

### **CREST CATALOGUE**

The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) is a national hub for understanding, countering and mitigating security threats.

This catalogue provides an overview of the published outputs from CREST's original research and research syntheses from October 2015 to September 2019. It ranges from short 'how-to' guides to in-depth reports; conference posters to introductory mind-maps; and journal articles to our quarterly magazine, *CREST Security Review*.

All these resources are available from our website and each entry is hyperlinked and includes a reference number to help you find and download the resource. However, we are publishing new resources all the time, so make sure you check the Read More section to learn how you can keep up-to-date with our work.

#### **ABOUT CREST**

CREST brings together the UK's foremost expertise in understanding the psychological and social drivers of the threat, the skills and technologies that enable its effective investigation, and the protective security measures that help counter the threat in the first place.

With the majority of its funding from the UK's security and intelligence agencies, it carries out its work within a context of significant stakeholder and international researcher engagement. This funding is administered by the Economic and Social Research Council, guaranteeing the academic rigour and independence of CREST's research.

CREST directly funds the work of over a hundred researchers, including doctoral students. It also brings together leading researchers from around the world who are working, directly or indirectly, on research that helps us understand, mitigate and counter security threats. This work is featured in our quarterly magazine, *CREST Security Review*. Through highlighting this work, regardless of funding source, CREST helps build the capacity of academic research in this area, whilst promoting and improving academic-practitioner dialogue and exchange.

#### **READ MORE**

For more information about CREST, including blogs, videos and other resources, visit our website: www.crestresearch.ac.uk.

You can also keep up-to-date with our resources as and when we publish them by signing up to our newsletter at *www.crestresearch.ac.uk/contact/newsletter* and by following us on social media.



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### **UNDERSTANDING WHO & WHY**



#### UNDERSTANDING WHO AND WHY

Who is involved in the transmission of violent ideologies? Why do people engage and disengage from violent extremism? How do groups innovate or restrain their violent actions?

These projects seek to understand the actors, their beliefs, values and motivations, as well as how they communicate their ideas to internal and external audiences.

#### **PROJECTS**

#### **CORE PROJECTS**

- Analysing the emotional appeal of extremist narratives.
- Conspiracy theories and the far right.
- Gender and violent extremism.
- Grassroots counter messaging.
- How do extremist groups and movements deploy symbols and communicate messages?
- Innovation and creativity in clandestine networks.
- Kin and peer contexts, ideological transmission and the move to extremist involvement.
- Refugees, social identity and resilience.
- Risk assessment including criminogenic and psychological pathways to extremism.
- The transmission of ideology.

#### COMMISSIONED PROJECTS

- Conspiracy theories, their adoption, communication and risks
- Learning and unlearning terrorism in Northern Ireland.
- Sikh radicalisation in Britain.
- Soft facts and digital behavioural influencing.
- Sri Lanka: When extremism gives way to moderate politics.
- The internal brakes on violent escalation.
- Inoculating against the spread of Islamophobic and extremist Islamist disinformation.
- Understanding twenty-first century militant anti-fascism: an analytical framework and matrix.
- Why do people spread disinformation on social media?
- 'Hot periods' of anti-minority activism and the threat of violent domestic extremism: Towards an assessment framework.
- Understanding moral injury and belief change in the experiences of police online child sex crime investigators.



# SUNNI & SHI'A ISLAM: DIFFERENCES & RELATIONSHIPS

16-005-01

A guide setting out the fundamental differences and similarities between Sunni and Shi'a Islam. Useful to help understand Islam as well as the tensions between these communities. Based on work by CREST researcher Professor Kim Knott.



### ISLAM: THE FIVE PILLARS

16-007-01

Knowing something about the five pillars and their significance for Muslims isn't just important to correct misunderstandings about what Muslims believe, it is also important in the work environment and for good working relations. Based on work by CREST researcher Professor Kim Knott this guide explains the five pillars and what they entail.



#### CREST PRIMER: COUNTER JIHAD MOVEMENT

16-008-01

The Counter Jihad Movement is a loose international network with a shared ideology that sees 'Islam' and 'the West' as being at war. Based on work by CREST researcher Dr Benjamin Lee, this guide gives an overview on the counter jihad ideology, their security implications, as well as the relationships between the different counter jihad groups.



#### GLOSSARY: ISLAMIC EXTREMIST MATERIAL

16-017-02

There are many concepts and phrases which are common to all Muslims, but which have a particular meaning for Islamic extremists. This glossary highlights the extremist interpretations of these, and helps people understand what is meant if they come across some of these phrases.



#### ISLAM: CONVERSION

16-024-01

Conversion to Islam is the process whereby a non-Muslim takes on a new religious identity, adopts new beliefs and practices, learns to live as a Muslim and gradually becomes accepted as one by others. This is a guide to the process of converting to Islam, why some people choose to convert, what they experience – good and bad – and whether they are likely to become extremists.



#### UNDERSTANDING THE FAR-RIGHT LANDSCAPE

17-001-01

Although the vast majority of far-right activists are non-violent, far-right activism has security implications in the UK and globally. Dr Benjamin Lee gives an introduction to the far-right in the UK, including an analysis of some of the groups and networks and the main security threats they present.



### COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

17-008-01

This guide details what CVE is, explores the broad landscape of CVE initiatives, what the CVE programmes target, the range of methods used, who delivers the different intervention programmes, and an overview of what we know from the evidence so far about how effective they are.



#### SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: NARRATIVES AND ISSUES

18-030-01

This guide by Dr Jasjit Singh explores Sikh activism in the UK. It gives an overview of the political, religious and social/cultural narratives which emerged from a series of interviews and a literature review as part of his CREST funded research project on 'Sikh radicalisation in Britain'.



#### BRITISH MUSLIMS: A HISTORY

18-010-01

There have been Muslims in Britain since the 16th century, when North African and Turkish galley slaves were released from ships captured from the Spanish Armada. This guide describes the history of Muslim settlement in the UK and the formation of their communities.



#### BRITISH MUSLIMS: DEMOGRAPHY AND COMMUNITIES

18-011-01

A major problem for British Muslims has been the way they have been perceived by others. This guide gives an overview of how many Muslims there are in the UK, and how these communities are characterised.



#### BRITISH MUSLIMS: GENDER AND GENERATIONS

18-012-01

This guide provides case-studies on young Muslim women and diverse Muslim masculinities and also covers topics such as Muslim women's spaces, participation and activism, Muslim men and masculinities, religious and national identity, and cultural, secular and ex-Muslims.



#### BRITISH MUSLIMS: FAMILIES AND FAMILY LIFE

18-013-01

The family is the most important unit within British Muslim communities. It is the place where religious and social norms and values are shared and practised. This guide provides basic information on kinship structure and relationships, marriage and related issues, everyday family life, and children's religious socialisation.



