



# THE CREST CATALOGUE

## MARCH 2019



CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND  
EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS

[www.crestresearch.ac.uk](http://www.crestresearch.ac.uk)



# CREST CATALOGUE

The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) is a national hub for understanding, countering and mitigating security threats.

This catalogue provides an overview of the published outputs from CREST's original research and research syntheses from October 2015 to March 2019. It ranges from short 'how-to' guides to in-depth reports; conference posters to introductory mind-maps; and journal articles to our quarterly magazine, *CREST Security Review*.

All these resources are available from our website and each entry is hyperlinked and includes a reference number to help you find and download the resource. However, we are publishing new resources all the time, so make sure you check the Read More section to learn how you can keep up-to-date with our work.

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## ABOUT CREST

CREST brings together the UK's foremost expertise in understanding the psychological and social drivers of the threat, the skills and technologies that enable its effective investigation, and the protective security measures that help counter the threat in the first place.

With the majority of its funding from the UK's security and intelligence agencies, it carries out its work within a context of significant stakeholder and international researcher engagement. This funding is administered by the Economic and Social Research Council, guaranteeing the academic rigour and independence of CREST's research.

CREST directly funds the work of over a hundred researchers, including doctoral students. It also brings together leading researchers from around the world who are working, directly or indirectly, on research that helps us understand, mitigate and counter security threats. This work is featured in our quarterly magazine, *CREST Security Review*. Through highlighting this work, regardless of funding source, CREST helps build the capacity of academic research in this area, whilst promoting and improving academic-practitioner dialogue and exchange.

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## READ MORE

For more information about CREST, including blogs, videos and other resources, visit our website:  
[www.crestresearch.ac.uk](http://www.crestresearch.ac.uk).

You can also keep up-to-date with our resources as and when we publish them by signing up to our newsletter at [www.crestresearch.ac.uk/contact/newsletter](http://www.crestresearch.ac.uk/contact/newsletter) and by following us on social media.



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# UNDERSTANDING WHO & WHY



## UNDERSTANDING WHO AND WHY

Who is involved in the transmission of violent ideologies? Why do people engage and disengage from violent extremism? How do groups innovate or restrain their violent actions?

These projects seek to understand the actors, their beliefs, values and motivations, as well as how they communicate their ideas to internal and external audiences.

## PROJECTS

### CORE PROJECTS

- Analysing the emotional appeal of extremist narratives
- Conspiracy theories and the far right
- Gender and violent extremism
- Grassroots counter messaging
- How do extremist groups and movements deploy symbols and communicate messages?
- Innovation and creativity in clandestine networks
- Kin and peer contexts, ideological transmission and the move to extremist involvement
- Refugees, social identity and resilience
- Risk assessment including criminogenic and psychological pathways to extremism
- The transmission of ideology.

### COMMISSIONED PROJECTS

- Conspiracy theories, their adoption, communication and risks
- Learning and unlearning terrorism in Northern Ireland
- Sikh radicalisation in Britain
- Soft facts and digital behavioural influencing
- Sri Lanka: When extremism gives way to moderate politics
- The internal brakes on violent escalation.



# GUIDES



## SUNNI & SHI'A ISLAM: DIFFERENCES & RELATIONSHIPS

16-005-01


A guide setting out the fundamental differences and similarities between Sunni and Shi'a Islam. Useful to help understand Islam as well as the tensions between these communities. Based on work by CREST researcher Professor Kim Knott.



## ISLAM: THE FIVE PILLARS

16-007-01


Knowing something about the five pillars and their significance for Muslims isn't just important to correct misunderstandings about what Muslims believe, it is also important in the work environment and for good working relations. Based on work by CREST researcher Professor Kim Knott this guide explains the five pillars and what they entail.



## CREST PRIMER: COUNTER JIHAD MOVEMENT

16-008-01

The Counter Jihad Movement is a loose international network with a shared ideology that sees 'Islam' and 'the West' as being at war. Based on work by CREST researcher Dr Benjamin Lee, this guide gives an overview on the counter jihad ideology, their security implications, as well as the relationships between the different counter jihad groups.



## GLOSSARY: ISLAMIC EXTREMIST MATERIAL

16-017-02

There are many concepts and phrases which are common to all Muslims, but which have a particular meaning for Islamic extremists. This glossary highlights the extremist interpretations of these, and helps people understand what is meant if they come across some of these phrases.



# GUIDES



## ISLAM: CONVERSION

16-024-01


Conversion to Islam is the process whereby a non-Muslim takes on a new religious identity, adopts new beliefs and practices, learns to live as a Muslim and gradually becomes accepted as one by others. This is a guide to the process of converting to Islam, why some people choose to convert, what they experience – good and bad – and whether they are likely to become extremists.



## UNDERSTANDING THE FAR-RIGHT LANDSCAPE

17-001-01

Although the vast majority of far-right activists are non-violent, far-right activism has security implications in the UK and globally. Dr Benjamin Lee gives an introduction to the far-right in the UK, including an analysis of some of the groups and networks and the main security threats they present.



## COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

17-008-01

This guide details what CVE is, explores the broad landscape of CVE initiatives, what the CVE programmes target, the range of methods used, who delivers the different intervention programmes, and an overview of what we know from the evidence so far about how effective they are.



## SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: NARRATIVES AND ISSUES

18-030-01

This guide by Dr Jasjit Singh explores Sikh activism in the UK. It gives an overview of the political, religious and social/cultural narratives which emerged from a series of interviews and a literature review as part of his CREST funded research project on 'Sikh radicalisation in Britain'.




# GUIDES



## BRITISH MUSLIMS: A HISTORY

18-010-01

There have been Muslims in Britain since the 16th century, when North African and Turkish galley slaves were released from ships captured from the Spanish Armada. This guide describes the history of Muslim settlement in the UK and the formation of their communities.



## BRITISH MUSLIMS: DEMOGRAPHY AND COMMUNITIES

18-011-01

A major problem for British Muslims has been the way they have been perceived by others. This guide gives an overview of how many Muslims there are in the UK, and how these communities are characterised.



## BRITISH MUSLIMS: GENDER AND GENERATIONS

18-012-01

This guide provides case-studies on young Muslim women and diverse Muslim masculinities and also covers topics such as Muslim women's spaces, participation and activism, Muslim men and masculinities, religious and national identity, and cultural, secular and ex-Muslims.




## BRITISH MUSLIMS: FAMILIES AND FAMILY LIFE

18-013-01

The family is the most important unit within British Muslim communities. It is the place where religious and social norms and values are shared and practised. This guide provides basic information on kinship structure and relationships, marriage and related issues, everyday family life, and children's religious socialisation.


# GUIDES



## BRITISH MUSLIMS: CHARITIES AND ORGANISATIONS

18-014-01

In addition to mosques and sectarian reform movements, the public face of Islam in the UK is composed of diverse organisations, including those that represent British Muslims, provide space for discussion, lobby and campaign, and raise funds for charity. This guide focuses on a number of the better known and more influential organisations.



## BRITISH MUSLIMS: SECTARIAN MOVEMENTS

18-015-01

In the UK today, a large number of Islamic movements and networks are represented, most with their origins in either South Asia or the Middle East. This guide provides an overview of British Muslim sectarian movements and networks.



## BRITISH MUSLIMS: MOSQUES

18-016-01

Mosques provide space for daily prayer, the weekly Jum'a and other community gatherings. They offer Qur'an classes for children, and the larger ones host Shari'ah Councils. This guide provides an overview of mosques in Britain including what they are for, and how they are governed.




## COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM II: A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE

18-039-01

**NEW** Since the early 2000s, more than fifty countries have developed initiatives to counter violent extremism. Despite this, there still remains a lack of strong evidence on which interventions are effective. Dr Sarah Marsden, James Lewis and Professor Kim Knott have reviewed the literature on CVE programmes, to give examples of what good CVE practice should look like.



# GUIDES




## DERADICALISATION PROGRAMMES: INTRODUCTORY GUIDE

18-090-01

**NEW** A guide to deradicalisation programmes, which seek to address the ideological, social, and personal issues that lead someone to become involved in violent extremism.

# REPORTS



## IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION I: FAMILY

**FULL REPORT**

**16-022-01**

This CREST report is the first of a series of synthetic reviews on ideological transmission produced by Professor Kim Knott and Dr Benjamin Lee. It focuses on the family as a context for ideological transmission, and includes case studies on extremism and terrorism. The reviews bring together and summarise open source, social science research on ideological transmission. They draw on literature from religion, studies on parenting, learning, socialisation, education, anthropology and security studies, and address the following research questions:

- How is political and religious ideology passed on between and across generations and to whom?
- Who is responsible for ideological transmission?
- Where and when does ideological transmission take place?
- How do these factors relate to the transmission of extremist and terrorist ideologies?

This first report synthesises arguments and findings from more than a hundred books and articles. It is divided into three principal sections, on the theoretical background, empirical approaches, and case studies on ideological transmission and families in the context of extremism and terrorism.




## IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION I: FAMILY

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**16-023-01**

This report synthesises arguments and findings from more than a hundred books and articles. It is divided into three principal sections, on the theoretical background, empirical approaches, and case studies on ideological transmission and families in the context of extremism and terrorism.




## IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION II: PEERS, EDUCATION AND PRISONS

**FULL REPORT**

**17-041-01**

This is the second in a series of synthetic research reports on ideological transmission produced by the CREST programme, Ideas, Beliefs And Values In Social Context. It focuses on secondary socialisation, and considers ideological transmission within social groups (peers), centred on educational settings, including schools, universities and university societies, and prisons.



## IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION II: PEERS, EDUCATION AND PRISONS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**17-039-01**

This is the executive summary of the full report (17-041-01), by Professor Kim Knott and Dr Benjamin Lee, on ideological transmission in the context of education and prisons.



# REPORTS



## IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION III: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS

FULL REPORT

18-040-01

This CREST report, by Professor Kim Knott and Dr Benjamin Lee, is the third in a series of synthetic research reports on ideological transmission produced by the Ideas, Beliefs And Values In Social Context programme.



## IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION III: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

18-041-01

This is the executive summary of the full report, by Professor Kim Knott and Dr Benjamin Lee, on ideological transmission, focusing on political and religious organisations.



## RECIPROCAL RADICALISATION

FULL REPORT

18-037-01

This CREST report, by Professor Kim Knott, Dr Ben Lee and Simon Copeland, highlights the topic of 'reciprocal radicalisation', which is the idea that extremist groups can feed off one another in a cycle of escalating rhetoric or even actions.




## RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND INTERFERENCE FOLLOWING 2017 UK TERRORIST ATTACKS

POLICY BRIEF

17-081-02

This policy brief details how independent analysis has identified systematic use of fake social media accounts, linked to Russia, amplifying the public impacts of four terrorist attacks that took place in the UK in 2017.

# REPORTS



## AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE END OF THE CALIPHATE

**WORKSHOP REPORT I**  
**17-007-02**


This report is the first in the series, *After Islamic State: Understanding the end of the caliphate*. It covers key questions concerning Iraq, Iran, Jordan and Syria, and highlights the underlying issues that contribute towards an environment where Islamist violence can thrive and threaten stability in these regions.



## AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE END OF THE CALIPHATE

**WORKSHOP REPORT II**  
**17-014-02**

This report is the second in the series and covers key questions concerning Russia and Yemen and highlights foreign fighters and what drives decisions to remain and fight, or leave for home.



## AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE END OF THE CALIPHATE

**WORKSHOP REPORT III**  
**17-015-01**

This report is the third in the series and covers key questions concerning Tunisia and militancy in North Africa as well as a historian's perspective of transnational mobilisations, exploring the lessons that can be learned from the fate of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan.



## AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE END OF THE CALIPHATE

**WORKSHOP REPORT IV**  
**17-016-01**

This report is the fourth in the series and covers key questions concerning Islamic State's (IS) long-term prospects as it continues to lose territories as well as Jihadi culture and its future appeal.



# REPORTS



## 'RUSSIAN SPEAKING' FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME

FULL REPORT

17-017-01

This report examines Russian-speaking foreign fighters and Islamic State's influence in the North Caucasus. Written by Dr Cerwyn Moore and Mark Youngman.



## 'RUSSIAN SPEAKING' FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

17-040-01

This is the executive summary of a substantive report on Russian-speaking foreign fighters and Islamic State's influence in the North Caucasus, by Dr Cerwyn Moore and Mark Youngman.



## 'RUSSIAN SPEAKING' FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME

POLICY BRIEF

17-042-01

This is the policy brief of a substantive report on Russian-speaking foreign fighters and Islamic State's influence in the North Caucasus written by Dr Cerwyn Moore and Mark Youngman.



## THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF 'SIKH RADICALISATION'

FULL REPORT

17-028-01

This report, by Dr Jasjit Singh, focuses on 'Sikh radicalisation' in Britain. The report examines the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh's earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian diasporas.

# REPORTS




## THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF 'SIKH RADICALISATION'

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

17-038-01

This is the executive summary of the full report, by Dr Jasjit Singh, on 'Sikh radicalisation' in Britain, an issue which has received much political and media attention, but little academic analysis to date.



## CONSPIRACY THEORIES: HOW ARE THEY ADOPTED, COMMUNICATED, AND WHAT ARE THEIR RISKS?

### FULL REPORT

18-031-01

**NEW** Conspiracy theories have also been closely linked to prejudice and racial violence. Historically and across the globe, conspiracy theories have played prominent roles in witch-hunts, revolutions, and genocide. This report, by Karen Douglas, Robbie Sutton, Aleksandra Cichocka, Jim Ang, Farzin Deravi, Joseph Uscinski and Turkey Nefes, provides a comprehensive and interdisciplinary review of the existing conspiracy theory research.



## MUSLIMS AND ISLAM IN THE UK: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS

### FULL REPORT

18-018-01

Written by CREST researcher Professor Kim Knott, this report comes out of CREST's Ideas, Beliefs and Values in Social Context project and is intended to inform and enrich discussions about Muslims in the UK.



## MUSLIMS AND ISLAM IN THE UK

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

18-028-02

This Executive Summary, written by CREST researcher Professor Kim Knott, draws together the principal points identified in the CREST review, *Muslims and Islam in the UK: A Research Synthesis*.



# REPORTS



## UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORA POLITICS: A CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION

FULL REPORT

18-034-01

The first of three, this report *Understanding Transnational Diaspora Politics: A Conceptual Discussion* discusses how four analytical concepts, diaspora, transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and translocalism, have come to frame the academic discussion of overseas politics and the potential of the concepts to shed light on the relationship between mobility and political action.




## THE ENGAGEMENT OF REFUGEES IN TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS: LESSONS FROM THE MIGRATION, DIASPORA AND REFUGEE STUDIES LITERATURE

FULL REPORT

18-035-01

*The Engagement Of Refugees In Transnational Politics: Lessons from the Migration, Diaspora and Refugee Studies Literature* complements the previous report's broad conceptual discussion by specifically focusing on an analysis of the context and drivers of political action among diaspora and refugee populations, and engaging with the term 'refugee politics'.



## ASYLUM, SECURITY AND EXTREMISM

FULL REPORT

18-036-01

This report, the last of three, critically reviews the current academic state of knowledge on refugee movements and the security threat nexus. Drawing on the two previous reports, it seeks to better understand why forced displacement, onward migration and refugee settlement in countries of asylum is increasingly linked to the threat of political extremism and terrorism.



## THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION: A DESCRIPTIVE TYPOLOGY

FULL REPORT

19-001-02

**NEW** Why do some 'extremists' or 'extremist groups' choose not to engage in violence, or only in particular forms of violence? This full report by Joel Busher, Donald Holbrook and Graham Macklin examines why there are often thresholds of violence that members of extremist groups rarely cross.

# REPORTS




## THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION: THE TRANSNATIONAL AND BRITISH JIHADI SCENE

### FULL REPORT

19-002-01

**NEW** The first of three case studies (produced out of The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology project) explores communication among individuals involved in an informal social network who were seeking to plan attacks in the UK, for which they were convicted in 2016.



## THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION: THE BRITISH EXTREME RIGHT

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

19-003-01

**NEW** This second empirical case study explores the extreme right, providing an example of mobilisation around a racial-nationalist ideology where, while there is significant interpersonal violence, lethal violence is rare and the period under analysis is characterised by a significant attempt to shift away from violence towards orthodox political campaigning.



## THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION: THE ANIMAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

### FULL REPORT

19-004-02

**NEW** For the purpose of this third case study, the Animal Liberation Movement are considered to comprise a sub-section of the wider animal rights movement, characterised by their willingness to use illegal forms of direct action in order to advance campaigns for animal rights, including, but not necessarily limited to, trespass and property damage.




## THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

19-005-02

**NEW** This is the Executive Summary by Joel Busher, Donald Holbrook and Graham Macklin, based on the full report (see 19-001) which looks at why some 'extremists' or 'extremist groups' choose not to engage in violence.

# REPORTS



## RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF THE CAUCASUS

FULL REPORT

19-020-01

**NEW** How does Russian state disinformation operate in the Caucasus region? This report considers three different cases of disinformation deployment in the Caucasus region. It highlights the dynamics of Russian state influence, both domestically in the Russian Federation's North Caucasus region as well as in Georgia, just across the Russian border in the South Caucasus.



## RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF THE CAUCASUS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

19-021-01

**NEW** This Summary brief focuses on why the Caucasus is important, and what the Russian deployment of disinformation in the region tells us.



## RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF UKRAINE

FULL REPORT

19-022-01

**NEW** This report considers Kremlin disinformation deployed in and surrounding Ukraine to highlight the dynamics of disinformation as used against a perceived enemy, in order to understand how Russia applies its operations abroad. The report analyses two case studies in order to better understand the dynamics of disinformation in and around Ukraine.



## RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF UKRAINE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

19-023-01

**NEW** How does Russian state disinformation operate in Ukraine? This brief by Dr Cerwyn Moore summarises the findings from the full report ()



# REPORTS



## RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: MASKIROVKA

**FULL REPORT**  
**19-024-01**

**NEW** This report by Dr Cerwyn Moore, is one of four reports on Russia and Disinformation. This report focuses on disinformation and Russia's 'strategic narrative'. This report draws on extensive scrutiny of open-source material, including from Russian-language primary sources as well as Western academic research and policy-related documents.



## RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: MASKIROVKA

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**  
**19-025-01**

**NEW** This brief investigates the phenomenon of disinformation in the contemporary context as conceived and practised by actors in the Russian Federation. It summarises the findings from the full report (19-024).



## RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

**FULL REPORT**  
**19-026-01**


**NEW** This report outlines the contemporary context in which disinformation occurs, as conceived and practised by actors in the Russian Federation. The aim of this report is to investigate in more depth Russia institutions and actors that contribute in various ways in the promotion of Russian disinformation.



## RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**  
**19-027-01**

**NEW** This brief is one of four Executive Summaries to come out of the reports on Russia and Disinformation. This brief focuses on the institutions and actors involved in Russian disinformation. It should be read in conjunction with the CREST Report or summary on Disinformation and Maskirovka, and the two other reports in the series, which examine case studies on disinformation.



## ASSESSING THE RISK OF EXTREMIST VIOLENCE

### FULL REPORT

19-019-01

**NEW** This directory by Monica Lloyd has been assembled from frameworks that have been developed in recent years to assess aspects of extremist violence, a term used here to encompass terrorist violence that is framed by ideology and targeted violence that is framed by idiosyncratic beliefs.



CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY TRUST

# Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Trust

## Ideas, beliefs and values

### in social context

### Introduction

This programme of research examines the building blocks of trust: attitudes, beliefs, and social norms. We focus on the role of these factors in the development of security trust. Through social cognition, knowledge and attitudes are transferable, and can be used to understand the underlying social norms that underpin trust. This understanding of the underlying social norms can be used to inform the development of interventions that are tailored and culturally relevant to the social norms of a community.

One of the key goals of this programme is to understand the role of social norms in the development of security trust. This understanding is important for the development of interventions that are tailored and culturally relevant to the social norms of a community.

