the Somali community face the ‘potential double burden of the lure of gangs and extremist groups as well as contact with institution and policies that discriminate on the bases of race, religion and class’, dangers that are further accentuated by ‘zealous sensationalist local, national and global media’ (2015: 575).

Interestingly, Abdi observes that government support through refugee schemes does not necessarily help refugees in better integrating into society, and rather they entail further stigma and stereotyping as ‘newcomers become immersed in America’s structural racism’ (2015: 570). While this recalls the discussion in Thematic Report Two on policies of integration, it remains unclear whether the condition of refugees
holding a special socio-political ‘baggage’ affects radicalisation in any specific way.

In relation to the role of religion in processes of radicalisation, three ‘clusters’ can be identified in the literature. While the impact of religion and ideology as factors contributing to radicalisation is broadly accepted, the literature is increasingly dominated by sociological analysis focusing on material conditions and issues related to personal identity, social context and social networks as key predispositions to radicalisation (Silke 2008; McCauley and Moskalenko 2008; Borum 2003). Silke (2008: 111), for example, argues that ‘in order to understand the mind-set of Islamist terrorism, one needs to move beyond the limits of religious doctrine’,centring instead on factors such as group loyalties, marginalisation and discrimination. Others (Coolsaet 2016; Sageman 2004) contend that while ideology may be relevant, religion per se is not. Finally, a third branch suggests that religion and ideology are both key factors in driving radicalisation (Kepel 2017), with Orsini (2012) providing an interesting account on the impact that ideology has on people who are seemingly not marginalised in society to join a left-wing terrorist organisation.

The Internet, and especially social media, is seen as a crucial facilitator in creating networks and enabling engagement in recruitment processes, however, research is limited on the ‘demand-side’ that would explain why and how individuals reach out to such networks through digital communication (Von Behr et al 2013). While certainly the use of the internet for radicalisation purposes has increased, most notably through the propaganda efforts of the Islamic State/Daesh, Stevens and Neumann warn against policies that overstate its importance; ‘radicalisation is largely a real-world phenomenon that cannot be dealt with simply by “pulling the plug”’ (2009: 1).

A RAND Corporation report on refugee radicalisation considers how radicalisation happens rather than why individuals become militants of groups such as Islamic State/Daesh (Sude, Stebbins and Weilant 2015 – emphasis in the original). The research considers the geographic location of refugees, the pre-existence of militant groups in refugee areas and the policies and actions of host countries and the international community (Sude, Stebbins and Weilant 2015: 1, 3). In this way the research begins to seek structural explanations for refugee engagement in extremist politics that originate in the forced migration and displacement cycle and in the conditions of asylum seeking in Western states. Dawson (2017) calls for a similar approach to shift the onus of analysis from the ‘why’ to the ‘how’, suggesting the need to consider ‘situations’, ‘contexts’ and ‘life experiences’.

To this end, research has focused on the ‘camp’ as a space of exception (Agamben 1998) and one where refugees become political actors, recalling Rygel’s (2011) discussion of the camp as a political space, whereby subjectivities and boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are negotiated and exercised, and where radicalisation processes might emerge in response to those processes. Milton, Spencer and Findley (2013: 637) find that that the conditions of the camp and the ways in which host states treat refugees ‘can lead to transnational terrorism as some smaller subset of the refugee population responds against the host state’.

Martin-Rayo (2011) highlights conditions within camps that might facilitate radicalisation processes, such as poor education, lack of freedom of movement and work; factors that have also been considered by several policy papers that refer to refugee camps as fertile grounds for recruitment and radicalisation (Koser and Cunningham 2017; Sude, Stebbins and Weilant 2015). Sude, Stebbins and Weilant (2015) imply that lessening the risk of radicalisation goes beyond providing immediate humanitarian assistance, and rather requires a multi-level and long-term approach that provides refugees with viable choices for the future. As Koser and Cunningham (2017) write in the International Organization for Migration’s 2017 World Migration Report, providing psychological and security needs is particularly important because refugees might experience abuse or powerlessness in their place of refuge, and militant groups might exploit the situation to radicalise vulnerable groups (especially youth) ‘with narratives of empowerment through violence’ (2017: 215). These ideas strongly resonate with Rygel’s (2011) understanding of subjectivities, and the extent to which a negative perception of one’s own subjectivity within a camp (due to abuse, humiliation or powerlessness) could give way to radicalising processes.