#### BRITISH MUSLIMS: CHARITIES AND ORGANISATIONS

18-014-01

In addition to mosques and sectarian reform movements, the public face of Islam in the UK is composed of diverse organisations, including those that represent British Muslims, provide space for discussion, lobby and campaign, and raise funds for charity. This guide focuses on a number of the better known and more influential organisations.



#### BRITISH MUSLIMS: SECTARIAN MOVEMENTS

18-015-01

In the UK today, a large number of Islamic movements and networks are represented, most with their origins in either South Asia or the Middle East. This guide provides an overview of British Muslim sectarian movements and networks.



### BRITISH MUSLIMS: MOSQUES

18-016-01

Mosques provide space for daily prayer, the weekly Jum'a and other community gatherings. They offer Qur'an classes for children, and the larger ones host Shari'ah Councils. This guide provides an overview of mosques in Britain including what they are for, and how they are governed.



#### COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM II: A GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE

18-039-01

Since the early 2000s, more than fifty countries have developed initiatives to counter violent extremism. Despite this, there still remains a lack of strong evidence on which interventions are effective. Dr Sarah Marsden, James Lewis and Professor Kim Knott have reviewed the literature on CVE programmes, to give examples of what good CVE practice should look like.



#### DERADICALISATION PROGRAMMES: INTRODUCTORY GUIDE

18-090-01

A guide to deradicalisation programmes, which seek to address the ideological, social, and personal issues that lead someone to become involved in violent extremism.



#### IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION I: FAMILY

FULL REPORT

16-022-01

This CREST report is the first of a series of synthetic reviews on ideological transmission produced by Professor Kim Knott and Dr Benjamin Lee. It focuses on the family as a context for ideological transmission, and includes case studies on extremism and terrorism. The reviews bring together and summarise open source, social science research on ideological transmission.



#### IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION I: FAMILY

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

16-023-01

This report synthesises arguments and findings from more than a hundred books and articles. It is divided into three principal sections, on the theoretical background, empirical approaches, and case studies on ideological transmission and families in the context of extremism and terrorism.



#### IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION II: PEERS, EDUCATION AND PRISONS

**FULL REPORT** 

17-041-01

This is the second in a series of synthetic research reports on ideological transmission produced by the CREST programme, Ideas, Beliefs And Values In Social Context. It focuses on secondary socialisation, and considers ideological transmission within social groups (peers), centred on educational settings, including schools, universities and university societies, and prisons.



#### IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION II: PEERS, EDUCATION AND PRISONS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

17-039-01

This is the executive summary of the full report (17-041-01), by Professor Kim Knott and Dr Benjamin Lee, on ideological transmission in the context of education and prisons.



#### IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION III: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS

#### **FULL REPORT**

18-040-01

This CREST report, by Professor Kim Knott and Dr Benjamin Lee, is the third in a series of synthetic research reports on ideological transmission produced by the Ideas, Beliefs And Values In Social Context programme.



#### IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION III: POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ORGANISATIONS

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

18-041-01

This is the executive summary of the full report, by Professor Kim Knott and Dr Benjamin Lee, on ideological transmission, focusing on political and religious organisations.



### RECIPROCAL RADICALISATION

**FULL REPORT** 

18-037-01

This CREST report, by Professor Kim Knott, Dr Ben Lee and Simon Copeland, highlights the topic of 'reciprocal radicalisation', which is the idea that extremist groups can feed off one another in a cycle of escalating rhetoric or even actions.



#### RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND INTERFERENCE FOLLOWING 2017 UK TERRORIST ATTACKS

**POLICY BRIEF** 

17-081-02

This policy brief details how independent analysis has identified systematic use of fake social media accounts, linked to Russia, amplifying the public impacts of four terrorist attacks that took place in the UK in 2017.



#### AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE END OF THE CALIPHATE

WORKSHOP REPORT I 17-007-02

This report is the first in the series, *After Islamic State: Understanding the end of the caliphate*. It covers key questions concerning Iraq, Iran, Jordan and Syria, and highlights the underlying issues that contribute towards an environment where Islamist violence can thrive and threaten stability in these regions.



#### AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE END OF THE CALIPHATE

WORKSHOP REPORT II 17-014-02

This report is the second in the series and covers key questions concerning Russia and Yemen and highlights foreign fighters and what drives decisions to remain and fight, or leave for home.



#### AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE END OF THE CALIPHATE

WORKSHOP REPORT III 17-015-01

This report is the third in the series and covers key questions concerning Tunisia and militancy in North Africa as well as a historian's perspective of transnational mobilisations, exploring the lessons that can be learned from the fate of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan.



#### AFTER ISLAMIC STATE: UNDERSTANDING THE END OF THE CALIPHATE

WORKSHOP REPORT IV 17-016-01

This report is the fourth in the series and covers key questions concerning Islamic State's (IS) long-term prospects as it continues to lose territories as well as Jihadi culture and its future appeal.



#### 'RUSSIAN SPEAKING' FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME

**FULL REPORT** 

17-017-01

This report examines Russian-speaking foreign fighters and Islamic State's influence in the North Caucasus. Written by Dr Cerwyn Moore and Mark Youngman.



#### 'RUSSIAN SPEAKING' FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

17-040-01

This is the executive summary of a substantive report on Russian-speaking foreign fighters and Islamic State's influence in the North Caucasus, by Dr Cerwyn Moore and Mark Youngman.



#### 'RUSSIAN SPEAKING' FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME

**POLICY BRIEF** 

17-042-01

This is the policy brief of a substantive report on Russian-speaking foreign fighters and Islamic State's influence in the North Caucasus written by Dr Cerwyn Moore and Mark Youngman.



# THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF 'SIKH RADICALISATION'

**FULL REPORT** 

17-028-01

This report, by Dr Jasjit Singh, focuses on 'Sikh radicalisation' in Britain. The report examines the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh's earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian disaporas.



# THE IDEA, CONTEXT, FRAMING AND REALITIES OF 'SIKH RADICALISATION'

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

17-038-01

This is the executive summary of the full report, by Dr Jasjit Singh, on 'Sikh radicalisation' in Britain, an issue which has received much political and media attention, but little academic analysis to date.



#### CONSPIRACY THEORIES: HOW ARE THEY ADOPTED, COMMUNICATED, AND WHAT ARE THEIR RISKS?

**FULL REPORT** 

18-031-01

Conspiracy theories have alsobeen closely linked to prejudice and racial violence. Historically and across the globe, conspiracy theories have played prominent roles in witch-hunts, revolutions, and genocide. This report, by Karen Douglas, Robbie Sutton, Aleksandra Cichocka, Jim Ang, Farzin Deravi, Joseph Uscinski and Turkay Nefes, provides a comprehensive and interdisciplinary review of the existing conspiracy theory research.