### Where does ideology come from and how is it transmitted?

In a series of three linked events we are assessing that ideology is not just a set of beliefs, but a set of beliefs that are transmitted through social norms. The first event is held at the University of York, the second at the University of Manchester, and the third at the University of Leeds.

- Ideology does not automatically flow from parents to children. It is transmitted to some children through social norms that are passed on to them, and to others through social norms that are passed on to them.
- Children are not always passive recipients of social norms. They can be active agents in the transmission of social norms.
- Society's structures are often different from the norms that are passed on to children. This can lead to a mismatch between the norms that are passed on to children and the norms that are passed on to them.
- The transmission of social norms is influenced by many factors, including the social norms of the community, the social norms of the family, and the social norms of the school.

The second event was concerned with values, attitudes and beliefs, and the role of these factors in the development of security trust. This understanding is important for the development of interventions that are tailored and culturally relevant to the social norms of a community.

• People are more likely to have beliefs about trust that are consistent with their attitudes and beliefs. This understanding is important for the development of interventions that are tailored and culturally relevant to the social norms of a community.

• A belief that trust is important can lead to a greater understanding of the role of trust in the development of security trust. This understanding is important for the development of interventions that are tailored and culturally relevant to the social norms of a community.

• Most research on the development of security trust is based on the assumption that trust is a social norm. This understanding is important for the development of interventions that are tailored and culturally relevant to the social norms of a community.

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### CREST Bite-size guides

- **Trust** - What is trust? What are the different types of trust? What are the different types of trust? What are the different types of trust?
- **Attitudes** - What are attitudes? What are the different types of attitudes? What are the different types of attitudes? What are the different types of attitudes?
- **Beliefs** - What are beliefs? What are the different types of beliefs? What are the different types of beliefs? What are the different types of beliefs?
- **Values** - What are values? What are the different types of values? What are the different types of values? What are the different types of values?
- **Social norms** - What are social norms? What are the different types of social norms? What are the different types of social norms? What are the different types of social norms?

### Team members and research areas

**Dr. Sarah L. Smith** (Principal Investigator) is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of York. She is also a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Leeds. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Manchester. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Bristol. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Exeter. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Gloucestershire. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Huddersfield. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Lincoln. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Northumbria. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Nottingham. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Oxford. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Reading. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Southampton. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Stirling. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Strathclyde. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Sunderland. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Sussex. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Surrey. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Swansea. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Teesside. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Tyneside. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Ulster. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Warwick. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Westminster. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Wexford. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Winchester. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Wollaton. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Worcester. She is a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at the University of York.

### Original research and connected projects

• **Trust and social norms** - This project examines the role of social norms in the development of trust. It is a longitudinal study that follows a sample of children from birth to age 10. It examines the role of social norms in the development of trust, and the role of trust in the development of social norms.

• **Beliefs, attitudes and values** - This project examines the role of beliefs, attitudes, and values in the development of trust. It is a longitudinal study that follows a sample of children from birth to age 10. It examines the role of beliefs, attitudes, and values in the development of trust, and the role of trust in the development of beliefs, attitudes, and values.

• **Gender and trust** - This project examines the role of gender in the development of trust. It is a longitudinal study that follows a sample of children from birth to age 10. It examines the role of gender in the development of trust, and the role of trust in the development of gender.

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### Research areas

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## IDEAS, BELIEFS AND VALUES IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

**17-060-01**

This poster gives an overview of the CREST programme of research on ideas, beliefs and values which examines the backcloth of economic, political, societal and global security perspectives that shape the perceptions and realities of security threats.

## HOW IS PREVENT ENACTED IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS & COLLEGES

17-060-01

James Lewis' poster gives an overview of his doctoral research which intends to answer the question: What is the reality of how the Prevent Duty is operating in secondary schools and colleges?

[illegible][illegible]

## ACTORS AND NARRATIVES

17-065-01

This poster gives an overview of the CREST programme of research on actors and narratives.

## THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS

17-066-01

This poster by Rosie Mutton gives an overview of Mutton's doctoral research which aims to assess the extent to which females participate in violent extremist groups.



# POSTERS



**CREST**  
 CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND  
 ADVISING ON SECURITY THREATS

Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats  

# Exploring 'Sikh Radicalisation' in Britain

  
 Dr Jasjit Singh



**UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS**  
 LEEDS LS2 9JT

## Key research questions

1. Framing Sikh activities in Britain? Which activities have taken place in Britain and which Sikh activities are being monitored and researched? How is this reported on the discourse around Sikhism in Britain?
2. Narratives and images? Which narratives and images are relevant to understanding the British Sikh community? How are these specific narratives and images relevant and how are they linked to individual Sikhism?
3. The representation of narratives? How are the narratives transmitted in Britain? How have these events been covered in the British media?
4. Types of Sikh activities in Britain? What are the types of Sikh activities and the reasons of concern?
5. The impact of Sikh activities in Britain? What is the impact of Sikh activities on the British public? What possible reasons to indicate this will be discussed.

## Approach

```

    graph TD
      A[Narrative structure] --> D[Contextualisation of individual Sikh activities]
      B[Representational structure] --> D
      D --> E[Analysis of historical/contemporary British Sikhism]
      E --> F[Radicalisation or activism?]
  
```

## Radicalism or activism?

- Radicalism is the use of extreme approaches to fundamental British values, on both dimensions, the *rule of law, individual freedoms and mutual respect and tolerance of different cultures and faiths*.
- Radicalisation** = the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and research has been advanced that monitoring groups.
- Mohamed and McCreedy (2009) identified a 'tendency to engage in illegal or violent political action' as reported in a religious belief as a 'tendency to engage in law-breaking or non-violent political action'.

## What does Sikh activism in Britain look like?

- Sikh activism in Britain (understanding) through the monitoring of the Gurkha Troops during Operation Bluestar in 1984 and the anti-Sikh riots that took place in India in November 1984. Influences the monitoring of British Sikh activities in Britain.
- From a community issue reported back in the news focused on the Gurkha Troops during Operation Bluestar in 1984 and the anti-Sikh riots of 1984 that took place in India to Britain about the lack of respect about the Gurkha Troops from the Indian side.
- The main frequency reported incidents of violence centred on the Sikh in Britain who came against other Sikh in Britain for political, domestic or religious reasons.

## What are the main narratives and issues?

- The main political narrative in the events of 1984 and the government lack of policy response for the events from the Indian side.
- The main religious issue links to disagreements about ideology and religious activism.
- Most of the main Sikh activities are a consequence of issues relating to the representation of Sikhism in westernised societies.
- Although the concept of 'representation' is important in the Sikh tradition it generally appears to be a concept that has been brought into the tradition as a concept of an identity in politics.
- The notion of a Muslim of power among people targeting Sikh in Britain has growing concern among Sikhs as they are being affected by dual work in the authorities.
- There is a growing concern about the representation of Sikhism in the media (the British, western historical authorities and contemporary)
- Sikh/Muslim violence

## How are relevant narratives transmitted?

- Issues are not always raised and crystallised through Sikh broadcast media and the British media. The British media and the religious website increasingly broadly address the British communities.
- There are a number of papers and videos which the British community has access to that contain the British and foreign. The book which is available in the British community.
- There are no communities responsible for the transmission of narratives through the community although they do support or oppose in particular situations.
- Narratives which are taken to maintain or represent in different ways, through the British media and the British community, which are relevant and which are relevant, broadcast and the British community.
- There are a number of papers and videos which the British community has access to that contain the British and foreign. The book which is available in the British community.
- There are no communities responsible for the transmission of narratives through the community although they do support or oppose in particular situations.

## What is the impact of Sikh activism in Britain?

- There is a tension in the British news in the wider British public about the representation of Sikhism in the British media.
- Sikh activism in Britain is usually focused around community targeting, specific issues. Their campaigns engage especially with an issue that is often related through local media. Provided that the result is a success of Sikh activities in Britain there is a consequence of popularising the British community.
- Issues of Sikh in Britain which are not seen as a consequence of the representation of images of religious activities in the British media and a long background papers in Britain there is a consequence of popularising the British community.
- The main issue that is currently identified in the British in the religious community is around Sikh activities in the British community and the British community.

# EXPLORING 'SIKH RADICALISATION' IN BRITAIN

**17-071-01**

Dr Jasjit Singh's poster gives an overview of his research on what Sikh activism in Britain looks like and the impact of Sikh activism in Britain.

**SOCIALISATION**

**Ideological Transmission**  
Although there is no universally accepted model that explains ideology of transmitters, socialisation is a process whereby society's norms, values and traditions are transmitted. Primary socialisation takes place during childhood, when children develop their own identity. Secondary socialisation extends into adolescence and adulthood and is when young adult learn how to behave in society – putting what they learned in as a life practice.

**Schools**  
Although charged with the responsibility for developing good citizens, there are many other roles that schools play. Schools are responsible for teaching children how to behave in society and how to interact with others. Schools are also responsible for teaching children how to behave in society and how to interact with others. Schools are also responsible for teaching children how to behave in society and how to interact with others.

**Friends**  
People tend to be friends with those who are similar to them. Friendship is a form of socialisation that is often formed in childhood and adolescence. Friends can influence a person's behavior and attitudes, and can provide a support system during difficult times.

**Religious education**  
Religious education is a form of socialisation that is often provided by religious institutions. It teaches children about the beliefs and practices of their religion, and can help them to develop a sense of community and belonging.

**Social environment**  
Social class, gender, ethnicity and religion are all factors that can influence a person's socialisation. These factors can shape a person's attitudes and behaviors, and can determine the opportunities and challenges they face in life.

**Other external influences**  
There are many other factors that can influence a person's socialisation, including mass media, advertising, and the environment. These factors can all play a role in shaping a person's identity and behavior.

**Extremist socialisation**  
Some acts of socialisation are seen as particularly significant for extremist transmitters. Although young people may be exposed to extremist ideologies in various contexts, relatively few adopt radical positions or actively join in terrorism.

