Measuring Progress in a CVE Program: A 3-Year Longitudinal Case Study

Introduction

In their efforts to prevent terrorism, most governments have adopted initiatives to counter violent extremism (CVE). While CVE efforts encompass a wide range of approaches, much promise has been touted for intervention programs that offer psychosocial support to facilitate “deradicalisation” (Koehler, 2017). The rationale for CVE intervention programs is that “by addressing a given individual's range of needs, vulnerabilities and risks, multi-agency programs can potentially redirect them away from violent extremism” (Public Safety Canada, 2018, p.34). These interventions aim to support individuals disengaging from violent ideologies without directly confronting their beliefs (Kubicek & King, 2021). Ultimately, these programs help “individuals and groups to leave violent radicalism behind, exit terrorist groups, and critically reassess the underlying ideology” (Koehler & Horgan, 2016, p. 4).

Most current CVE initiatives, including intervention programs, draw inspiration from public health and disease prevention. This approach recognises three types of prevention strategies that vary according to their target populations. The primary prevention strategy in public health, as well as in CVE, targets broad sections of the population through educational or awareness-based initiatives. The secondary prevention strategy targets those identified as “at risk” of contracting the disease, or for CVE, radicalising to violence. The tertiary prevention strategy targets those who are already radicalised or have already engaged in extremist activities (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit, 2016; World Health Organization, n.d.). Because they specifically target individuals at risk of, or currently engaging with, violent extremism, CVE intervention programs are considered to perform secondary and tertiary prevention. 

In addition to public health, CVE interventions borrow elements from crime prevention and are, in most cases, considered to be the crime prevention strategy for counter-terrorism (Bjørgo, 2016). In particular, both crime prevention and CVE interventions prioritise the disruption of behaviours before a crime can occur (Innes, Roberts & Lowe, 2017; Bjørgo, 2016), promote desistance through reducing risk factors and strengthening protective factors (Hardy, 2022), emphasise the importance of early interventions, and work toward the overall goals of rehabilitation and reintegration (Heath-Kelly & Shanaah, 2023). 

Public health strategies have significantly improved population health outcomes globally (Koplan et al., 2009), while crime prevention initiatives have consistently shown effectiveness in reducing crime rates (Welsh, Farrington & Gowar, 2015). Yet, despite being rooted in the successful models of these two adjacent fields, some remain skeptical of CVE interventions. This skepticism stems, in large part, from the limited amount of evidence that demonstrates whether CVE interventions are indeed effective. Certainly, the scarcity of evidence about CVE interventions –especially quantitative measurements of change over time– is widely documented (Brouillette-Alarie et al, 2022; Lewis et al., 2024; Pistone, Eriksson, Beckman, Mattson & Sager, 2019). Yet this evidence gap extends beyond mere data scarcity; it also encompasses the broader lack of methodologies required to collect data. Researchers and practitioners alike grapple with fundamental methodological questions, such as which indicators or metrics are most relevant for assessing program success (Gielen, 2017; O’Halloran, 2017; Romaniuk, 2015), what constitutes a meaningful level of change (Sinai, Fuller & Seal, 2019; Van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018), and which program components are most effective (Cherney & Belton, 2023; McBride, Carroll, Mellea, Hughes & Savoia, 2022). This lack of methodological clarity hinders the monitoring and evaluation of CVE programs which in turn perpetuates the skepticism towards these interventions.

Given how long these programs have been operating, the amount of available evidence about their effectiveness is somewhat surprising. In Canada, for example, the first CVE intervention programs were launched in 2015 (Kubicek & King, 2021). In Denmark, the Aarhus model was implemented in 2014 (Hemmingsen, 2015). In the U.K., the government piloted its Channel program in 2007 before rolling it officially in 2012 (Lancashire County Council, n.d.). In Germany, the first non-government exit program was implemented in 2001 (Koehler, 2021), while the first exit program in Sweden was established in 1998, and in Norway in 1996 (Daugherty, 2019).

...many CVE intervention programs have been operating for over a decade. Yet during this time, the development of measures capable of assessing program success and participant progress has progressed slowly.

In sum, many CVE intervention programs have been operating for over a decade. Yet during this time, the development of measures capable of assessing program success and participant progress has progressed slowly. Meanwhile, these programs have faced skepticism about their effectiveness and necessity (e.g., Gurski, 2019a, b).  Conclusive and convincing data is required to refute this skepticism.

Moreover, the skepticism highlights a genuine vulnerability for publicly funded CVE programs. The limited amount of available evidence about their impact can place CVE programs at a disadvantage when competing for funding. Beyond financial viability, data scarcity also hinders the full integration of CVE into counter-terrorism practices. At a strategic level, policymakers require data to support the development of CVE intervention policies. On a tactical level, skeptical investigators require convincing evidence to challenge their doubts, as do those seeking to persuade their managers to divert individuals under investigation toward CVE intervention programs. 

Recognising the need for more evidence, the challenges related to collecting this evidence, and the vulnerabilities stemming from this evidence gap, the Organization for the Prevention of Violence (OPV) set out to develop a methodology to measure the impact of our own CVE intervention program. Our efforts yielded a relatively simple yet comprehensive methodology to measure the progress of participants in CVE programs. As proof of concept for our methodology, we present a case study documenting the longitudinal impact of our CVE interventions.

Before presenting this case study, we first explain how we developed our methodology, which is built on previous attempts to measure progress in CVE intervention programs. While such attempts are few, they have greatly contributed to the existing, albeit limited, evidence base. In the following section, we review this evidence base, which pertains to the Channel program in the U.K. and the PRISM program in Australia, while also reviewing the methodologies used to measure the impact of these programs.  

The research in this independent report is funded by Public Safety Canada, without any direct funding by CREST. Its findings are relevant to the Countering Violent Extremism project. You can see more outputs from this project at: www.crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/countering-violent-extremism