# MUSLIMS AND ISLAM IN THE UK: A RESEARCH SYNTHESIS

**FULL REPORT** 

18-018-01

Written by CREST researcher Professor Kim Knott, this report comes out of CREST's Ideas, Beliefs and Values in Social Context project and is intended to inform and enrich discussions about Muslims in the UK.




### MUSLIMS AND ISLAM IN THE UK

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

18-028-02


This Executive Summary, written by CREST researcher Professor Kim Knott, draws together the principal points identified in the CREST review, *Muslims and Islam in the UK: A Research Synthesis*.



#### UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL DIASPORA POLITICS: A CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION

FULL REPORT 18-034-01

The first of three, this report *Understanding Transnational Diaspora Politics: A Conceptual Discussion* discusses how four analytical concepts, diaspora, transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and translocalism, have come to frame the academic discussion of overseas politics and the potential of the concepts to shed light on the relationship between mobility and political action.




THE ENGAGEMENT
OF REFUGEES IN
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS:
LESSONS FROM THE
MIGRATION, DIASPORA
AND REFUGEE STUDIES
LITERATURE

**FULL REPORT** 

18-035-01

The Engagement Of Refugees In Transnational Politics: Lessons from the Migration, Diaspora and Refugee Studies Literature complements the previous report's broad conceptual discussion by specifically focusing on an analysis of the context and drivers of political action among diaspora and refugee populations, and engaging with the term 'refugee politics'.



### ASYLUM, SECURITY AND EXTREMISM

**FULL REPORT 18-036-01** 

This report, the last of three, critically reviews the current academic state of knowledge on refugee movements and the security threat nexus. Drawing on the two previous reports, it seeks to better understand why forced displacement, onward migration and refugee settlement in countries of asylum is increasingly linked to the threat of political extremism and terrorism.



# THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION: A DESCRIPTIVE TYPOLOGY

**FULL REPORT** 

19-001-02

Why do some 'extremists' or 'extremist groups' choose not to engage in violence, or only in particular forms of violence? This full report by Joel Busher, Donald Holbrook and Graham Macklin examines why there are often thresholds of violence that members of extremist groups rarely cross.




# THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION: THE TRANSNATIONAL AND BRITISH JIHADI SCENE

**FULL REPORT** 

19-002-01

The first of three case studies (produced out of The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology project) explores communication among individuals involved in an informal social network who were seeking to plan attacks in the UK, for which they were convicted in 2016.



# THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION: THE BRITISH EXTREME RIGHT

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

19-003-01

This second empirical case study explores the extreme right, providing an example of mobilisation around a racial-nationalist ideology where, while there is significant interpersonal violence, lethal violence is rare and the period under analysis is characterised by a significant attempt to shift away from violence towards orthodox political campaigning.



# THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION: THE ANIMAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

**FULL REPORT** 

19-004-02

For the purpose of this third case study, the Animal Liberation Movement are considered to comprise a sub-section of the wider animal rights movement, characterised by their willingness to use illegal forms of direct action in order to advance campaigns for animal rights, including, but not necessarily limited to, trespass and property damage.



## THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

19-005-02

This is the Executive Summary by Joel Busher, Donald Holbrook and Graham Macklin, based on the full report (see 19-001) which looks at why some 'extremists' or 'extremist groups' choose not to engage in violence.



#### RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF THE CAUCASUS

**FULL REPORT** 

19-020-01

How does Russian state disinformation operate in the Caucasus region? This report considers three different cases of disinformation deployment in the Caucasus region. It highlights the dynamics of Russian state influence, both domestically in the Russian Federation's North Caucasus region as well as in Georgia, just across the Russian border in the South Caucasus.



#### RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF THE CAUCASUS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

19-021-01

This Summary brief focuses on why the Caucasus is important, and what the Russian deployment of disinformation in the region tells us.



#### RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF UKRAINE

**FULL REPORT** 

19-022-01

This report considers Kremlin disinformation deployed in and surrounding Ukraine to highlight the dynamics of disinformation as used against a perceived enemy, in order to understand how Russia applies its operations abroad. The report analyses two case studies in order to better understand the dynamics of disinformation in and around Ukraine.



#### RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: THE CASE OF UKRAINE

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

19-023-01

How does Russian state disinformation operate in Ukraine? This brief by Dr Cerwyn Moore summarises the findings from the full report ()



#### RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: MASKIROVKA

**FULL REPORT** 

19-024-01

This report by Dr Cerwyn Moore, is one of four reports on Russia and Disinformation. This report focuses on disinformation and Russia's 'strategic narrative'. This report draws on extensive scrutiny of open-source material, including from Russian-language primary sources as well as Western academic research and policy-related documents.



#### RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: MASKIROVKA

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

19-025-01

This brief investigates the phenomenon of disinformation in the contemporary context as conceived and practised by actors in the Russian Federation. It summarises the findings from the full report (19-024).



#### RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

**FULL REPORT** 

19-026-01

This report outlines the contemporary context in which disinformation occurs, as conceived and practised by actors in the Russian Federation. The aim of this report is to investigate in more depth Russia institutions and actors that contribute in various ways in the promotion of Russian disinformation.



#### RUSSIA AND DISINFORMATION: INSTITUTIONS AND ACTORS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

19-027-01

This brief is one of four Executive Summaries to come out of the reports on Russia and Disinformation. This brief focuses on the institutions and actors involved in Russian disinformation. It should be read in conjunction with the CREST Report or summary on Disinformation and Maskirovka, and the two other reports in the series, which examine case studies on disinformation.



### ASSESSING THE RISK OF EXTREMIST VIOLENCE

FULL REPORT 19-019-01

This directory by Monica Lloyd has been assembled from frameworks that have been developed in recent years to assess aspects of extremist violence, a term used here to encompass terrorist violence that is framed by ideology and targeted violence that is framed by idiosyncratic beliefs.



### IDEAS, BELIEFS AND VALUES IN SOCIAL CONTEXT

#### 17-060-01


This poster gives an overview of the CREST programme of research on ideas, beliefs and values which examines the backcloth of economic, political, societal and global security perspectives that shape the perceptions and realities of security threats.



#### **ACTORS AND NARRATIVES**

#### 17-065-01

This poster gives an overview of the CREST programme of research on actors and narratives.



### HOW IS PREVENT ENACTED IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS & COLLEGES

#### 17-060-01

James Lewis' poster gives an overview of his doctoral research which intends to answer the question: What is the reality of how the Prevent Duty is operating in secondary schools and colleges?



### THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUPS

#### 17-066-01


This poster by Rosie Mutton gives an overview of Mutton's doctoral research which aims to assess the extent to which females participate in violent extremist groups.