**Family and home**  
Provides the primary context for ideological transmission, where children are first exposed to social or religious ideas. Parents may actively transmit certain ideas, though many others are implicit or religious education, than they do abstract values. This is particularly so where sons are directly told certain things, strongly held and frequently discussed.

**Genetics**  
Hereditary factors, such as how much lower income correlates to the type of diet, can play a role in socialisation and religious development in young children and potentially cognitive problems later on.

## MINDMAP: IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION

17-079-01

This mindmap shows different socialisation processes that affect ideological transmission. It first appeared in issue 3 of *CSR, Transmission*.

[illegible]

# EXPLAINING THE IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCIES: THE NORTH CAUCASUS, 2007-2015

**17-076-01**

This poster draws on doctoral research looking at what factors inside and outside insurgent groups can explain the ideological evolution of insurgencies.


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## KIN AND PEER CONTEXTS

17-051-01

Simon Copeland's poster presents his doctoral research on the roles and impacts of kin and peer networks in the transmission of extremist ideologies and individuals' engagement in terrorism and extremism.

# POSTERS



## ICONS AND SYMBOLS IN EXTREMISM

**17-045-01**

The poster presents Christopher Barry's doctoral research on extremist imagery and why assessing this imagery matters.

## MORE ON BRITISH MUSLIMS

These resources give an overview of Muslims and Islam in the UK. The underlying research is a synthesis of open source, humanities and social science research on British Muslims and Islam. It draws on academic literature from Islamic studies, religious studies, history, sociology, anthropology, political science, education, social psychology, and policy and security studies, as well as information from a variety of websites produced by Muslim and Islamic groups, and material from news websites.

The reports and guides were written by Professor Kim Knott, as part of CREST's Ideas, Beliefs and Values in Social Context project. They are intended to inform and enrich discussions about Muslims in the UK. You can find all these resources here: [www.crestresearch.ac.uk/britishmuslims](http://www.crestresearch.ac.uk/britishmuslims)



# JOURNAL ARTICLES

**NEW** Busher, Joel, Donald Holbrook, and Graham Macklin. 2019. 'The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Typology'. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 11 (1): 3–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2018.1551918>.

**NEW** Copeland, Simon. 2018. 'Telling Stories of Terrorism: A Framework for Applying Narrative Approaches to the Study of Militant's Self-Accounts'. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*: 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2018.1525417>.

**NEW** Douglas, Karen M., Robbie M. Sutton, and Aleksandra Cichocka. 2017. 'The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories'. *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 26 (6): 538–42. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417718261>.

**NEW** Douglas, Karen M., Joseph E. Uscinski, Robbie M. Sutton, Aleksandra Cichocka, Turkay Nefes, Chee Siang Ang, and Farzin Deravi. 2019. 'Understanding Conspiracy Theories'. *Political Psychology* 40 (S1): 3–35. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12568>

Hinds, Joanne, and Adam Joinson. 2017. 'Radicalization, the Internet and Cybersecurity: Opportunities and Challenges for HCI'. In *Human Aspects of Information Security, Privacy and Trust*, 481–93. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, Cham. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58460-7\\_33](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58460-7_33).

Knott, Kim. 2018. 'Applying the Study of Religions in the Security Domain: Knowledge, Skills, and Collaboration'. *Journal of Religious and Political Practice* 4 (3): 354–73. <https://doi.org/10.1080/20566093.2018.1525901>.

Lee, Benjamin. 2016. 'Why We Fight: Understanding the Counter-Jihad Movement'. *Religion Compass* 10 (10): 257–65. <https://doi.org/10.1111/rec3.12208>.

Lee, Benjamin, and Vincent Campbell. 2016. 'Looking Out or Turning in? Organizational Ramifications of Online Political Posters on Facebook'. *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 21 (3): 313–37. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161216645928>.

Lee, Benjamin J. 2017. "It's Not Paranoia When They Are Really out to Get You": The Role of Conspiracy Theories in the Context of Heightened Security'. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 9 (1): 4–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2016.1236143>.

**NEW** Lee, Benjamin J. 2018. 'Informal Countermessaging: The Potential and Perils of Informal Online Countermessaging'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*: 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1513697>.

**NEW** Logan, Caroline, and Monica Lloyd. 2019. 'Violent Extremism: A Comparison of Approaches to Assessing and Managing Risk'. *Legal and Criminological Psychology* 24 (1): 141–61. <https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12140>.

**NEW** Moore, Cerwyn. 2019. 'Russia'. In *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, edited by Andrew Silke, 1st Edition, 604–14. Abingdon: Routledge. <https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Handbook-of-Terrorism-and-Counterterrorism-1st-Edition/Silke/p/book/9781138819085>.

Morrow, Elizabeth A, and John Meadowcroft. 2018. 'The Rise and Fall of the English Defence League: Self-Governance, Marginal Members and the Far Right'. *Political Studies*, June. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321718777907>.



# JOURNAL ARTICLES

Prentice, Sheryl, and Paul J. Taylor. 2018. 'Psychological and Behavioral Examinations of Online Terrorism'. In *Psychological and Behavioral Examinations in Cyber Security*, edited by John McAlaney, 151–71. <https://www.igi-global.com/chapter/psychological-and-behavioral-examinations-of-online-terrorism/199887>.

Taylor, Paul J., Donald Holbrook, and Adam Joinson. 2017. 'Same Kind of Different'. *Criminology & Public Policy* 16 (1): 127–33. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12285>.

# BETTER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND DECISIONS



## BETTER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND DECISIONS

How can we tell if someone told a lie? Which techniques can help people recall facts about an event? How are terrorist groups financed and what decisions do terrorists make to protect their security? Can social media use look unusual and how can we assess the value of information we receive? These projects seek to help us understand how we can gather better information from and about groups and individuals. They also research how both terror groups and the services who respond to them make decisions, to help better anticipate and improve responses to critical incidents.

## PROJECTS

## CORE PROJECTS

- Developing and evaluating methods of online influence
- Language and engagement in ideological online forums
- Blockchain, social media and terrorist financing
- Methods for characterising typical and atypical social media users
- Language and rapport
- Eliciting intelligence from memory: Innovative tools, techniques and approaches
- Innovative techniques for information elicitation
- The verifiability approach
- Developing intelligence gathering methods that maximise the quantity and quality of information
- Collective interviewing
- What tactics does a smuggler use to avoid detection?

## COMMISSIONED PROJECTS

- Expertise and inertia in Emergency Service decision making
- Assessing cognitive mechanisms of radicalisation with a quantitative analysis of Islamic State's online propaganda
- Terrorist decision making regarding security and risk.
- Differences in the ability to spot rare, non-salient or hidden targets
- Means to increasing information gain through minimal social exclusion
- Taking decisions about information value
- Quantifying the effectiveness of an evidence-based rapport-building training programme
- Imaginative scenario planning for law enforcement organisations.

# GUIDES




## THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH

16-001-01

Research by CREST programme lead Professor Aldert Vrij has shown that when people tell lies in interviews they can struggle to provide the same number

of checkable details as when they are telling the truth. We have provided a short guide based on this research aimed at interviewers.



## THE TIMELINE TECHNIQUE

16-002-02

Based on research by CREST researcher Professor Lorraine Hope guide outlines The Timeline Technique. This technique can be used by interviewers to help

interviewees by giving them an intuitive way of organising their recall and reporting, which makes it easier to organise their thoughts and reduces demands on working memory.



## THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW

16-006-01

The guide outlines the Cognitive Interview as a set of phases to be worked through. However, to be used effectively in the field it should be implemented as

a toolbox of skills to be used strategically, including only those elements that are appropriate for the specific interview, and modifying or adapting the various elements as the situation demands.



## THE MODEL STATEMENT TECHNIQUE

16-011-02

Based on research by CREST programme lead Professor Aldert Vrij, this guide details how we can encourage

interviewees to report more detail in interview settings using a technique that involves the use of a 'model statement'.



# GUIDES



## THE UNEXPECTED QUESTIONS TECHNIQUE

16-014-01

A consistent finding in deception research is that liars prepare themselves for anticipated interviews. They

do so by preparing possible answers to questions they expect to be asked. Based on research by CREST programme lead Professor Aldert Vrij, this guide details why the unexpected question technique works and how to use it, with good and bad examples of questions, for single and multiple interviewees.




## WHEN DOES (IN) CONSISTENCY MATTER?

16-031-01

It's important for interviewers to distinguish between different types of inconsistency so they can

make a good judgement about where threats to accuracy lie. How can they do this? Based on work by CREST researcher Professor Lorraine Hope, this guide details how to distinguish between different types of inconsistency and how to help make a good judgement about where threats to accuracy lie.

# REPORTS



## MASTERCLASS IN ELICITING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

FULL REPORT

16-030-02

CREST researchers delivered a masterclass on intelligence interviewing to over fifty practitioners from European government, police and military organisations. The day covered new techniques and findings from ground breaking research and was delivered in partnership with the IIIRG. This report is a summary of the presentations.



## PERFORMANCE AND COPING UNDER STRESS IN SECURITY SETTINGS

FULL REPORT

18-033-01

**NEW** This report summarises themes discussed at a workshop, sponsored by CREST and organised by researchers at the University of Manchester. The aim was to share latest cross-disciplinary academic research and practical experiences of performance and coping under extreme stress and discuss the implications for security.

# POSTERS

Centre for Research and Evidence in Security Threats

# Text Mining Islamic State's Online Propaganda

Stephane Baele, Katharine Boyd, Travis Coan

## CREST project overview:

- Central research objectives:
  - How does Islamic State's online propaganda disseminate dimensions of radicalisation?

### Primary aims of the project:

- 1) Develop a tool to harvest and analyse online content.
- 2) Use this tool to extract how propaganda tries to shape dimensions of radicalisation (including Islamic law, expertise, language, culture).
- 3) Examine if the content structure, layout, and language differs across types of propaganda content (inspiration, video, images).

## Methodologies employed:

### Video content extraction & analysis:

- We used IBM's Video to Text service (English and Arabic output) to process videos.
- We then combined additional analysis to assess the accuracy of the generated text.

### Document-level content analysis:

- We identified words associated with specific topics in Islamic law, Islamic history, Islamic philosophy, nationalism, and a combined content and linguistic analysis.

