Transnational Repression: A Conceptual Model

Transnational repression (TNR), namely any actions by states or non-state groups to prevent, curtail, or deter real or perceived dissent among their nationals, compatriots, or critics abroad by targeting members of their diaspora or third-party citizens, is a practice of growing significance in the West and the world more generally (Tsourapas, 2021). Though TNR is by no means a new phenomenon, the emergence of information technologies and the rise of globalisation have entailed “the quantitative increase and qualitative transformation” of TNR practices (Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw, 2021: 359). 

While the extant literature on transnational repression has come a long way in exploring TNR, thus far there does not exist a conceptual model or framework that identifies the complex tapestry of interrelated perpetrator behaviours and risk factors that contribute to the TNR process. Filling this important gap, this report forwards a model of TNR as a multi-domain, grey zone activity wherein perpetrators navigate, manipulate, and synergise tactical approaches in several environments to reach their victims and undermine the sovereignty of host states. The model is policy-orientated and introduces the core domains and contexts of TNR with the aim of elucidating areas in which host states can introduce policies and responses to frustrate TNR perpetrators’ behaviours, thereby ultimately protecting their territorial integrity, sovereignty, and the well-being of people within their communities. 

TNR is conceptualised in this report as an act of grey zone conflict that is achieved, executed, and facilitated by the interplay of perpetrators’ behaviour in and between several domains, namely the perpetrators’ domestic environment, the international arena, the domestic environment of the host or target state, and the digital domain (see Figure 3.1 below). Understanding TNR dynamics is only possible if the complex connectivity between individuals, governments, foreign states, the global system, and the digital environment is appreciated. It is apposite, thus, to forward a conceptual model of TNR that highlights it as a form of foreign interference that requires a multi-domain and multi-level analysis.

Domestically, TNR perpetrators plan TNR operations, engage in domestic repression of TNR targets’ contacts (usually family members), sometimes incite and exacerbate social cleavages (which often spills over into diaspora communities), and engage in wide-ranging behaviours that impact their diaspora (such as forced remittance strategies and forbidding the travel of TNR targets’ family members abroad). The domestic environment of frequent TNR perpetrators is one that Western states should scan for active repression, as there is also a relationship between domestic crackdowns and concerted TNR campaigns. 

There are many risk and enabling factors associated with TNR perpetrators’ actions in the international system to conduct, facilitate, or render more feasible their TNR activities. Among the core activities and approaches are: manipulation of intergovernmental organisations (such as INTERPOL); membership in regional organisations and strong ties with states that are lenient towards TNR and repressive activity in general; a revisionist approach to the international order that relegates the centrality of human rights and the rule of law; and broader malign activities abroad, such as international crime, terrorism, espionage, and other forms of foreign interference. 

TNR perpetrators engage in several activities in target states that are supportive of their TNR activities. In the target state, the interactions between multiple levels of analysis, from the state and its institutions down to local communities and individuals, make for a complex environment that has the potential to be vulnerable in several places. Among other activities, TNR perpetrators engage in espionage, interference activities that seek to undermine the target state’s legitimacy and security, and propaganda campaigns to inspire (primarily) diaspora communities. They also establish networks with criminal gangs, members of their own diaspora, and even third-party citizens to reach their targets. Further, in many cases TNR perpetrators use their ordinary diplomatic presence to achieve their TNR objectives.

TNR perpetrators use the digital environment to threaten targets, hack them, spy on them, uncover their networks, dox them, and to undermine their privacy. The array of tactics used by perpetrators is wide and evolving with new technological developments. Digital repression, whether used to support physical tactics (such as to trace targets’ movements ready for a physical attack) or as a tool of harassment in and of itself, can have wide-ranging psychological impacts on targets, creating a sense of terror and an inability to escape the reach of their perpetrators. The salience of the digital realm in the modern age makes it especially difficult for targets to evade the reach of TNR perpetrators. Furthermore, even those that refrain from using the internet can be the target of attacks resulting from online campaigns inspiring hate.

Transnational Repression and the Grey Zone

Transnational repression fits squarely within the grey zone. Actors engaging in TNR engage in activities that purposefully fall below the threshold of that which ordinarily sparks retaliatory warfare. Examples throughout this report firmly fulfil the criterion of being “aggressive, persistent, determined campaigns characteristic of [an escalation] but without the overt use of military force”. The confluence of digital, foreign, and domestic tactics that are aggressive but do not signal the use of traditional military power place TNR among the broader array of grey zone activities. In harmony with the assertion that grey zone conflict uses strategies that are “multidimensional and synchronised” (Jordan, 2021), what particularly affirms TNR’s designation as a grey zone activity is perpetrators’ reliance on multiple synchronised and multi-domain tactics to reach their targets. Indeed, TNR perpetrators engage in several specific grey zone activities in support, or as part, of their TNR activities. It is this approach of sub-threshold activity - namely acts that do not reach the expected threshold that normally triggers conflict - that is typical of perpetrators’ approaches to TNR.