### EXPLORING 'SIKH RADICALISATION' IN BRITAIN

#### 17-071-01


Dr Jasjit Singh's poster gives an overview of his research on what Sikh activism in Britain looks like and the impact of Sikh activism in Britain.



#### MINDMAP: IDEOLOGICAL TRANSMISSION

#### 17-079-01

This mindmap shows different socialisation processes that affect ideological transmission. It first appeared in issue 3 of *CSR*, *Transmission*.



### EXPLAINING THE IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCIES: THE NORTH CAUCASUS, 2007-2015

#### 17-076-01

This poster draws on doctoral research looking at what factors inside and outside insurgent groups can explain the ideological evolution of insurgencies.



#### KIN AND PEER CONTEXTS

#### 17-051-01

Simon Copeland's poster presents his doctoral research on the roles and impacts of kin and peer networks in the transmission of extremist ideologies and individuals' engagement in terrorism and extremism.



#### **ICONS AND SYMBOLS IN EXTREMISM**

#### 17-045-01

The poster presents Christopher Barry's doctoral research on extremist imagery and why assessing this imagery matters.

#### **MORE ON BRITISH MUSLIMS**

These resources give an overview of Muslims and Islam in the UK. The underlying research is a synthesis of open source, humanities and social science research on British Muslims and Islam. It draws on academic literature from Islamic studies, religious studies, history, sociology, anthropology, political science, education, social psychology, and policy and security studies, as well as information from a variety of websites produced by Muslim and Islamic groups, and material from news websites.

The reports and guides were written by Professor Kim Knott, as part of CREST's Ideas, Beliefs and FOR A PRINCIPLE AND A PRINCIPL

Values in Social Context project. They are intended to inform and enrich discussions about Muslims in the UK. You can find all these resources here: <a href="https://www.crestresearch.ac.uk/britishmuslims">www.crestresearch.ac.uk/britishmuslims</a>

### JOURNAL ARTICLES

Busher, Joel, Donald Holbrook, and Graham Macklin. 2019. 'The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Typology'. *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 11 (1): 3–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2018.1551918.

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Knott, Kim. 2018. 'Applying the Study of Religions in the Security Domain: Knowledge, Skills, and Collaboration'. *Journal of Religious and Political Practice* 4 (3): 354–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/20566093.2018.1525901.

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Lee, Benjamin J. 2018. 'Informal Countermessaging: The Potential and Perils of Informal Online Countermessaging'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*: 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1513697.

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### BETTER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND DECISIONS



#### **BETTER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND DECISIONS**

How can we tell if someone told a lie? Which techniques can help people recall facts about an event? How are terrorist groups financed and what decisions do terrorists make to protect their security? Can social media use look unusual and how can we assess the value of information we receive? These projects seek to help us understand how we can gather better information from and about groups and individuals. They also research how both terror groups and the services who respond to them make decisions, to help better anticipate and improve responses to critical incidents.

#### **PROJECTS**

#### **CORE PROJECTS**

- Developing and evaluating methods of online influence.
- Language and engagement in ideological online forums.
- Blockchain, social media and terrorist financing.
- Methods for characterising typical and atypical social media users.
- Language and rapport.
- Eliciting intelligence from memory: Innovative tools, techniques and approaches.
- Innovative techniques for information elicitation.
- The verifiability approach.
- Developing intelligence gathering methods that maximise the quantity and quality of information.
- Collective interviewing.
- What tactics does a smuggler use to avoid detection?

#### COMMISSIONED PROJECTS

- Expertise and inertia in Emergency Service decision making.
- Assessing cognitive mechanisms of radicalisation with a quantitative analysis of Islamic State's online propaganda.
- Terrorist decision making regarding security and risk.
- Means to increasing information gain through minimal social exclusion.
- Taking decisions about information value.
- Quantifying the effectiveness of an evidence-based rapportbuilding training programme.
- Imaginative scenario planning for law enforcement organisations.
- Rapport building: Culture and online vs. in-person interviews.
- The adaptable law enforcement officer: Developing a measure of adaptive effectiveness.
- Collecting and leveraging identity cues with keystroke analysis (CLICKA).



### THE VERIFIABILITY APPROACH

16-001-01

Research by CREST programme lead Professor Aldert Vrij has shown that when people tell lies in interviews they can struggle to provide the same number of checkable details as when they are telling the truth. We have provided a short guide based on this research aimed at interviewers.



### THE TIMELINE TECHNIQUE

16-002-02

Based on research by CREST researcher Professor Lorraine Hope guide outlines The Timeline Technique. This technique can be used by interviewers to help interviewees by giving them an intuitive way of organising their recall and reporting, which makes it easier to organise their thoughts and reduces demands on working memory.



### THE COGNITIVE INTERVIEW

16-006-01

The guide outlines the Cognitive Interview as a set of phases to be worked through. However, to be used effectively in the field it should be implemented as a toolbox of skills to be used strategically, including only those elements that are appropriate for the specific interview, and modifying or adapting the various elements as the situation demands.



# THE MODEL STATEMENT TECHNIQUE

16-011-02

Based on research by CREST programme lead Professor Aldert Vrij, this guide details how we can encourage interviewees to report more detail in interview settings using a technique that involves the use of a 'model statement'.



## THE UNEXPECTED QUESTIONS TECHNIQUE

16-014-01

A consistent finding in deception research is that liars prepare themselves for anticipated interviews. They do so by preparing possible answers to questions they expect to be asked. Based on research by CREST programme lead Professor Aldert Vrij, this guide details why the unexpected question technique works and how to use it, with good and bad examples of questions, for single and multiple interviewees.



#### WHEN DOES (IN) CONSISTENCY MATTER?

16-031-01

It's important for interviewers to distinguish between different types of inconsistency so they can make a good judgement about where threats to accuracy lie. How can they do this? Based on work by CREST researcher Professor Lorraine Hope, this guide details how to distinguish between different types of inconsistency and how to help make a good judgement about where threats to accuracy lie.



#### USING SELF-GENERATED CUES TO ELICIT INFORMATION

18-092-01


NEW This guide, by Feni Kontogianni, explains how self-generated cues can be used at the beginning of a debrief or in an interview with a cooperative interviewee, in conjunction with the Timeline Technique, to prompt the interviewee's memory about a witnessed single event or a series of repeated events.



# ELICITING INFORMATION FROM COOPERATIVE SOURCES ABOUT SINGLE & REPEATED MULTI-ACTOR EVENTS

18-093-01

NEW This is our first *Doctoral Thesis Summary* resource. Feni Konotignni's doctoral research examines the effectiveness of eliciting information from cooperative sources about single and repeated multi-actor events. In particular, elicitation techniques designed to enhance reports concerning multi-actor single and repeated events provided by cooperative sources.