The literature suggests that radicalisation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and that further research is needed to address the wide range of factors that might influence its development. While the focus on the ‘lack of integration’ sheds some light on refugee-specific situations, and despite Dawson’s (2017) argument that radicalisation is directly related to movement (and hence, displacement), existing literature does not adequately identify any relevant difference between
Lessons from the Radicalisation Literature

From the Diasporisation to the Transnationalisation of Exile Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka, 1983-2016

‘immigrants’ at large and refugee-specific contexts. This is particularly interesting considering that most post-2001 literature on radicalisation and terrorism focuses on Muslims and ‘immigrant backgrounds’ as key elements of the discussion. The next section will observe whether this is also reflected in the ‘characteristics’ of terrorists.

3.2 THE ‘TAXONOMY’ OF TERRORISTS

Literature on the drivers of radicalisation and characteristics of terrorists overlap, as both often consider personal characteristics such as loneliness, marginalisation caused by immigrant or cultural background, or poverty as important factors. Several authors (Bryson 2017; Bakker 2006, 2011; Hegghammer 2011; Sageman 2004) have attempted to create a ‘taxonomy’ of Islamic terrorists, often by analysing case studies of past terrorist attacks in search of common traits among the perpetrators. While it is often agreed that the most recent attacks have been carried out by young males from immigrant backgrounds, other factors such as socio-economic circumstances, religion or levels of marginalisation vary considerably, reflecting the discussions earlier in the report.

Koser and Cunningham observe that a sizeable proportion of foreign terrorist fighters from Europe (FTFs - those who travel abroad to engage in direct conflict) are often European citizens and descendants of migrants, which might flag that ‘a migrant background may be symptomatic of a long-term failure of integration, resulting in social exclusion’ (2017: 210). Crone (2017) also highlight the European background – either as citizens or residents – of those engaged in terrorist action in European soil within the last decade. However, Klausen (2016: 79) suggest that ‘many Muslim terrorists are converts to Islam rather than demographically “Muslims”’, while Lia and Nesser’s (2016: 121) analysis of the evolution of terrorist networks in Norway describes the current scenario as consisting of ‘Norwegian speaking youth of multiple ethnic origins, including a number of Norwegian converts’.

Bryson (2017: 35) when seeking to identify relevant biographical characteristics among terrorists in the UK does not consider asylum or refugee status. Bakker (2011) identifies the significance of being a marginalised immigrant but he does not consider refugeehood as a potential defining characteristic of radicalised individuals. On the other hand, as discussed previously, authors such as Milton, Spencer and Findley (2013) have considered potential links between the conditions of displacement and radicalisation, for example, in relation to periods spent in camps and the treatment received by host states, including during the asylum process, and the contribution that refugee flows can make to transnational terrorism. Ellis (2015: 858) suggests that ‘greater exposure to personal trauma’ among Somali refugees ‘was associated with greater openness to illegal and violent activism’. While the Somali community in the United States was generally open to legal non-violent activism, which recalls the initial discussion on radicalisation as not necessarily being violent, the study by Ellis supports the understanding that refugees’ experiences during their displacement cycle indeed affects the extent to which radicalisation processes develop. In general, however, the relevance of a refugee or asylum background to the risk of radicalisation and the potential to carry out acts of terrorism in countries of asylum or naturalisation, are not widely discussed in the literature.

3.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

It is a finding of this review and the CREST research project for which the three thematic reports have been prepared - and given the reported high incidence of asylum seekers, failed asylum seekers, first and second generation refugees’ involvement in acts of terrorism in Europe since 2015 (see Annex A) - that further research is required in to the causal relationship, if any, between an individual’s asylum and refugee profile and experience, and the appeal of violent and extremist narratives, as well as the risk of radicalisation by terrorist groups.