### Linguistic network analysis:

- We used word or phrase "successors" to develop a network-based approach to analysing the paragraphs.

### Visual coding:

- We developed a methodology for collecting content image content and used the method to analyse Islamic IS's *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines.

### Project outputs:

- A tool to harvest and analyse IS's magazines
- Paper on language use in IS's content
- Paper on linguistic network & propaganda platforms
- A tool used for IS's propaganda
- Research used for UK's Parliament
- Most recent work done.

Depiction of how *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines were released and the word count increase in time in words.

- Over 1,000 images in 2 images
- Distinguishes Islamic "salafism" from the "Victim" images across images
- The most frequent keyword found in *Dabiq* is "salafism", followed by "Islamic law" and "Islam"
- It was a comparatively proportion of appearance in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* magazines
- Document-level content analysis: words related language used to describe Islamic history, nationalism, Arabic, "Islamic law", "Islamic philosophy", and a combined content and linguistic analysis.
- The network-based analysis: words and the role of the network: mapping the structure of connections the word has with other words. These connections allow us to specify the content.

## Video content:

- 1,278 IS videos from 2013 - Jan 2017
- Magazines have 450 videos produced in one province, Iraq, followed by the central office from 375, then propaganda generators, followed by the decentralised offices of IS's provinces.

Number of videos released in each year province.

- Most videos are 3:00 minutes, more than a half hour, less than one hour.
- The number of videos is decreasing over time across media channels.


## Discussion

- Despite content analysis, confirmation of radicalisation through how language and words contribute to radicalisation, providing evidence that IS's content, including "Victim" and "salafism" content, and encourage viewers to join IS.
- The linguistic network analysis method is used to make large bodies of text into a more readable way that allows security practitioners to understand the content and identify the underlying structure of content across paragraphs.
- The visual networks developed can be used to make comparisons of propaganda structure across content groups.

# TEXT MINING ISLAMIC STATE'S ONLINE PROPAGANDA


17-047-01

The poster presents research on how Islamic State (IS) online propaganda demonstrate dynamics of radicalisation.



# Team Decision-Making in Extreme Environments

Olivia Brown



### Abstract

Extreme environments create unique physical and temporal challenges. This PhD research seeks to further understand how teams adapt to make effective decisions that resulted in extreme environments. Specifically it will explore two types of extreme teams: 30 members teams and 600+ expedition teams. This research will examine understanding of effective teamwork in extreme environments to improve planning for future work in high-risk conditions such as oil and gas, defence and space exploration.

### Introduction

Dissemination is difficult in the presence of changing or adverse conditions. In order to achieve a goal in an uncertain environment, Nonlinear Decision-Making is required. Teamwork is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to explain, understand, predict, and control. This PhD research will adopt an SDMT approach to explore the team decision-making process in extreme environments, covering: extreme, high-risk, and/or high-stakes environments; extreme teams or extreme space exploration; and extreme teams with no types of extreme teams (as the emergency response according to major disasters), and all extreme teams who are working across harsh landscapes (e.g. water, desert).

### Effective team performance during Emergency Response

Emergency responses, the Police, Fire and Rescue and Ambulance services across most countries are required to respond to a wide range of emergency situations. The research seeks to explore and improve team response during emergency response.

We collect data from a data mining exercise conducted at "Managing Teamwork: Extreme AirSea" PhD project as a starting point for the "Big Data" of team decision-making.

- We consider the data from the Team-Processing tool. We found that team members perceived communication to be the most important factor in team decision-making.
- We used the data from the team decision-making tool to explore the team decision-making process.

**Study 1:**

Study 1 will be collected from the Strategic Command Group, which is a standard MFTW. We identified all the data collected from the data to be able to perform a detailed analysis. This will allow us to explore communication networks at the strategic level.




Figure 1

### Reviewing the literature

1

History of the Development of Team Decision-Making

2

History of the Development of Team Decision-Making

3

Teamwork in Extreme Environments

**Research aims:**

- 1. To explore the psychological literature of effective teamwork in extreme environments.
- 2. To develop a scale to measure perceived effectiveness of Team Processing communication, coordination and cooperation.
- 3. To explore Team Processing communication responses, planning and decision-making to help improve training and sharing in future team situations.
- 4. To investigate how expedition teams can only be accepted in harsh conditions for the purpose of periods of time and possible communication for the future.

### Exploring how expedition teams function


When an expedition team enters a new environment, they are often faced with difficult conditions and unexpected challenges. The research will collect data from expedition teams in a period of time, focusing on how team members operate over time, particularly in response to situations and unexpected challenges. The study will use the data from the Big Data to explore the team decision-making process in extreme environments.

**Study 1:**

- No student team travelling on a expedition, expedition or team.
- Team members will be trained in the team decision-making process and have a plan.
- During the expedition data will be collected from the team decision-making tool.

**Study 2:**

Will seek to collect data on only 1 team and only 1 team.



## TEAM DECISION-MAKING IN EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS

17-048-01

The poster presents Olivia Brown's doctoral research on decision-making within teams, operating in extreme environments.

[illegible]

## SHAPE SHIFTING ACROSS SOCIAL MEDIA

**17-052-01**

Brittany Davidson's poster presents her doctoral research on user interaction and behaviour across social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn).

CREST CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND  
INTEGRATED SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATIONS

# Risk Propensity and Smartphone Operating System

Kristoffer Geyer

Lancaster  
University

## Introduction

- Researchers have demonstrated that smartphone type can predict personality
- Consumers who opt-in as iPhone users take Android users' privacy and disclosure more as a liability and are more concerned about disclosure for their device. This difference may be the personality of the frequently used device, as they are more likely to select whether their personality is tied to privacy
- We were interested to see if this relationship extended to behavior. For example, those who are less likely to opt-in are more likely to exhibit other risk behaviors

## Method

	Android	iOS	Other	Windows	Other
Male	20	18	1	1	1
Female	20	18	1	1	1

### Measures

- Participants had completed an online survey (giving details about their smartphone usage and behavior) regarding other surveys
- Participants also completed the Revised Risk Tolerance Test (RRTT). The RRTT is a validated measure of risk aversion with the nine questions
- Provided that participants had their phone before the 'before' experiment, the number of times they had used the before would be added to their score. Participants were not asked how many times they had used the before
- Participants responded to an open ended likelihood of receiving a cash prize
- A likelihood experiment was randomly distributed to the participants, however there were two different points of distribution to this survey

```

graph LR
    SOS[Smartphone Operating System] --> RP[Risk Propensity]
    RP --> RB[Risk Behavior]
    SOS --> RB
  
```

## Results

- Participants were equally likely to opt-in to the before and the after survey
- The single-factor ANOVA for frequency of smartphone usage across operating systems was significant. The block had the average score of the device

Figure 1: Risk propensity scores by operating system and time point.

Operating System	Time Point	Median Risk Propensity Score
Android	Before	~4.5
iOS	Before	~4.5
Android	After	~4.5
iOS	After	~4.5

- Phone users scored more on risk, but due to the large difference in behavior scores, the difference in risk propensity for the whole study did not reach a higher threshold. Android users had significantly more risk behavior, but the difference in risk propensity was not significant. There were no significant differences in risk propensity between before and after scores, this difference is due to the large group sizes
- The gender did not significantly differ in their risk propensity or risk behavior
- There is no significant difference in risk propensity between before and after scores

## Discussion

- This preliminary results should be interpreted with caution. However, they suggest that iPhone users are more likely to risk behavior than Android users. This may be due to the fact that iPhone users are more likely to opt-in to the survey, and Android users are more concerned and less likely to opt-in to the survey. This difference in risk propensity may be due to the fact that iPhone users are more likely to opt-in to the survey, and Android users are more concerned and less likely to opt-in to the survey. This difference in risk propensity may be due to the fact that iPhone users are more likely to opt-in to the survey, and Android users are more concerned and less likely to opt-in to the survey.

## Implications

- The main implication of this study is that risk propensity is related to smartphone operating system. This result is important because it suggests that risk propensity is not just a personality trait, but it is also related to the device that a person uses. This finding has implications for researchers and practitioners alike. For example, researchers can use this information to better understand the relationship between risk propensity and smartphone operating system. Practitioners can use this information to better understand the relationship between risk propensity and smartphone operating system. This finding has implications for researchers and practitioners alike. For example, researchers can use this information to better understand the relationship between risk propensity and smartphone operating system. Practitioners can use this information to better understand the relationship between risk propensity and smartphone operating system.

## RISK PROPENSITY & SMARTPHONE OPERATING SYSTEM

**17-056-01**

Kristoffer Geyer's poster gives an overview of his doctoral research on smartphone type predicting personality.

# POSTERS

[illegible]

## UNDERSTANDING AND COUNTERING ONLINE BEHAVIOUR

**17-059-01**

This poster gives an overview of the CREST programme of research on understanding and shaping online behaviour in a security context.

[illegible]

## THE BENEFITS OF A SELF-GENERATED CUE MNEMONIC FOR TIMELINE INTERVIEWING

17-061-01

Feni Kontogianni's poster gives an overview of her doctoral research on developing evidence-based techniques to support the retrieval and reporting of accurate and detailed information.

[illegible]

## GATHERING FULL AND FAITHFUL HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

**17-069-01**

This poster gives an overview of Jordan Nunan's doctoral research which aims to enhance memory recall by creating proactive techniques that can be used prior to attending an event.

[illegible]

## UNEXPECTED QUESTIONS IN CROSS CULTURAL DECEPTION DETECTION

17-072-01

Irina Tache's poster gives an overview of her doctoral research on differences in interviewing due to cultural background.



# POSTERS

**CREST** CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS  
University of Portsmouth

## Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats Eliciting Information and Cues to Deceit

**Eliciting intelligence from memory:**  
Innovative tools, techniques and approaches  
Professor Lorraine Hope

- Eliciting intelligence from memory requires information cues to elicit and recall information in memory. This can be done in a number of ways, including the use of memory cues, memory aids, and memory triggers.
- The use of memory cues can be done in a number of ways, including the use of memory cues, memory aids, and memory triggers.
- The use of memory aids can be done in a number of ways, including the use of memory aids, memory triggers, and memory cues.
- The use of memory triggers can be done in a number of ways, including the use of memory triggers, memory cues, and memory aids.