#### MASTERCLASS IN ELICITING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

**FULL REPORT** 

16-030-02

CREST researchers delivered a masterclass on intelligence interviewing to over fifty practitioners from European government, police and military organisations. The day covered new techniques and findings from ground breaking research and was delivered in partnership with the IIIRG. This report is a summary of the presentations.




# PERFORMANCE AND COPING UNDER STRESS IN SECURITY SETTINGS

**FULL REPORT** 

18-033-01


This report summarises themes discussed at a workshop, sponsored by CREST and organised by researchers at the University of Manchester. The aim was to share latest cross-disciplinary academic research and practical experiences of performance and coping under extreme stress and discuss the implications for security.



### TEXT MINING ISLAMIC STATE'S ONLINE PROPAGANDA

#### 17-047-01


The poster presents research on how Islamic State (IS) online propaganda demonstrate dynamics of radicalisation.



### TEAM DECISION-MAKING IN EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS

#### 17-048-01


The poster presents Olivia Brown's doctoral research on decision-making within teams, operating in extreme environments.



#### SHAPE SHIFTING ACROSS SOCIAL MEDIA

#### 17-052-01

Brittany Davidson's poster presents her doctoral research on user interaction and behaviour across social media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn).



### RISK PROPENSITY & SMARTPHONE OPERATING SYSTEM

#### 17-056-01


Kristoffer Geyer's poster gives an overview of his doctoral research on smartphone type predicting personality.



### UNDERSTANDING AND COUNTERING ONLINE BEHAVIOUR

#### 17-059-01


This poster gives an overview of the CREST programme of research on understanding and shaping online behaviour in a security context.



### GATHERING FULL AND FAITHFUL HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

#### 17-069-01


This poster gives an overview of Jordan Nunan's doctoral research which aims to enhance memory recall by creating proactive techniques that can be used prior to attending an event.



### THE BENEFITS OF A SELF-GENERATED CUE MNEMONIC FOR TIMELINE INTERVIEWING

#### 17-061-01


Feni Kontogianni's poster gives an overview of her doctoral research on developing evidence-based techniques to support the retrieval and reporting of accurate and detailed information.



### UNEXPECTED QUESTIONS IN CROSS CULTURAL DECEPTION DETECTION

#### 17-072-01


Irina Tache's poster gives an overview of her doctoral research on differences in interviewing due to cultural background.



#### **ELICITING INFORMATION AND CUES TO DECEIT**

#### 17-073-01


This poster given an overview into the Eliciting Information and Cues to Deceit programme, by Aldert Vrij, Lorraine Hope, Feni Kontigianni, Becky Milne, Zarah Vernham, and Samantha Mann.



#### THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

#### 17-074-01


This poster presents doctoral research by Lynn Weiher on Exploring the Relationship Between Nonverbal and Verbal Behaviour on Rapport and Dyadic Cooperation.



#### SAFE SPACE: DOES CONTEXT AFFECT SELF-DISCLOSURE IN SECURITY VETTING?

#### 17-075-01


Christina Winters' poster gives an overview of her doctoral research on self-disclosure in different environments.



#### MINDMAP: NETWORKS

#### 17-080-01

When it comes to networks do you know your nodes from your ties? This mindmap (first published in issue 5 of *CSR*, *Networks*) breaks down the jargon and explains the common terms used when talking about networks.



### WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" OR "I DON'T REMEMBER"?

#### 18-002-01


What do sources mean when they say, 'I don't know' or 'I don't remember'? Professor Lorraine Hope categorises potential reasons for these hindering responses.



### WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" DISTRUST, CYNICISM & HOSTILITY

#### 18-003-02


This poster focuses on reasons that relate to distrust, cynicism and hostility such as trust and control issues, perceptions of efficacy and deliberate deceit to mislead.



### WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" MEMORY ENCODING

#### 18-004-01


This poster focuses on reasons that relate to factors at memory encoding, such as attention problems, distraction or reduced psychological capacity.



### WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" MEMORY RETRIEVAL

#### 18-005-02


This poster focuses on reasons relating to memory retrieval, such as forgetting, uncertainty and metacognition and lack of retrieval support.



### WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" PERSONAL MOTIVATION

#### 18-006-01

This poster focuses on reasons that relate to personal motivation, such as reluctance, status insecurity and ideological motivations or identifying as an 'informer'.



#### MINDMAP: INFORMATION ELICITATION

#### 17-077-01

Do you know your baselining from your timeline technique? In the very first issue of *CREST Security Review* we produced a mindmap which charted the lay of the evidence land.



### WHAT DO SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW" INTERVIEW CONTEXT

#### 18-007-02

This poster focuses on reasons relating to interview context, such as pragmatic communication, impression management and inferences about the interview.



### MINDMAP: WHAT SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW"

#### 18-032-02

What do sources mean when they say, 'I don't know' or 'I don't remember'? This mindmap, (first published in issue 7 of *CSR*, *Transitions*) categorises potential reasons for these hindering responses.

### **JOURNAL ARTICLES**

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Kontogianni, Feni, Lorraine Hope, Paul J. Taylor, Aldert Vrij, and Fiona Gabbert. 2018. 'The Benefits of a Self-Generated Cue Mnemonic for Timeline Interviewing'. *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition*, April.

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### **JOURNAL ARTICLES**

Nahari, Galit, Tzachi Ashkenazi, Ronald P. Fisher, Pär-Anders Granhag, Irit Hershkowitz, Jaume Masip, Ewout H. Meijer, et al. 2019. "Language of Lies": Urgent Issues and Prospects in Verbal Lie Detection Research'. *Legal and Criminological Psychology* 24 (1): 1–23.

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Vernham, Zarah, Aldert Vrij, and Sharon Leal. 2018. 'Collective Interviewing: The Use of a Model Statement to Differentiate between Pairs of Truth-Tellers and Pairs of Liars'. *Legal and Criminological Psychology*, July.

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Vrij, Aldert. 2018. 'Deception and Truth Detection When Analyzing Nonverbal and Verbal Cues'. *Applied Cognitive Psychology*, September.

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### FEATURED RESOURCE



#### MORE ON WHAT SOURCES MEAN WHEN THEY SAY "I DON'T KNOW"

During an interview a source may respond to a question with either 'I don't know' or 'I don't remember'. This may well be a legitimate response. However, these responses may also reflect several cognitive, social and motivational states. Therefore, there are many reasons why they might respond with an 'I don't know or 'I don't remember'.

Drawing on published research from a variety of sources, Professor Lorraine Hope has developed a taxonomy of the potential reasons for these responses, to help interviewers explore, understand and potentially respond in ways that help elicit further information.

Through a series of posters, Professor Hope provides examples that illustrate each reason along with possible responses.