As discussed above, authors including Sude, Stebbins and Weilant (2015), Dawson (2017), Rabil (2016) and

10 Authors like Pearson (2016) bring to our attention the fact that women’s radicalisation and involvement in terrorist activities is understudied because of the lack of gendered approaches within the literature.
Rygiel’s (2011), have drawn attention to the contextual risks associated with conflict-induced displacement and onward migration. Rabil (2016) conducted research among Syrian refugees in camps in Lebanon and noted that as a reaction against their humility and helplessness, a significant number of young Syrians, previously apolitical, were attracted to Salafism and transnational jihadism with an unknown number joining al-qaeda, Islamic State/Daesh and al-Nusrah.

A recent UNHCR (2017a) report has shed further light on the conditions of life for Syrian refugees, and research conducted by McDowell, lead researcher for the CREST project for which this review was prepared, based on interviews with resettled Syrian refugees in the UK about their lives in Lebanon, exposed indebtedness, exploitative working conditions, a lack of education opportunities, and extremely poor housing conditions (UNHCR 2017b). Extremist groups, often operating in collaboration with people traffickers and smugglers, are able to exploit such severe vulnerabilities with, for example, offers of financial assistance to secure passage out of the region that tie refugees in to dependent relationships that continue once settlement in Europe has been achieved. Further research is necessary to better understand the nature of these relationships, operational aspects of cross-border movements and onward asylum journeys, and their human consequences.

As discussed previously, Dawson (2017: 6), among others, has suggested that given the profile of known terrorist in Western states ‘there is a link between homegrown terrorism and the unprecedented movement of peoples around the world [and] the ability of immigrants to stay in regular contact with people and issues in their homeland’. The literature, however, does not identify the processes of migration at an individual or family level that may shape an individual’s political development. This project recommends that additional research is undertaken based on the following observations:

- For a small minority of migrants who seek asylum, the life stage at which someone migrates is likely to be a factor in their future political development. Recent convictions for terrorist offences in Europe suggest that the extremist population includes people who migrated as children, with their families, and people who migrated as teenagers or young adults - often alone. This raises important questions about the asylum and migration experience for young people, their specific vulnerabilities and exposure to extremist narratives and controlling influences in the country of origin as well as in countries of asylum.

- The extremist population includes people whose relatives (either with them or ‘back home’) were involved in violent or nonviolent politics; some were or may have been extremists when they arrived. A research task, as Dawson (2017) notes, is to understand the form and content of ongoing politicisation in migration and settlement including through social media and how the experience of asylum-seeking and integration influence such politicisation.

- Whilst the evidence that can be derived through media and court reports is quite sparse, it does suggest that the extremist population includes individuals who apparently integrated well into mainstream society, people who settled well but in to insular groups (co-ethnic /co-religion, closed to outsiders), and also people who never seemed to settle anywhere (geographically, through employment, or via friendship circles). As discussed elsewhere in this report, in the absence of systematic longitudinal studies the evidence base on the integration trajectories of asylum seekers and resettled refugees in Western countries is weak. The conceptual and theoretical literature on refugee integration is limited to models that fail to address integration risks or consider the significance of political engagement as a factor in integration. Further research is required in to the process of asylum seeking and the struggles of settlement, with a focus on forms of integration through which emerge sub-cultures of mainly
Lessons from the Radicalisation Literature

From the Diasporisation to the Transnationalisation of Exile Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka, 1983-2016

young men who are likely to be disaffected with the state and their host society. A disaffection that stems in part from the experience of claiming asylum, a long drawn out legal process with uncertain outcomes, financial insecurity, working illegally, and living in poor conditions described by a number of NGOs as a condition of destitution, and according to some commentators more likely to suffer from discrimination and racism (see Oxfam 2011). Sub-cultures are likely to be marked by the frequent isolation of individuals, or by the seeking of membership of closed groups of co-nationals or co-religionists.