**The verifiability approach (VA)**  
Professor Aldert Vrij

- The VA is a method for eliciting information from memory. It involves asking a series of questions that are designed to elicit information from memory. The VA is based on the idea that people are more likely to provide accurate information when they are asked to provide information in a structured way.
- The VA is a method for eliciting information from memory. It involves asking a series of questions that are designed to elicit information from memory. The VA is based on the idea that people are more likely to provide accurate information when they are asked to provide information in a structured way.

**Collective interviewing**  
Dr Sarah Mann

- The purpose of this research was to explore the effectiveness of collective interviewing. Collective interviewing is a method for eliciting information from memory. It involves asking a series of questions that are designed to elicit information from memory. The purpose of this research was to explore the effectiveness of collective interviewing.
- The purpose of this research was to explore the effectiveness of collective interviewing. Collective interviewing is a method for eliciting information from memory. It involves asking a series of questions that are designed to elicit information from memory. The purpose of this research was to explore the effectiveness of collective interviewing.

**Developing intelligence gathering methods that maximise the quantity and quality of information**  
Professor Feni Kontogianni

- The purpose of this research was to explore the effectiveness of intelligence gathering methods. Intelligence gathering methods are methods for eliciting information from memory. The purpose of this research was to explore the effectiveness of intelligence gathering methods.
- The purpose of this research was to explore the effectiveness of intelligence gathering methods. Intelligence gathering methods are methods for eliciting information from memory. The purpose of this research was to explore the effectiveness of intelligence gathering methods.

## ELICITING INFORMATION AND CUES TO DECEIT

17-073-01

This poster given an overview into the Eliciting Information and Cues to Deceit programme, by Aldert Vrij, Lorraine Hope, Feni Kontigianni, Becky Milne, Zarah Vernham, and Samantha Mann.

**CREST** CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS  
Lancaster University

## Through the Looking Glass: Exploring the Relationship Between Nonverbal and Verbal Behaviour on Rapport and Dyadic Cooperation

Lynn Weiher

**Introduction – open questions**  
Examining the complementary roles of verbal and nonverbal behaviours in rapport and dyadic cooperation.

**Aim of this research:**  
• To explore the relationship between nonverbal and verbal behaviour on rapport and dyadic cooperation.

**Methodology I**  
Participants: 30 university students (14 Male, 16 Female)  
Measures: Video recordings of interactions, self-reports of rapport and cooperation.

**Methodology II**  
Stimulus: A video recording of a dyadic interaction.

**Hypotheses**  
1. Nonverbal behaviour will predict rapport and dyadic cooperation.  
2. Verbal behaviour will predict rapport and dyadic cooperation.

**Conclusion**  
This research suggests that nonverbal and verbal behaviour are both important for rapport and dyadic cooperation.

## THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

17-074-01

This poster presents doctoral research by Lynn Weiher on Exploring the Relationship Between Nonverbal and Verbal Behaviour on Rapport and Dyadic Cooperation.

**CREST** CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS  
Lancaster University

## Safe Space: Does Context Affect Self-Disclosure in Security Vetting?

Christina L Winters

**Introduction**  
Security vetting involves assessing a person's identity and assessing their integrity and suitability for security sensitive positions. Most research on self-disclosure has focused on individual differences, such as the gender and personality of the discloser. Research on contextual self-disclosure has examined online settings, interview situations, and even games.

**Testing across contexts**  
128 Lancaster University students (68% female) were recruited via three and the University's research participation panel. The sample largely comprised Black, Chinese, and Nigerian participants. Participants were randomly assigned to interview in 1 of 4 conditions: 1. Public (the shop), 2. Office (the Participant House), 3. Online (Skype), 4. Private (the shop). Participants completed a personality measure, the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI).

**Results**  
Preliminary analysis examined the length of interview in a proxy for information provision. Interviewers took twice as long to interview in the public setting, followed by the office, and then the online setting. Interviewers took about 30% longer to interview in the public setting. No gender or ethnic differences were found for interview length across contexts. Self-reported openness was largely uncorrelated with interview length, however openness was found to be negatively correlated with interview length.

**Implications**  
This study offers insight into the potential usefulness of conducting vetting interviews with confidence. Aside from reducing the costs associated with interviewers, confidence in the vetting process may increase the quality of the information provided by the interviewees. This study also offers insight into the potential usefulness of conducting vetting interviews with confidence. Aside from reducing the costs associated with interviewers, confidence in the vetting process may increase the quality of the information provided by the interviewees.

## SAFE SPACE: DOES CONTEXT AFFECT SELF-DISCLOSURE IN SECURITY VETTING?

17-075-01

Christina Winters' poster gives an overview of her doctoral research on self-disclosure in different environments.

**THE BLUFFERS GUIDE TO NETWORKS**  
Researchers on networks, and especially social network analysis, use a variety of technical terms to describe the structure and dynamics of a network. But what do they actually mean?

**BRIDGES OF KÖNIGSBERG**  
The original problem, how to cross the bridges over and only once, had no solution. It was a puzzle that was solved by the first paper on graph theory in 1736.

**GRAPH THEORY**  
A graph is a set of nodes (vertices) and edges (links). A graph theory is a set of rules for how to construct a graph. A graph theory is a set of rules for how to construct a graph.

**BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY**  
A node's betweenness centrality is a measure of how central a node is in a network. A node's betweenness centrality is a measure of how central a node is in a network.

**CLOSENESS CENTRALITY**  
A node's closeness centrality is a measure of how close a node is to all other nodes in a network. A node's closeness centrality is a measure of how close a node is to all other nodes in a network.


**WEIGHTS**  
A node's weight is a measure of how important a node is in a network. A node's weight is a measure of how important a node is in a network.

## MINDMAP: NETWORKS

17-080-01

When it comes to networks do you know your nodes from your ties? This mindmap (first published in issue 5 of *CSR, Networks*) breaks down the jargon and explains the common terms used when talking about networks.


# POSTERS



## WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" OR "I DON'T REMEMBER"?

18-002-01


What do sources mean when they say, 'I don't know' or 'I don't remember'? Professor Lorraine Hope categorises potential reasons for these hindering responses.



## WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" DISTRUST, CYNICISM & HOSTILITY

18-003-02


This poster focuses on reasons that relate to distrust, cynicism and hostility such as trust and control issues, perceptions of efficacy and deliberate deceit to mislead.



## WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" MEMORY ENCODING

18-004-01

This poster focuses on reasons that relate to factors at memory encoding, such as attention problems, distraction or reduced psychological capacity.



## WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" MEMORY RETRIEVAL

18-005-02

This poster focuses on reasons relating to memory retrieval, such as forgetting, uncertainty and metacognition and lack of retrieval support.


# POSTERS



## WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" PERSONAL MOTIVATION

18-006-01


This poster focuses on reasons that relate to personal motivation, such as reluctance, status insecurity and ideological motivations or identifying as an 'informer'.



## WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" INTERVIEW CONTEXT

18-007-02

This poster focuses on reasons relating to interview context, such as pragmatic communication, impression management and inferences about the interview.



## MINDMAP: INFORMATION ELICITATION

17-077-01

Do you know your baselining from your timeline technique? In the very first issue of *CREST Security Review* we produced a mindmap which charted the lay of the evidence land.



## MINDMAP: WHAT SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW"

18-032-02

What do sources mean when they say, 'I don't know' or 'I don't remember'? This mindmap, (first published in issue 7 of *CSR, Transitions*) categorises potential reasons for these hindering responses.



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**NEW** Ask, Karl, Emma Ejelöv, and Pär Anders Granhag. 2019. 'Eliciting Human Intelligence: The Effects of Social Exclusion and Inclusion on Information Disclosure'. *Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling* 16 (1): 3–17. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jip.1516>.

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**NEW** Gill, Paul, Zoe Marchment, Emily Corner, and Noémie Bouhana. 2018. 'Terrorist Decision Making in the Context of Risk, Attack Planning, and Attack Commission'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 0 (0): 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1445501>.

Harrison, Karen, and Nicholas Ryder. 2016. *The Law Relating to Financial Crime in the United Kingdom*. 2nd Edition. UK: Ashgate. <http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409423898>.

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**NEW** Leal, Sharon, Aldert Vrij, Haneen Deeb, and Louise Jupe. 2018. 'Using the Model Statement to Elicit Verbal Differences Between Truth Tellers and Liars: The Benefit of Examining Core and Peripheral Details'. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition* 7 (4): 610–17. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.07.001>.

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**NEW** Milne, Rebecca, and Kevin Smith. 2017. 'Vulnerable Witnesses: The Investigation Stage'. In *Vulnerable People and the Criminal Justice System: A Guide to Law and Practice*, edited by Penny Cooper and Heather Norton. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. <https://global.oup.com/academic/product/vulnerable-people-and-the-criminal-justice-system-9780198801115>.

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**NEW** Stanier, Ian, and Jordan Nunan. 2018. 'Reframing Intelligence Interviews: The Applicability of Psychological Research to HUMINT Elicitation'. In *The Psychology of Criminal Investigation: From Theory to Practice*, edited by Andy Griffiths and Rebecca Milne, 1st Edition. Abingdon: Routledge. <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315637211/chapters/10.4324/9781315637211-12>.

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**NEW** Vrij, Aldert. 2018. 'Deception and Truth Detection When Analyzing Nonverbal and Verbal Cues'. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, September. <https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3457>.

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# PROTECTING OURSELVES



## PROTECTING OURSELVES

How can we patch security vulnerabilities with people rather than relying solely on technology? How can we prevent low-level breaches in security by well-meaning employees? What can people's digital footprints tell us about their personality? What are the barriers to reporting friends and families suspected of extremism to the authorities, and how do people keep secrets online?

These projects address our need to better understand how we can protect ourselves. They include researching how security professionals can communicate better with employees about how to protect organisations as well as understanding and mitigating the risk of large-scale change leading to counterproductive behaviour in employees. They also include projects looking at how we can keep secrets online and better understand why people might not report friends and family members they suspect of involvement in extremism.

