Transnational Repression: Actors, Tools, and Victims

Transnational repression (TNR), namely any actions by states or non-state groups to prevent, curtail, or deter real or perceived dissent among their nationals, compatriots, or critics abroad by targeting members of their diaspora (and their contacts back home) or third-party citizens, is a practice of growing significance in the West and the world more generally (Tsourapas, 2021). Though TNR is by no means a new phenomenon, the emergence of information technologies and the rise of globalisation have entailed “the quantitative increase and qualitative transformation” of TNR practices (Furstenberg, Lemon, and Heathershaw, 2021: 359). This report (the first of four) details the core actors and tools of transnational repression in the modern era, detailing the primary perpetrators, agents, victims, and strategies of TNR.

TNR Perpetrators

In order to confront the phenomenon of TNR, it is vital to understand who the foremost perpetrators are in the modern context. It is widely accepted that democratic states engage in repressive behaviour at home far less frequently (and often far less severely) than autocratic states (Henderson, 1991). Accordingly, it is unsurprising that autocratic states commit the lion’s share of TNR.  (Dukalskis et al., 2024).

Crucially, though, there are at least two preliminarily strong indicators of whether a state is more likely to engage in a concerted campaign of TNR. The first is if the state has an enduring tradition of domestic repression and a strong diplomatic presence abroad (Moss, 2016). The second is if there has been a recent domestic crackdown on dissent. When a crackdown has been executed domestically, it is far more likely that the state will also engage in TNR in the same period. Further to this, states with greater capacity abroad, including diplomatic reach, usually commit acts of TNR more frequently than those with limited capacity. Thus, the depth of a foreign state’s diplomatic presence is a good measure of the state’s potential TNR capabilities (Moss, 2016).

The process of free elections should not obfuscate the fact that ‘democracy’ does not (necessarily) equate with ‘rule of law’ and thus some democracies engage in TNR abroad. Western states should thus be wary of democracies with limited rule of law and that are leaning towards illiberal governance models. India, for example, is the only state designated by Freedom House as ‘free’ that reportedly engages in physical acts of TNR, including assassinations in the West (Schenkkan and Linzer, 2021). It is vital to note that states are not the only actors that perpetrate TNR, though. Just as states can employ methods of co-optation, repression, and legitimation to mobilise power among the diaspora, non-state actors (such as the PKK) have also been known to employ similar methods to amass power and discourage dissent. Very occasionally, family members commit TNR, for example as part of an honour-related crime. The across-border nature of this renders any such act TNR (as opposed to simply an act of private criminality) when it also fits the criteria for repression as a broader concept.

Agents of TNR

While the perpetrators - those that mastermind or order the execution of TNR - are perhaps the most significant actors in the TNR process, it is crucial to understand the agents or proxies that actually carry out the specific acts on behalf (knowingly or unknowingly) of the perpetrators. Officials working directly on behalf of the TNR perpetrator are the most common. These include intelligence and military officials, but also diplomatic staff. Further, actors of concern as agents are other members of the diaspora. While the diaspora can form a central part of life for foreign communities as a strong connection to their homeland based on cultural, familial, ethnic, religious, and social commonalities, members of the diaspora have been known to report back to the home regime on diaspora activities and even to threaten, attack, and murder their compatriots directly on behalf of their home state’s regime or simply out of loyalty to a particular political, economic, social, religious, or ethnic ideal that they have derived from the political landscape of their home state (Tsourapas, 2021). Additionally, local citizens that are nationals of the host state have also knowingly or unknowingly supported the TNR operations of perpetrating states following the consumption of disinformation or divisive rhetoric online. TNR perpetrators have also been known to use connections with criminal networks to commit TNR, in addition to exploiting their links with multi-national corporations, intergovernmental organisations (such as INTERPOL), and even host states themselves to reach their targets.

TNR Victims

The sheer majority of TNR victims are foreign nationals living in third-party countries, whether they are naturalised citizens of their host state, living in the host state (e.g., on a work/student visa), seeking asylum, or on a trip. While some TNR perpetrators target members of the diaspora according to their ethnic, sexual, or religious identity, TNR perpetrators primarily target members of the diaspora that are involved - or are perceived to be involved - in activism or dissent against the regime of the origin state or non-state group. However, a dimension of this equation that must be acknowledged is the targeting of third-party citizens and critics with no ties to the perpetrating state or non-state group (for example, the Iranian regime’s reported targeting of foreign journalists with no religious, ethnic, familial, genetic, geographical, or social ties to Iran). Academics, journalists, government officials, and other activists and critics of perpetrating states are also frequent targets of TNR.

TNR Activities and Means of Repression

Acts of TNR vary significantly across a spectrum of behaviour from surveillance to assassination. It is key to note, though, that TNR perpetrators often employ several TNR tools or strategies on the same individuals to maximise their chances of deterring dissent among the diaspora. Perpetrators frequently engage in physical and digital acts of TNR, the latter of which are growing in frequency and adapting in nature with new technological developments.

Many TNR perpetrators engage in surveillance and espionage of the diaspora and foreign critics as the starting point for wider TNR activities. The rise of digital technologies has given TNR perpetrators a further advantage in this regard, for example through the hacking of social media accounts. TNR perpetrators rely heavily on threats, extortion, and intimidation. The digital domain has provided a cost-effective means of intimidating targets with ease, through the use of doxing, disinformation campaigns, so-called ‘electronic flies’ operations, and more. A strikingly common tool of leverage used by TNR state and non-state perpetrators is the threat or execution of proxy punishment. Instead of executing extra-territorial violence, proxy punishment is the application of violence within the origin state’s jurisdiction towards the locally-based family members, colleagues, and friends of dissidents abroad (Moss, Michaelsen, and Kennedy, 2022). Thus, proxy punishment “constitutes the actual or threatened use of physical or other sanctions against an individual within the territorial jurisdiction of a state, for the purpose of repressing a target individual residing outside its territorial jurisdiction” (Adamson and Tsourapas, 2020). The extradition and detention of TNR targets is also a ubiquitous issue. Many autocratic states ignore the principle of non-refoulement by sending TNR targets back to their origin states where they face repression. Further, TNR perpetrators abuse the INTERPOL Red Notice system to hoodwink states into extraditing targets. While TNR perpetrators stop short of physical violence in many cases, the prevalence of physical attacks, abductions, violence, and lethal retribution (assassinations) is concerning. This node must not be ignored at the expense of new non-physical acts taking place in the digital domain.