The Relationship between Transnational Repression and Other Forms of Foreign Interference

Transnational repression (TNR), namely any actions by states or non-state groups to prevent, curtail, or deter real or perceived dissent among their nationals, compatriots, or critics abroad by targeting members of their diaspora (and their contacts back home) or third-party citizens, is a practice of growing significance in the West and the world more generally (Tsourapas, 2021). Though TNR is by no means a new phenomenon, the emergence of information technologies and the rise of globalisation have entailed “the quantitative increase and qualitative transformation” of TNR practices (Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw, 2021: 359).

This report examines the concept of foreign interference and foreign-direct malign activities, how TNR plays into the foreign interference framework, and the relationship between TNR and other forms of foreign interference and malign actions, including terrorism, espionage, and transnational crime. Specifically, this report seeks to delve into ways that TNR can improve our understanding of the tools and means deployed by foreign actors to commit broader and/or cognate foreign interference offences in the UK.

Foreign Interference and TNR

Building on the National Security Act in 2023, which provided a limited framework for foreign interference, the UK National Security Bill outlined in 2024 states that, to constitute foreign interference, an act must: (1) “be intended to have a certain effect or objective (such as interference with public functions or to manipulate how or whether a person participates in a political or legal process)”; (2) be “illegitimate”, for example misrepresenting someone or something; and (3) be carried out “for or on behalf of a foreign power” and the transgressor “knows, or ought reasonably to know, that to be the case”. All of these conditions must be met for an act to be considered foreign interference (Home Office, 2024; UK Parliament, 2024: 11-21). This showcases a framework that has the potential to place TNR squarely among other forms of foreign interference.

Several scholars and observers have identified foreign interference as generally seeking to achieve two goals, namely “stimulating the target state to alter its behaviour” or “destabilising the target state to induce weakness” (Dowling, 2021: 385; Herzog, 2011). The emphasis of the state as the ultimate target of foreign interference unduly emphasises the state as the foremost entity of concern in the equation. While acts of TNR can and do undermine the host state, the goal is often orientated towards the individual/s being targeted and eventually towards the origin state (i.e. suppressing dissent). The destabilisation or undermining of the host state may be an objective of the perpetrator, but it may also solely be a side-effect or corollary of specific TNR activity. Naturally, as is already clear in this report, TNR is an activity that ultimately undermines the values, sovereignty, and national security of host states, even if the prime purpose is the repression of select individuals from the country’s diaspora.

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Drawing a hard boundary between terrorism and TNR can be challenging in many cases. At the core of both, either one of the aims or a secondary outcome is undermining the host or target state’s claim to provide security to individuals within its territory. If terrorism is basically understood as “the deliberate creation of a sense of fear, usually by the use or threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence”, then TNR is in many cases remarkably similar, albeit that TNR tactics range across a wider spectrum of activities (Neumann and Smith, 2005: 574). In some cases, particular acts can be considered as manifestations of both terrorism and TNR, and drawing a hard boundary between the two can appear arbitrary. Russia’s flagrant attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal using Novichok - a commonly-cited example of TNR - is an act that evidently embodies the above definition of terrorism. Further, the attack certainly sought to create the sense that the UK authorities were no longer perceived as “providers of stability and security” (Neumann and Smith, 2008).

Part of the picture when considering the relationship between terrorism and TNR is the role of counter-terrorism rhetoric and operations in the legitimisation of TNR practices, since the use of what could be considered a means of transnational repression is often viewed as a justified counter-terrorism tactic. The challenge associated with this is that many TNR perpetrators frame TNR victims as terrorists “to delegitimise a range of political claims and deny the possibility of serious dialogue” (Freedman, 2007: 315). Over 50 percent of TNR cases involve “accusations of terrorism” towards the victim (Gorokhovskaia and Linzer, 2022: 34). By labelling individuals and groups as terrorists, TNR perpetrators are able to justify these extraordinary measures abroad as part of a legitimate counter-terrorism strategy. After all, for many, terrorism “implies crude extremism and indifference to human life” (Freedman, 2007: 327). In a contested world order marked by information wars and rivals seeking to bring the Western liberal order into disrepute, TNR perpetrators can hide behind counter-terrorism rhetoric to commit TNR by claiming the West is employing double standards.

Espionage

The synergies between espionage and transnational repression are many. First, the use of both local agents and officials or citizens of the perpetrating state or members of the non-state group as the executor of espionage is aligned with the tactics used by TNR perpetrators. Second, the threat of espionage or surveillance is an important node in the TNR process, both as a tool of TNR itself and as a feared or genuine prelude to more intrusive acts. Third, the use of the cyber domain as a means of espionage pervades the TNR process, as is evident in the aforementioned use of ‘electronic flies’ by several states and non-state groups. Espionage is a central node in the TNR process, but a limited one, though. TNR involves multi-pronged strategies that often entail activities across a wide spectrum of behaviour. However, given that espionage often forms a preliminary node of TNR strategies, it is a crucial area in need of intervention to counter TNR.

Transnational Crime

According to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, an offence fulfils the definitional criteria of a transnational crime if: (1) “it is committed in more than one state”; (2) “it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes place in another state”; (3) “it is committed in one state but involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state”; and (4) “it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state” (UN, 2004). TNR perpetrators often target their diaspora in more than one locale. It is often planned in the homeland. It occasionally involves organised criminal groups that engage in more than one state – see report three for more on this. TNR also has significant effects in another state, not least of all back in the homeland where the cyclical effects of TNR are felt acutely (for example in suppressing dissent via proxy punishment) but also among diaspora in other states. Evidently, understanding the synergies between TNR and transnational crime is useful to counter both phenomena. Interestingly, TNR activity can be considered a sub-type of transnational organised crime in some cases. This could have important implications for how states attempt to address TNR, perhaps in some cases treating it as a transnational crime specifically rather than a form of foreign interference. Certainly, viewing TNR as both a transnational crime and a manifestation of foreign interference supports an appreciation of TNR from complementary but differing angles.