## PROJECTS


### CORE PROJECTS

- The simple model of rational security
- Security dialogues
- The workplace village
- Studies of digital footprints and remote assessment of personality.

### COMMISSIONED PROJECTS

- Reporting violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict
- Assessing and mitigating the impact of organisational change on counterproductive work behaviour
- The cyber security risks of digital hoarding
- Keeping secrets online.

# GUIDES



## MESSAGING APPLICATIONS

16-003-02

A guide introducing the characteristics of messaging applications which may be useful for terrorist and criminal behaviour. The guide covers Facebook Messenger, Firechat, Kik, Paltalk, Snapchat, Telegram, Twitter, and WhatsApp.



## WHY DO PEOPLE CLICK ON PHISHING LINKS?

16-004-01


Based on work by CREST researchers Professor Adam Joinson and Dr Joanne Hinds we have published an introductory guide to help individuals and organisations understand some of the techniques used by fraudsters and what they can do about them.



## WHAT MAKES SPOTTING FACES DIFFICULT?

16-025-01

Intuitively, we might assume that humans can search for more than one unfamiliar face at a time. The reality is quite different. When asked to search simultaneously for two unfamiliar faces, one is prioritised and there is a cost to searching for the second target face, regardless of how difficult the search is.



## HOW TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AFFECT THE ABILITY TO SPOT TARGETS

16-026-01

The goal of workforce training is to enable people to quickly reach a level of competency that allows them to perform their work effectively. When the work task is search, the good news is that for a newcomer search and image comparison generally improves with practice. But what does it mean for a training programme to be well-designed?



# GUIDES



## FINDING HIDDEN TARGETS

16-027-01



## DETECTING RARE TARGETS

16-028-01

What can influence our ability to find hidden targets? Based on research by CREST researchers Professor Nick Donnelly, Dr Anne Hillstrom and Dr Natalie Mestry, this guide presents an overview of some of the difficulties in detecting hidden targets.

The expectation of how likely it is that a target will appear builds up slowly over experience with the detection task. Performance can be affected by the length of time spent on a detection task. However, whether the target being searched for is rare or not does not affect performance.




## INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ABILITY TO SEARCH

16-029-01

There are a number of factors which can affect peoples' ability to search and detect targets. These can be cognitive abilities like perception and working memory. Functional factors like how much someone can see without moving their eyes can also play a role. This guide presents an overview of these differences.

# REPORTS



## COMMUNITY REPORTING THRESHOLDS

### FULL REPORT

17-018-01

The first people to suspect or know about someone becoming involved in planning acts of violent extremism, will often be those closest to them. Based on research by CREST researchers Professors Paul Thomas and Michele Grossman, this full report details the identifying triggers, thresholds and barriers which may prevent community members from reporting potential violent extremist behaviour.



## COMMUNITY REPORTING THRESHOLDS

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

17-019-01

This is the executive summary of the Community Reporting Thresholds report. It looks at the reporting of potential violent extremism and terrorism, with focus on identifying triggers, thresholds and barriers which may stop someone from reporting, providing the key findings and conclusions from the research conducted by CREST researchers Professors Paul Thomas and Michele Grossman.




## MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

### FULL REPORT

18-029-02

This report comprises the findings of CREST funded research by Professor Ros Searle and Dr Charis Rice, into organisational change and insider threat. It outlines the individual, social and organisational factors that over time, can contribute to negative employee perceptions and experiences.




## MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: PRACTITIONER

### FULL TOOLKIT

18-020-01

This toolkit is one of a series of CREST resources for managing organisational change to mitigate the development of Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.

# REPORTS




## MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: CULTURE

### TOOLKIT

18-021-01

This toolkit on Organisational Culture is designed to be used as part of the complete toolkit and in conjunction with the Manager's Guide to help raise awareness about organisational change and Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour and to assist training in your organisation. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.




## MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: INDIVIDUALS

### TOOLKIT

18-022-01

This toolkit is one of a series of CREST resources for managing organisational change to mitigate the development of Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.




## MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: LEADERS

### TOOLKIT

18-023-01

This toolkit is designed to help all types of leaders, as well as security professionals and staff in HR and Organisational Development, to effectively manage change. It includes practical resources and self-reflective activities. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.




## MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: TEAM RELATIONS

### TOOLKIT

18-024-01

This toolkit focuses on Team Relations and is one of a series of CREST resources for managing organisational change to mitigate the development of Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.

# REPORTS



## MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: MANAGER'S GUIDE

### TOOLKIT


18-019-01

This toolkit is one of a series of CREST resources for managing organisational change to mitigate the development of Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.

## MORE ON COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIOUR

Further resources from the project on managing organisational change are available from:  
[www.crestresearch.ac.uk/cwb](http://www.crestresearch.ac.uk/cwb)

These resources are made available to help managers and employees work through the impacts of organisational change, in a positive manner. They are designed to help all types of leaders, as well as security professionals and staff in HR and Organisational Development, to effectively manage change.



Positively Influencing Individuals During Organisational Change



Managing Organisational Change | Video Introduction



A manager's guide to organisational change



Managing Organisational Change | Practitioner Toolkit



Managing Organisational Change | Full Report




Managing Organisational Change | Team Relations Toolkit



Managing Organisational Change | Leaders Toolkit



Managing Organisational Change | Organisational Culture Toolkit



Managing Organisational Change | Individuals Toolkit



# POSTERS

Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats

**Protective Security & Risk**

Prof. Debi Ashenden & Darren Lawrence

**The problem**

A recent industry report suggests that 30% of employees have security policies in place but only 10% follow them. This is a significant gap in security awareness.

**The workplace village**

A diagram showing a central 'Village' with various 'Houses' representing different security domains like IT, HR, Finance, etc.

**Security dialogues**

A diagram showing a central 'Village' with various 'Houses' representing different security domains like IT, HR, Finance, etc.

Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats

**Security Dialogues**

Prof. Debi Ashenden & Darren Lawrence

**Background**

The Security Dialogues workshop presents a response to the reality of organisational security. It provides a framework for security practitioners to build effective relationships with other developers and teams.

**Workshop**

A diagram showing a central 'Village' with various 'Houses' representing different security domains like IT, HR, Finance, etc.

**Outcomes**

A diagram showing a central 'Village' with various 'Houses' representing different security domains like IT, HR, Finance, etc.

**References**

A list of references including academic papers and industry reports.

## PROTECTIVE SECURITY AND RISK

17-044-01

The poster presents Professor Debi Ashenden's programme of CREST research on protective security and risk, with the premise that we should patch security vulnerabilities with people rather than relying solely on technology.

## SECURITY DIALOGUES

17-045-02

The poster gives an overview of Professor Debi Ashenden's Security Dialogues workshop.

Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats

**Community Reporting Thresholds**

Paul Thomas, Michele Grossman, Shamim Miah & Kris Christmann

**The problem**

A diagram showing a central 'Village' with various 'Houses' representing different security domains like IT, HR, Finance, etc.

**Selective key research findings:**

A list of key research findings related to community reporting thresholds.

**Three reporting pathways**

A diagram showing three different reporting pathways for security incidents.

**Some key future considerations**

A list of key future considerations for community reporting thresholds.

## COMMUNITY REPORTING THRESHOLDS POSTER

17-057-01

Community Reporting Thresholds by CREST Researchers, Professor Paul Thomas, Professor Michele Grossman, Dr Shamim Miah and Kris Christmann.

**FACTCHECK: THE CYBER SECURITY ATTACK SURFACE**

DEBI ASHENDEN, CHAMBERLAIN UNIVERSITY

**1. SECURITY COMPLEXITY AND SURFACE OF ATTACK**

As the number of devices connected to the internet, so the surface of attack grows. This is a complex and growing problem.

**2. MARKET FORCES**

As the market for cyber security grows, so does the complexity of the attack surface. This is a complex and growing problem.

**3. SECURITY THREAT**

As the security threat grows, so does the complexity of the attack surface. This is a complex and growing problem.

**4. INDUSTRY COMPLIANCE**

As industry compliance grows, so does the complexity of the attack surface. This is a complex and growing problem.

**5. PERSONAL DATA**

As personal data grows, so does the complexity of the attack surface. This is a complex and growing problem.

**6. IMPACT OF CYBER LIFE**

As the impact of cyber life grows, so does the complexity of the attack surface. This is a complex and growing problem.

## MINDMAP: CYBER SECURITY FACTCHECK

17-078-02

This poster, by Professor Debi Ashenden, gives an insight into the size and complexity of systems and devices that are vulnerable to attack. It first appeared in issue 2 of *CSR*, 'Cyber Security'.

# JOURNAL ARTICLES

Ashenden, Debi, and Darren Lawrence. 2016. 'Security Dialogues: Building Better Relationships between Security and Business'. *IEEE Security Privacy* 14 (3): 82–87. <https://www.computer.org/cms/Computer.org/ComputingNow/issues/2016/08/msp2016030082.pdf>.

Ashenden, Debi. 2017. 'Employees: The Front Line in Cyber Security'. *The Chemical Engineer*, February 2017, 908 edition. <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/employees-front-line-cyber-security/>.

**NEW** Ashenden, Debi. 2017. 2018. 'In Their Own Words: Employee Attitudes towards Information Security'. *Information and Computer Security* 26 (3): 327–37. <https://doi.org/10.1108/ICS-04-2018-0042>.

**NEW** Hinds, Joanne, and Adam Joinson. 2019. 'Human and Computer Personality Prediction From Digital Footprints'. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, February, 0963721419827849. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721419827849>.

**NEW** Hinds, Joanne, and Adam N. Joinson. 2018. 'What Demographic Attributes Do Our Digital Footprints Reveal? A Systematic Review'. *PLOS ONE* 13 (11): e0207112. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207112>.

Joinson, Adam, and Lukasz Piwek. 2016. 'Technology and the Formation of Socially Positive Behaviours'. In *Beyond Behaviour Change - Key Issues, Interdisciplinary Approaches and Future Directions*, edited by Fiona Spotswood. Bristol: Policy Press. Accessed 20 July 2018. <https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/beyond-behaviour-change>.