#### **POSTERS**

These six posters can be downloaded and shared under our Creative Commons licence. You can see all the posters here: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/tag/i-dont-know/

OVERVIEW – a summary of the many reasons why a source would say 'I don't Know' or 'I don't remember'.

MEMORY ENCODING – reasons that relate to factors at memory encoding, such as attention, distraction, reduced psychological capacity.

MEMORY RETRIEVAL – reasons relating to memory retrieval, such as forgetting, uncertainty and metacognition, lack of retrieval support.

INTERVIEW CONTEXT – reasons relating to interview context, such as pragmatic communication, impression management and inferences about the interview.

DISTRUST, CYNICISM AND HOSTILITY – reasons that relate to distrust, cynicism and hostility such as trust and control issues, perceptions of efficacy and deliberate deceit to mislead.

PERSONAL MOTIVATION – reasons that relates to motivational factors such as reluctance (fear, protecting others), status insecurity and ideological motivations e.g., taboo, shame, identity as an 'informer'.

# PROTECTING OURSELVES



### **PROTECTING OURSELVES**

How can we patch security vulnerabilities with people rather than relying solely on technology? How can we prevent low-level breaches in security by well-meaning employees? What can people's digital footprints tell us about their personality? What are the barriers to reporting friends and families suspected of extremism to the authorities, and how do people keep secrets online?

These projects address our need to better understand how we can protect ourselves. They include researching how security professionals can communicate better with employees about how to protect organisations as well as understanding and mitigating the risk of large-scale change leading to counterproductive behaviour in employees. They also include projects looking at how we can keep secrets online and better understand why people might not report friends and family members they suspect of involvement in extremism.

### **PROJECTS**

#### **CORE PROJECTS**

- The simple model of rational security.
- Security dialogues.
- The workplace village.
- Studies of digital footprints and remote assessment of personality.

#### COMMISSIONED PROJECTS

- Reporting violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict.
- Differences in the ability to spot rare, non-salient or hidden targets.
- Assessing and mitigating the impact of organisational change on counterproductive work behaviour.
- The cyber security risks of digital hoarding.
- Keeping secrets online.
- Understanding the role of individual differences in the adoption, use and exploitation of smart home technology.
- Human engagement through artificial / augmented intelligence.
- Simulated phishing and employee cybersecurity behaviour (SPEC)

# **GUIDES**



### MESSAGING APPLICATIONS

16-003-02

A guide introducing the characteristics of messaging applications which may be useful for terrorist and criminal behaviour. The guide covers Facebook Messenger, Firechat, Kik, Paltalk, Snapchat, Telegram, Twitter, and WhatsApp.



# WHY DO PEOPLE CLICK ON PHISHING LINKS?

16-004-01

Based on work by CREST researchers Professor Adam Joinson and Dr Joanne Hinds we have published an introductory guide to help individuals and organisations understand some of the techniques used by fraudsters and what they can do about them.



### WHAT MAKES SPOTTING FACES DIFFICULT?

16-025-01

Intuitively, we might assume that humans can search for more than one unfamiliar face at a time. The reality is quite different. When asked to search simultaneously for two unfamiliar faces, one is prioritised and there is a cost to searching for the second target face, regardless of how difficult the search is.



# HOW TRAINING AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE AFFECT THE ABILITY TO SPOT TARGETS

16-026-01

The goal of workforce training is to enable people to quickly reach a level of competency that allows them to perform their work effectively. When the work task is search, the good news is that for a newcomer search and image comparison generally improves with practice. But what does it mean for a training programme to be well-designed?

# **GUIDES**



# FINDING HIDDEN TARGETS

16-027-01

What can influence our ability to find hidden targets? Based on research by CREST researchers Professor Nick Donnelly, Dr Anne Hillstrom and Dr Natalie Mestry, this guide presents an overview of some of the difficulties in detecting hidden targets.



# DETECTING RARE TARGETS

16-028-01

The expectation of how likely it is that a target will appear builds up slowly over experience with the detection task. Performance can be affected by the length of time spent on a detection task. However, whether the target being searched for is rare or not does not affect performance.



# INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ABILITY TO SEARCH

16-029-01

There are a number of factors which can affect peoples' ability to search and detect targets. These can be cognitive abilities like perception and working memory. Functional factors like how much someone can see without moving their eyes can also play a role. This guide presents an overview of these differences.

# **REPORTS**



### COMMUNITY REPORTING THRESHOLDS

**FULL REPORT** 

17-018-01

The first people to suspect or know about someone becoming involved in planning acts of violent extremism, will often be those closest to them. Based on research by CREST researchers Professors Paul Thomas and Michele Grossman, this full report details the indentifying triggers, thresholds and barriers which may prevent community members from reporting potential violent extremist behaviour.



### COMMUNITY REPORTING THRESHOLDS

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** 

17-019-01

This is the executive summary of the Community Reporting Thresholds report. It looks at the reporting of potential violent extremism and terrorism, with focus on identifying triggers, thresholds and barriers which may stop someone from reporting, providing the key findings and conclusions from the research conducted by CREST researchers Professors Paul Thomas and Michele Grossman.



### MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

**FULL REPORT** 

18-029-02

This report comprises the findings of CREST funded research by Professor Ros Searle and Dr Charis Rice, into organisational change and insider threat. It outlines the individual, social and organisational factors that over time, can contribute to negative employee perceptions and experiences.



### MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: PRACTITIONER

**FULL TOOLKIT** 

18-020-01

This toolkit is one of a series of CREST resources for managing organisational change to mitigate the development of Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.

# **REPORTS**



### MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: CULTURE

**TOOLKIT** 

18-021-01

This toolkit on Organisational Culture is designed to be used as part of the complete toolkit and in conjunction with the Manager's Guide to help raise awareness about organisational change and Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour and to assist training in your organisation. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.



### MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: INDIVIDUALS

**TOOLKIT** 

18-022-01

This toolkit is one of a series of CREST resources for managing organisational change to mitigate the development of Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.



### MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: LEADERS

**TOOLKIT** 

18-023-01

This toolkit is designed to help all types of leaders, as well as security professionals and staff in HR and Organisational Development, to effectively manage change. It includes practical resources and self-reflective activities. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.




### MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: TEAM RELATIONS

**TOOLKIT** 

18-024-01

This toolkit focuses on Team Relations and is one of a series of CREST resources for managing organisational change to mitigate the development of Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.

# **REPORTS**



### MANAGING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE: MANAGER'S GUIDE

**TOOLKIT** 

18-019-01


This toolkit is one of a series of CREST resources for managing organisational change to mitigate the development of Counterproductive Workplace Behaviour. It is available to download in an interactive version and a print version.

### **MORE ON COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIOUR**

Further resources from the project on mananging organisational change are available from:

www.crestresearch.ac.uk/cwb

These resources are made available to help managers and employees work through the impacts of organisational change, in a positive manner. They are designed to help all types of leaders, as well as security professionals and staff in HR and Organisational Development, to effectively manage change.