A particularly under-researched topic of asylum integration relates to the experiences of asylum seekers whose applications have been turned down but who remain in their country of asylum evading the attention of the authorities, or are unreturnable (on the latter category see, for example, Refugee Law Initiative and Centre for International Criminal Justice 2016). A minority in this population could become part of criminal groups and gang membership that may later evolve into or engage in activities that intersect with extremist networks.
CONCLUSION

This review was undertaken in the course of a CREST-funded research project that provides – among other things - a comprehensive picture of the state of knowledge on political action among diasporas, refugee and asylum populations, with a particular interest in identifying factors that shape and influence processes of radicalisation and moderation among these communities. The current paper – Thematic Report Three – addresses the growing identification in popular and policy discourses of refugees and asylum-seekers with threats to international and national security, via the alleged link to terrorist and other criminal acts, and to societal security, via concerns over the economic burden and issues of identity, belonging and integration. The literature analysed in this review – from the fields of Security Studies and Radicalisation, and to a lesser extent, Diaspora Studies – provide the intellectual basis to argue that without more conceptual and theoretical research, and additional large-set but also micro-level data, multifaceted complex phenomena at stake in the migration/asylum-security nexus (such as radicalisation, refugeehood, displacement) cannot be reduced to the often-taken-for granted ‘lack of integration’ or ‘religion-driven’ arguments.

The theoretical approaches reviewed in this report are, however, not without limitations when applied to debates on asylum, security and extremism. First, the ‘asylum-security nexus’ is more than often conflated with the ‘migration-security nexus’. While there have been some cases of specific refugee-related issues being analysed under the asylum-security nexus framework (Avdan 2014), the literature tends to overlook the specific experiences of refugees and asylum-seekers, and these are often ‘lost’ in analyses that generalise terminologies and empirical researches under the ‘migration’ term. There are other key terms that have equally not received sufficient attention, such as the tendency – less so in the radicalisation literature compared with Security Studies – to generalise various situations under umbrella terms such as ‘Muslims’ or ‘foreigners’, limiting the depth of the analysis.

A second matter that needs to be considered is that both the Security Studies and Radicalisation literatures are, to different degrees, policy-oriented when applied to migration. The literature on radicalisation is heavily influenced by policy papers and analyses aimed at finding ‘solutions’ to the radicalisation problem. Traditional security approaches and critical security studies, on the contrary, are strongly oriented towards understanding how policy changes because of the migration/asylum-nexus. While writings on human security and radicalisation do take into consideration individual, people-oriented dynamics, they are nonetheless limited compared to structure- and policy-change analyses. This signifies a failure to consider the agency of migrants and refugees alike in ‘resisting’ or ‘perpetrating’ the security nexus, which on the contrary could be a more beneficial way for policy-makers seeking solutions to various security-related issues.

Finally, the ‘forced migration and displacement cycle’ is rarely (Koser and Cunningham 2017 being an exception) acknowledged as a useful analytical tool, leading to two consequences. While on the one hand the academic discussion on the migration/asylum-security nexus remains often conceptual, on the other it also means that most attention is placed to the space that it is most salient in political terms, which is the border. In addition, failing to address the ‘forced migration and displacement cycle’ as an analytical tool also reflects a lack of structure within the literature with many topics and areas either being over studied (e.g., border; Muslim immigration) or understudied (e.g., refugees; returned asylum-seekers).

This review highlights the continuous salience of migration and asylum in relation to security, the need to focus on refugees and asylum-seekers as active political actors, and the structural vulnerabilities in the forced migration and displacement cycle as an important factor influencing political action. Rather than talking about refugees and asylum-seekers as the threat, the focus should be on the conditions of displacement and forced migration that open the door to exploitation and increases the probability that some individuals will give their support to radical/extreme forms of politics and may shift to acts of terror.


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Wike, R., Stokes, B. and Simmons, K. (2016) Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean


## ANNEX A.

Media and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) Reports of Politically Inspired Attacks in Europe since 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>COUNTRY IN EUROPE</th>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>DETAILS OF TERRORIST INCIDENT/CONVICTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2018</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>BBC RTE</td>
<td>Police arrested an 18-year-old Egyptian man carrying at least two knives, following the death of a 24-year-old man from Japan after being stabbed in Dundalk, County Louth, and two others were injured following subsequent attacks. Initial investigations indicate that he sought asylum in the UK but entered Ireland following the refusal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 January</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>The Local.de</td>
<td>A 23-year-old Syrian refugee, identified as A Al-H, attacked several people with a knife ‘for no apparent reason’ at the Bayerischer Platz station in southwestern Berlin on New Year’s Eve, according to a police report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2017</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 December</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>FS, 22, from Sheffield, and ASS, 31, from Chesterfield, both Iraqi Kurds have been charged with engaging in the preparation of an act of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>The Times (Roger Boyes)</td>
<td>Two recently arrived Syrian refugees and a Palestinian were charged with molotov cocktail attacks at a Malmo synagogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 December</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>MA who arrived as a child refugee in the UK from Libya was found guilty of travelling to join so-called Islamic State/Daesh in Syria. MA told jurors he got by in Britain by stealing and selling cannabis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 December</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>A married couple have been jailed for planning a terror attack in Birmingham. UM, 21, and his wife MT, 22, were sentenced to 16 years and 10 years respectively. Woolwich Crown Court heard the couple, from Birmingham, had been planning a knife attack and had looked at targets, including the city’s central synagogue. MT’s sister, Z, was jailed for 30 months for sharing propaganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November/20 December</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Met Police</td>
<td>Two men arrested by counter-terrorism police in London and Birmingham were charged with plotting attacks. NZR, 20, a ‘Bangladeshi-Britain’ from north London, and MAI, 21, from south-east Birmingham, were detained on 28 November.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>MHHM, 36, an Eritrean national seeking asylum in the UK, was arrested in December 2016 and RE-H, 33, shared videos of Islamic State/Daesh jihadists beheading prisoners and recruiting children to the terror organisation. They were convicted of preparing terrorist acts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>Two people were killed by a knife-wielding assailant at Saint-Charles Station in Marseille. The assailant was shot dead by soldiers stationed nearby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 September</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td><em>Daily Mirror</em></td>
<td>HY arrived in the UK from Afghanistan in 2010 at the age of 14. His asylum application was rejected in September 2015. He was sentenced to six and-a-half years at Kingston Crown Court after being convicted of the collection of information which may be useful to someone who commits or prepares acts of terrorism, encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 September</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td><em>Manchester Evening News</em></td>
<td>Father-of-three SHS aged 35, who was granted asylum in 2014 pleaded guilty to one count of encouraging an act of terrorism and one count of disseminating terrorist material. He claimed he supported the terrorist organisation because they attacked another rebel group which murdered his father and brother-in-law in Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td><em>BBC</em> <em>Daily Telegraph</em></td>
<td>30 people were injured following an explosion on a tube train in London. The device is thought to have malfunctioned and appeared not to have fully exploded. The perpetrator(s) are thought to have left the train before the device went off. 18-year-old Ahmed Hassan, an Iraqi refugee/asylum seeker who moved to the UK at the age of 15 has been charged with attempted murder in connection with the Parsons Green terror attack, and a second charge under the Explosive Substances Act. The teenager is thought to have arrived in Britain three-years ago as an orphan refugee, who had travelled across Europe to reach the so-called Jungle camp at Calais. As an unaccompanied child he was allowed entry to the UK and after being processed through a migrant centre in Kent, was found a home with a foster family in Sunbury on Thames.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 – 18 August</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td><em>BBC</em></td>
<td>At least 13 people killed and about 100 injured on 17 August when a van drove through a crowd of people in a popular tourist district in Barcelona, Spain. Two suspects were arrested and another shot dead. Islamic State/Daesh issued a statement claiming responsibility. On August 18th, in Cambrils, a coastal city around 100 kilometers from Barcelona, five attackers drove an Audi A3 into several pedestrians, killing one. Police shot dead three of the attackers, OH, HA and MO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 August</td>
<td>France</td>
<td><em>BBC</em></td>
<td>HB, a 36-year-old Algerian rammed a BMW car into a group of soldiers in a Parisian suburb, injuring six.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>France</td>
<td><em>Reuters</em></td>
<td>A young man tried to force his way into the Eiffel Tower with a knife, shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ (God is Greatest). A source said he told investigators he wanted to kill a soldier. The assailant is believed to be a French national born in Mauritania in 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td><em>BBC</em></td>