**NEW** Neave, Nick, Pam Briggs, Kerry McKellar, and Elizabeth Sillence. 2019. 'Digital Hoarding Behaviours: Measurement and Evaluation'. *Computers in Human Behavior* 96 (July): 72–77. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.01.037>.

**NEW** Williams, Emma J., Amy Beardmore, and Adam N. Joinson. 2017. 'Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Online Influence: A Theoretical Review'. *Computers in Human Behavior* 72 (July): 412–21. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2017.03.002>.

**NEW** Williams, Emma J., Joanne Hinds, and Adam N. Joinson. 2018. 'Exploring Susceptibility to Phishing in the Workplace'. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies* 120 (December): 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.06.004>.

**NEW** Williams, Emma J., Phillip L. Morgan, and Adam N. Joinson. 2017. 'Press Accept to Update Now: Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Malevolent Interruptions'. *Decision Support Systems* 96 (April): 119–29. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2017.02.014>.



# CREST SECURITY REVIEW

*A quarterly magazine presenting accessible, informative, world-leading research on security threats.  
Produced by international experts for the needs of government, police and security professionals.*

*Available online, in print and via your app store.*




*CREST Security Review is a quarterly magazine which provides a gateway to the very best knowledge and expertise. The articles in CSR translate academic jargon to 'so what' answers and illustrate how behavioural and social science can be used effectively in everyday scenarios.*

You can read the magazine online at:  
[www.crestsecurityreview.com](http://www.crestsecurityreview.com)



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app, available from  
both Google Play and  
the App Store.**





# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



YOUR WATCH WILL SOON KNOW YOU BETTER THAN YOU KNOW YOURSELF - p4

THE TRICKS OF MASTER INTERROGATOR HANS SCHARFF UNCOVERED - p14

SCIENCE AND THE LIE DETECTORS: WE REVIEW WHICH ONES WORK - p18

## INFORMATION ELICITATION

### ISSUE 1


With a special focus on Information Elicitation this issue showcases research on why we are more trusting online, eliciting information the friendly way, and which lie detection techniques work. Other articles cover how your watch will soon know you better than yourself and what are the similarities and differences between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims.

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The future of wearable tech	4
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# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



## CYBER SECURITY

### ISSUE 2

This issue of *CSR* considers social science contributions to cyber security. It highlights research on 'everyday insider threats' to organisations, the threat from cyber enabled and cyber dependent crimes and the hacker mind set. There's also a long-read on the future of religious belief and extremism as well as findings from research on English Defence League activists.

LOAFERS, FREE-RIDERS AND SUCKERS - EMPLOYEES BEHAVING BADLY - p10

A MANIFESTO FOR NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITY MODELLING - p12


THE NEW FRONTIER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CRIME FIGHTING - p16

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# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



## TRANSMISSION

### ISSUE 3

Understanding how extremist ideas are transmitted is a key priority of many governments and law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. This issue of *CSR* focuses on 'transmission' – the transmission of ideas, beliefs and values. Studying transmission focuses attention on how, where and by whom extremist ideologies are acquired and spread. Most ideas and values are not extreme, and the issue includes articles on transmission of religious identity within families and on how the internet has affected transmission.


THE EFFECT OF IDEOLOGICAL MATERIAL ON JIHADIST'S CHOICE OF TARGETS – p18

JUST A FACE IN THE CROWD? THE PROBLEMS WITH SPOTTING UNFAMILIAR FACES – p26

HOW RADICAL IDEAS SPREAD AND TAKE HOLD – p24


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# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



YEMEN, JORDAN, IRAN, LIBYA, TUNISIA – WHAT HAPPENS AFTER ISLAMIC STATE? – p4

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE CHILDREN OF THE CALIPHATE? – p10

ISLAMIC STATE AND AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI'S ALTERNATIVE JIHAD – p14


## AFTER ISLAMIC STATE

### ISSUE 4


The Islamic State's territory is in decline. Squeezed on all sides, it is facing a future where it can no longer lay claim to statehood. In this issue of *CREST Security Review (CSR)*, leading scholars from around the globe consider 'what happens after Islamic State?' Topics include the plight of children forced to join Islamic State; the effects on countries like Yemen – which may become an ideal location for retreating fighters; and how al-Qaeda may benefit from Islamic State's decline.

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# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



## NETWORKS

### ISSUE 5



Studying networks not only gives us an insight into our human behaviour. It also helps us understand weak points in critical networks, be it food or energy supply, or in the way a company is run. This issue of CSR highlights how studying networks can help us understand security threats and how understanding weak points in networks can be useful in both offensive and defensive applications.

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# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



RESPONDING TO ERRORS IN CRISIS  
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INTERVIEWS – p24

ASSESSING THREATS OF VIOLENCE  
- WHY THE PROFESSIONALS DO IT  
BEST – p10

CYBER SECURITY DECISIONS -  
HOW DO YOU MAKE YOURS? – p6

## DECISION MAKING

### ISSUE 6

From teams operating in extreme environments, to the emergency services, to people responsible for cyber security, understanding decision making is very important. Current research can help decision makers avoid misleading biases, from being paralysed by the choices available, or failing to get information out to the people who need it. In this issue we feature some of the latest research, including decision-making processes in cyber security, decision making under stress, and terrorist decision making.

## CONTENTS


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### AMIRI, MAGGIORE AND SYLVESTER PREY CYBER SECURITY DECISIONS: HOW DO YOU MAKE YOURS?



### JAN-WILLEM BULLÉE SOCIAL ENGINEERING: FROM THOUGHTS TO AWARENESS





# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



## TRANSITIONS

### ISSUE 7


From helping extremists reintegrate back into society, to looking at cults and the reasons why people both leave and stay, this issue explores the series of difficult transitions some individuals and groups make. It includes research on programmes that help extremists make the transition from violent groups back into society; research that helps crisis negotiators train successful negotiation techniques, and research that looks at Russian interference on Twitter following the 2017 UK terror attacks.

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# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



## INFLUENCE

### ISSUE 8

This issue gives an insight into some of the latest research on influence, from the ethical challenges of some techniques, through how people can be primed to be persuaded, to how to inoculate people from being influenced by fake news. Other articles in this extra-long issue cover understanding how cultural stereotypes can improve rapport in interviews, the need to find a way to account for mental disorder in terrorism and mass murder without pathologising violence, and whether or not being under the influence of alcohol makes for more unreliable witnesses, or not.

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# CREST SECURITY REVIEW



## DATA

### ISSUE 9



This issue highlights research on Data, and in particular on how the social and behavioural sciences can help us see the value that data and computer science can bring to understanding and countering security threats. Articles include a look into how algorithmic decision-making can be improved, to help build trust between governments and citizens; the challenges of applying big data solutions to small data problems and the risks and opportunities in using big data to predict behaviour. Two further articles address issues relating to extremism: one on why some extremists or groups choose not to engage in violence; and the second provides us with an introduction to good practice in countering violent extremism.

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
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# ONLINE RESOURCES



## VIDEOS: CREST on Film

Our YouTube channel showcases some of the research and work undertaken by CREST researchers.

From PhDs to Professors, our CREST researchers talk about their cutting-edge research on security issues – and explain why it is so important. Watch these videos and learn more about what our researchers are doing up to.

Go to <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUZK6-m7tipdvM7oliDMYNw> and make sure you subscribe to our channel so you don't have to manually search for new videos we upload.

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Professor Paul Taylor, Director of CREST, talks about the first two years of CREST, and what it has achieved to-date.



Professor Kim Knott, Deputy Director of CREST talks about how ideas, beliefs and values are transmitted in different contexts, and the role they play in regulating behaviour.



# ONLINE RESOURCES



## IMAGES: CREST On Flickr

The CREST Flickr page provides a channel where all our fantastic images are collected in one place, making it easier to find, use and share CREST images. Go to [www.flickr.com/photos/crestresearch](http://www.flickr.com/photos/crestresearch) to see all our images. You don't need a Flickr account to access them, but if you're on Flickr make sure to follow us. By following us you'll be updated with the new collections of images as we add them.

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# ONLINE RESOURCES



## RESEARCH RESOURCES: Radicalisation Research

Radicalisation Research was set up to provide policymakers, journalists, and anyone whose work utilises concepts such as radicalisation, fundamentalism or extremism, with easy access to high-quality academic research on these controversial issues. By taking a non-partisan approach and providing access to the best, including the latest, research it hopes to challenge ungrounded assumptions that may obscure a clear understanding of violent extremism, especially where that is associated with 'Islamicism'.

Many of the pieces of research included show how and why recent uses of the term 'radicalisation' can be misleading, especially when that term is used to refer to a simple process of 'brainwashing' which drives individuals along a conveyor belt from 'normal' to 'violent'. There is growing evidence that there is no necessary connection between 'extremist' views and the resort to violence: other factors are involved. This also has implications for 'de-radicalisation'.

The site was set up with funding from the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Research Programme and subsequently sponsored by an ESRC Global Uncertainties project looking at ideology, decision-making and uncertainty. As such, it pays particular attention to the role religion plays in discourses of contemporary violence, and to the post-9/11 concern with Muslim extremism. Its primary aim is to inform the debates related to these topics.

As much of the research on these topics indicate, it is problematic to think that there is something unique about Islam in relation to violent extremism. There are many comparable forms of both religious and secular violence, and historical and geographical comparisons are explored in several of the articles and books discussed on this site. Such comparative work is important in helping to clarify the current situation.

Radicalisation Research continues to operate on the same principles on which it was founded, namely highlighting and curating quality academic research regardless of whether this contradicts or criticises governments' policies. Since October 2015 it has been funded by CREST.

Visit the website here: [www.radicalisationresearch.org](http://www.radicalisationresearch.org)







CREST's funding was secured following a competitive process administered by the *Economic and Social Research Council*, which is the UK's largest organisation for funding research on economic and social issues. The Centre's funding is for five years, from 2015, with £7.23 million from the UK security and intelligence agencies and a further £2.9m invested by the founding institutions.

[www.crestresearch.ac.uk](http://www.crestresearch.ac.uk)