# **POSTERS**



#### PROTECTIVE SECURITY AND RISK

#### 17-044-01


The poster presents Professor Debi Ashenden's programme of CREST research on protective security and risk, with the premise that we should patch security vulnerabilities with people rather than relying solely on technology.



#### **SECURITY DIALOGUES**

#### 17-045-02


The poster gives an overview of Professor Debi Ashenden's Security Dialogues workshop.



# COMMUNITY REPORTING THRESHOLDS POSTER

#### 17-057-01

Community Reporting Thresholds by CREST Researchers, Professor Paul Thomas, Professor Michele Grossman, Dr Shamim Miah and Kris Christmann.



### MINDMAP: CYBER SECURITY FACTCHECK

#### 17-078-02

This poster, by Professor Debi Ashenden, gives an insight into the size and complexity of systems and devices that are vulnerable to attack. It first appeared in issue 2 of *CSR*, *'Cyber Security'*.

# **JOURNAL ARTICLES**

Ashenden, Debi, and Darren Lawrence. 2016. 'Security Dialogues: Building Better Relationships between Security and Business'. *IEEE Security Privacy* 14 (3): 82–87. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7478475

Ashenden, Debi. 2017. 'Employees: The Front Line in Cyber Security'. *The Chemical Engineer*, February 2017, 908 edition. *https://crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/employees-front-line-cyber-security/*.

Ashenden, Debi. 2017. 2018. 'In Their Own Words: Employee Attitudes towards Information Security'. *Information and Computer Security* 26 (3): 327–37. https://doi.org/10.1108/ICS-04-2018-0042.

Hinds, Joanne, and Adam Joinson. 2019. 'Human and Computer Personality Prediction From Digital Footprints'. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, February, 0963721419827849. *https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721419827849*.

Hinds, Joanne, and Adam N. Joinson. 2018. 'What Demographic Attributes Do Our Digital Footprints Reveal? A Systematic Review'. *PLOS ONE* 13 (11): e0207112. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207112.

Joinson, Adam, and Lukasz Piwek. 2016. 'Technology and the Formation of Socially Positive Behaviours'. In *Beyond Behaviour Change - Key Issues, Interdisciplinary Approaches and Future Directions*, edited by Fiona Spotswood. Bristol: Policy Press. Accessed 20 July 2018. <a href="https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/beyond-behaviour-change">https://policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/beyond-behaviour-change</a>. Neave, Nick, Pam Briggs, Kerry McKellar, and Elizabeth Sillence. 2019. 'Digital Hoarding Behaviours: Measurement and Evaluation'. *Computers in Human Behavior* 96 (July): 72–77. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.01.037

Williams, Emma J., Amy Beardmore, and Adam N. Joinson. 2017. 'Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Online Influence: A Theoretical Review'. *Computers in Human Behavior* 72 (July): 412–21. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2017.03.002.


Williams, Emma J., Joanne Hinds, and Adam N. Joinson. 2018. 'Exploring Susceptibility to Phishing in the Workplace'. *International Journal of Human-Computer Studies* 120 (December): 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2018.06.004.

Williams, Emma J., Phillip L. Morgan, and Adam N. Joinson. 2017. 'Press Accept to Update Now: Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Malevolent Interruptions'. *Decision Support Systems* 96 (April): 119–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2017.02.014.

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












CREST Security Review is a quarterly magazine which provides a gateway to the very best knowledge and expertise.

The articles in *CSR* translate academic jargon to 'so what' answers and illustrate how behavioural and social science can be used effectively in everyday scenarios.

You can read the magazine online at: www.crestsecurityreview.com

Download our free app, available from both Google Play and the App Store.





### INFORMATION ELICITATION

#### **ISSUE1**

With a special focus on Information Elicitation this issue showcases research on why we are more trusting online, eliciting information the friendly way, and which lie detection techniques work. Other articles cover how your watch will soon know you better than yourself and what are the similarities and differences between Sunni and Shi'a Muslims.

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The future of wearable tech - p4
The promise of social science - p12
How does memory work? - p16
Sunni and Shi'a Muslims - p20
Creativity and cyber security - p24

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The A-Z of information elicitation - p10
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Turning research into practice - p22
Mind Map on Elicitation - p26







### **CYBER SECURITY**

#### **ISSUE 2**

This issue of *CSR* considers social science contributions to cyber security. It highlights research on 'everyday insider threats' to organisations, the threat from cyber enabled and cyber dependent crimes and the hacker mind set. There's also a long-read on the future of religious belief and extremism as well as findings from research on English Defence League activists.

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
Cyber crime and the Social Web - p16

The hacker mind set - p18

Factcheck: The cyber security attack surface - p30







### **TRANSMISSION**

#### **ISSUE 3**

Understanding how extremist ideas are transmitted is a key priority of many governments and law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. This issue of *CSR* focuses on 'transmission' – the transmission of ideas, beliefs and values. Studying transmission focuses attention on how, where and by whom extremist ideologies are acquired and spread. Most ideas and values are not extreme, and the issue includes articles on transmission of religious identity within families and on how the internet has affected transmission.

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#### **TRANSMISSION**

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
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
Disrupting transmission of extremist messaging - p22

How radical ideas spread and take old - p24

Mindmap of transmission - p30







### **AFTER ISLAMIC STATE**

#### **ISSUE 4**

The Islamic State's territory is in decline. Squeezed on all sides, it is facing a future where it can no longer lay claim to statehood. In this issue of *CREST Security Review (CSR)*, leading scholars from around the globe consider 'what happens after Islamic State?' Topics include the plight of children forced to join Islamic State; the effects on countries like Yemen — which may become an ideal location for retreating fighters; and how al-Qaeda may benefit from Islamic State's decline.

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OF THE CALIPHATE? - p10

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#### AFTER ISLAMIC STATE

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
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
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Regional guides: Yemen, Jordan, Iran, Tunisia, Libya - p4-9







### **NETWORKS**

#### **ISSUE 5**


Studying networks not only gives us an insight into our human behaviour. It also helps us understand weak points in critical networks, be it food or energy supply, or in the way a company is run. This issue of *CSR* highlights how studying networks can help us understand security threats and how understanding weak points in networks can be useful in both offensive and defensive applications.

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## **DECISION MAKING**

#### **ISSUE 6**

From teams operating in extreme environments, to the emergency services, to people responsible for cyber security, understanding decision making is very important. Current research can help decision makers avoid misleading biases, from being paralysed by the choices available, or failing to get information out to the people who need it. In this issue we feature some of the latest research, including decision-making processes in cyber security, decision making under stress, and terrorist decision making.