<td>Man shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ stabbed to death one person and wounded six others in a supermarket in Hamburg. The attacker, born in the UAE, was overpowered by passers-by and arrested. Olaf Scholz, the mayor of Hamburg, said the attack had been motivated by ‘hate’ and added that the suspected attacker was a failed asylum seeker whose deportation had been blocked because he lacked identity papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>France</td>
<td><em>Reuters</em></td>
<td>French police shot a man who attacked an officer with a hammer outside the Notre-Dame cathedral in Paris. According to the French Interior Minister, the assailant carried kitchen knives and the identity card of an Algerian student.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>3 June</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>Sky</td>
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<td>22 May</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>June</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BBC</td>
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<td>22 May</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>7 April</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>BBC</td>
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<td>April</td>
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<td>April</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BBC</td>
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<td>22 March</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Reuters</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 March</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>3 February</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 February</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service BBC</td>
<td>Five men were sentenced for making speeches encouraging support for Islamic State/Daesh. MA, YB and RK, all from Luton, gave speeches in the town and were part of the local branch of the proscribed extremist group Al-Muhajiroun. ZR, from Luton, and MSC, from Maidenhead, were convicted of similar offences after a retrial in January 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 February</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service BBC</td>
<td>RC, 28, who planned to travel to the Philippines to fight with Abu Sayyaf, a banned terrorist group, was found guilty of preparation of acts of terrorism and convicted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>AMH, 27, and SHAZ, both Kurdish Iraqi refugees who tried to return to his home country and join Islamic State/Daesh, were jailed for seven years in the UK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 December</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>AA, a Tunisian ‘failed asylum seeker’ drove a lorry into a crowded Christmas market in central Berlin, killing 12 people and injuring 48. German Chancellor said the authorities were assuming it was a terrorist attack.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 December</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service BBC</td>
<td>ZB, 26, and MAA, 27, were jailed on that day at Kingston Crown Court for preparation of acts of terrorism. MAA withdrew over £3,000 and gave the money to MA, also known as the ‘man in the hat’, a suspect linked to the Brussels terror attack in March 2016.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 September</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service BBC</td>
<td>AC and MBR (both UK nationals) were each sentenced to a total of five years and six months imprisonment for encouraging support for Isalmic State/Daesh in a series of videos they broadcasted online.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 July</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>henryjacksonsociety.org</td>
<td>AK and AP killed a priest with a blade and seriously wounded another hostage in a church in northern France before being shot dead by French police. French President Francois Hollande said the two hostage-takers had pledged allegiance to Islamic State/Daesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>MD, a Syrian national, wounded 15 people when he blew himself up outside a music festival in Ainsbach in southern Germany. Islamic State/Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack. The 27-year-old arrived in Germany two years earlier and claimed asylum. He had been in trouble with the police repeatedly for drug-taking and other offences and had faced deportation to Bulgaria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>MR, a 17-year-old Afghan refugee, wielding an axe and a knife, attacked passengers on a train in southern Germany, severely wounding four, before being shot dead by police. Islamic State/Daesh claimed responsibility for the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>ML-B drove a heavy truck into a crowd celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, killing 86 people and injuring scores more in an attack claimed by Islamic State/Daesh. The attacker is a Tunisian-born Frenchman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>LA, a Frenchman of Moroccan origin, stabbed a police commander to death outside his home in a Paris suburb and killed his partner, who also worked for the police. The attacker told police negotiators during a siege that he was answering an appeal by Islamic State/Daesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>AA, 23, who moved to the UK with his family as refugees in 1993, was convicted of terror offences after helping a RAF veteran who converted to Islam try to join jihadis in Syria.</td>
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<td>22 April</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
<td>Tarik Hassane, aged 22, and Suhaib Majeed, 21, were found guilty of conspiracy to murder and preparation of terrorist acts. Nyall Hamlett, aged 25, and Nathaniel Cuffy, aged 26, were found guilty of possessing or supplying the firearm and ammunition that was to be used in the terror plot. Nathaniel Cuffy also pleaded guilty to possessing other firearms that were recovered from an address linked to him. Hassane and Majeed were given life sentences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
