Policy Recommendations: Countering Transnational Repression

Building on the insights from across this series of reports and, in particular, the conceptual framework in report three, this document highlights many of the interventions that states should consider introducing to counter the TNR process and several cognate activities. The recommendations made in this report are by no means exhaustive, much as the issues examined in report three are inexhaustive, but this discussion gives a flavour of the types of interventions that could be introduced as part of a coherent counter-TNR strategy. As is evident, there are many synergies between policies and strategies that can be introduced to counter TNR and those to counter other forms of foreign interference or malign non-liberal activities across the world. This once again highlights the nexus between transnational repression and other malevolent acts amid a contested world order in the digital age, particularly within the context of ever-evolving grey zone practices. 

In harmony with the conceptual framework forwarded in the report three of this series, the following recommendations are organised according to the environments in which they are to be deployed, namely the international environment (including the perpetrating states), the domestic environment, and the digital domain. The recommendations in this report further underline the holistic approach that is required to deal with TNR, particularly within the context of grey zone conflict. TNR perpetrators draw on multi-pronged, multi-domain strategies to reach their targets in very much the same way as broader grey zone approaches rely on concerted campaigns of dynamic and mutually-reinforcing tactics in various domains. Accordingly, any solid attempt to counter this phenomenon necessarily calls for a complex, holistic approach that mobilises resources and expertise from across (and beyond) the government. Naturally, each recommendation forwarded below does not necessarily fit neatly into one environment, but they have been placed in the environment in which they are primarily relevant. Finally, it should be noted that these recommendations are aimed at governments that are seeking to counter TNR as an act of unwelcome foreign interference. For the many states in the world that are facilitating or turning a blind eye to foreign actors’ TNR activity within their borders, these recommendations would fall very short of the types of interventions required.

Core Recommendation

The key finding of this series of reports is that TNR is a multi-faceted type of foreign interference that relies on the confluence of perpetrator behaviour in multiple domains. In keeping with this, the core recommendation is that TNR requires a whole-of-government response to counter effectively. It is through concerted cooperation between government departments that an effective multi-pronged counter-TNR strategy can be executed. Accordingly, several recommendations forwarded in this report would require collaboration between departments. Further, some of the recommendations in this report may be more suited to government departments other than the Home Office, including the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). In this context, the following specific recommendations can enrich and strengthen counter-TNR practices.

International Environment

• Ensure that there is a robust scanning process and early warning mechanism in place to identify crackdowns in other countries. Note if particular groups are being targeted in these crackdowns. Step up preparations for counter-TNR activity in regard to these groups when crackdowns are active.
• Maintain solid ties with states that are supportive of the liberal, rules-based international order. Cooperate in international fora with these states to fight against attempts to dilute human rights regimes, norms, and laws.
• Establish coherent strategies to manage ties with authoritarian states such that there are incentives for them to engage with the liberal order and democratic states. Work to balance this goal against the risk of legitimising or buttressing any of their autocratic or illiberal behaviour, such as human rights abuses.
• Work proactively with INTERPOL and partners to solve the mismatch issue between the central INTERPOL Red Notices database and national databases.
• Lobby for effective solutions to other loopholes used by TNR perpetrators, such as misuse of the Stolen and Lost Travel Document system.
• Pursue gangs and transnational criminal organisations engaged in all manner of malign activities (including the sale of narcotics) and scrutinise if they are involved in TNR activities with or on behalf of perpetrating states and their agents.
• Monitor ties between authoritarian states, with a particular emphasis on how they bolster each other’s regime security and authoritarian actions. Analyse if this aspect of their ties can be weakened through the use of other measures (international law; sanctions; undermining their relations in other ways, for example by offering better alternatives).
• Alert possibly vulnerable TNR targets to threats faced by them when transiting through airports in third-party authoritarian states, even if the state through which they are travelling is unrelated to the subject of their activism/criticism/research.
• Hold ‘transit states’ accountable for human rights abuses that they facilitate on their soil and seek commensurate punitive measures where appropriate.
• Ensure that global counter-terrorism rhetoric and operations are justified and conducted according to consistent and rigorous criteria to uphold the highest standards relating to human rights and citizen protection, thereby working to safeguard against foreign malign actors using counter-terrorism as an inappropriate justification for TNR.
• Support international organisations to provide the highest levels of security to vulnerable individuals speaking at the United Nations or in other international fora, especially those that are activists critical of known TNR perpetrators.

Domestic Environment

• Establish a clear typology of the most frequent types of TNR victims to inform decisions and approaches relating to other recommendations made in this report.
• Introduce and maintain a reporting function for targeted individuals to inform authorities of TNR against them, including for acts that may not clearly fit the criteria for a particular crime at the point of reporting including, for example, digital harassment. Conduct up-to-date analyses of these reports for trends, weak points, and common issues with the aim of informing timely responses to emerging trends in perpetrators, victims, and tools. Use this service to deliver awareness and warning updates to relevant groups (see for an example of this, FBI, No Date). 
• Consider monitoring foreign officials’ attendance of activist/university/other events relating to their country and follow up actively on reports of intimidation/threats.
• Make counter-terrorism teams aware of TNR, including the differences and areas of crossover and commonality between terrorism and TNR.
• Build awareness among commonly-targeted groups of TNR and how they can mitigate some of the threats against them.
• Support the establishment and maintenance of a domestic environment that is conducive of robust internationally-minded journalism and scholarship so that diaspora and civil society have the opportunity to be aware of events and developments in their homeland free from propaganda and disinformation.
• Establish multi-pronged efforts across civil society, in the corporate sphere, in the digital domain, and in the media to deal with and counter disinformation.
• Earmark and deploy substantial resources for the introduction of robust security protocols at protests and demonstrations, especially those that relate to established TNR perpetrators.
• Introduce and maintain labour laws and measures to protect employees from politically-motivated discrimination and repression in the workplace that can result from MNCs or companies with ties to TNR perpetrators.
• Improve awareness among private investigators, intelligence, and due diligence organisations that TNR perpetrators misuse their services for the surveillance and intelligence gathering of TNR victims.
• Ensure that thorough communication channels exist between government departments relating specifically to TNR so that all relevant departments are aware of evolving strategies and the cross-department relevance of these tactics and tools.

Digital Domain

• Increase awareness among social media companies and users of digital TNR practices. Consider enforcing the establishment of TNR compliance officers in social media companies.
• Step up activities to counter disinformation online, specifically those that relate to TNR or could result in an increase in TNR.
• Raise awareness among target communities of information security and ways that they can continue civic engagement while minimising personal risk.
• Ensure thorough regulations are in place surrounding the purchase of end-to-end encryption and surveillance tools (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer, 2022).
• Scrutinise closely and restrict when appropriate the export of surveillance goods to known TNR perpetrating states (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer, 2022).

TNR and the Grey Zone

• Incorporate TNR among the activities that are understood according to the grey zone framework.
• While acknowledging that TNR is a grey zone activity of foreign interference, host states must still place human rights at the centre of TNR conversations and debates.
• Identify policies that are used to confront other forms of grey zone activities which could prove useful when combatting TNR.
• Educate policymakers and analysts working on other grey zone areas of how particular grey zone strategies can be used to achieve or work towards TNR. This can ensure that TNR is identified as reliably as possible and that staff across government identify relevant trends, including victim typologies.
• Establish coherent responses to grey zone conflict more broadly and TNR specifically.