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Terrorist decision making - p16
A-Z of decision making - p28







### **TRANSITIONS**

#### **ISSUE7**

From helping extremists reintegrate back into society, to looking at cults and the reasons why people both leave and stay, this issue explores the series of difficult transitions some individuals and groups make. It includes research on programmes that help extremists make the transition from violent groups back into society; research that helps crisis negotiators train successful negotiation techniques, and research that looks at Russian interference on Twitter following the 2017 UK terror attacks.


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
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### **INFLUENCE**

#### **ISSUE 8**

This issue gives an insight into some of the latest research on influence, from the ethical challenges of some techniques, through how people can be primed to be persuaded, to how to inoculate people from being influenced by fake news. Other articles in this extra-long issue cover understanding how cultural stereotypes can improve rapport in interviews, the need to find a way to account for mental disorder in terrorism and mass murder without pathologising violence, and whether or not being under the influence of alcohol makes for more unreliable witnesses, or not.

#### **CONTENTS**


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#### DATA

#### **ISSUE9**

Thi issue highlights research on Data, and in particular on how the social and behavioural sciences can help us see the value that data and computer science can bring to understanding and countering security threats. Articles include a look into how algorithmic decision-making can be improved, to help build trust between governments and citizens; the challenges of applying big data solutions to small data problems and the risks and opportunities in using big data to predict behaviour. Two further articles address issues relating to extremism: one on why some extremists or groups choose not to engage in violence; and the second provides us with an introduction to good practice in countering violent extremism.


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
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### STRESS AND RESILIENCE

#### **ISSUE 10**

NEW To varying degrees, stress is a factor in all our lives, but security work is inherently stressful. Individuals working in security often make high-consequence decisions, in complex and potentially dangerous situations, and sometimes whilst exposed to extreme environments. It is therefore crucial to operational success to identify sources of stress and implement effective coping strategies. Guest edited by Emma Barrett and Nathan Smith, this 10th issue of CREST Security Review (CSR) helps develop understanding on how we can identify, learn about and apply lessons from how stress manifests as well as how resilience can be developed.

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## VIDEOS: CREST on Film

Our YouTube channel showcases some of the research and work undertaken by CREST researchers.

From PhDs to Professors, our CREST researchers talk about their cutting-edge research on security issues – and explain why it is so important. Watch these videos and learn more about what our researchers are doing up to.

Go to <a href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUZK6-m7tipdvM7oliDMYNw">https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCUZK6-m7tipdvM7oliDMYNw</a> and make sure you subscribe to our channel so you don't have to manually search for new videos we upload.

# Paul Taylor - Director Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats

Professor Paul Taylor, Director of CREST, talks about the first two years of CREST, and what it has achieved to-date.

### **STAY INFORMED**

You can also keep updated with CREST news through our other social media platforms including *Facebook*, *Linkedin* and *Twitter*. If you would prefer to have the latest CREST news, events and opportunities straight to your inbox, then sign up to our monthly free *newsletter* here: *www.crestresearch.ac.uk/contact/newsletter* 



Professor Kim Knott, Deputy Director of CREST talks about how ideas, beliefs and values are transmitted in different contexts, and the role they play in regulating behaviour.



## IMAGES: CREST On Flickr

The CREST Flickr page provides a channel where all our fantastic images are collected in one place, making it easier to find, use and share CREST images. Go to <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/crestresearch">www.flickr.com/photos/crestresearch</a> to see all our images. You don't need a Flickr account to access them, but if you're on Flickr make sure to follow us. By following us you'll be updated with the new collections of images as we add them.

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# **RESEARCH RESOURCES:**

### **Radicalisation Research**

Radicalisation Research was set up to provide policymakers, journalists, and anyone whose work utilises concepts such as radicalisation, fundamentalism or extremism, with easy access to high-quality academic research on these controversial issues. By taking a non-partisan approach and providing access to the best, including the latest, research it hopes to challenge ungrounded assumptions that may obscure a clear understanding of violent extremism, especially where that is associated with 'Islamicism'.

Many of the pieces of research included show how and why recent uses of the term 'radicalisation' can be misleading, especially when that term is used to refer to a simple process of 'brainwashing' which drives individuals along a conveyor belt from 'normal' to 'violent'. There is growing evidence that there is no necessary connection between 'extremist' views and the resort to violence: other factors are involved. This also has implications for 'de-radicalisation'.

The site was set up with funding from the AHRC/ESRC Religion and Society Research Programme and subsequently sponsored by an ESRC Global Uncertainties project looking at ideology, decision-making and uncertainty. As such, it pays particular attention to the role religion plays in discourses of contemporary violence, and to the post-9/11 concern with Muslim extremism. Its primary aim is to inform the debates related to these topics.

As much of the research on these topics indicate, it is problematic to think that there is something unique about Islam in relation to violent extremism. There are many comparable forms of both religious and secular violence, and historical and geographical comparisons are explored in several of the articles and books discussed on this site. Such comparative work is important in helping to clarify the current situation.

Radicalisation Research continues to operate on the same principles on which it was founded, namely highlighting and curating quality academic research regardless of whether this contradicts or criticises governments' policies. Since October 2015 it has been funded by CREST.

Visit the website here: www.radicalisationresearch.org



## **IMPACT REVIEW:**

### A review of impact of the research projects conducted through CREST

Coming to the end of its fourth year of operation, CREST sought to commission a review of the impact of its activities and outputs. Lucidity Solutions conducted the review and this report depicts the findings and recommendations.

The aim of the review was to better understand what impact CREST research has achieved, in individual projects, across the core programmes as well as commissioned projects. Information was gathered to inform the report from two online surveys, a series of interviews, and through existing data. For the purpose of the review, impact has been considered in broad terms, drawing on a range of sources that are relevant to the social sciences and that provide different lenses through which impact can be evaluated.

This report sets out these findings and is accompanied by a set of case studies that demonstrate specific examples of where impact has been achieved, along with a suggested framework for a more systematic evaluation of impact.

The findings from the review demonstrate that there is strong evidence that CREST's research is delivering impact for end-users, enabling them to achieve changes in practice, advances in understanding, and development of skills and knowledge that they otherwise would not have been able to.

This review has demonstrated that CREST's role as a national hub is valued highly by the funders and other stakeholders, and by the researchers involved, particularly in relation to the quality and range of CREST research, the impact it is achieving and the role that CREST is playing to support that impact.

It also includes recommendations to suggest ways that CREST could further enhance this national role.

You can download the Impact Review from the CREST website here: <a href="https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/impact-review">https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/impact-review</a>

























































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CREST's funding was secured following a competitive process administered by the *Economic and Social Research Council*, which is the UK's largest organisation for funding research on economic and social issues. The Centre's funding is for five years, from 2015, with £7.23 million from the UK security and intelligence agencies and a further £2.9m invested by the founding institutions.

www.crestresearch.ac.uk