<td>Junead Khan, aged 25, and Shazib Khan, aged 23, were found guilty of planning to travel to Syria to join Islamic State/Daesh and attempt to join a group of people fighting against Islamic State/Daesh in Syria. They were also found guilty of preparing an act or acts of terrorism within the UK. Junead Khan was given a life sentence and Shazib, eight years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 March</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>Khalid el-Bakraoui, Khalid el-Bakraoui, and Jihadi John, three Islamic State/Daesh suicide bombers, all Belgian nationals, blew themselves up at the Brussels airport and in a metro train in the Belgian capital, killing 32 people. Police found links with the November attacks in Paris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 January</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>TB, born in Tunisia, was shot dead by police as he wielded a knife and attempted to stab people outside a Paris metro station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 December</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
<td>Mohammed Rehman, 25, and Sana Ahmed Khan, 24, were found guilty of plotting to carry out a major terrorist attack at Westfield shopping centre in London or within the London underground. Both were given life sentences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Mustafa Abdullah was convicted of 13 terrorism-related offences after terror training videos were found in his possession when he returned to the UK after six months in Syria. He was sentenced to four and a half years imprisonment. Abdullah told police at the airport that he was born in the UK of Christian Jamaican parentage but converted to Islam around 2000 and had several wives under Islamic law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>MM, Somali born, attacked several people at a London underground station and attempted to cut one victim's throat. He received a life prison sentence for the attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 November</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
<td>Yahya Rashid (family originally from Somalia) was convicted of two counts of preparing to commit acts of terrorism following a trial at Woolwich Crown Court. He was charged with the intention of travelling to Syria in order to join Islamic State/Daesh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 November</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>Paris was rocked by multiple, near simultaneous, gun-and-bomb attacks on entertainment sites around the city, in which 130 people die and 368 were wounded. Islamic State/Daesh claimed responsibility.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 October</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
<td>Abderrahman Eshati, a Libyan national aged 29, was sentenced for terror-related and immigration offences. Eshati received a six-year prison sentence. Documents, including invoices for ammunition worth $28.5 million and falsified documents which had been provided to an immigration tribunal, were found on his phone when he was arrested in Dover. Eshati claimed to have entered the UK on a visa in 2009 and then to have sought asylum in the UK.</td>
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<td>Summary</td>
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<td>21 October</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service BBC</td>
<td>Tuin Shahensha, 27, and Mustakim Janam, 23, both British citizens, were found guilty of helping in the preparation of acts of terrorism. They helped a number of men travel to Syria and were preparing themselves to travel to Syria to commit terrorist acts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 October</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service</td>
<td>A 15 year-old boy (anonymous due to his age, nationality not divulged) was sentenced to detention for life for his part in planning to attack ANZAC Day parade in Australia. He had exchanged over 3000 email messages with fellow plotter in Australia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Crown Prosecution Service BBC</td>
<td>Mohammed Nahin Ahmed (born in Bangladesh and moved to UK as a child) and Yusuf Zubair Sarwar (born in UK of Pakistani descent) were convicted of terrorist offences and jailed for 12 years each having been arrested on return from a 8 month visit to Syria where they had joined terrorist groups in Aleppo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>The Guardian BBC</td>
<td>MAA was found guilty of attempting to acquire Ricin from a black market website. He was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>YS killed his boss then attempted to blow up a US owned chemical factory in Lyon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 April</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>SAG, 24, of Algerian descent murdered a young French woman and had planned to attack churches but shot himself and was arrested by police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>OAHEI-H, a 22-year-old man, born in Denmark, to Jordanian-Palestinian parents, was the perpetrator of three separate shootings that occurred in Copenhagen, Denmark. In total, two victims and El-Hussein were killed, while five police officers were wounded.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 February</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>MC attacked three soldiers with a knife in Nice. He was arrested by police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 January</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>AC, killed a policewoman on 8 January and took hostages at a supermarket on 9 January, killing four before police shot him dead.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 January</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>SK and CK, two Islamist militants, broke into an editorial meeting of the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo on January 7 and raked it with bullets, killing 12. The attacks prompted a worldwide solidarity movement with the slogan ‘Je Suis Charlie’.</td>
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</table>
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